Senvubu v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 497 of 2015) [2022] UGCA 354 (14 October 2022) | Murder | Esheria

Senvubu v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 497 of 2015) [2022] UGCA 354 (14 October 2022)

Full Case Text

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SENVUBU FRED::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

#### **VERSUS**

### UGANDA:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

(Appeal from the judgment of Byabakama Mugenyi, J (as he then was) dated 13<sup>th</sup> October 2014 in Fort Portal Criminal Case No. 014 of 2012)

#### **JUDGEMENT OF THE COURT**

#### **Introduction**

This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court of Uganda at Fort Portal, sitting at Masindi, in which the trial judge convicted the appellant of the offence of murder, contrary to sections 188 and 189 of the Penal Code Act (PCA), and sentenced him to 27 years' imprisonment.

#### **Background**

The facts that were accepted by the trial judge were that on the $1^{st}$ day of January 2011, the appellant had a quarrel with the deceased. In the course of the quarrel he threatened that he would kill him. On the 5<sup>th</sup> January 2011, the deceased left his home and went to work at his shop 20 in Kiduuma Trading Centre. He did not return to this home and was never seen alive again. A search was mounted for him and in the course of it, one Byaruhanga Patrick was arrested. He revealed that the deceased's body was dumped in the Nguse River. The said Byaruhanga then led the Police to a spot where he told them that the appellant and

he dumped the body. It was then retrieved from the spot he identified to the search party, which included village mates and Police.

The appellant disappeared and was not seen in the village after the 5\*, January 2011 until he returned on 2oth December 2011. He was then

- 5 arrested in connection with the murder and tried for it. He offered his defence on oath stating an alibi but called no witnesses to support it. The trial judge believed the testimonies of witnesses called by the prosecution, found him guiity of the offence and sentenced him as already stated. He now appeals against both conviction and sentence on the following grounds: 10 - 1. The learned trial judge erred in law and fact when he held that the appellant's alibi was disbelievable (sic) without considering the contradictions and inconsistencies of the prosecution witnesses who failed to place the appellant at the scene of the crime and as such occasioned a miscarriage ofjustice.

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2. The trial judge erred in law and fact when he passed a manifestly harsh and excessive sentence of 27 years' imprisonment against the appellant, thereby occasioning (a) gross miscarriage ofjustice.

The appellant prayed that the appeal be allowed and that the conviction and sentence be set aside. In the alternative, that the sentence of 27 years' imprisonment be substituted with a lesser sentence. The respondent opposed the appeal. 20

### Representation

At the hearing of the appeal on 7s August 2022, the appellant was represented by learned counsei, Ms Angella Bahenzire on State Brief. Mr Sam Oola, learned Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions represented the respondent. 25

Counsel for both parties liled written submissions before the hearing date as directed by court. They each prayed that these be adopted as their submissions in the appeal and the prayers were granted. This appeal was therefore disposed of on the basis of written submissions only.

## Determination of the Appeal

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The duty of this court as a first appellate court is stated in rule 3O (1) ofthe Court ofAppeal Rules. It is to reappraise the whole ofthe evidence before the trial court and draw from it inferences offact. The court then comes to its own decision on the facts and the law but must be cautious of the fact that it did not observe the witnesses testify. (See Bogere Mosea & Another v Uganda, Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. I of 19971

In resolving this appeal, we considered the submissions of both counsel and the authorities cited and those not cited that are relevant to the appeal. We reviewed the submissions in respect of each of the grounds immediately before we disposed of each of them. We addressed the grounds of appeal in their chronological order. 15

# Ground I

In this ground of appeal, the appellant complained that the trial judge came to the conclusion that the appellant's alibi was unbelievable on the basis of evidence adduced by the prosecution that was riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions. 20

## Submissions of Counsel

In this regard, Ms Bahenzire referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bogere Moses v Uganda (supral for the submission that in 25

circumstances where the accused person denies the offence and adduces evidence to show that he was elsewhere at the time of the offence, it is incumbent upon the court to evaluate the evidence of both parties and give reasons why one and not the other version is

5 acceptable.

Counsel then pointed us to the testimonies of PW2, PW3 and PW6 who all testified that they saw the appellant on the sth January 2Oll, al different places and times within Kiduuma. She emphasised the testimony of PW2, wife to the deceased, who stated that perhaps the appellant left the viliage on the l"t January 2011 because she did not see him after that date. And that according to PW3, on 5th January 2011, he saw the appellant who told him that he had a job for him, to carry a dead body to a place he would direct him to. She went on to submit that according to PW6, he saw the appellant on sth January 2O11, but the deceased disappeared on 4th January 2Oll.

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On the basis of these 3 testimonies, counsel for the appeilant asserted that none of the witnesses called by the prosecution put the appellant at the scene of the crime because they each met the appellant at a different place and time. That the iearned trial judge therefore erred when he found, at page 4 of his judgment, that the appellant told a lie by stating that he was not in the village at the time the offence was committed. Further that his disappearance was incompatible with innocence. She concluded that though the trial judge took note of the inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence, he did not consider them before he came to his finding about the guilt of the appellant and

so occasioned a miscarriage of justice. She relied on the decision in Obwalatum Francis v Uganda, Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 3O of 2015 for the principles observed by the courts in cases where there are inconsistencies and contradictions in evidence and prayed 25

that in this case, this court finds that the appellant was never placed at the scene of the crime. And that therefore, his alibi was more believable than the evidence that was adduced against him.

5 In reply, Mr Oola relied on the decision of the East Africa Court of Appeal in Simoni Mugoke v Uganda [19581 EA 715, for the submission that where a case turns exclusively on circumstantial evidence, before convicting the accused the court must find that the inculpatory facts are incompatible with the innocence of the accused, and incapable of explaaation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt.

Counsel then pointed out that ground 1 of the appeal was mixed up because the appellant compiained about the triai judge's linding that the appellant's a/ibi was unbelievable, but went on to complain that he did not consider the inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence. He then charged that the first ground of appeal contravened rule 66 (2) 10

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of the Rules of this Court. However, counsel went on to address the complaint, an indication that he clearly understood what was required of him. We therefore did not delve into his complaint that the ground as framed contravened rule 66 (2) of the Rules of this Court. 15

Mr Oola went on to submit that in coming to his decision, the trial judge relied on 5 pieces of circumstantial evidence, viz: (i) the threat by the appellant to the deceased that he would kill him, issued on l"t January 2011; (ii) the confession by the appellant to PW3 that he killed a person and wanted him to help dispose of the body; (iii) the statement by Byaruhanga Patrick (co-accused who confessed to participation in the crime as an accessory after the fact and was convicted) to PWS that the appellant asked him to dispose of the body and the fact that he 1ed the search party to the place from whence it was retrieved; (iv) the evidence that the appellant was in Kiduuma village, the piace of the crime, on Sth 20 25

January 2011 and the deliberate lies of the appellant that he was not, the alibi; and (v) the disappearance of the appellant from Kiduuma village for about one year after the crime.

5 Counsei for the respondent went on to explain the five (5) pieces of evidence in some detail as he reviewed the testimonies related to each of them. He further submitted that the assertion by counsel for the appellant that there were inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of PW2, PW3 and PW6 was misconceived. She misunderstood the trial judge's observation at page 4 of the judgment, where he stated that "each of the uitnesses stated different circumstances and locattons where tLeg saw the acansed duing that period. " He contended that the statement was not a finding that there were contradictions in the evidence but an explanation that the witnesses were truthful and credible but they saw the appellant at different times and places. And that as a result, there were no contradictions in the evidence adduced by the prosecution. 10 15

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Mr Oola concluded that there was ample circumstantial evidence to prove the participation of the appellant in the offence. Further that his alibi was discredited by the prosecution and correctly disbelieved by the trialjudge. That therefore, ground 1 ofthe appeal should faii.

# Resolution of Ground I

The assertion by counsel for the appellant in this ground of appeal was basically that due to the contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimonies of three of the witnesses called by the prosecution, the trial judge ought not to have discarded the appellant's alibi. Stated differently, the complaint is that the prosecution did not effectively discredit or disprove the appellant's alibi and so the trial judge ought to have believed it and acquitted the appellant of the crime of murder.

These contentions require the court to consider two principles of law as they relate to the evidence on the record: (i) inconsistencies and contradictions in evidence; and (ii) disproving or discrediting of an *alibi*. We shall deal with them in that order and so dispose of ground 1 of the

appeal. $5$

> Starting with the assertion that there were inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence of the three witnesses that the trial judge based his decision upon, the text of the judgment that the appellant complained about was at page 28 of the record of appeal. We deemed it appropriate to set it out here, verbatim within its context, in order to facilitate a better understanding of our decision on this point. It was as follows:

"In the instant case, I found the said PW2, PW3 and PW6 as truthful and credible witnesses. Mind you, each one stated different circumstances and locations where they saw the accused during that period. There is no known reason for each to have stated that the accused was in the village whereas he was not. In my view, the accused told a lie by stating he was not in the village at the time. Accordingly, I find the accused's disappearance from the area after the night of 5-1-2011 and that his *conduct was incompatible with innocence. (sic)*

*The accused refuted PW3's assertion that he asked him to ferry a dead* body on the motorcycle, he stated that since the deceased was PW3's uncle he could not ask him to ferry the body of his uncle. While it sounds odd the accused could ask PW3 to carry the body of his own uncle, he (PW3) would not have known the identity of the body since it was found tied in a sack. PW3 would have simply carried an unidentified body.

It is significant to note the accused disappeared immediately the deceased went missing. Four days earlier he had threatened to kill the deceased. He was with Byaruhanga Patrick when PW3 was asked to carry the body. Byaruhanga led to the discovery of the body of the *deceased. I can safely infer from those facts, that the body the accused* sought PW3 to ferry was that of the deceased. The circumstantial evidence therefore irresistibly points to the accused as having *participated in the murder of the deceased."*

The chronologr of events that was set before the court by the State started with the testimony of PW2, Balikooha Stella, who was the wife of the deceased. She stated that on the 5m January 2011, the deceased left home to go to the shops at 10.00 am but he did not return. That the

- 5 following day she went to his shop to look for him and using her spare key to the lock she opened and found his bicycle but he was not in the shop. She informed his brother who told her to report the matter to the Police which she did, at Kiryandongo Police Post. A search was mounted but he was not found but the Police arrested Byaruhanga Patrick, a - friend to the appellant. PW3 also recalled that on the 1"t January 2O11, the deceased quarrelled with the appellant and the appellant threatened to kill him. 10

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PW2 went on to state that on the day she reported to the Police that her husband had gone missing, the appellant disappeared from the village. That Byaruhanga, the appellant's friend was tortured. He then revealed that the deceased had been murdered and he led the search party to Nguse River where he directed them to the place where they would find the body and they did find it in the spot to which he led them. It was stuffed in a bag and had been dumped in the river. That Byaruhanga confessed that he helped Senvubu, the appellant, to dispose ofthe body. She concluded her testimony with the observation that the appellant 15 20

did not return to the village until about one year after the discovery of the body. He was then arrested and prosecuted for the crime.

The likely contradiction that PW2 could have occasioned in her testimony occurred when she was cross examined. At page 10 of the record is shows ttrat she conhrmed that the appellant threatened to kill the deceased on 1"r January 20 1 i . That the incident was reported to the Local Council (LC) I Chairperson, but she did not see the appellant after l"t January 2O11. And that it was possible that he left the village on 2"a 25

January 2011 because he was not in the village on 5tt'January 2011. This would lead us to doubt that the appellant was in Kiduuma village on the 4s or Str, January 2011. However, there was other evidence on the record.

5 Byamukama Godfrey, a boda boda ider, testifred as the third witness called by the prosecution. PW3 stated that in the evening of sth JanuarJr 2Oll at about 8. OO pm, while he was at a bar operated by the Chairman LCIII Kiryanga Sub County, one Ndyanabo John went to him and informed him that the appellant's wife was sick and that the latter needed his services to take her to a hospital. PW3 then rode to the appellant's home and when he got there, he found the appellant with one Byaruhanga. That on arrival, the appellant told him to switch off the light of his motor cycle and he tried to remove the ignition key from it. 10

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- He further stated that the appellant informed him that there was actually no patient to take to hospital but he had another job for him. The appellant then revealed to him that he killed a person and wanted PW3 to take the body to a place he would direct him. That he declined to do so but Byaruhanga approached his motor cycle menacingly. And that in order to save himself from the threatened menaces, he agreed to take the body but requested that they give him time to go and refuel the motorcycle. He explained that he did not go back but instead went to inform the Chairman LCIII about the matter. That the Chairman then advised him to spend the night at his home. 15 20 - PW2 went on to state that the following day, the Chairman and the Police began the search for the deceased because his wife reported that he was missing. That he participated in the search but he did not know where the appellant was at the time. Further that after two days, the 25 body of the deceased, Barongo John, was found and thereafter, he too was detained by the Police.

During cross examination, PW2 explained that the late Barongo was his uncle and he got to know that he could not be found one the day after

5 he went missing. Further that he informed the police about the request to dispose of the body after he was arrested, but the Chairman had already notified the Police about it. He further clarified that the appellant did not tell him whose body he wanted him to dispose of, he was therefore surprised when he learnt that it was actually his uncle's body. When he was re-examined, he clarified that it was the appellant

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who confessed to him that he killed a person, not Byaruhanga. 10

The Chairman LCIII, Kamanyire Julius was PW4. He confirmed that in the evening of 5f, January 2O11 he was in the company of PW3 at his bar when a young man carne for PW3 and went away with him. That

Iater that evening PW3 went to his home and informed him that he had gone to the appellant's home to take a patient to hospital but when he got there, the appellant confessed to him that he killed a person. That he also wanted him to help dispose of the dead body. Further that the appellant was at his home with Byaruhanga and other people but he managed to convince them that he had to fuel his motor cycle and then return to collect the dead body but he instead escaped and did not return. That he then advised PW3 not to go back but spend the night in the Trading Centre. 15 20

PW4 also confirmed that he had gone to report the crime to the Police the following day but before he did so, he found that PW2 already reported that her husband, Barongo, was missing. That the Police arrested Byaruhanga as a suspect, but as they were searching for the deceased, the said Byaruhanga revealed to the Police that he knew 25

where to find Barongo's body. That he led them to a spot on Nguse River in Kiduuma village and the body was recovered from the river, wrapped in a tarpaulin tied up with ropes. That it was taken to Barongo's home where it was unwrapped and conlirmed to be that of John Barongo.

- 5 D/Cpl Ocen Tonny testified as PW5. He stated that he received a call about a suspected murder in Kiduuma. That he responded to the call and went to Kiduuma where he found people gathered. Further that he interviewed some people and arrested Byaruhanga, said to be a brother to Senmbu, the appellant. That the said Byaruhanga revea-led that the - appellant requested him to assist him carry a dead body. That he then revealed to the LCI Chairperson where he and the appeliant dumped the body. Further, that the following day, they were led to a spot at Nguse River in which they found the body tied up in a sack. When the sack was opened, it was found to be the dead body ofJohn Barongo. 10

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- In cross examination, he said that though he inquired from Byaruhanga where his brother was, he said he did not know. That he went to his home but the door was locked, so he did not carry out a search. That the appellant was arrested later when he (PWS) had been transferred from the area. 15 - The last relevant witness was Vumuliya Perusi (PW6) the wife of Byaruhanga Patrick, who she said was in prison serving a sentence for killing John Barongo at the time she testified. She stated that on the 5th January 2O11, the appeilant who was a friend to her husband went to her home. Further, that he gave her food to prepare a meal for her mother who was visiting. That it was 9.00 am when the appellant went to her home. That she later heard that John Barongo was missing but a search was mounted and his body was recovered from Nguse River. She said that since the 5e January 2011, she had not seen the 20

appellant again till the 21<sup>st</sup> August 2014 when she saw him in court. In cross examination she stated that John Barongo disappeared on 4<sup>th</sup> January 2011 and she last saw the appellant on the 5<sup>th</sup> January 2011.

Having reviewed the evidence on record, we found that the trial judge was correct when he found that PW2, PW3 and PW6 all saw the $\mathsf{S}$ appellant in Kiduuma-Kiryanga area on the 5<sup>th</sup> January 2011. PW3 actually found the appellant and his co-accused Patrick Byaruhanga together. He observed that the two of them were in league when they tried to coerce him into carrying the body of the deceased and dispose

10 of it. Byaruhanga Patrick was the person who led the police and the LCs to the place where the body was dumped in River Nguse. He later confessed to the crime and was convicted for it and was already in prison when his co-accused was tried for the offence.

The position on inconsistencies and contradictions was re-stated by this

## court in Candiga Swadick v Uganda, Criminal Appeal No. 23 of 2012 15 as follows:

The law on contradictions and inconsistencies is well settled. Major contradictions and inconsistencies will usually result in the evidence of the witnesses being rejected unless they are satisfactorily explained away. Minor ones, on the other hand, will only lead to rejection of the evidence if they point to deliberate untruthfulness on the part of the witness- see Alfred Tajar vs Uganda E. A. C. A Cr. Appeal NO. 167 of 1969 (unreported); Sarapio Tinkamalirwe vs. Uganda, Cr. Appeal NO. 27 of 1989 (SC) and Twinomugisha Alex and 2 others Vs. Uganda, Cr. Appeal No. 35 of 2002 (SC).

Save for some inconsistency in the testimony of PW2 about the date on which she suspected the appellant left the village, we found no contradictions at all in the evidence that was adduced by the prosecution against the appellant. We also are of the view that the contradiction or inconsistency in PW2's testimony was not a deliberate lie or a statement that she believed was not true. It was therefore a

minor one that did not go to the root of the evidence and it could be safely ignored. Otherwise it is our opinion that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was seamless and sufficient to convict the appellant for the crime for which he was indicted.

Going on to the appellant's *alibi*, he denied that he was present in $\mathsf{S}$ Kiduuma-Kiryanga area on the 5<sup>th</sup> January 2011 in his sworn testimony, when he stated, at page 20 of the record, as follows:

> "I left for Kampala on 28-12-2010. I last saw Byaruhanga Patrick during Christmas holidays of 2010. I also last saw Vumuliya during the month of December 2010. She told lies when she claimed she saw me on 5-1- $2011...$

> *I had returned to the village on 20-11-2011 and before I got home I was* arrested by Police officers from Kiryanga police post. I worked at the beer deport for 3 months and left the job. I started trading on my own. ... All the witnesses told lies about me. I left the village on 28-1-2010 and returned on 20-1-2011."

In Lt Jonas Ainomugisha v Uganda, Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 2015, the court discussed what it takes to disprove an *alibi* in the following passage:

20 "One of the ways of disproving an alibi is to investigate its genuineness as was stated in the case of **Androa Asenua & Another Vs Uganda** (Cr. Appeal No 1 of 1998) [1998] UG SC 23 where the Supreme Court of Uganda cited with approval the authority of **R Vs Sukha Singh s/o** Wazir Singh and Others 1939 (6 EACA) 145 where the Court of *Appeal for East Africa observed that:* 25

> 'If a person is accused of anything and his defence is an alibi, he should bring forward the alibi as soon as he can because, firstly, if he does not bring it forward until months afterwards there is naturally a doubt as to whether he has not been preparing it in the interval, and secondly, if he brings it forward at the earliest possible moment it will give prosecution an opportunity of inquiring into that alibi and if they are satisfied as to its genuineness *proceedings will be stopped."*

There is no evidence on the record that the appellant presented his a/ibi to the investigating officer as soon as he was arrested. It was therefore not possible at the time to investigate it. It seems to us that he first presented it at his trial on the lTtt September 2014, about three years

5 after the crime was committed.

However, even without an investigation to disprove tlle alibi, it is clear to us that the prosecution disproved its genuiness with the evidence that was adduced by three of the witnesses that saw the appellant on the Sth January 2O11 in Kiduuma Village. PW2, in particular dispelled any doubt in our minds about his presence in the village when he revealed that the appellant tried to induce him to become an accessory after the fact by helping him to dispose of the body. This evidence was

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concretised by the fact that his accomplice, Patrick Byaruhanga, eventually helped him to hide the dead body and led ttre police to the place where it was hidden. The body was found as a result of Byaruhanga's information and he was arrested and when prosecuted he admitted to participation in the crime and was convicted and sentenced for it. 15

We therefore find that the trial judge made no error at all when he disregarded the appellant's a/ibias a lie and convicted him of the crime. Ground I of the appeal therefore must fail. 20

## Ground 2

In this ground of appeal, the appellant complained that the sentence of 27 years in prison imposed upon him for murder was excessive and 25 harsh in the circumstances of the case. That the trial judge erred in fact and law when he imposed it and so occasioned a gross miscarriage of justice.

## Submissions of Counsel

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In this regard, Ms Bahenzire for the appellant referred us to the decision in Kyalimpa Edward v Uganda, Supreme court Criminal Appeal lto. 1O of 1995 to support her submission that an appropriate sentence is a matter for the discretion of the sentencing judge. That each case presents its own facts upon which a judge exercises their discretion.

Counsel then referred us to the case of Anguipi Isaac alias Zako v Uganda, whose citation she did not provide, and stated that the court in that case considered the mitigating and aggravating factors and reduced the appellant's sentence of26 years to 18 years and 8 months. She explained that the appellant in that case was convicted of murder but upon scrutiny of the evidence afresh, the court considered the aggravating and mitigating factors and the fact that the appellant was remorseful and a young man of 35 years and still capable of reforming. That on that basis, the court reduced his sentence.

Counsel further referred us to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bukenya Joseph v Uganda, Criminal Appeal No. 17 of 2OlO, in which the court observed that in order for an appeal against sentence to succeed, it must be shown that the sentence was illegal, manifestly excessive or inadequate. She then prayed that this court reconsiders the sentence of 27 years that was imposed upon the appellant, which in her view was manifestly harsh and excessive and substitute it with another sentence, as we deem fit.

In reply, Mr Oola for the respondent supported the sentence that was imposed by the trial judge as an appropriate one in the circumstances. He pointed out that the trial judge complied with all the principles regarding sentencing; he considered both the mitigating and aggravating factors as they \$rere presented to the court for both parties. lq.

He added that it was "a murder most foul" because the deceased was hacked at, wrapped in a tarpaulin and disposed of in the most dehumanising manner. That the trial judge thus correctly observed that it was a gruesome murder,

5 Counsel went on to submit that the appellant deserved a sentence of death or life imprisonment but the trial judge spared him such a sentence because he considered the mitigating factors. That the sentence of 27 years in prison was ienient compared to sentences that had hitherto been handed down by the Supreme Court. Counsel then referred to the decisions in Aharikundira Yustina v Uganda, Supreme Court Crimiaal Appeal No. 27 of 2015, where a sentence of 30 years was imposed on the appellant who murdered her husband by cutting off his arms and legs; Nasimolo Paul Kibolo v Uganda, Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 2O17, where the appellant had been sentenced to death but the court on appeai substituted the sentence with a sentence of life imprisonment; and Kaddu Kavulu Lawrence v Uganda, Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No, 72 of 2018, where the appellant injured his former partner to death by hacking at her with a panga and was sentenced to death. On appeal this court substituted the sentence to life imprisonment and on further appeal to the Supreme 10 15

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He concluded that the sentence of 27 years' imprisonment in the circumstances of this case was an appropriate sentence and this court should not disturb it. And that the appeal had no merit and ought to be

dismissed. 25

## Resolution of Ground 2

Court the sentence was upheld.

We accept the submissions of both counsel about the principles that appellate courts must consider before they exercise their discretion to interfere with sentences imposed by trial courts and appreciate the authorities that were commended to us.

We however observed that though the appellant's contention in the Memorandum of Appeal was that the trial judge erred in law and fact, counsel did not present any submissions about how the judge erred in law. Neither did she refer us to any error of fact occasioned by the trial judge. The sentencing proceedings at page 23-24 of the record show that the trial judge carefully considered the aggravating and mitigating factors. He then concluded the proceedings as follows:

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"In determining an appropriate sentence, court considers that the conuict is a first time offender and at 25 gears, he is still a Aoung man tuho once reformed is capable of making a positiue contibution to his communitg. He is said to haue a lot of responsibilities ouer his siblings and mother. A death penalty utould not serue the ends of justice in mg uiew. Court also takes cognizance of tle fact that he has been on remand for 2 gears and 9 months. <sup>10</sup> a 15

> Taking all the said factors into consideration, I herebg sentence the conuict to 27 gears' impisonment taking into account tlrc peiod spent on remand."

- 20 Much as the trial judge did not demonstrate that he considered the principle of consistency with other sentences, it is our view that this did not prejudice the appellant at all. It was also in keeping with the principle that the discretion to sentence is a matter for the sentencing judge. - We have considered the sentences imposed upon convicts of similar offences that were drawn to our attention by both learned counsel in this case. We are also mindful of the fact that the maximum sentence for murder is death. We are of the view that in comparison to sentences imposed by this court and the Supreme Court, which according to the 25 - authorities that were drawn to our attention by both counsel ranged between 18 years and life imprisonment, the sentence of 27 years that 30

was imposed by the trial judge was not only lawful but also appropriate in the circumstances. Given that no plausible reason was given to us for us to exercise our discretion to set it aside, we will not disturb it. The appellant will continue to serve his sentence of imprisonment of 27

5 years that was imposed by the trial court. Ground 2 therefore also fails.

In conclusion, this appeal has substantially failed and it is hereby dismissed.

! Dated at Kampala this l+ day of OetPk/ 2022.

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Richard Buteera DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICE

Irene Mulyago

20 JUSTICE OF APPEAL

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2s Eva <sup>L</sup> ta TICE OF APPEAL