Simon Njogu Kariithi & Paul Njoroge Karithi v Cleti Kembio Kimaiyo [2015] KEHC 112 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL APPLICATION NO.373 OF 2015”B”

SIMON NJOGU KARIITHI………….…………………1ST APPLICANT

PAUL NJOROGE KARITHI………………………….2ND APPLICANT

VERSUS

CLETI KEMBIO KIMAIYO…………..……......…………RESPONDENT

RULING

By  an application dated 8th September  2015  the applicants Simon Njogu  Kariithi  and Paul Njoroge  Karithi seek from this court orders that:

This court do determine  whether  Milimani Nairobi CM’s Court has  jurisdiction to hear and determine  CM CC 6151 of 2014 and CM CC 6152 of  2014 and or in the alternative, this court do  transfer  CM CC 6151/2014  and CM CC 6152/2014 from Nairobi  Milimani Chief  magistrate’s  court to Naivasha Chief  Magistrates court.

The application is based on the grounds that albeit the  applicants’ advocates believe that the said suits  were instituted  in the correct  court pursuant  to Section 14  of the Civil  Procedure  Act, the respondent’s  advocate  insists on  raising  a preliminary objection that the  CM’s  court at  Nairobi has  no territorial jurisdiction to hear  and determine  those  suits, the  cause of action having  arisen along Nairobi-Naivasha  road at Kinungi area.  The  application is supported by an  affidavit  sworn by Mr Kimani  Githongo J advocate  sworn on 8th September  2015 reiterating the  above two grounds as summarized  and on a more detailed account  indicating  that  the defendant works   at GSU Headquarters  Nairobi  in Ruaraka  and that  witnesses  from his Insurance  Company  are in Nairobi.  Further that  nonetheless  the court has  powers under Section  18 of the  Civil Procedure  Act to withdraw  suit from one court  to another  court  of competent  jurisdiction  and to avoid unnecessary delay  in the prosecution of the matter  due to the preliminary objection  it is  fair  that this court determines the two issues of transferability and or jurisdiction  of the CM’s  Court at Nairobi.  The applicants annex copies of pleadings and documents filed in the lower court.

The application is opposed  by the respondent’s counsel  who filed  very terse grounds of opposition  this morning contending  that the Milimani Commercial Courts  lack jurisdiction   to hear  the stated suits  and therefore the suit s are  a nullity, citing Nyarangi JA in Owners  of Motor  Vessel  ‘Lilian S”V Caltex Oil Kenya Ltd [1989] KL 191 and that  a suit  that is  a nullity ab initio  is incapable  of being transferred  to another  court  of competent jurisdiction.

In addition, that the  entire suits  in the lower  court are  based  on quick  sand and  not even  Article 159(2)  of the Constitution  can save  the applicants  as the suit was   fatally  defective  and the act  of transferring  the said cases  to another  court would  not only be bad  but incurably  bad.  He relied on Bonface  Waweru Mbiyu V Nancy Njeri & Another  Nairobi HC Miscellaneous  Application  639/2005  ( unreported) no copy supplied  where it was held inter alia that“…where a matter is  filed  in a wrong court, such matter  has no capacity to be transferred  to any other court…….”

The respondent’s counsel further maintained that the application was misconceived, bad in law, untenable and an abuse of the court process.  The parties advocates  argued the  application orally in court this  morning with Mr Kimani  relying  entirely on the grounds  and supporting affidavit urging  the court  to grant the  orders sought in the affidavit whereas   Miss Chepkurui  holding  brief  for Mr  Arusei  relied entirely on the grounds  of opposition filed this  morning  urging  the court to dismiss the application.

I have urgently considered the application grounds, supporting affidavit and annextures.  I have also considered the respondent’s grounds of opposition.  The only issue for  determination  is whether  Milimani CM’s court has  jurisdiction  to hear and  determine  the two  cases CM CC 6151/2014  and CM CC 6152/2014  and if  not, can this court  order for  transfer  of the said suits  to Naivasha Chief Magistrate’s Court  for hearing  and final  determination.

The High Court  is empowered  under Section 18 of the Civil Procedure  Act Cap  21 Laws of   Kenya to withdraw  and transfer  any  suit pending  before a lower court to itself or to another  court of competent  jurisdiction to hear and determine it.  However,  the court can  only transfer  a matter which  was  in the first  instance  filed before  a court that  was  competent  to hear  and determine  the suit.

That is the spirit of Section  18 of the Civil Procedure  Act  and  as was  espoused  in the case  of Omwoyo V African Highlands  and Produce Ltd  [2002] KLR  698  Ringera  J citing  Kagenyi V Musiramo & Another [1968] EA 48 by Sir Udoma CJ that :

“An order for transfer of a suit   from one court to another court cannot be made unless the suit has been in the first place been brought to a court which has jurisdiction to try it.”

In that case, the appellant  had sought  to transfer  suit from  the magistrates  court to the  High Court  on the basis that the claim exceeded  the pecuniary  jurisdiction of the lower court.

In the instant case, however, the challenge   relates to territorial or geographical jurisdiction  of Milimani  Chief Magistrates court to hear  and determine  a suit whose cause  of action  arose  along Nairobi-Naivasha  road.

Section 3(1) of the magistrate’s courts  Act Cap 10 Laws of  Kenya  establishes  the Resident Magistrates  court  which shall be a court  subordinate  to the High Court and  shall be  duly  constituted  when  held by a Chief  Magistrate, a Senior  Principal Magistrate , a Principal Magistrate, a Senior Resident  Magistrate  or a Resident Magistrate’s court shall have jurisdiction throughout Kenya.  Cap  10 is the substantive  law that  confers  jurisdiction on the magistrates courts whereas  the Civil Procedure Act, Cap 21 Laws of Kenya  is the  procedural law in civil disputes  in civil courts Section 12 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that  subject to pecuniary  or other  limitation prescribed  by any law, suits shall be  instituted  where subject matter is situate.  However, where  suit is for compensation  for wrong  done  to  the person  or to movable property, if the wrong  was done within the local  limits of the jurisdiction of one court  and the defendant resides or  carries  on business, or personally works  for gain, within the local limit  of the jurisdiction of another court, the suit may be instituted  at  the option of the  plaintiff  in either  of the two court ( Section 14 Cap 21).

In addition, Section 15 of the Civil Procedure Act is clear that   subject to the limitation  aforesaid  every suit  shall be  instituted  in a court  within  the local  limits  of whose jurisdiction  the defendant  or each of the defendants  actually or voluntarily resides  or carries  in business  or personally works for  gain or  have acquiesced  in such  institution of suit or  the cause of  action   wholly or  in part, arises .  Under Section 17 of  Cap 21, where  a suit  may be  instituted  in any one  or more of the subordinate  courts  and is instituted  in one of those  courts  any defendant may  apply  or the court may on its  own motion  transfer  it to another court and the High Court shall after considering  objections shall  determine  in which of the several courts having  jurisdiction  the suit  shall proceed.

Then Section  18 gives  the  High Court  power to order, at  any stage of the proceedings  for withdrawal and transfer of any suit  pending in any court subordinate  to it  and either  try  and dispose  it or transfer  it for trial  or disposal  to any court subordinate  to it  and competent  to try it.  What is clear  from the above  provisions  of the Civil Procedure  Act  which  are  elaborate is that suits  should be  instituted either where  the cause of action  arose  or where the defendant  ordinarily resides  or carries  on business subject to pecuniary jurisdiction.

On the other hand, the Magistrates  Court Act  is clear under Section 3(2) that the Resident  or Magistrates  court has  countrywide  jurisdiction  meaning that  a suit can be  instituted  in any part of the  Resident  or Chief Magistrate’s Court in any part of the Republic  not withstanding  where the defendant  resides  or where the cause of  action arose.

That being  the case, what is  required  of this court is  to understand  the rationale  for the  Civil Procedure Act  provisions  that confine the filing of suits  in court where the cause of action arose  or where the defendant  or defendants  ordinarily or voluntarily  reside, thereby tending to create  a conflict in two pieces of  legislation.

In my view, there is no conflict in the said Cap 10 Magistrate’s Courts Act, and Cap 21 of the Civil Procedure Act.  The two pieces of legislation were enacted  at different  times and whereas  the Civil Procedure  Act as earlier stated is  a procedural law, the Magistrates Courts Act is  the substantive law establishing  the magistrates courts and conferring  it with geographical  as well as pecuniary jurisdiction  to hear and  determine disputes.  It therefore follows that this court would adopt the provisions of the substantive law to be superior to the procedural law.  Even if that were not to be  the case, this court would   employ  the principles  applicable  in statutory  construction  among them, the rule of precedence  that the  statute  that was  enacted  latter would  have the effect  of amending  the earlier statute.

In this case, the Civil Procedure Act was enacted on 31st January 1924 whereas the Magistrates Courts Act was enacted n 1st August 1967.

In both cases, the dates given are the actual commencement dates.  It therefore  follows that  in as much  as Section 15 of the Civil Procedure  Act commands   the spirit that  appears to be in  the conflict  with Section  3(2) of the Magistrates Courts Act, the Magistrate’s Courts Act  having  been enacted  later than  the Civil procedure  Act, is  deemed  to have amended  the Civil Procedure Act.  I am also  persuaded by the holding by Ringera J ( as  he then was) in  Mohamed Sitaban V George Mwangi Karoki  in HCCA  13/2002 where the  Learned Judge  in considering the perceived  conflict  between the above two provisions  in the two statutes  stated:

“ Section 3(2)  of the Magistrates  Courts Act  provided that a court  of the Resident  Magistrate( which is  defined to include a Senior  Principal Magistrate’s court has jurisdiction  throughout Kenya.  Such a court is not the subject of the local jurisdiction contemplated by Section 15 of the Civil Procedure Act.  In my opinion, Section 15 of the Civil Procedure Act applied only to courts lower than a Resident Magistrates Court.  I am  fortified  in that  view by the fact  that the  Magistrate’s Court Act  Cap  10 of the  Laws of Kenya, was enacted in 1967 long after  the Civil Procedure Act.

The legislative was therefore  aware  of the provisions  of  Section 15 of  the Civil procedure Act and  the hallowed rule of statutory  construction  that where  two provisions  in different statutes  conflict, the provisions  in the latter  statute  is deemed  to amend  the earlier provision.  Accordingly,  I  find that  the Bungoma Court  had jurisdiction to entertain  the  suit and the rule that suit filed  in a court  without geographical  jurisdiction  is a nullity and cannot  be transferred  is inapplicable  in the circumstances   of this case.  There may be sound administrative  reasons for  filing suits in administrative  districts  in which the defendant  resides  as the cause of action but those  reasons  cannot outs  the statutory jurisdiction.”

A similar situation had arisen  in Doshi  Enterprises  Ltd V Oriental Steel  Fabrications  & Buildres  Nairobi HCC 627/2001  and Mwera J, with approval by Odunga J in Justus Kyalo Mutunga  V Labb Singh Harnam [2012] e KLR agreed that the filing of a case  outside the geographical jurisdiction of  both parties  contrary to the mandatory provisions  of Section  15  of  the Civil  Procedure Act does not make it a nullity  because Section 15(b)  of the Civil procedure  Act adds that  a court may give leave for the filing away from the local  limits or the defendant may  acquiesce  in such situation.

A similar situation arose in JohnWekesa Maraka V Patrick Wafula Otunga(Sergon J).  This court  in Ruth  Gathigia Kamunya & Another  V George  Kimani [2015] e KLR  cited with  approval all the above  decisions  and also agreed with Honourable Sergon J that  Section 15  of  the Civil Procedure Act  was not meant to apply to Resident Magistrate’s Court.  The learned Judge stated:

“I do not think Section 15 of the Civil Procedure Act was meant to apply to Resident Magistrate’s Court.  Most probably it was intended to apply to District Magistrate’s Courts defined under Section 6 of the Magistrate’s Court, the position  in my view  will not  change because  the law is well  settled that where  there is a  conflict  between two statutes, the provision in the latter statute  would be  deemed to have amended the earlier  provision.  The Magistrate’s Courts Act was enacted later than the Civil Procedure Act.  It therefore evidently clear that the Webuye Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit.  The Learned Senior Resident Magistrate therefore misapprehended the point when she held that she had no jurisdiction to hear the matter.  For the above reasons the appeal must succeed.”

This court does subscribe  to the principle of law  that indeed, where  a suit is filed in  a court  that lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine  that  suit, then the  suit would be a nullity, as  was held in the celebrated  and often quoted  decision  of Nyarangi JA  in Owners of Motor Vessel “Lilian S” V Caltex Oil (K) Ltd [1989] KLR 1that:

“Jurisdiction is everything without which a court of law has no power to make one more step where a court of law has no jurisdiction there would be no basis for a continuation of proceedings   pending other evidence.  A court of law downs its tools in respect of the matter the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction”

And that   is the basis  upon which the  respondent  herein  is challenging  this application and  the suit  pending  before Milimani  Chief Magistrate’s Court, wherein it is contended  that the cause  of action arose in  Naivasha and therefore  Milimani Chief Magistrate’s Court  has no territorial  jurisdiction to hear and determine  the suit  which is void ab initio hence, this court cannot transfer  suit from a court that has  no jurisdiction  to another  court  that has  jurisdiction as was  held in Bonface Waweru Mbiyu V Mary Njeri and Another Nairobi HC Miscellaneous  Application 639 of 2005 cited by  the respondent.

The respondent maintains that  the  suit in the lower court  is grounded on quick sand and not  even Article  159(2) of the  Constitution can salvage it; and that this application is therefore misconceived  bad in law, untenable  and constitutes  an abuse of the court process.

In my view, the respondent’s terse position is overtaken by events as per my exposition above. Furthermore, even if it was not  the issue  of the Resident Magistrate’s Court  having countrywide  jurisdiction in matters  wherein it has competent  pecuniary  jurisdiction to hear and determine, I would still hold  that Section 14  of the Civil Procedure  Act is  applicable   as it has not been denied by the respondent herein, that he, at the  commencement  of the subject  suit or currently actually and voluntarily resided  or worked  for gain within the jurisdiction  of Milimani Chief Magistrates court in Nairobi  and that  he works at  the General Service Unit.  It follows that either way, the Milimani Chief Magistrate’s Court has   the territorial jurisdiction in the suit since the defendant lives and personally works for gain within the jurisdiction   of Milimani Chief Magistrate’s court.  And for  convenience of the parties  to the said suit ,  bearing   in mind  the overriding  objectives of  the Civil Procedure Act as espoused  in Sections 1A and 1B  of the Civil procedure Act, it would be  a traversity of justice  to transfer  the suit from  Milimani Chief Magistrates Court to Naivasha Chief Magistrate’s Court.

The overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Act   and the Rules made thereunder is to facilitate the just expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of the civil disputes governed by the Act.  The court  is also called  upon, in exercising  its powers  under  the Act or  interpretation of any of  its provision, seek to give effect  to the overriding  objective  specified  in Subsection 1 of Section 1A of the Civil Procedure Act.

The court under Section 1B of the  Civil Procedure Act is  mandated  to further  the overriding  objectives of  the Act to  handle   all matters presented before  it  for the purpose  of attaining  the following  aims:-

The just determination  of the proceedings;

The efficient  disposal of the business of the court;

The efficient  use of the available  judicial  and administrative  resources;

Timely disposal of the proceedings, and all other proceedings  in the court, as a cost affordable by the respective parties; are

The use   of suitable technology.

Parties knock  on the doors  of justice  seeking for justice  which the courts must be ready  to administer  without  undue regard  to procedural technicalities  and which justice must  be administered  expeditiously and without undue delay.  This delay is a constitutional imperative that this court cannot escape.  What  is being challenged  is territorial  jurisdiction and the  challenger  has  not disputed  any facts  laid bare that he works for  gain and  resides  in Nairobi where it will be  convenient  and cost effective  for him to attend  the hearing.  There is no justification why this case cannot be heard and determined by a Nairobi court.  Furthermore, there is no merit in the challenge to the jurisdiction of the Nairobi Milimani Chief Magistrate’s Court to hear and determine the suit.  This court is  conscious  that parties  to suits and  particularly  in running down  claims  do not enjoy the luxury  of having  sufficient  resources to globe  trot.  Majority of plaintiffs cannot even afford to pay their advocated briefs, and for the defendant GSU Officer a public servant, the same situation is likely to apply, albeit he may be represented by his insurance company lawyer.  To take this case to Naivasha is to deny justice to the parties and to cause them to incur more expenses unnecessarily, since even their respective advocates addresses provided to this court show that they practice law in Nairobi City County.

It is for  those reasons  that I would  allow the applicant’s  1st limb of the application dated 8th  September  2015  and hold that  the Chief Magistrates Court at  Nairobi has jurisdiction to hear and  determine CMCC  6151 and CMCC 6152 of 2014  filed at  Milimani  Nairobi Chief Magistrate’s  Court.  I decline to grant the 2nd prayer for transfer being the alternative.  I make no orders as to costs of this application as the applicant  simply sought an opinion of this court and albeit opposed, the opposition is hereby appreciated for building jurisprudence of the court but rejected as lacking in merit.

Those are orders of this court.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 12th day of November 2015.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE