Senior University Staff Union v National University of Lesotho (CIV/APN 422 of 96) [1997] LSHC 25 (18 February 1997)

C I V / A P N / 4 2 2 / 96 IN T HE H I GH C O U RT OF L E S O T HO In the matter between S E N I OR U N I V E R S I TY S T A FF U N I ON A P P L I C A NT and N A T I O N AL U N I V E R S I TY OF L E S O T HO R E S P O N D E NT J U D G M E NT D e l i v e r ed by the H o n o u r a b le M r. Justice M M. R a m o d i b e di On 18th d ay of F e b r u a r y, 1 9 9 7. In this m a t t er the A p p l i c a nt s e e ks an urgent relief in the f o rm of declaratory orders c o u c h ed in the following t e r m s: " ( a) D i s p e n s i ng with periods of notice required by the rules on the a c c o u nt of u r g e n cy of this matter; ( b) D e c l a r i ng that the current S e n i or Administrative Staff of the University are entitled to be paid the car a l l o w a n ce in t e r ms of the n ew contract w h i ch spells o ut the a c a d e m ic t e r ms a nd conditions of service; (c) D e c l a r i ng that the current S e n i or Administrative Staff of the U n i v e r s i ty are for all intensive p u r p o s es to be treated in the s a me m a n n er as all other m e m b e rs of staff w ho are on a c a d e m ic t e r ms a nd conditions of service. ( d) Directing R e s p o n d e nt to p ay the costs hereof; (e) Granting A p p l i c a nt s u ch further a n d / or alternative relief as this H o n o u r a b le C o u rt m ay d e em it fit." A c c o r d i ng to the p a p e rs before me there are t wo t y p es of contract of e m p l o y m e nt w h i ch are the subject m a t t er of the litigation here. T h ey are the following: ( a) O ne is entitled " N a t i o n al University of L e s o t ho T E R MS OF S E N I OR S E R V I CE F OR A C A D E M IC L I B R A RY A ND A D M I N I S T R A T I VE S T A F F" Clause 1 of this contract reads thus:- " 1. A U T H O R I T Y: T h e se terms and conditions of service b e c a me operative f r om 1 July, 1 9 7 7 ." This contract is Annexture " C" in the papers before me a nd I shall hereinafter refer to it as "the O ld Contract." (b) T he other contract is entitled " N A T I O N AL U N I V E R S I TY OF L E S O T HO T E R MS OF S E R V I CE F OR A C A D E M IC S T A F F. Clause 2 thereof is to the following effect: " 2. A U T H O R I TY T h e se terms a nd conditions of service b e c a me operative f r om the First of July 1 9 9 6" This contract is A n n e x t u re " B" in the papers before me a nd I shall hereinafter refer to it as "the N ew C o n t r a c t ." I should m e n t i on at this stage that the N ew C o n t r a ct w as b r o u g ht a b o ut as a result of negotiations of a U n i on called L e s o t ho University T e a c h e rs a nd R e s e a r c h e rs U n i on ( L U T A R U) w i th the University C o u n c i l. T he b o ne of contention as far as this application is c o n c e r n ed is that unlike the old contract, the N ew Contract contains a provision for C ar A l l o w a n ce in t e n ns of clause 13 D thereof w h i ch reads as follows:- " 13 D. C AR A L L O W A N CE A m e m b er shall be entitled to 10 percent of basic salary as car allowance. M e m b e rs shall n o r m a l ly be e x p e c t ed to u se their vehicles for official a nd a p p r o v ed p u r p o s es w i t h o ut m i l e a ge claim within a radius of 35 k m ." T he w o rd " m e m b e r" referred to in the a b o ve m e n t i o n ed clause o b v i o u s ly m e a ns a m e m b er of the A c a d e m ic Staff as defined in C l a u se 1 of the N ew Contract. T h at clause r e a ds thus:- 1. D E F I N I T I ON T he t e rm a c a d e m ic shall d e n o te all m e m b e rs of staff in the T e a c h i n g, R e s e a r c h, E x t e n s i on a nd Senior Library C a d r e ." C l a u s es 4 a nd 5 of the N ew Contract are also significant as they provide as follows:- " 4. N A T U RE OF A P P O I N T M E NT All a p p o i n t m e n ts are g o v e r n ed by provisions of the National University A ct a nd Statutes, a nd a ny O r d i n a n ce or Regulations m a de thereunder (as shall be a m e n d ed f r om time to time). 5. G R A D ES A p p o i n t m e n ts u n d er these t e r ms of Service shall be in o ne of the following grades: (I) Professor (ii) Associate Professor (iii) Senior Lecturer/Senior Extension Librarian. Educator/Senior R e s e a r ch Fellow/Senior Documentalist/Senior (iv) Lecturer/Research Fellow/Extension Educator/Documentalist/Librarian. (v) Assistant Lecturer/Assistant R e s e a r ch Fellow/Assistant Extension Educator/Assistant Documentalist/Assistant Librarian. (vi) Assistant/Research T e a c h i ng Assistant/Extension E d u c a t or Assistant/Documentation Assistant/Teaching Assistant/Graduate Library Trainee." W h at is o b v i o us f r om the definition of the term " a c a d e m ic staff' a nd the grades in the N ew Contract is that m e m b e rs of Senior Administrative Staff for w h om the A p p l i c a nt herein claims to represent are excluded. T he latter m e m b e rs are still included in the O ld Contract under C l a u s es 2 a nd 4 thereof w h i ch read thus:- " 2. N A T U RE OF A P P O I N T M E N TS All appointments are governed by the provisions of the National University A ct a nd Statutes, a nd a ny O r d i n a n c es or Regulations m a de thereunder. 4. G R A D ES A p p o i n t m e n ts u n d er t h e se T e r ms of S e r v i ce shall be in o ne of the f o l l o w i ng g r a d es or their equivalent: ( a) A c a d e m i c: A p p o i n t m e n ts shall be of six g r a d e s, n a m e l y :- (I) (ii) (iii) (iv) ( v) (vi) P r o f e s s or A s s o c i a te P r o f e s s or S e n i or L e c t u r er L e c t u r er Assistant L e c t u r er A d m i n i s t r a t i v e / R e s e a r c l V T e a c h i ng Assistant. ( b) S e n i or A d m i n i s t r a t i ve a nd L i b r a ry Staff: A p p o i n t m e n ts shall be of six g r a d e s, n a m e l y :- (I) (ii) (iii) (vi) Registrar, Librarian B u r s ar D e p u ty Registrar, D e p u ty Librarian, Director of W o r ks S e n i or Assistant Registrar, S e n i or Assistant Librarian, or S e n i or Assistant B u r s a r, D e p u ty B u r s a r. ( v) (vi) Assistant Registrar, Assistant Assistant B u r s ar or D e an of S t u d e nt Affairs. A d m i n i s t r a t i ve Assistant." Assistant or S e n i or Librarian L i b r a ry or F or t he a v o i d a n ce of d o u bt I s h o u ld m e n t i on that it is c o m m on c a u se in this c a se that Applicant's alleged m e m b e rs n a m e ly t he S e n i or A d m i n i s t r a t i ve Staff h a ve n ot s i g n ed the N ew C o n t r a ct b ut h a ve s i g n ed the O ld o n e. It p r o v es convenient at this stage to refer to relevant legislation in the matter. T he N a t i o n al University of L e s o t ho (the R e s p o n d e n t) w as established as a b o dy c o r p o r a te by the N a t i o n al University A ct N o. 13 of 1 9 7 5. T he t e rm " a c a d e m ic staff" as far as the N a t i o n al University of L e s o t ho is c o n c e r n ed w as first defined in Section 2 of the N a t i o n al University of L e s o t ho A ct N o. 10 of 1 9 76 as follows:- " 2. In this A ct unless the c o n t e xt o t h e r w i se requires - " A c a d e m ic staff' m e a ns the V i c e - C h a n c e l l o r, P r o - V i c e- C h a n c e l l o r, a nd m e m b e rs of the teaching a nd research staff of the University." It is o b v i o us to me therefore that m e m b e rs of S e n i or A d m i n i s t r a t i ve Staff w e re n ot included in the t e rm " a c a d e m ic staff' in t e r ms of the N a t i o n al University A ct 1 9 7 6. S e c t i on 2 of the N a t i o n al University of L e s o t ho O r d er N o. 19 of 1 9 92 h o w e v er introduced S e n i or Administrative Staff into the t e rm " a c a d e m ic staff' in the f o l l o w i ng w o r d s :- " 2. In this O r d er unless the context o t h e r w i se requires, " a c a d e m ic staff m e a ns the V i c e - C h a n c e l l o r, the P r o - V i c e - C h a n c e l l o r, the T e a c h i ng a nd R e s e a r ch staff, Senior Administrative staff S e n i or Library staff, d o c u m e n t a l i s ts a nd other m e m b e rs of staff of the N a t i o n al University a p p o i n t ed on a c a d e m ic t e r ms of service." 7 . T he application before me is b a s ed on the a b o ve m e n t i o n ed section. It is A p p l i c a n t 's c o n t e n t i on that b e c a u se m e m b e rs of S e n i or Administrative staff h a ve b e en statutorily defined as m e m b e rs of the a c a d e m ic staff therefore t h ey are automatically entitled to e n j oy the benefits that are c o n t a i n ed in the N ew C o n t r a ct m o re particularly car a l l o w a n c es n o t w i t h s t a n d i ng the fact that they h a ve n ot s i g n ed t he N ew C o n t r a c t. It is also s o u g ht to p e r s u a de the court to i n v o ke the constitutional principles of equality of treatment a nd the principle against discrimination. In p a r a g r a ph 2 of h er a n s w e r i ng affidavit ' M A S E F I N E LA M P H U T H I NG w ho is admittedly the Registrar of the R e s p o n d e nt University a nd as s u ch Secretary of the University C o u n c il states as follows:- " P O I N TS IN L I M I NE T he f o l l o w i ng points of l aw will be t a k en in l e m i ne (sic) by the r e s p o n d e n t 's c o u n s el at the h e a r i ng hereof:- 1. 2. , 3. T h is is a m a t t er that falls within the jurisdiction of the L a b o ur C o u r t, a nd therefore this H o n o u r a b le C o u rt h as no jurisdiction to entertain this matter. T h e re is no u r g e n cy in this matter, a nd there is no r e a s on w hy applicant did n ot serve the p a p e rs u p on the r e s p o n d e nt in the n o r m al w a y. A p p l i c a nt h as no locus standi to e n f o r ce p r a y er ( b) in as m u ch as no legal enforceable right in respect of the said p r a y er exists at the instance of applicant." At the c o m m e n c e m e nt of the hearing of the m a t t er before me M r. M o s i to for the Respondent withdrew the first point in limine based on jurisdiction. The points in limine were therefore restricted to the question of urgency and locus standi only. Purely as a matter of convenience I directed that the points in limine be argued along with the merits of the application. In doing so I recalled the remarks of this court in Basotho National Party v The Management Board. Lesotho Highlands Revenue Fund and 2 others CIV/APN/335/95 (unreported) where in dealing with a similar situation I had occasion to state:- "It is therefore necessary to examine the entire body of evidence from all the affidavits and documents before me to determine whether despite lack of specific averments thereto the Applicant nevertheless does have the required locus standi. It was partly for this reason that the court ruled that the question of locus standi be argued together with the merits of the case as deposed to in the affidavits and having regard to the law and any relevant statutes. The other reason of course was in case I found myself unable to make an immediate ruling on the point in limine which might have the effect of concluding the matter in favour of either party without the necessity of going into the merits. I find myself in very good company in this approach as it has become increasingly common for the question of locus standi to be considered together with the merits of the claim. See Kendrick v Community . Development Board 1983 in S. A. 532. See also The Administrator. Transvaal and The Firs Investments (Pty) Ltd. V Johannesburg City Council 1971 (1) S. A. 56 (A) in which the question of locus standi was raised for the first time in the appeal." I discern the need to adopt the said remarks herein as indeed they are apposite to the case before me. I proceed then to deal with the remaining points in limine. 1. That there is no urgency in this matter. In paragraph 4.3 of his founding affidavit J O S E PH M A E M E LA H L A L E LE d e p o s es as to u r g e n cy as follows: " T h is matter is urgent in that the other m e m b e rs of staff w ho are on a c a d e m ic terms a nd conditions of service continue to enjoy this benefit (car a l l o w a n c e) to the exclusion of the current Senior Administrative Staff. T he University Council h ad to attend to the n e e ds of L e s o t ho University Teachers a nd Researcher U n i on to avoid an i m m i n e nt strike w h i ch w as threatened by the m e m b e rs of that union. It is my genuine belief that unless this matter is attended to urgently m e m b e rs of Applicant m ay go on strike as they h a ve b e en very patient thus far." T he Respondent's a n s w er to this allegation is contained in paragraph 5 of the a n s w e r i ng affidavit o f ' M A S E F T N E L A M P H U T H I NG w ho avers as follows: " 5. 4.3 T h e re is no urgency in this matter. This H o n o u r a b le C o u rt will be t a k en at r a n s om through intimidations of strikes. If such a strike takes place to w h i ch it is submitted e m p l o y e es are by l aw entitled to resort to the respondent will take appropriate steps and\ counter m e a s u r es to protect itself against the d a m a g i ng of its business by e m p l o y e es w ho w o u ld in breach of their contracts, (sic). A n y w ay the respondent will cross that bridge w h en it c o m es to it." It is also important to bear in m i nd that in paragraph 3.5 of his founding affidavit J O S E PH M A E M E LA H L A L E LE himself states that the r e c o m m e n d a t i on to separate the cadres in the a c a d e m ic staff w as a p p r o v ed by the University Council as far b a ck as N o v e m b er 1 9 9 5. Y et there is no evidence before me that the Applicant ever took up the matter with the R e s p o n d e nt n or did it resort to the L a b o ur C o de 1 9 92 to h a ve the matter resolved. In this regard Section 2 25 of the L a b o ur C o de O r d e r, 1 9 92 p r o v i d es thus:- " 2 2 5. Settlement of trade disputes (1) w h e re there is a trade dispute a nd the L a b o ur C o m m i s s i o n er is of the opinion that suitable m e a ns for settling the dispute a l r e a dy exists by virtue of the provisions of a ny a g r e e m e nt r e a c h ed b e t w e en the parties, he or s he m ay refer the dispute for settlement in a c c o r d a n ce w i th those provisions. ( 2) W h e re the L a b o ur C o m m i s s i o n er d o es not refer the dispute for settlement u n d er subsection ( 1) or w h e re u p on s u ch reference there h as b e en a failure to r e a ch a settlement, the L a b o ur C o m m i s s i o n er shall immediately:- (a) ( b) inquire into the c a u s es a nd c i r c u m s t a n c es of the dispute; a nd t a ke s u ch steps as s e em e x p e d i e nt to p r o m o te a settlement of the dispute." F u r t h e r m o r e, as earlier stated the N ew C o n t r a ct providing for car a l l o w a n c es to the m e m b e rs thereof c a me into operation on the 1st d ay of July, 1 9 9 6. Y et the present application w as o n ly filed w i th the Registrar of this H o n o u r a n b le C o u rt on the 18th N o v e m b e r, 1 9 96 w h i ch is a d e l ay of full four ( 4) m o n t h s. . J O S E PH M A E M E LA H L A L E LE alleges in p a r a g r a ph 3.9 of his f o u n d i ng affidavit that the A p p l i c a nt protested against the aforesaid p a y m e nt of car a l l o w a n c es a nd that "the University C o u n c il h as refused to deal w i th the said protest or h as d e c i d ed to ignore it completely." 1 o b s e r ve h o w e v er that the d e p o n e nt m e r e ly m a k es b a re unsubstantiated allegations herein. O n ce m o re no resort w as m a de to S e c t i on 2 25 of the L a b o ur C o de O r d e r, 1 9 9 2. B ut e v en a s s u m i ng that the A p p l i c a nt h ad in fact unsuccessfully protested against the said p a y m e nt of car a l l o w a n c es I do n ot t h en s ee h ow that in itself c o u ld s u d d e n ly turn the m a t t er into o ne of u r g e n c y. In my v i ew the real r e a s on that w as a d v a n c ed for the perceived u r g e n cy in the m a t t er is that stated by J O S E PH M A E M E LA H L A L E LE in p a r a g r a ph 4.3 of his f o u n d i ng affidavit n a m e ly that:- " U n l e ss this matter is attended to urgently m e m b e rs of A p p l i c a nt m ay go on strike as they h a ve b e en v e ry patient t h us far." O n ce m o re this allegation r e m a i ns unsubstantiated. T h e re is no e v i d e n ce before me that m e m b e rs of A p p l i c a nt will (as o p p o s ed to m a y) in fact go on strike. T h is s t a t e m e nt therefore is speculative. T h e re is no d o u bt in my m i nd h o w e v er that the a b o ve m e n t i o n ed s t a t e m e nt clearly a m o u n ts to threats by the Applicant that its m e m b e rs m ay go on strike unless the court h e a rs their c a se as a m a t t er of u r g e n c y. In my o p i n i on this is a classical c a se of a litigant creating its o wn u r g e n c y. T h at c a n n ot be tolerated. I c o n s i d er therefore that the p e r c e i v ed u r g e n cy is n ot g e n u i ne at all. W h at is m o r e, it m u st be r e c o r d ed that this court t a k es a v e ry d im v i ew of the a b o ve m e n t i o n ed threats w h i ch a m o u nt to intimidation of the court by the A p p l i c a n t. T he A p p l i c a nt w as ill a d v i s ed to e m p l oy this t y pe of a rm twisting tactic w h i ch c an only bring o ur justice s y s t em into disrepute if it is tolerated. C o n s e q u e n t ly this court d i s a p p r o v es of this t y pe of attitude in the strongest possible t e r m s. I shall return to this a s p e ct later. Suffice it to s ay that the Legislature in its o wn w i s d om h as set up a m a c h i n e ry in t e r ms of the aforesaid Section 2 25 of the L a b o ur C o de O r d er 1 9 92 for settlement of l a b o ur disputes. It is my c o n s i d e r ed v i ew therefore that until the A p p l i c a nt h as e x h a u s t ed his r e m e d i es in t e r ms of the L a b o ur C o de O r d er it c a n n ot be said that the matter is urgent. T h e re m u st first be a d e a d - l o ck r e a c h ed in the dispute in question after the intervention of the L a b o ur C o m m i s s i o n e r. T h is h as n ot b e en d o ne in the present c a s e. In the circumstances as aforesaid I h a ve c o me to the c o n c l u s i on that there is no u r g e n cy in the matter. 2. T h at A p p l i c a nt h as no locus standi to e n f o r ce p r a y er (b) in as m u ch as no legal enforceable right in respect of the said p r a y er exists at the instance of the A p p l i c a n t. In M a rs Inc v C a n dy W o r ld (Pty) L td 1 9 91 ( 1 ) S . A. 5 67 ( A) at 5 75 N e s t a dt JA h ad this to say:- "In a c c o r d a n ce w i th the general rule that it is for the party instituting p r o c e e d i n gs to allege a nd p r o ve that he h as l o c us standi, the o n us of establishing that issue rests u p on the A p p l i c a n t. It is an o n us in the true s e n s e; the overall o n us ( S o u th C a pe C o r p o r a t i on (Pty) L t d. V E n g i n e e r i ng M a n a g e m e nt Services (Pty) Ltd. 1 9 77 (3) S. A. ( A) at 5 48 B)." I respectfully associate m y s e lf w i th these r e m a r k s. It is also important to b e ar in m i nd the r e m a r ks of T e b b u tt J in A A IL ( S A) v Muslim Judicial Council 1983 (4) 855 at 861 to the following effect:- "It is quite clear that in order to determine whether an association possesses the characteristics of a universitas the court has to consider the nature and objects of the association as well as the constitution. The constitution is clearly, the most important." I entirely agree. In paragraph 2 of his founding affidavit J O S E PH M A E M E LA H L A L E LE deposes as follows:- "Applicant is S E N I OR U N I V E R S I TY S T A FF U N I ON a trade union duly established under Part XIII of the Labour Code 1992 carrying on business at the R o ma Campus of the National University of Lesotho in the Maseru district which consists of staff members appointed on academic terms and conditions of service and members of staff appointed on Senior Administrative terms and conditions of service by the National University of Lesotho as well as interested senior staff." It is significant that nowhere does J O S E PH M A E M E LA H L A L E LE allege and prove that Applicant has locus standi. What is worse the constitution of the Applicant union has not been attached to the papers before me. In the absence of the constitution this court is therefore unable to determine the powers and rights of the Applicant and whether such powers and rights include representation of the interests of members of the Senior Administrative Staff. In this regard I further attach significance to the fact that none of the ordinary members of the Senior Administrative Staff has sworn a supporting affidavit to this application. M r. P h e ko for the Applicant has tried to o v e r c o me this hurdle by arguing that because it is not disputed that Applicant is a trade union therefore it has the right to represent its m e m b e r s. M r. P h e ko farther submits that it is not disputed for that matter that Applicant is in fact representing its m e m b e rs in this matter: I do not agree. In fact I observe that there is no allegation altogether in the papers before me that Applicant is representing its m e m b e rs in this matter. N or do I think it suffices for the Applicant merely to s h ow that it is a trade union. In my opinion a trade union is not necessarily relieved from alleging a nd proving that it has locus standi to sue in the absence of a constitution to that effect. In this regard it is necessary to bear in m i nd the definition of the term "trade union." Section 3 of the L a b o ur C o de Order, 1 9 92 defines the term trade union as follows:- "Trade union m e a ns any combination, either temporary or permanent, often or m o re employees or workers, the principal purposes of w h i ch are, u n d er its constitution, the representation a nd promotion of employees' interests and the regulation of relations between e m p l o y e es a nd employers, or b e t w e en e m p l o y e e s, w h e t h er such combination w o u ld or w o u ld not, if the c o de h ad not b e en enacted, h a ve b e en d e e m ed to h a ve b e en an unlawful combination by reason of its purposes being in restraint of trade" ( my underlining). In my j u d g m e nt the rights a nd p o w e rs of a trade union are derived f r om its constitution, I am fortified in this v i ew that I take by the fact that apart from the definition of the term "trade union" in Section 3 of the L a b o ur C o de n o w h e re are rights a nd p o w e rs of a trade union specifically spelt out in the C o d e. In the c i r c u m s t a n c es I h a ve c o me to the c o n c l u s i on that the A p p l i c a n t 's failure to attach its constitution to the application b e f o re me is fatal a nd that c o n s e q u e n t ly the A p p l i c a nt h as failed to establish l o c us standi. I turn n ow to consider w h e t h er the A p p l i c a nt h as l o c us standi in the s e n se of h a v i ng a direct a nd substantial interest c a p a b le of legal e n f o r c e m e nt in the subject m a t t er of the application a nd in the o u t c o me thereof. As earlier stated A p p l i c a n t 's c a se rests solely on the statutory definition of t he t e rm " a c a d e m ic staff' as d e f i n ed by S e c t i on 2 of the national U n i v e r s i ty of L e s o t ho O r d e r, 1 9 9 2. T he question that i m m e d i a t e ly arises therefore is w h e t h er this definition automatically e m b r a c es the t e r ms a nd conditions of e m p l o y m e nt of m e m b e rs of the S e n i or A d m i n i s t r a t i ve Staff. T he L e a r n ed author G i b s o n: M e r c a n t i le a nd C o m p a ny L aw states as f o l l o ws on p a ge 2 2 2 :- " In g e n e r al statutes do n ot p r o v i de a contract for t he parties." I entirely a g r e e. In C a s s e r ly v S t u b bs 1 9 16 T PD 3 10 at 3 12 W e s s e ls J stated the f o l l o w i ng principle:- "It is a w e l l - k n o wn c a n on of construction that we c a n n ot infer that a statute intends to alter the c o m m on l a w. T he statute m u st either explicitly s ay that it is the intention of the legislature to alter the c o m m on l a w, or the inference f r om the o r d i n a n ce m u st be s u ch that we c an c o me to no other conclusion than that the legislature did h a ve s u ch an intention". T he A p p e l l a te Division also d e c i d ed in the s a me vein in D h a n a b a k i um v S u b r a m a n i a n& A n o t h er 1 9 43 A D. 1 6 0 at 1 67 w h e re Tindall JA held:- "It is a s o u nd rule to construe a statute in c o n f o r m i ty w i th the c o m m on l aw rather t h an against it, e x c e pt w h e re a nd so far as the statute is plainly i n t e n d ed to alter the c o m m on l a w ." I entirely a g r ee w i th the principles e n u n c i a t ed in these cases. W h at then is the c o m m on l aw in this m a t t e r? In my j u d g m e nt the t e r ms a nd c o n d i t i o ns of service in individual e m p l o y m e nt relationships are d e r i v ed f r om the c o m m on l aw of contract. I p r o c e ed t h en to d e t e r m i ne w h e t h er the N a t i o n al University of L e s o t ho O r d e r, 1 9 92 h as altered the c o m m on l aw of contract in the matter. As a starting point I o b s e r ve that the definition of the t e rm " a c a d e m ic staff' d o es not prescribe that m e m b e rs of a c a d e m ic staff shall h o ld identical contracts or t e r ms of service, rights or benefits n or d o es it a t t e m pt to regulate s u ch t e r ms a nd conditions of service of m e m b e rs of the a c a d e m ic staff. I am satisfied that if the Legislature h ad i n t e n d ed that m e m b e rs of the a c a d e m ic staff s h o u ld be treated equally irrespective of seniority, qualifications, e x p e r i e n c e, merit, efficiency etc. it w o u ld h a ve said so expressly. As an e x a m p le I c a n n ot i m a g i ne that it c o u ld h a ve b e en the intention of the Legislature to treat the m an at the t op of the a c a d e m ic staff n a m e ly the V i c e - C h a n c e l l or equally w i th the m an at the b o t t om of the c a d r e. In the circumstances therefore I h a ve c o me to the conclusion that the N a t i o n al University of L e s o t ho O r d e r, 1 9 92 particularly Section 2 t h e r e of h as n ot altered the c o m m on l aw of contract of service. A c c o r d i n g ly I find that the t e r ms a nd conditions of service of e m p l o y e es of the National University of L e s o t ho are to be f o u nd in the contracts of e m p l o y m e n t. In this r e g a rd S e c t i on 56 ( 5) of the N a t i o n al University of L e s o t ho O r d e r, 1 9 92 p r e s e r v es existing contracts of e m p l o y m e nt as follows:- "All m e m b e rs of the a c a d e m ic staff a nd other officers a nd servants of the U n i v e r s i ty a p p o i n t ed or c o n t i n u ed in office u n d er the: N a t i o n al University A ct 1 9 76 a nd in office at the c o m m e n c e m e nt of this o r d er shall subject to this O r d e r, c o n t i n ue to h o ld their offices in t e r ms of their a p p o i n t m e n ts thereof respectively u n d er a nd for the p u r p o s es of this O r d er a nd shall, w i t h o ut further or other a p p o i n t m e nt be d e e m ed to be a p p o i n t ed u n d er this O r d e r ." ( My underling). T he u se of the w o rd shall in this section clearly indicates that the section is p e r e m p t o r y. I c o n s i d er therefore that the old contracts are still valid a nd that in o r d er for a ny e m p l o y ee to w r i g g le out of s u ch contract a nd enter into the current contract h e / s he m u st first negotiate w i th the e m p l o y er n a m e ly the R e s p o n d e nt University failing w h i ch he/she m u st f o l l ow the trade dispute m a c h i n e ry of the L a b o ur C o de as a b o ve stated. Section 10 of the National University of L e s o t ho O r d e r, 1 9 92 p r o v i d es in part as follows:- " 1 0. ( 1) T he C o u n c il shall be t he s u p r e me g o v e r n i ng b o dy of the University. ( 2) S u b j e ct to this O r d er a nd the Statutes, the C o u n c il shall m a n a ge a nd control all the affairs, c o n c e r ns a nd p r o p e r ty of t he University a nd m ay act in all m a t t e rs c o n c e r n i ng t he U n i v e r s i ty in s u ch m a n n er as a p p e a rs to it best calculated to p r o m o te the interests a nd functions of the U n i v e r s i ty a nd in particular a nd w i t h o ut limiting the generality of the f o r e g o i ng shall h a ve a nd m ay exercise t he f o l l o w i ng p o w e r s, (a) regulate its o wn p r o c e d u r e s; (c) enter into, v a r y, carry o ut or rescind contracts on b e h a lf of the University; ( k) establish s u ch administrative or service sections or units as it d e e ms fit a nd f r om t i me to t i me abolish or v a ry the constitution of a ny s u ch administrative or service section or unit; (n) provide for the welfare of all persons in the employment of the University including the provision of p e n s i on a nd retirement benefits. ( q) subject to this O r d e r, to m a ke statutes, o r d i n a n c es a nd regulations a nd to c o n f i rm a ny regulations d r a wn up by the S e n a te in p u r s u a n ce of its p o w e rs a nd u n d er this O r d e r ." I am satisfied therefore that in order to discharge its functions as a b o ve stated the University C o u n c il w as given carte b l a n c he to regulate its o wn p r o c e d u r es by statutes, o r d i n a n c es a nd regulations. S ee S e h l o ho M o k a p e la v T he M i n i s t er of H o me Affairs a nd 4 others C of A ( C i v) N o. 16 of 1 9 95 (unreported). Statute 24 ( 4) of the R e s p o n d e nt University significantly p r o v i d es that: " 4. E v e ry m e m b er of the a c a d e m ic staff h o l ds office u n d er the t e r ms of this Statute a nd of a ny O r d i n a n c es a nd R e g u l a t i o ns m a de u n d er it, a nd of a ny R e s o l u t i on of the C o u n c i l, a nd u p on s u ch t e r ms of his contract of e m p l o y m e nt as are n ot inconsistent w i th this Statute a nd a ny s u ch O r d i n a n c e s, R e g u l a t i o n s, a nd R e s o l u t i o n s ." ( my underlining). S u b - s e c t i on 23 of Statute 24 is also instructive a nd it p r o v i d es that :- " 2 3. T he C o u n c il m ay m a ke O r d i n a n c es or R e g u l a t i o ns w i th respect to the t e r m s, conditions of services, a nd m a n n er of a p p o i n t m e nt of the M e m b e rs of the A c a d e m ic Staff of the University, a nd m ay f r om t i me to t i me v a ry or r e v o ke a ny s u ch o r d i n a n c es or R e g u l a t i o n s, albeit n ot to the d i s a d v a n t a ge of a ny M e m b er of the A c a d e m ic Staff w i th respect to the t e r ms a nd conditions of his current period of e m p l o y m e n t ." F r om the f o r e g o i ng I am satisfied that the R e s p o n d e nt University h as unfettered p o w er a n d / or discretion to enter into a ny contracts w i th individual e m p l o y e e s. A c c o r d i n g ly I find that b o th the O ld Contract a nd the N ew C o n t r a ct are valid contracts as b e t w e en the R e s p o n d e nt University a nd the individual e m p l o y e es w ho are signatories thereto. I c a n n ot then see h ow a p e r s on w ho is n ot a signatory to these contracts c an validly c l a im benefits arising t h e r e f r o m. Y et in e s s e n ce that is precisely the A p p l i c a n t 's c a se b e f o re m e. In D a l r y m p le v Colonial Treasurer 1 9 10 T . S. 3 72 I n n es CJ o b s e r v ed at p a ge 3 7 9 :- " T he general rule of o ur l aw is that no m an c an s ue in respect of a w r o n g f ul act, unless it constitutes the b r e a ch of a d u ty o w ed to h im by the w r o n g d o e r, or unless it c a u s es h im s o me d a m a ge in l a w. T h is principle r u ns t h r o u gh the w h o le of o ur jurisprudence. It is n ot c o n f i n ed m e r e ly to the civil side A nd the rule applies to w r o n g f ul acts w h i ch affect the public, as well as to torts c o m m i t t ed against private individuals." I entirely agree with these r e m a r ks w h i ch are apposite to the c a se b e f o re m e. In his b o ok on Administrative L a w, L a w r e n ce B a x t er states as f o l l o ws at p a ge 6 5 2 :- "In o r d er to establish his standing, the challenger m u st c l a im that: 1. S o me legal right or r e c o g n i z ed interest is at stake, 2. 3. T he right or interest is direct; a nd T he right or interest is a p e r s o n al ( a nd possibly special) o n e ." In this r e g a rd the r e m a r ks of A a r on JA in L e s o t ho C o n g r e ss of F r ee T r a de U n i o ns v Ts'eliso R a m o c h e la a nd 3 others 1 9 8 2 - 84 L LR 4 42 are apposite in this case. T h is is w h at he stated at p a ge 4 47 on the question of locus standi:- " the A p p e l l a nt is n ot a m e m b er of the L F T U: It is a rival federation Appellant's interests m ay be affected by a decision on these matters, b ut it h as no legal rights c a p a b le of e n f o r c e m e nt arising t h e r e f r o m ." In v i ew of the fact that neither the A p p l i c a nt n or its alleged m e m b e rs h a ve signed the N ew Contract then I h a ve c o me to the c o n c l u s i on that the A p p l i c a nt h as no right c a p a b le of legal e n f o r c e m e nt arising f r om s u ch contract. It c a n n ot c l a im car a l l o w a n c es on b e h a lf of its m e m b e rs b e c a u se s u ch a l l o w a n c es o n ly arise f r om the signing of the N ew Contract. A c c o r d i n g ly I h a ve c o me to the c o n c l u s i on that A p p l i c a nt h as no locus standi to s ue in this matter. N or d o es this court find that there is a ny merit in M r. P h e k o 's s u b m i s s i on b a s ed on the so called discrimination. I c o n s i d er that s u ch is the nature of l a b o ur relations that differences in the t e r ms a nd conditions of service a m o n g st individual e m p l o y e es are b o u nd to o c c ur w h e re t h ey h o ld different contracts or w h e re t h ey do n ot p e r f o rm identical or the s a me t y pe of w o rk or e v en w h e re t h ey differ in t e r ms of seniority, e x p e r i e n c e, qualifications etc. T he list is n ot exhaustive. In this r e g a rd the decision of the Industrial C o u rt of the R e p u b l ic of S o u th A f r i ca in N a t i o n al U n i on of M i ne W o r k e rs v H e n ry G o u ld ( P t y) Ltd. & A n o t h er ( 1 9 8 8 ) IL J 1 1 49 is v e ry instructive. T he court h e ld as f o l l o ws at p a ge 5 83 :- " W h e re a s y s t em of plural representation is in existence as in this c a s e, it necessarily h o l ds w i t h in it the possibility that the principle of equality will be sacrificed w h e re the m e m b e rs of a l a b o ur unit of e q u a ls elect to b e l o ng to different g r o u p i n gs t h e y, in fact, elect to go their s e p a r a te w a ys a nd this at the e x p e n se of f o r m er equality. T he result is that it b e c o m es legitimate for the e m p l o y er to b a r g a in or deal separately w i th t h e se t wo or m o re g r o u p s. It f o l l o ws that e q u a ls p e r f o r m i ng the s a me w o rk m ay be subject to different t e r ms a nd conditions of e m p l o y m e n t. In t h e se c i r c u m s t a n c es o ne g r o up c a n n ot be h e a rd to c o m p l a in a b o ut t he a b s e n ce of equality b e t w e en their t e r ms a nd conditions of . e m p l o y m e nt a nd that prevailing as r e g a r ds the other g r o u p. T he potential for inequality a nd unfairness is inherent in their a r r a n g e m e n t ." I respectfully agree w i th these principles w h i ch a p p ly w i th e q u al force in the c a se b e f o re m e. In the result therefore I h a ve c o me to the conclusion that both points raised in limine as aforesaid m u st succeed. Since I have heard full arguments on the merits as well I should mention that this application further falls to be dismissed for the following reasons: (1) Since the p o w er of the court to grant a declaratory order is discretionary I feel that it w o u ld be setting a dangerous precedent if this court acceded to the intimidations and threats m a de by the Applicant to the court as earlier stated. T he court therefore m a r ks its displeasure at this type of attitude by refusing to exercise its discretion in favour of the Applicant in the circumstances. (2) T h e re is a material dispute of fact on whether all m e m b e rs of the academic staff w e re appointed on s a me terms and conditions of service and entitled to the s a me benefits. In this regard J O S E PH M A E M E LA H L A L E LE deposes as follows in paragraph 3.2 of his founding affidavit:- "All m e m b e rs of the academic staff w e re appointed on s a me terms a nd conditions of service a nd entitled to the s a me benefits depending on whether or not o ne w as e m p l o y ed on the p e r m a n e nt establishment or on contract." T he Respondent's answer to this allegation is contained in paragraph 4 of the a n s w e r i ng affidavit of M A S E F I N E LA M P H U T H T NG in the following w o r d s :- "I d e ny categorically that all m e m b e rs of a c a d e m ic staff w e re appointed on the s a me t e r ms a nd conditions of service a nd entitled to the s a me benefits a nd put d e p o n e nt to the p r o of thereof. I w i sh to i n f o rm this H o n o u r a b le C o u rt that there exists a collective bargaining a g r e e m e nt b e t w e en L U T A RU as the representative of its m e m b e rs a nd the r e s p o n d e nt herein. A c o py of the s a me is h e r e u n to attached a nd m a r k ed " A ". Pursuant to the said a g r e e m e nt s o me of the m e m b e rs of L U T A RU o p t ed for n ew t e r ms a nd conditions of service w h i ch t h ey n ow h o ld a p p o i n t m e n t s. A c o py of the said contractual t e r ms a nd conditions is h e r e u n to attached a nd m a r k ed " B ". T h is H o n o u r a b le C o u rt will realise that m e m b e rs of applicant h o ld contracts t e r ms of service different f r om " A ". T h ey h o ld t e r ms a nd conditions of service as reflected on A n n e x u re " C" a b o v e. Contracts are different a nd it c a n n ot therefore be correct to s ay that m e m b e rs of a c a d e m ic staff h o ld s a me t e r ms a nd condition, a nd that they are entitled to the s a me benefits. I h a ve b e en legally a d v i s ed a nd verily believe s a me to be true a nd correct that benefits, rights a nd privileges arise o ut of a contract of e m p l o y m e n t, not definitions in the University O r d e r, 1 9 9 2. C o n s e q u e n t l y, contents h e r e of are d e n i ed a nd applicant is p ut to the p r o of thereof." In M a h o m ed v M a h o m ed a nd others 1 9 76 (3) S. A. 151 at 1 54 M a r a is J stated as follows:- " T he position n ow is that the courts w o u ld entertain (not necessarily grant) an application for a declaratory o r d er if neither an infringement n or a c o n c r e te dispute exists, the o n ly condition p r e c e d e nt b e i ng that the declaratory order, if granted, w o u ld b i nd o ne or m o re interested parties as well as the A p p l i c a n t, w ho m u st be a party "interested" in a decision on a contingent right or obligation". W i th respect I find that these r e m a r ks are apposite to the c a se b e f o re m e. ( 3) On the principle of the rule laid d o wn in P l a s c o n - E v a ns Paints v V an R i e b e e ck Paints 1 9 84 ( 3) S . A. 6 23 ( A) I a s s u me t he correctness of the version of the R e s p o n d e nt University on t he aforesaid dispute of fact. S ee also N a t i o n al University of L e s o t ho Students U n i on v N a t i o n al University of L e s o t ho a nd 2 others C of A ( C i v ) N o . l0 of 1 9 9 0. In the c i r c u m s t a n c es therefore I h a ve c o me to the c o n c l u s i on that this application o u g ht n ot to s u c c e ed a nd it is a c c o r d i n g ly d i s m i s s ed w i th costs. M . M. R a m o d i b e di J U D GE 18th d ay of February, 1 9 9 7. F or Applicant: F or R e s p o n d e n t: M r. P h e ko M r. M o s i to