Schenker (E.A.) Limited v Kenya Shipping Clearing & Warehousing Workers Union & Industrial Court [2016] KEHC 221 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI

CONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION NO.  628 OF   2008

SCHENKER (E.A.) LIMITED ……………….APPLICANT /RESPONDENT

VERSUS

KENYA SHIPPING CLEARING &

WAREHOUSING WORKERS UNION…1ST RESPONDENT/APPLICANT

THE INDUSTRIAL COURT…………………...............2ND RESPONDENT

RULING

1. By a notice  of  motion  dated   3rd  April  2014  brought  under   the provisions  of Order  17 Rule  2(3)  and  Order  51 Rule  1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Section  3A  of the Civil Procedure   Act,  the inherent  powers of the court and all  other enabling   provisions of  the  law,  the applicant   who is the 1st   respondent  herein  KENYA SHIPPING CLEARING & WAREHOUSING WORKERS UNION sought from this  court orders:

1) That the suit be dismissed for want of prosecution by the applicant/respondent.

2) That  the costs of this application  and  of the  suit be  awarded   to the 1st respondent/applicant;

3) That the  Honourable  court do  issue such orders  or give  such directions  as it may  deem  fit and  just to meet the  ends of  justice.

2. The application is premised on the grounds that:

1) Over three (3) years after the last adjournment of the suit generally, the applicant/ respondent has failed to set the   matter for hearing;

2) The applicants/respondent’s failure  to set down the suit for   hearing shows that   it  has no interest  in the case;

3) That the applicant’s failure to set down the case for   hearing  has caused  the  1st respondent/applicant  serious  prejudice as the ruling of the Industrial Court which the applicant/respondent  had  sought to  challenge, is in the 1st respondent’s  favour;

4) It will be for the best interest of justice that this suit   be dismissed for want of prosecution.

3. The application is  also supported  by the   affidavit sworn  by Alfred  Nyabera  advocate  sworn on  3rd April  2014    wherein it is deposed, inter alia, that on  23rd  November   2010, the applicant/respondent’s  advocate   fixed  a date for   hearing of f  this matter  as   29th November   2010 and that  since then, the respondent  has neglected, refused   and or   otherwise   failed   to set down  the suit for  hearing  or to take  any steps  to prosecute  the same; that  the applicant  appears not  keen to prosecute   this suit;   that it is  in the interest of  justice  that the suit be  dismissed  since it  is now over  three(3 ) years since  the matter  was last in court; that neglect, refusal or failure  to prosecute  the suit amounts  to an abuse of   the court   process and the delay  thereof   to prosecute   the matter or take steps   to have it   prosecuted   is unreasonable  and  extremely  prejudicial  to the  1st respondent/applicant; and that it is   just, fair  and   expedient; and that the suit be dismissed with costs for want of   prosecution.

4. The applicant also gave the history of the matter   herein.

5. In response   to the notice  of motion, the  original  applicants   who are  respondents  in this application   swore   an affidavit  on 14th June 2014   by George  Ogembo  advocate  giving  the history  of the matter  herein  and contending  that after  the suit  was instituted  in 2008  and service  of process (es)  effected  upon the respondents  herein,  a replying  affidavit   was filed  and both parties   filed submissions  by 2009  but that   the suit could    not be   heard   by one judge  hence   directions    were sought  and obtained  from the Chief Justice  ( Honourable  Gicheru C.J. ( as  he then was ), to constitute  a bigger   bench  of two(2)  judges  to hear and determine the suit.  That  however, two of the judges  assigned  to  hear the case  were  transferred  and  the file was  send  to the Chief  Justice  to constitute   a new bench.  That the file however went missing   in 2010 after   the applicant had been directed to invite the adverse parties, to fix a date.

6. That a new bench has never been constituted.  That the   applicant is still aggrieved  by the decision of the Industrial  Court and   still desires that  a three judge  bench  be constituted to  hear and determine  the matter.

7. That no prejudice  will be occasioned to the  respondents  if the case  herein is kept alive  and  that the applicant  shall be  greatly  prejudiced  if the   matter is dismissed.

8. On a point of   law, the applicant’s  counsel   deposed   that in any event, proceedings  herein are   constitutional  in nature  and not governed  by the Civil Procedure Rules hence Order 17 Rule  2(3)  and Order  51  of the Civil Procedure  Rules  do not apply to these  proceedings.

9. Both parties   advocates appeared   before me today and urged the application orally.  The applicant relied on the grounds and supporting affidavit of Alfred Nyabera whereas the   respondent relied on the replying affidavit sworn by Mr George Ogembo.  None of the advocates cited any case law to advance their respective positions.

10. The submissions  which  mirrored  the  positions  taken in the respective  pleadings  and affidavits  on record  are taken into  account as they are a replica of the averments  in the application, supporting affidavit and replying affidavit respectively.

11. In summary, the 1st respondent’s  counsel  urged the court to consider   that the delay  of  6  years to prosecute    the suit is   too long  and  prejudicial   to the  1st respondent  and that since there  is no  good reason   given for the  delay, the matter  should be   dismissed   with costs.

12. On the other hand, Mr Okello counsel for the applicant submitted that the matter  herein   raises   weighty  constitutional   issues  which should  be determined   on merit   since the  Chief  Justice  had already  constituted  a three(3)  Judge  bench to hear and determine the suit.  Further, that the applicant’s   counsel had done everything in their power to ensure the suit was ready for hearing and that there is no prejudice to the respondents if the suit is sustained.  He urged the court to dismiss the application seeking   to dismiss the matter herein for want of prosecution, with costs.

Determination

13. I have   carefully considered the application herein seeking for   dismissal of this matter filed in 2008, for want of   prosecution.  I have also considered the opposition thereto and both parties counsel’s brief submissions.

14. In my  view, the issue  for determination  is whether  this suit   or  proceedings  should be  dismissed   for want of prosecution as prayed and if not, what  orders  should  this  court make.

15. I will   first determine   the point  of  law taken  by the applicants  as to whether  Order 17 Rule   2(3)  and Order  51 of the Civil Procedure   Rules  can be   invoked to these  proceedings  which are neither civil nor criminal and which are brought as  constitutional  under Section  65   of the old   Constitution ( now repealed).

16. Examining the originating Notice of motion  dated  9th  October  2008, it is  brought under  the provisions of Section  65  of the Old Constitution seeking

a. declaration  that the  Industrial Court is  subordinate  to the High Court  and the High Court  has the  jurisdiction under Section 65(2) of the  Constitution to supervise  to Industrial  Court;

b.A declaration that the applicant has been  deprived his Constitutional right of appeal  by the Industrial Court and   hence the  proceedings   in the Industrial Court cause  No. 126/2007  are unconstitutional, null and void and that the said  proceedings  be quashed   and or  set aside;

c. A stay of any further proceedings and of execution in Industrial   court cause No. 126/2007.

17. I have no doubt in my mind that the above issues for  determination in the substantive originating motion are constitutional questions, which are  neither civil nor  criminal matters  and therefore in determining those  issues, the court will   not be  exercising either civil or criminal jurisdiction  as the procedure for enforcement of fundamental rights and  freedoms  under the former constitution did exist under Section 84(6)  thereof.

18. However, the procedure for dismissal of matters of this nature for   want of prosecution is not provided for in the said former constitution.

19. In my  humble view, although  the  Civil Procedure  Act   and Rules are  not applicable in this case, this  court notes that it has and  can invoke  its inherent   jurisdiction  to dismiss   a matter which has not been  prosecuted  for an  unnecessarily  long time.

20. Besides, although the proceedings  herein  were instituted  in  2008 when  the former Constitution  was in force, the application  to dismiss  the proceedings were instituted  in  2014  during the new  constitutional  dispensation.

21. Accordingly, albeit the determination of the substantive  originating notice of motion  would  be  anchored   on the law  or constitutional  provisions  applicable  as at the  time  of  filing  of this matter, nonetheless  procedural steps   taken  in the matter   during the  currency  of the new  constitution  would fall  within the new   constitutional order.

22. In this case, Article 159(2) (d) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 makes provision that in exercising   judicial authority, the courts and tribunals shall be guided by the following   principles:

a) ………

b) That justice shall not be delayed.

c) ………..

d) Justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities.

23. Therefore, in  my humble view, the application   herein having been   filed in 2014 is governed by the above   provisions cited, which provisions abhor undue regard to procedural technicalities and delayed justice.

24. Furthermore, under part 5 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of Kenya  2010- on  administration of justice, until the Chief Justice makes  Rules contemplated in Article  22, the Rules  for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and  freedoms under Section  84  (6) of  the former  constitution shall  continue  in force with the alterations, adaptations, qualifications  and  exceptions as may  be necessary  to bring them  into   conformity  with Article   22.

25. Article 22(d) of the Constitution also makes it clear that the court, while observing the rules of natural justice shall not be unreasonably restricted by procedural technicalities.

26. What the above  provisions  espouse it that   in dealing   with constitutional  matters or where a person’s  right or  fundamental freedom is concerned, courts shall not be unreasonably  restricted by procedural technicalities as to whether the provisions of the Civil Procedure  Act and  or Rules  apply or not.

27. What  is significant   is whether  a matter  which is  filed in  court and   which  has not been prosecuted  for nearly  10 years  can be left archived and   hanging  on the respondent’s shoulders in perpetuity.

28.  Accordingly I find that the objection as to the applicable procedure for dismissal of constitutional matters   for want of prosecution not well taken and dismiss it.

29. Back  to the main  substantive  question of  whether the  matter herein should be dismissed for want of prosecution, and  therefore, relying  on  the principle  that justice  shall not  be delayed,   and without this court paying undue regard to procedural  technicalities, there are several  authorities  that espouse  the question  and provide  the test to be  applied in  determining   whether  or not to dismiss a matter or cause  for want  of  prosecution.

30. In Moses Murira & 2 Others Vs  Maingi  Kamuru  & Another - Nyeri  CA  No. 151/2010, the Court of Appeal, while   citing  with  approval  the decision by Chesoni J ( as he then  was ) in Ivita  vs Kyumbu  [1984] KLR  441  stated inter alia:

“The power of the court to dismiss a suit for want of prosecution is a discretionary power, but which should be exercised judicially.”

31. In Agip (K) Ltd v Highlands Tyres Ltd [2001] KLR 630, the court outlined three principles governing the dismissal   of a suit for want of prosecution as being:

i. Delay must be inordinate;

ii. The inordinate delay is inexcusable.

iii. The defendant is likely to be prejudiced by the law.

32. In E.T. Monks & Company Ltd V Evans [1985] KLR 584 Kneller J (as he then was held that:

1) Whether  an application for dismissal  of suit   for  want of  prosecution  should be  allowed or not  is a matter for the discretion  of the judge  who must  exercise  it judicially.  The court shall among other things, consider whether the delay was lengthy; whether it has rendered a fair trial impossible and whether it was inexcusable.

However, each case will turn on its own fats and circumstances.

2) If  an action is dismissed  for  want of prosecution, a  plaintiff  may sue  his advocate for  negligence  unless such   plaintiff   has caused  or consented  to the  delay  which led  to the dismissal of the action;

3) The delay in this case was inordinate and inexcusable   and a trial would be prejudicial to the defendants, as important   witnesses may no longer be traced.”

33. In the IvitaV Kyumbu case (supra) Chesoni J further held that:

“ The  test to be  applied by the  courts  in an application for dismissal  of a suit  for  want of prosecution  is whether   the delay is  prolonged  and inexcusable, and if it is, whether  justice  can be  done  despite  the delay.

Thus,  even if  he delay  is prolonged, if the court  is satisfied  with the  plaintiff’s  excuse for the delay  and  that justice  can still be  done to  the parties, the action will not  be dismissed but it  will be  ordered  that it  be set  down for hearing  at the earliest  time.  It is a matter in the discretion of the court.”

34. In my humble  view, from the decisions  above cited  and the provisions  of Article 159(2) (b)  of the Constitution  that  justice shall not be delayed, it becomes apparent that the court  reserves  inherent   jurisdiction to  dismiss  matters filed  before it  but not  prosecuted  for unnecessarily  long periods  and in so  doing,  the court will  also be  acting   to prevent   abuse of its  process  or to  prevent  injustice,   for, delayed   justice is  denied  justice.

35. In Mukisa  Biscuit  Company V West End  Distributors  CA [1969] EA  696, the  Court of Appeal  made it  trite that   the court has inherent jurisdiction which  can be  invoked  to dismiss  suits for want of prosecution.

36. It is s the primary duty of the applicant  who instituted  these proceedings  to take steps to progress  its case  since  it is the  one  who dragged the  2 respondents  to court  and where  no such action  is taken, indeed, a court of law  should not  condone  any inertia on the part of the applicant or initiator of proceedings.

37. However, that discretion of the court should not be exercised capriciously.  This court  does  ascribe  to the  principle  of law that  dismissal  of cases  without  hearing the merits  thereof  is a draconian  act which  drives  a party from the  judgment  seat of justice and therefore from accessing justice which is a  fundamental right guaranteed under Article 48 of the Constitution.

38. Therefore, albeit  I am indeed  persuaded   by the record  hereto which speaks  for itself   that from  13th May 2010  to  4th April  2014  when the  application  herein  was filed, no  action had  been taken  by the applicant   to  have the  originating  motion to be prosecuted, I find  that  delay  of 4 years  and until the  1st  respondent  moved this court to have the  matter dismissed   for want  of  prosecution, however, inordinate, justice  can still be done by  according  the applicant  an opportunity  to ventilate  its grievances.

39. In addition, I note that the matter herein is the type that would not require oral evidence of witnesses who could be said to be dead or their memories affected or documents that could be lost or destroyed.  The matter raises  purely constitutional issues and based on the record of  proceedings before the industrial  court( as it  then was). it therefore  follows that  the delay has not necessarily  prejudiced  the 1st respondent  and the prejudice, if any can be  adequately  compensated  by an award of  costs.

40. In addition, although  it is the duty of the applicant   to prosecute  its case, where it  is clear  that any delay in prosecuting  the case will occasion prejudice to the respondents, then the  respondents  too have a  duty to  move the court  within  reasonable  time to  have the suit  prosecuted  expeditiously on its merits  or even  apply earlier on to have it dismissed  for  want of prosecution and not to sit back  and  wait  for  4 years  then seek to have the  suit dismissed  for want of prosecution.  This is so, even though the respondents have no counterclaim in the matter.  This is the principle espoused in the Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Companyvs West End Distributors (supra) case where the Court of Appeal stated inter alia.

“ without wishing in any  way  to  condone  the inordinate  delay  which has  undoubtedly  occurred in this case it seems to me that both sides  contributed  to the delay in reaching a hearing, and that if the  appellant  genuinely  belief itself  to be prejudiced  by the delay, it  would  have applied for dismissal at a  much earlier  stage.”

41. In the  instant  case, whereas  this  court finds  that for  4 years  no action  took place before  this application  was  filed, and that indeed there is no  satisfactory  explanation given for  the delay  in prosecuting  the matter, I  however note that  both parties   were ready to have  the matter heard by  filing submissions  which then  would be  highlighted before a three judge bench  as  constituted  by the then Chief Justice  but as  the record  shows, the judges  who were to hear the matter  namely Honourable Dulu J, Honourable  Wendoh  J and  Honourable  Abida Ali Aroni J, as a  bench, were all transferred  away from  Nairobi  and that situation may have  contributed  to the  inertia  on the part  of the applicant.

42. My examination of the substantive  motion  reveals  that the matter  indeed  raises  weighty constitutional  issues  affecting   rights and  as such it is  only fair  and just that  those issues  be subjected to a full trial.  The originating motion, in other words is not on the face of it, frivolous.

43. This court  will, therefore   exercise  its discretion  leniently  in order to  accord the applicant an  opportunity to be heard, in the interest of justice, and moreso, substantive  justice, as   it is not persuaded  that the delay is likely  to affect  a fair  trial  of the issues in the action or cause serious prejudice  to the 1st respondent.

44. In  other words, having  weighed the prejudice that is  likely to be  suffered  by the 1st  respondent/applicant  innocent  party  by the prolonged  delay  in prosecuting   this matter  and  as against  the prejudice that is likely to be suffered by the  applicant/respondent  who is  the  offending  party, if  I dismiss this matter for want of prosecution, when, clearly, the  applicant  has shown interest in prosecuting this matter to its logical conclusion, I would have ousted the applicant from the judgment seat. I find that it is appropriate in the circumstances, to sustain this matter for a full trial.

45. Thus, despite the delay, justice  can be   done and in this case, the justice  of the matter  is that this  matter is  sustained  and the application to dismiss it  for want  of prosecution is dismissed. However, as the delay  was occasioned by the applicant’s necessitating  this application, I  order that the applicant  shall pay costs to  the 1st  respondent  amounting to kshs 50,000/- within 21 days  from the date  hereof and  in default, the 1st  respondent  is at liberty to execute for recovery of the same.

46. I further  order that  as the matter  had  already been certified  to be heard  by a three judge  bench, the file  be placed  before  the Honourable  Chief Justice  to constitute  a three   Judge bench  to hear  and determine  this matter  expeditiously.  The file   shall be placed before the Principal Judge for onward transmission to the Honourable Chief Justice for appropriate directions.

47. Orders accordingly.

Dated, signed and delivered at Nairobi this 10th day of November 2016.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE