Safe Rider Vehicle Technologies (PTY) Limited, Leon Du Plessis & Theo Technologies Limited v National Police Service Commission (NTSA) [2017] KEHC 2820 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW NO.  10 OF 2017

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR ORDER OF MANDAMUS

AND

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 8 OF THE LAW REFORM ACT

BETWEEN

SAFE RIDER VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES (PTY) LIMITED....1ST APPLICANT

LEON DU PLESSIS.................................................................2ND APPLICANT

THEO TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED..........................................3RD APPLICANT

VERSUS

THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE COMMISSION (NTSA)....RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

1. By  a notice of motion  dated  23rd  January  2017  filed on      24th January  2017, pursuant  to leave granted  on 18th January  2017, the exparte  applicants  Safe Rider  Vehicle  Technologies  (PTY) Limited; Leon Du Plessis  and  Theo Technologies seek from this   court judicial  review  orders that:

a) An order of mandamus  be and  is  hereby issued to  compel the respondentNational Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA)to register  the  3rd applicant  as a speed governor  supplier  and  agent of the  1st and  2nd  applicants  in Kenya and  by virtue of such registration, the respondent be compelled  to accept vehicle  speed governor certificates  issued  by the  3rd  applicant.

b) The costs of the application be awarded to the exparte applicants.

2. The application is predicated on the grounds stated in the  statutory  statement and supported  by a  verifying affidavit  filed  together  with the exparte  chamber  summons  on 17th January 2017 sworn  by John Makau Mutisya, the  3rd applicant’s Managing  Director  and the affidavit sworn by Leon Du Plessis, the Managing  Director  of the  1st applicant, who is  also the  2nd applicant  in these proceedings.

3. The  exparte  applicants’  case is that  the 1st applicant  Safe Rider  Vehicle Technologies (PTY) Limited is a South African Company  Manufacturing   Motor Vehicle  Speed Governors  and  whose brand  copyrighted  name  is “ Safe  Rider” and has  done business  of  servicing  and selling  its  speed governors   in Kenya  for over  15 years.

4. As a manufacturer, the  1st applicant  appoints  distributors  to develop  business  and  distribute its products  and for   a long time, it had  its agent  distributor  in Kenya known as Safe  Rider  Management Systems Limited which latter is a Kenyan Company.

5. In July 2016, the 1st applicant terminated the business  relationship  with Safe Rider  Management  Systems  Limited  on discovery that the latter company was distributing  counterfeit  speed governors  originated  by the  1st  applicant’s  competitor  in South Africa.

6. In  the same  month of  July  2016, the  1st  applicant  appointed Theo Technologies Limited ( the 3rd applicant ) as its  distributor  in Kenya and  notified  Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS)  and National Transport Safety Authority (the  respondent  herein) which  are the statutory bodies   responsible  for  inspection and  licensing  the use  of commercial  motor  vehicle  speed governors  and  recorders  in Kenya.

7. It is alleged  that the respondent  has  refused  to permit  the  3rd applicants  to sell,  distribute, service, install certify  and or otherwise  sell the  1st applicant’s speed  governors in Kenya for  no good  reason, which  is a denial  of opportunity  to earn  a living  unduly  despite  several requests.

8. Further, that the respondent  has frustrated  the  1st and  2nd  applicants’  efforts  to sell  their speed  governors  and  recorders  in Kenya, which  has also  made it  impossible  for the 3rd   applicant  to sell the  1st and  2nd  applicant’s  products  which refusal is  illegal  and  abuse of  office by the respondent.

9. It is also alleged  that by the refusal to  register  the  3rd  applicant  as a distributor of motor vehicle speed governors  and  recorders on behalf of the 1st and 2nd applicants  the respondent has  acted  ultra  vires  its powers.

10. In the  affidavit  sworn by Leon  Du  Plessis, it  was  basically  reiterating what  Mr Mutisya  had deposed  while  maintaining  that the respondent’s  refusal  to register the 1st and 2nd applicants’  new distribution agent  had resulted  in the applicants’ inability  to  sell their  products  in Kenya without  any reason  given  that  they had operated in Kenya for  more  than 15  years  of Kenya.

11. Mr Du Plessis further deposed that their products are recognized by the government of Kenya as ideal for use here.  Further, that  the Kenya Industrial  Property  Institute (KIPI) had  registered  the  trade mark  “ Safe Rider”  which   was  also certified  by KEBS  as  being ideal  for  use in Kenya.

12. It is further  deposed that the respondent  has not  treated  the  applicants   fairly  by denying  them an  opportunity  to earn an honest living, denial of economic opportunity and  discrimination  hence the  respondent’s  administrative   action of  refusing  to register   their  agent should be  reviewed  in terms  of the law.

13. The respondent  National Transport   Safety  Authority  filed a  replying  affidavit  sworn  by Engineer  Fredrick  Oanya, Deputy Director, motor vehicle  inspection, setting out  the statutory functions of the National Transport Safety Authority  as per the National Transport   Safety  Authority  Act  No.  33 of  2012   being to advise  and make  recommendations  to the  Cabinet  Secretary  on matters relating  to  road and   transport and safety; implement policies relating to road  transport   and  safety;  and conduct  motor vehicle  inspections  and  certifications.

14. It was contended that the speed governor supplier approved by the Kenya  Bureau of Standards (KEBS), Chief Mechanical and  Transport   Engineer (CMTE) and the National Transport   Safety  Authority  to supply  and  install  the “   Safe rider” branded  speed governors  in Kenya   is Safe Rider  Management Systems  who bears the    “S” mark approved by (KEBS).  It is contended that the  applicants had  neither submitted  their speed  governor  to the  KEBS, Chief Mechanical and  Transport  Engineer for  testing and approval nor to the National Transport Safety Authority for approval to fit their  speed governors  and  therefore  are not  listed  among  the approved  speed  limiter  suppliers  in Kenya.

15. That the National Transport Safety Authority only recognizes approved speed governor suppliers and does not interfere with obligations between contracting parties.

16. It was  contended  that the prayers  to register  the  3rd  agent applicant  as  a speed  governor   supplier for the  1st and  2nd  applicants is premature   because they have  not  submitted  their speed  governors   for  testing  and  approval  by the KEBS, Chief Mechanical and Transport Engineer and the National Transport Safety Authority.

17. On 10th March  2017  the  2nd applicant  filed  a further affidavit contending  that the respondent   was misleading  the court  on the allegation that  Safe Rider  Management  Systems  is approved by Kenya  Bureau of Standards.

18. That it is  his  company  the 1st  applicant  that  manufactured the  speed governors that Safe Rider Management Systems  distributed  in Kenya  for over 10 years  and that  the  1st   applicant  holds  the trademark  for the products.  Further, that the distribution  contract  was  terminated  in July  2016   on discovery  that Safe Rider  Management  Systems  traded  in  counterfeit   speed governors  called  Safe Rider.  Further, that  on 14th October 2016  the  Safe Rider  Management  Systems   placed  an advertisement  in the Nationa newspaper  stating that its  speed governors are manufactured in Kenya, a clear  confirmation  that it  no longer  dealt  with the  1st   applicant’s  products  which are  manufactured  in South Africa.

19. That Safe Rider  Management  Systems  was  illegally  taking over  the applicant’s brand  name  yet  the  names  are different  in that  “SafeRider” is  different  from “ Safe Rider”  products, the latter  belonging  to the   1st  applicant  hence  it is strange  for the respondent  to refuse  to  register  the applicants.

20. That on 29th  January  2014  the  1st  applicant’s  product  was duly  tested  by KEBS and  the test results  showed  that  the  product complied with required standards established  by KEBS.

21. Further, it  was stated that the  Safe Rider Management  Systems  speed  governor   is  a different  brand  from the  1st  applicant’s  products  and  that it  was   after the successful  testing of the 1st applicant’s products that Safe Rider Management Systems Limited  was  approved  as distributor  for the  1st  applicant, after  the  1st applicant  was authorized  to export  the speed  governors to Kenya.

22. In addition, it  was  deposed that  when the  agency  of Safe Rider Management Systems  Limited was  terminated  in August  2016, the  3rd applicant  and KEBS  were  notified  and  a  response  received  from KEBS  on  11th August  2016.

23. That the respondent does not test speed governors but that the task of testing is with KEBS which testing was duly undertaken and approvals given.

24. That had  the 1st applicant  not  changed  its distribution  agent, it  would still  be selling   its  products   in Kenya.

25. That the  respondent  is working with the  1st  applicant’s former agent  Safe Rider  Management  Systems  Limited to frustrate  the  applicants  business  hence the  refusal to authorize  the new agent- 3rd  applicant, to supply  the speed governors  in Kenya  and to  the over  15,000 customers  in Kenya  who already  installed  the  speed  governors  courtesy  of  Safe Rider Management  Services  Limited, the  former agent.

26. At one  point in the  course of  these proceedings , there  was  an attempt  by Stima Thabiti  Manufacturers Limited  and  Safe Rider  Management  Systems  to be enjoined  as interested  parties  but they  never  actualized  their intentions   other than  filing notice of appointment   of  advocates  through  Kamotho Njomo  & Company  Advocates and  Wathuta  and  Company Advocates. This   was  despite  the  court granting   them  leave  to file  their  applications  for  joinder for consideration  and even  fixing  a hearing  date of  15th May  2017   of the intended  applications if any, but by that date, no application for  joinder had  been  filed  hence the court  set this date for  judgment on the substantive  motion.

27. Only the  exparte  applicant  filed written submission  on 15th  May  2017 framing  one issue for  determination, that of whether   the  order of mandamus should issue compelling  the respondent  to discharge  its statutory  duty of  registering  the  3rd   applicant  as  a speed  governor supplier  and  agent of  the  1st and   2nd applicants and  by such registration the respondent be compelled  to accept   vehicle  speed  governor  certificates  issued  by the applicant.

28. In answer to the above sole question, the exparte applicants’ counsel  reiterated the facts of the case herein as deposed in their affidavits.

29. On the  law applicable, it  was  submitted that the respondent  is under  a duty to act fairly  in its dealings as an administrator to ensure that  rules of  natural justice  have been  followed  in all its  dealings.  That refusal to grant the  applicants a license to sell their speed governors without giving them as opportunity to be heard, or telling them, why their application for a license has been rejected is unfair.

30. That despite  the applicants’  writing   to the  respondent  seeking  to know  why  they had not  been licensed, the respondent  did not  reply.

31. That the  respondent  is subject  to supervision  by this court  and that   the Constitution of Kenya  2010  Article 27(1)  and (4)  protects the applicants’ right against discrimination  and  protects their  rights  to equal  protection  under the law.

32. Further reliance  was  placed  on Article  43 (1) (c ) of the Constitution which guarantees the applicants rights to  economic empowerment, which rights had allegedly been unduly infringed  by the respondent  hence  this application. No case law was referred to.

DETERMINATION

33. I have considered  the  foregoing  and in my  humble  view, the  issue that flow for determination is whether the order of mandamus  is in the  circumstances of this  case, available  to the  exparte  applicants  as prayed.

34. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition paragraph 89 page 111, it is stated:

“ The   order of mandamus  is a  most extensive  nature, and,  is, in the form  of a command  issuing  from the High Court  of justice,  directed  to any person, corporation or inferior  tribunal, requiring him or  them to do some particular thing  therein  specified  which  appertains  to his  or their  office  and is in the  nature  of a public  duty.  Its  purpose  is to  remedy the defects  of justice  and  accordingly, it will  issue, to the  end that justice may be  done,  in all cases, where, although  there is  an alternative  legal  remedy yet that  mode  of redress is less convenient, beneficial and  effectual…….The  order must  command  no more than  the  party  against  whom the  application is made is  legally  bound  to perform.

When a general duty is imposed, a mandamus  cannot  require  it to be  done. Where  a statute  which imposes  a duty  leaves  discretion  as to the mode of  performing  the  duty  in the hands of the party on whom the obligation  is laid, a mandamus  cannot  command the duty in  question  to be carried  out  in a specific  way.”

35. In Kenya National  Examination  Council  vs  Exparte  G. Gathenji  Njoroge  & Others  CA  No.  Nairobi 266/96 (CA) the Court of Appeal applying the above principles stated inter alia:

“ In  other words, an order of mandamus  will issue  to compel  the  performance of a public duty which is imposed  on a person  or body of persons  by a statute  and  where that person  or body of persons has failed to perform  the duty to the detriment  of a party  who has a legal right  to expect  the duty  to be  performed.”

36. Applying  the above legal  principles  to the facts  of this case, the  exparte   applicants  lament  that despite   KEBS  testing   and  approving  the licensing  and  distribution  of the  1st  applicant’s   products “SafeRider” speed governors© in Kenya, the respondent   has refused  to license  or register  the first applicants’ agent the 3rd  applicant  to distribute  the  copyrighted product  and is instead  hell bent  to frustrate  the  applicants with the help  of the 1st applicant’s former agent  Safe Rider  Management  Systems  Limited  with whom they fell out upon discovery that the latter was distributing  counterfeit  products  and  passing them  off as  the  1st applicant’s  speed governors.

37. The respondent  contends that  it is  Safe Rider  Management  Systems  which is  licensed to distribute the  speed  governors as approved  by KEBS  under class S and that  the  1st and 2nd   applicants  have not  applied for  lab testing  of their products  by KEBS  before  consideration for registration  and  licensing  of the intended  agent  for distribution purposes.

38. As correctly  submitted by  the  exparte  applicant’s  counsel, the  functions  and  powers  of the  respondent  National Transport Safety Authority  are as stipulated under Section  4 of the Act. The functions  of the  Authority   include- ensuring  the  provision of a safe, reliable   and  efficient  road  transport  services; implement  policies  relating  to road  transport   and  safety; plan, manage  and  regulate  the  road  transport  system  in accordance  with  the provisions of the Act.

39. Under Section 4(2) of the NTSA Act, in the performance of its   functions under Subsection (1), the authority shall, among others;

a) Register and license motor vehicles.

c) Conduct  motor vehicle   inspections  and  certification;

c) Regulate  public service vehicles

d) Develop and implement road safety strategies.

40. The applicants complain that the  respondent has  without giving   any reasons  refused to register the  3rd applicant  as a speed governor  supplier  and  agent of  the  1st  and  2nd applicants  in Kenya  and that by  virtue of  such registration, the respondent  be compelled  to accept  vehicle  speed governor  certificates  issued by the  3rd applicant.

41. In other words, the applicants  are challenging  the  decision of the  respondent to  ‘ refuse’  to register   the  3rd  applicant  as  an agent for the 1st and 2nd applicants for supply and  or distribution  of “SafeRider”  speed  governors  in Kenya, which   license had earlier on been granted to the Safe Rider  Management  Systems Limited.

42. However,  the applicant  has  not sought  any judicial review  orders  of certiorari to bring  into  this court  for purposes  of quashing  the decision  of the respondent  refusing  to register  and or licence  the  3rd applicant  as an  agent for  the supply  and  distribution of  SafeRider  Speed Governors  for the  1st and 2nd  applicants.

43. In the absence of remedy of  certiorari, this court  cannot  consider  mandamus  as there  is no  specific  statutory duty imposed  on the respondent  to register/licence  the  3rd  applicant as an agent   of the  1st and  2nd  applicants  for  supply of  speed governors  in Kenya.

44. Furthermore, mandamus  cannot issue to quash  a decision that is made  not to  register  the  3rd applicant  as an agent for the  1st and  2nd applicants.  Mandamus is a discretionary Judicial Review remedy and is mandatory   in nature.  It   compels the performance of a public/statutory duty which duty must be   identifiable   and specific not a general duty.  Mandamus only issues if the impugned decision is quashed since there is no specific statutory duty.

45. In Prabhulal Gulabchand Shah V Attorney General and  Evans  Gathoni  Miano CA 24/1985 the Court  of Appeal made it  clear  that a person  seeking  mandamus  must show  that there resides  in him a legal right to the  performance of a  legal duty  by a party  against whom the mandamus is sought or alternatively  that he  has  substantial personal interest  and the duty  must not be  permissive  but imperative  and  must be  of public  rather  than private  nature.

46. Sections 29 and 30 of the NTSA Act provide for discretion and conditions for issuance of licences.  The court  notes that  there is no  specific  duty imposed  by statute  on the  respondent  to register/license  the  3rd  applicant  as the agent for the 1st  and  2nd  applicants.

47. In addition, any challenge to the decision of the National  Transport Safety Authority is appealable to the Transport  Licensing  Appeals  Board  established  under Section  39  of the National Transport  Safety Authority  Act.  This is the spirit and letter of Sections 38 of the Act which stipulates.

“38(1) A person who-

Being  an applicant for the  grant or  variation of a license, is aggrieved  by the decision  of the  Authority  on the  application;

Having made an objection to any such application as aforesaid, being an objection which the Authority is bound to take into consideration, is aggrieved by the decision of the Authority thereon, or

Being the licensee is aggrieved by the revocation or suspension thereof.

May, within the time  and in the manner  prescribed  appeal to   the Appeals Board  established  under Section  39. ”

48. The National Transport  Safety Authority also  administers  the  Traffic Act, Cap  403  Laws of Kenya. Under Section 41 A of the Traffic Act Regulations, made  pursuant  to Section 117  of the Traffic Act, every  public service vehicle  must be fitted with a speed governor  which meets  the  specifications.

49. In this case  the  Act does not accord the applicant  the option of  either  filing an appeal or  filing  for  Judicial Review.  It is  clear that  a person aggrieved  by the decision  of the Authority on an  application for the grant  or variation of a license may  within the  time  and  manner prescribed  appeal to  the Appeals  Board  established under  Section  39 of the Act.

50. It has not  been shown that the Appeal  stipulated  in the Act is not an   efficacious  remedy  for the exparte  applicant.  Section  2 of the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015 defines an administrative action  to include the powers, functions and  duties  exercised  by authorities  or quasi-judicial  tribunals; or  any act, omission or  decision of any person, body  or authority  that  affects  the legal rights  or interests  of any person  to whom such action  relates. It therefore follows that  refusal to  act,  which is an  omission, is an  administrative action.

51. There are a number of authorities  stipulating  that the  existence of alternative remedy are not in themselves a bar to the  issuing  of Judicial Review  orders, such authorities  include Republic Vs National Environmental Management  Authority, [2011]eKLR.  However, the applicant, under the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2017 must show  that it  has to be  exempted  from the alternative  remedies  which may  not  be  efficacious.  This is the  spirit  and letter of  Section 9(2) (3)  and (4)  of the Fair  Administrative  Action Act, 2015.

52. Section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015 stipulates.

“ (1) The High Court or a subordinate court under Subsection (1)  shall not  review  an administrative  action or decision  under this Act  unless the  mechanisms  including  internal mechanisms  for appeal  or review  and  all remedies  available under any  other written  law are first  exhausted.”

53. The internal  mechanisms  for appeal or review  are as stipulated  in Sections 38 and 39 of the National  Transport Safety Authority Act which stipulates that any aggrieved  person  by the decision may appeal  to the Board  established  under Section  39.

54. The applicants in this case chose to approach  this court  by way  of Judicial Review without first exhausting the internal appeals  mechanisms  provided for   under Section 38  of the National  Transport Safety Authority Act.

55. Long before  the enactment  of Section 9 of the  Fair Administrative  Action Act,  2015, the Court of  Appeal  in Speaker of the National Assembly  vs Njenga Karume  Nairobi CA  No. 92/1992stated:

“ There is  considerable  merit in the  submission that where there is a clear  procedure  for  redress of any particular grievances prescribed by the Constitution  or an Act  of Parliament, that procedure  should be strictly  followed.  Accordingly the special procedure  provided  by  any law  must be  strictly  adhered  to since  there are  good reasons for such  special  procedure.”

56. This court  cannot lose  sight of  the  principle  espoused  in Republic vs Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National  Government  and  another Exparte  ZTE  JR  442/2013  that :

“………one must  not lose  sight of  the fact  that the decision  whether  or not to  grant  Judicial  Review  orders  is an  exercise  of  judicial discretion and as  was held  by Ochieng J in John  Fitzerald  Kennedy Omanga  vs The  Post Master  General Postal Corporation of  Kenya and  2 Others  Nairobi HCMA 997/03 for the court to require the alternative  procedure to be exhausted  prior to  resorting  to Judicial Review   is in  accord with judicial review  being very  properly  regarded  as a remedy  of last  resort  though  the  applicant  will not  be required to resort to some other procedure if  that other procedure is less convenient or otherwise less  appropriate. Therefore, unless  due to  the inherent  nature of the  remedy provided  under the  statute  to resort  thereto  would   be less convenient  or otherwise  less  appropriate  parties  ought  to follow  the  procedure  provided  for  under the statute.”

57. A plethora  of decisions both from  the High Court and Court of Appeal are  clear  that  where the statute  has provided  for  a remedy  to a party, this  court must  exercise  restraint  and  first  give an opportunity  to the relevant bodies  or  state organs  to deal  with the dispute  as provided  in the relevant   statute.  These  cases include  Francis Gitau Parsimei vs  The National Alliance  Party of Kenya  and 4 Others Petitioner 356/2012; Kipkalya Kones  v Republic  and Another  exparte  Kimani  Wanyoike  &  4  Others (2008) (EP) 291.

58. Under Section 9(3) of the Fair Administrative  Action Act, 2015, The High Court or a subordinate  court shall, if it  is not satisfied that  the  remedies  referred  to in Subsection  (2)  have been  exhausted, direct  that the applicant  shall first  exhaust  such remedy before  instituting  proceedings  under Subsection (1).

59. Under Section 9(4) of the Fair Administrative  Action Act, 2015, notwithstanding Subsection (3), the High Court  or a subordinate  court may, in exceptional circumstances  and  on application by the applicant, exempt  such person from the obligation  to exhaust  any remedy  if the court  considers  such exemption to be in the  interest of justice.

60. In this case, there is  no evidence  of an attempt  to exhaust  an internal  appeals  mechanism  as  stipulated  in Section  38  of the National Transport Safety Authority  Act.  There  is also no application placed before  this court  or even  a reference  to exemption of pursuit  of alternative  remedies  or exhaustion  of internal  appeal mechanism.

61. The applicant  has proceeded  as if there is no such legal  requirement  for exhaustion of  alternative  remedies/internal appeal   mechanisms.

62. In Republic vs National Environment Management  Authority, CA No. 84/2010, the Court  of Appeal  was categorical that:

“..  Where  there  was  an alternative  remedy and  especially  where Parliament had provided  a statutory appeal process, it is  only in exceptional circumstances  that an order  for Judicial Review  would be granted, and that in determining whether an  exception should be  made and  judicial review granted, it  was  necessary for  the court to look carefully at the  suitability  of the  statutory appeal in the context  of the particular  case and  ask itself  what, in the context  of the real issue  is to be  determined  and  whether  the  statutory  appeal  procedure  was suitable  to determine it.  The learned judge, in our  respectful view, considered  these structures  and came to the conclusion  that the appellant  had failed  to demonstrate  to her what  exceptional  circumstances  existed  in its case  which would  remove it  from the appeal process  set out  in the statute.  With respect, we agree with the judge.”

63. The above  decision  was made  prior to the  enactment  of the   2015 Fair Administrative  Action Act which latter statute specifically  obliges  exhaustion of alternative  remedies  or internal appeal or review  mechanisms  and  also goes  further to  provide  for exemption  to such exhaustion of alternative remedies in exceptional circumstances  and  on application  by the applicant.

64. No such  exceptional circumstances  are apparent  in this  case and neither  has any application  been placed  before the court  for exemption  from exhaustion  of internal  appeals  mechanism under Section  38  of the National Transport  Safety Authority  Act.

65. Judicial Review, though  now  elevated  to the constitutional  threshold, is a remedy of last resort since it does not  substantially look into the merits  of the  decision but the legality, rationally  and or procedural propriety  of the decision and  decision  making  process.  It therefore  ought not to  be resorted to  where there  exist   appropriate  efficacious remedies  to redress the grievances  complained of.

66. The exparte  applicants in this case  had the  remedy of lodging  the appeal  to the Transport Licencing Appeals Board  established  under Section 39 of National Transport  and Safety Authority  Act.  The Board  would then have examined  the  grounds  of appeal  and determined  the merits of the  respondent’s refusal  to grant  to the 1st applicants  agent  the licence to distribute the “SafeRider”©  devices (speed governors and or  to accept  the vehicle  speed  governor  certificate  issued  by the  3rd applicant).  This is  so because, as earlier  stated, there is no  specific  statutory duty  placed  on the respondent  to do any  of the  things  that the  applicants wish  this court to  compel  the  respondent  to do.

67. An Act  of Parliament  such as  the  National Transport  Safety Authority Act and others with inbuilt dispute resolution  mechanisms  are self-embodiments  and  cannot  be wished  away at the altar of Judicial Review  which is a  remedy of last resort.  The  mechanisms  provided for  under these  enactments  for dispute  resolution  which is  espoused  in Article  159(2) ( c)  of the Constitution must be  respected.

68. In the end, I find that  not only  have the applicants  failed to  demonstrate  that they are  entitled  to the orders of  mandamus  sought as the  decision of refusal  to grant the  license  or to accept the certificates issued  by the 3rd  applicant  has  not  been sought  to be quashed  by this court  and  secondly, there   was and  still is  an alternative  remedy of  exhaustion  of  internal  appeals  mechanism to the Transport Licencing Appeals Board established  under Section  39  of the National Transport Safety Authority Act. In the  absence of any special circumstances  and on an  application by the applicants  for  exemption from such  exhaustion of internal appeals  mechanisms, this  court  finds  and holds  that the exparte  applicant  is not entitled  to the Judicial Review  remedies  of  mandamus sought.

69. Accordingly, the notice of motion  dated 23RD January, 2017 be and is hereby declined and  dismissed  with an  order that  each party  do bear their own costs  of these  Judicial Review  proceedings.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 17th day of October, 2017.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE.

In the Presence of:

Mr Mwangi Advocate for the exparte applicants

N/A for Respondent

CA: Marylyn