Solomon Ekolama and Another v Federal Republic of Nigeria (ECW/CCJ/APP/41/19; ECW/CCJ/JUD/24/25) [2025] ECOWASCJ 27 (12 May 2025)

THE COMMUNITY COURT OF ruSTICE OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOW AS) In the Matter of SOLOMON EKOLAMA & ANOR. V FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA Application No: ECWICCJIAPP/41/19 Judgment NO. ECWICCJ/JUD/24/25 JUDGMENT LAGOS DATE: 12th May 2025. OI Page JUDGMENT NO. ECW/CCJ/JUD/24125 1. SOLOMON EKOLAMA APPLICANTS 2. FAR-REACHING TECHNOLOGIES LTD V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA RESPONDENT COMPOSITION OF THE COURT~ Hon. Justice Sengu Mohamed KOROMA - Presiding/Judge Rapp01ieur Hon. Justice Gberi-Be OUATT ARA Hon. Justice Edward Amoako ASANTE - Member - Member ASSISTED BY: Dr. Y aouza OURO-SAMA - Chief Registrar ll Page REPRESENTATION OF PARTIES: Chief Festus OGWUCHE Counsel for the APPLICANTS Maimuna Lami SHIRU(Mrs.) Counsel for the RESPONDENT Enock SIMON, Esq P. E . OGWU (Mrs.) D. N. LAMIRI 2 1 Page I. JUDGMENT: 1. This is the judgment of the Community Court of Justice ECOW AS (hereinafter referred to as 'the Court') delivered virtually an,d in open Court under Article 8(1) of the Practice Direction on Electronic Case Management and Virtual Court Session, 2020. II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTIES: 2. The First Applicant is SOLOMON EKOLAMA, a Registered Engineer with the Council for the Regulation of Engineering in Nigeria (COREN), and a Community citizen of ECO WAS residing in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 3. The Second Applicant is FAR-REACHING TECHNOLOGIES LTD, a company registered under the Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 4. The Respondent is the Federal Republic of Nigeria and a Member State of ECOWAS. III. INTRODUCTION 5. The subject matter of the claims before the Court borders on allegations of the violation of the right to property, theft of a software application, invasion and infringement of their right to property contrary to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Work and the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty. IV. PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COURT 6. The Applicants filed their Initiating Application on the 20th November 20 19, in the Registry of the Court. t) 3I Page 7. On 16th March 2020, the Respondent filed a Motion for the Extension of Time to file its Statement of Defense, and the Statement of Defense in the Registry of the Court. 8. On 16th July 2020, the Applicants filed a Motion Invoking the Oral Procedure Measures along with its Reply to the Respondent's Statement of Defense in the Registry of the Court. 9. The Court held a virtual session on the 26th October 2021, in which both parties were represented by Counsel. The Respondent moved its Motion for the Extension of Time, and the Applicants, in response, did not object to the application but prayed for costs of N200,000. The Court granted the Respondent's application but denied the Applicant's plea for costs. The Court further granted the Applicant's Motion to Call Witnesses on the condition that they file the witness depositions and serve them on the Respondent before the next hearing date. IO. On 4th November 202 1, the Applicants filed a Witness Deposition on Oath in the Registry of the Comt, as ordered by the Comt. 11. The Court held a second virtual session on 30th March 2022, in which both parties were represented by Counsel. The witness, Solomon Ekolarna, was affirmed, examined, and re-examined before the Court. The Respondent adopted its processes and applied to the Court to file its Written Address. 12. The Applicant filed its Written Address on 19th April 2022 in the Registry of the Court. 13 . Following this, the Comi had a virtual session on 5th December 2023, in which the Applicants were represented by Counsel and the Respondent was not represented. The Applicants noted that the case had been withdrawn for judgment however, the Comi stated the need to in ite an expe1i to submit a 4I Page technical report before judgment can be delivered. It adjourned to 15th December 2023 . 14. On 15th December 2023, during its virtual session in which both pai1ies were represented by Counsel, the Court informed the pai1ies of the need to contract an expe11. It also informed the parties of the change in panel and a need for further hearing for the benefit of the new member of the panel. The parties consented and readopted their pleadings, while the Respondent prayed for leave to file its Final Address. The Court granted the prayer and waived the need for an expert witness while adjourning the case to 28 th February 2024. 15. The Applicants filed their Further Written Address on 31 st January 2024, in the Registry of the Com1. 16. On 12th February 2024, the Respondent filed its Final Written Address in the Registry of the Court. 17. Subsequently, on the 29 th February 2024, the Comt held a virtual session, in which both parties were represented by Counsel. The Court, suo motu, under A11icle 45 of the Rules of the Com1, ordered the Chief Registrar to appoint an independent expert to obtain an expert report. It is ordered that the pai1ies must be informed and that the Chief Registrar should contract said expert within two weeks and furnish said person with a terms of reference and the pleadings of the case. The Respondent consented and welcomed the opportunity to comment on the suitability of the expe11. The Cou11 adjourned after reiterating that it would follow the procedure in Article 45 of the Rules to the letter. 18. On 2 pt October 2024, an announcement for the appointment of an independent expert was made. 19. This was followed by the Respondent1s request for an adjournment by way of letter during the Court1s penultimate vi1iual session on 1 th November 2024. SI Page t} f ~ 20. The Couit held its final vi1tual session on 3rd March 2025, in which both parties were represented by Counsel. The Applicant informed the Couit of their objection to the appointment of the first expett and prayed that the Court should deliver its judgment based on the documents before it. The Respondent, however, had no objection to the appointment of the expert contracted by the Court. This elicited a fu1ther objection from the Applicant that the Respondent, having failed to lodge its written observations, cannot viva voce make the same. The Court withdrew the file for judgment and adjourned the session. V. APPLICANT'S CASE a. Summary of facts 21. The Applicants' claim is centered on the development of a security software infrastructure intended to provide quick repo1tage of crime and a corresponding response by the appropriate security forces. They claim that after a lengthy research process, software design and processing, a framework called Nigerian Community Safety and Security Software Infrastructure, which is also known as Nigerian Secure Po1tal, was born. Their claim includes a submission that the software was registered with an agent of the Respondent and certified with Ce1tificate No. L W 1785 issued by the Copyright Commission and dated 7th September, 2016. 22 . The Applicants claim that they submitted a proposal to an agent of the Respondent, the National Information Technology Development Agency (hereinafter referred to as NITDA), which resu lted in series of meetings on the development of the infrastructure of community based security intelligence. They maintain that the Respondent had access to its intellectual GI Page property during these meetings via their numerous submissions and presentations. 23. They claim that after being to ld that their su bmi ss ions had been sent for further study on the recommendation of the Office of the President, they were surprised that shortly after this discovery, an application on Google Play Store called N igeria Internal Security and Public Safety Alert System (NISPAS) was discovered. T hat upon investigation, the application showed a direct lifting of the Applicants' concept and features. 24 . The Applicants allege that further investigations revealed that the NI SPAS was owned by an agent of the Respondent and that it bore striking similarities with the web infrastructure that they (the Appl icants) developed. The premise of this claim is that the functionality and administrative procedure of the Respondent's app lication is a direct copy of the Applicants' creation. In support of this, the Applicants submit that, following demonstrations to the respective agencies of the Respondent, it managed to put up the same application on the website of the Ministry of Interior. The Applicants claim that this is theft and are therefore claiming that they have suffered loss which is unquantifiable. 25 . It is the unreserved averment of the Applicants that the theft of their web application, which is an intellectual property, was perpetrated by the Respondent and passed off on its platform as its own. As a result of this, the Applicants notified the Respondent of its breach of their intellectual property rights on the 14th August 2019. b. Pleas in law 26. The Applicants have relied on the following provisi 1s in support of their claim: 71 Page • ARTICLE 17 OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. • ARTICLE 14 OF THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES ' RIGHTS. • ARTICLE 26 OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. • SECTIONS 42 AND 43 OF THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTION. • ECtHR, BOLAN V. MOLDOVA, NO. 19247/03 , 29 JANUARY, 2008. • SMITH KLINE & FRENCH LAB TECH LTD V. THE NETHERLANDS (DEC) NO. 12633/87, 4 OCTOBER, 1990 EcommHR. • LENZING V. THE UNITED KINGDOM, (DEC), NO. 38817/97, 9 SEPTEMBER, 1998. • "INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS" PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CKS-CERDOCT DOCTORAL SCHOOLS, CHALLENGES OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY, BUCHAREST, 15 - 16 APRIL, 201 1, 93 . • TIMOTHY PINTO, "THE INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ." 24(4) EIPR 209 (2002). • ECtHR, ANHEUSER - BUSCH INC. V. PORTUGAL (GC) NO. 73049/01, 11 JANUARY, 2007, P 72 . Bl Page • ECtHR, PAEFFGEN GMBH V. GERMANY (DEC.), NO. 25379/04, 21688/05, 21722/05 AND 21770/05, SEPTEMBER, 2007, PARA 1. • ECtHR, A. D V. THE NETHERLANDS (DEC.), NO. 21962/93 , 11 JANUARY, 1994. • ECtHR, ARAL TEKIN AND ARAL V. TURKEY (DEC.), NO. 24563/94 ECtHR, 14 JANUARY, 1998. • ECtHR, MELNYCHUK V. UKRAINE (DEC.), NO. 28743/05, 5 JULY, 2005. • ECtHR, EDITURA ORIZONTURI SRL V. ROMANIA, NO. 15872/03 , 13 MAY, 2008. • ECtHR, SIA AKKA/LAA V. LATVIA NO. 562/05, 12 JULY, 2016. • THE DEFENDANT'S COPYRIGHT ACT, CAP C28, LAWS OF THE FEDERATION OF NIGERIA, 2004 (PROTECTING CREATIVITY). - SECTIONS 1, 10, 11 , 12, 15, 18,AND 19OF SAME DEFENDANT'S STATUTE. • NEU V. SWEDEN, APP NO: 40397/2, EUR. CT H. R. 2013. • THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY AND THE PROTECTION OF INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY - A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE ON THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS DECISION IN: ANHEUSER-BUSH INC V. PORTUGAL. • DRAGOS BOGDAN - INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. 9 I Page • P. L. C. TORREMANS(ED) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS : ENHANCED EDITION OF COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS (KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL, 2008). • BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS, 1886. • WIPO COPYRIGHT TREATY, 1996. c. Reliefs sought 27. The Applicants are seeking the following reliefs from the Comt: a) A declaration that the Plaintiffs are entitled to the protection of the fundamental freedoms enshrined and guaranteed under the Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. b) A declaration that the Defendant state is bound to observe and respect the rights enshrined and guaranteed under the Atticles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, African Chatter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Politi cal Rights regarding the property rights of the Plaintiffs to the Nigeria Community-Based Safety and Security Software Infrastructure (NCSSSI) otherwise known as Nigeria Secure Portal. c) A declaration that the Defendant's Ministry of Interior in reproducing and aping the Plaintiffs' Nigeria Secure Portal a web agent created by the l st Plaintiff to as an electronic 10 I P age reporting platform and remo lding the said Po1tal into a Nigeria Internal Security and Public Safety Alert System (NISPSAS), safety and security portal using the same structure, content, framework, development techniques, rep01ting and administrative concept and the consumer-to-national safety and security mechanism, is an infringement on the property rights of the Plaintiffs and a violation of their fundamental rights guaranteed and enshrined under Article 14, of the African Cha1ter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Sections 42 and 43 of the Defendant's Constitution. d) An order compelling the Defendant to submit and/or release to the Plaintiffs, the 'Nigerian Internal Security and Public Safety Alert System (NISPSAS)' and all the materials and artifacts related or connected thereto existing in both web and mobile platforms in accordance with law. e) An order prohibiting the Defendant perpetually, its agents, servants, privies and assigns from further developing any website, software or IT device, in the mode, character, form , nature and dimension of the Plaintiffs' Nigerian Community Based Safety and Security Software Infrastructure (NCSSSI). f) The sum of $441,927,961.00 (Four Hundred and Forty-one Million, Nine Hundred and Twenty-seven Thousand, Nine Hundred and Sixty-one Dollars) being the Project Development cost. g) The sum of $ 154,674,786.40 (One Hundred and Fifty-four Million, Six Hundred and Seventy-four Seven <0 I ~ lll Page Hundred and Eighty-six, Dollars and Fo1iy cents) to the Plaintiffs as compensation for the infringement on their property rights and violation of their fundamental rights. h) The sum of $1,487,407.00 (One Million, Four Hundred and Eighty-seven Thousand, Four Hundred and Seven Dollars) being damages. VI. RESPONDENT'S CASE a. Summary of facts 28. The Respondent admits the first assertion of the Applicant, that it is beset with security challenges to the extent that there have been several insurgency attempts and other crimes within the Respondent state. However, it denies knowledge of the Applicants creative energy and elaborate research effort towards developing a web application to address insecurity issues as claimed. 29 . In sum, the allegations levied by the Applicants are all denied by the Respondent, who states that the facts as alleged are within the knowledge of the Applicants alone. That the efforts expended and the expenses incurred in procuring research and data gathering as claimed by the Applicants were done of their own freewill and pleasure. It however, admits that the registration and certification of the Applicants' proprietary interest in the application is true. 30. The Respondent contends that even if the security intelligence mechanism known as the Nigeria P01ial is a brainchild of the Applicant, it did not engage them to produce or design the same for its own use. 31. It is submitted by the Respondent that the narration of facts by the Applicants is largely dist01ied, as the Respondent cannot award a contra except via its Public Procurement Act. 12 I Page 32. The Respondent submits further that NISPSAS is not the brainchild of the Applicants and the latter's claim of intellectual theft is unfounded. The Respondent argues in rebuttal that the NISPSAS application has no similarity with the Applicants' web application; therefore, it puts them to strict proof. 33 . It is specifically stated that the security number of the Respondent's application differs from the Applicants', even though the features may appear to be similar. Nonetheless, the Respondent submits that the forum for redress in view of the allegation of intellectual rights theft should be the national Comis. 34. The Respondent in its Final Address submits that while the Applicants claim that their invention was stolen by it, its First Witness under oath stated that he was not told that the invention was stolen. 35 . In light of the foregoing, the Respondent considers the application frivolous, made in bad faith, gold digging, and an attempt to distract the Respondent from its efforts to provide maximum security, and prays that the Court dismisses the entire application based on the aforesaid grounds. VII. APPLICANTS' RESPONSE TO THE RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE 36. The Applicants maintain their claim and rebut the Respondent's contention as to the inconsistencies in the dates of association with its agents, submitted in its narration of facts. They, however, restate the procedure employed in the concept and development of its software and submit a table of expenses that they incurred in the process. 37. They also aver that the Respondent did not procure or engage their services but that they offered their services out of patriotism. Further, he norm for Bl Page researchers, inventors, and manufactu rers alike is that they do not need to be solicited. 38. They submit vehemently in their Fmiher Address that: "Incidentally, intellectual property rights are recognized in Nigeria, and are enforceable by the courts and this is informed chiefly by its being a party to the Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works. By this indication, and for the enforcement of intellectual property rights (specifically as in this case, copyrights). It is important that the domestic copyright law can only come into consideration in the areas assigned to it by the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1979. SOJne key area are reserved for the domestic legislature by the Convention in what may be regarded as a Margin of Appreciation for municipal intervention. The infringement complained of in the circumstance of this application falls essentially under international law, which provisions and principles thereby apply via the defendant's Copyright Act. The reason for this is not far-fetched- the areas reserved by the Convention and covered by the domestic Act are seen and construed as part of the Convention and its provisions thereunder. For this reason, the court will not be said to have gone outside its jurisdictional mandate to interpret or enforce municipal laws, but rather exercising its jurisdiction to interpret an international convention. Secondly, the international conventions applicable in construing the extent and ramifications of intellectual property rights, holds sway and prevails in the event of an inconsistency with any domestic law. In other words, the international convention is the gauge or barometer for meas 14 I Page (fj correctness or otherwise of domestic laws on intellectual property, specifically as in this case, the Nigerian Copyright Law. To this extent, we state that the applicable convention zn this circumstance is the prime instrument for consideration around which the adjudication and consideration in this case should revolve. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WJPO) has set standards/or protection of intellectual property by the enactment of the Berne Convention of which Nigeria is signatory, alongside I 70 other countries. The WJPO copyright Treaty (WCT) is a special agreement under the Berne convention that deals with the protection of works and the rights of the authors in the digital environment, such as in this circumstance. The main criteria for consideration of the protective status of a work as a literary work are where they are fixed in a definite format, and the proof that sufficient effort has been expended in the making of the work to give it an original character. We submit that the Applicant has shown by his processes before the court particularly his witness deposition on Oath of which evidence was led before the court on 30th March that the work concerned is not only in a fixed definite format, but is distinct, and incapable of reproduction except by a party privileged to have been introduced to it and its intricate workings. " 39. The Applicants are urging the Court to grant the application in the interest of justice and as a measure to stymie the blatant acts of infringement and theft that are becoming a regular occurrence in some domestic entities. It submits that by granting the application, it would be taking a step in protecti artistic and literary works for a better society. 15 I Page VIII. JURISDICTION 40. Having regard to the fact that the claim has been partly premised on Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (hereinafter ACHPR), Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR), BERNE Convention and the WIPO Treaty, the Court is mindful to carefully determine its competence to hear and determine the claim. 41. With regards to Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, which is a provision guaranteeing the ri ght to prope1iy of citizens in the Member States, the Court considers that an allegation of breach thereunder falls under A1iicle 9 ( 4) of the Supplementary Protocol (A/SP.1/01/05). This provision states that the CoU1i has competence to adjudicate claims of human rights violations occurring in Member States. Thus, in the present claim regarding the alleged violation of Article 14 of the ACHPR, the Court will rely on EL HADJI TIDJANI ABOUBAKAR V REPUBLIC OF NTGER (2011) CCJELR at page 8, where it held that "For an application to be admissible in matters of human rights, the mere citing of the facts connected with such description suffices to confer competence on the Court." The Court has steadfastly declared competence over cases on the strength of a mere allegation of human rights violation occurring within the jurisdiction of Member States. Therefore, the Couii declares that it has the competence to determine the claim under Article 14 of the ACHPR. 42. On the competence of the CoU1i regarding A1iicle 26 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which denotes that "[A]ll persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and efJective protection 16 I Page against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." Following Article 9 (4) of the Protocol (supra) and the aforementioned jurisprudence of the Court in EL HADJ ABOUBAKAR TIDJANI (supra), the Court holds that it has the competence to determine the claim under Article 26 of the ICCPR. 43 . Regarding the claims under the Berne Convention for the Protection of L iterary and Artistic Works, and by extension the World Intellectual Property Copyright Treaty, the Court is guided by Article 19 of the Protocol on the Community Court of Justice (A/P.1 /7/91) which states that "The Court shall examine the dispute before it in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and its Rules of Procedure. It shall also apply, as necessary, the body of laws as contained in Article 38 of the Statutes of the International Court of Justice. 11 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Comi of Justice (ICJ) outlines the sources of law that the ICJ applies when deciding disputes submitted to it. It specifies international conventions, international customs, and general principles oflaw, and subsidiary means like judicial decisions and the writings of legal scholars. It is the same modus that the Court applies in its determination of claims before it however, the claims must firstly fa ll within its subject matter jurisdiction as well as meet the requirements laid down in MR OLAJIDE AFOLABI V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2004) CCJELR at page 1. The Court held in this case that "It is a well-established principle of law that a Court is competent when: it is properly constituted as regards number and qualifications of the ,nembers of the bench, and no member is disqualified for one reason or another; and the subject-matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction; and the cas comes before 17 I Page the court initiated by due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. 11 44. The subject-matter jurisdiction of the ECO WAS Court is not codified like in other Courts however, Article 9 (supra) guides the application and scope of the subject-matter. It is trite law that the same Article provides the Court with four core mandates, i.e. , a Community Court interpreting ECOWAS legal instruments, a Public Service Comi resolving disputes between the Community and its officials, a Human Rights Comi handling human rights violations in ECOWAS member states, and an Inter-State dispute resolution Tribunal. Each core mandate is guided by texts that inform its subject-matter jurisdiction and form the basis of its competence. As a Community Court and a Public Service Court, it uses Community law, which is made up of the ECOWAS Treaty, Protocols, and Supplementary Protocols that establish the framework for the economic, social, and political framework of integration of ECOW AS. As a human ri ghts Court, it uses the fundamental human rights treaties of the United Nations (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; International Covenant on All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment; International Convention on the Rights of the Child; International Covenant on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families; International Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities) and the regional human rights treaty i.e. the African Cha1ier on Human and People's Rights. All protocols to the international and regional treaties form pa1i of the texts that th Court uses in 18 I P a g e the determination of claims bordering on human rights v iolations. The fourth mandate of the Comi is still in the frontier stages, so no definite text has been adopted or earmarked for the purposes of application. 45. In the brief narration of texts that inform the subj ect-matter jurisdiction of the Court, the Berne Convention (supra) and its anci llary WIPO Treaty do not form part of the texts that guide its adjudication within its competence und er A1iicle 9 of the Protocol of the Court as amended. It is needless to say that the Court's competence is derived by law; therefore, it cannot suo motu create a new arm of competence regardless of how exhaustively a claimant has pleaded his cause. 46. Consequently, being mindful of the conclusions of the Applicants to wit: "a. The defendant's security portal is the Original expression of the work of the plaintiffs and not just the underlying idea behind the work. b. There is a casual connection between the original work and the infringing work. c. The defense of fair use, or fa ir dealing as applied in the US Supreme Court decision in Oracle v Google cannot avail the defendant as it has been shown, and demonstrated before the court that the defendant has not met any of the criterion for such defense to avail it,· the Court finds that the claim in this regard, is outside its competence. For emphasis, the Cami holds that the Berne Convention and its anci llary WIPO Treaty are completely outside its competence and declares that it lacks the competence to adjudicate the claim in this regard. 47. Fmihermore, the Court v iews the submissions of Sections 42 and 43 of the Constitution of Nigeria by the Applicants as misguided. The reason being that it has held severall y that it lacks the competence to examine the laws of Member States or to review decisions made by domestic comis of Member States: MESSRS ABDOULA YE BALDE & REPUBLI OF SENEGAL 19 I Page t ~ (2013) CCJELR at page 75. This jurisprudence remains good law and gives the Court the basis to declare that the claim under Sections 42 and 43 of the Constitution of Nigeria is outside its competence. 48. Based on the foregoing analysis, in sum, the Couii finds that it has the requisite competence to determine the claims pe1iaining to human rights violation and so holds. IX. ADMISSIBILITY 49 . In determining admissibility of a human rights claim, the Court must, as a matter of law, determine whether paiiies have the requisite standing to institute the action: MR. CHUDE MBA V. REPUBLIC OF GHANA (2013) CCJELR at page 18. In determining whether the Applicant has proper standing, the Court will rely on the following ratio that "Admissibility of a human rights violation case is to meet two cumulative conditions, which are: the said case should neither be anonymous nor be taken before another international Court of competent jurisdiction:" MRS. NAZARE GOMES DE PINA V . THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEE BISSAU (2018) CCJELR at page 10-11. This requirement is set under Article 10 ( d) of the Protocol as amended (supra), and the Comi considers that the Applicants have sufficiently identified themselves as v ictims with a claim for violation of human rights. The Court therefore, finds the first part of Article 10 ( d) fu lfil led; and having found no fact or evidence that the same claim is before another international Court, this Court finds that the Applicant has fulfilled both conditions for admissibility. 20 I Page SO. Having considered the facts and evidence before it, the Court finds that the requirements for admissibility for applications bordering on human rights allegations have been met and declares the app lication admissible. X. MERITS 51. The Court notes that the admissible claims before it are those brought for the alleged violation of the right to property pursuant to Article 14 of the ACHPR and Article 26 of the ICCPR. It has been the tradition of the Court to regard the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as soft law as it is not binding on any state, it therefore maintains the same tradition in this case. 52. The Applicants are seeking several declarations giving effect to the rights guaranteed in Article 14 of the ACHPR and A1iicle 26 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and orders of release, prohibition, and compensation for costs and damages. 53 . In determining the claims and reliefs sought hy the Applicant, the Court has formulated two issues, to wit: "Whether the Respondent has infringed on the right to property of the Applicants pursuant to Article 14 of the ACHPR on the one hand, and Article 26 of the ICCPR on the other." Article 14 of the ACHPR 54. Article 14 of the ACI-IPR states that: "The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws." This guarantee is, however, not absolute as it can be derogated from in certain instances within the law. This was aiiiculated in the Court's decision in DEXTER OIL LIMITED v. REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA 21 I Page JUDGMENT NO ECW/CCJ/JUD/03/19 (Unreported) at page 24 where it stated that: "Even where the Applicant's claim to ownership is substantiated, it is trite that the right to property in Article 14 of the A CHP R is not absolute as it may be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of the appropriate laws." 55. The facts in the present case show that the Applicant conceptualized and developed a software which was duly registered under law and exhibited before this Court for ease of reference. The Respondent, in turn, has corroborated this piece of evidence, and the Court takes note of its submission that the same is authentic. It is on this property, the intellectual property rights which were registered by the Applicants, that the present claims of a breach of Article 14 of the ACHPR have been based. Establishing a proprietary right 56. In determining issue one, which is establishing that the Applicant has a proprietary right to the property in the claim pursuant to Article 14 of the ACHPR, the Comt considers the facts and evidence before it, paiticularly the Copyright Registration Certificate No . L Wl 785 was issued by the Nigerian Copyright Commission on 7th September, 2016. This is for it to dispense with the question of what forms a property or what is a property. Generally, prope1ty is viewed as a thing that can be owned, and the said ownership of property is usually vested by way of law . Yet, every jurisdiction has the right to set the standard of ownership and the manner of registration of ownership. Ownership of a thing includes intellectual property, which extends to creations of the mind, etc. Therefore, the registration and ce1 •ification of such 22 I Page ~ a thing vests the interest in the person making the application and endows him with the power to hold that interest exclusively. 57. In the present claim, the Court notes that the certificate submitted demonstrates that the proprietary interest of the Applicants' creation, i.e., they are vested with proprietary. It is thus axiomatic that the certificate is suffic ient to establish a property right, and the Court so holds. Evidence of dispossession of ownership 58 . Notwithstanding proof of proprietary interest, the Court considers it imperative that the Applicants in a claim under Article 14 of the ACHPR must adduce evidence of a violation of the said right. Thus, it is considered that the facts and evidence before it must be sufficient to prove a breach of the right. 59 . It has been established before the Court by way of evidence that the Applicants have a proprietary right to a certain web application. However, they claim that the said right was breached when the Respondent allegedly infringed on it by using the same. To this end, the Court notes the Applicants' submission that after several meetings and presentations, the Respondent went ahead to adopt the Applicants' web design, rename the same and deploy it for public use. This allegedly improper use of a web application believed to be theirs is an infringement of their proprietary right and a breach of Article 14 of the ACHPR. 60. On its part, the Court notes the Respondent's rebuttal of all the claims and its averment of possessing independent ownership of its invention and a unique security code. It contends that the Applicants were never engaged by it and they have in no way infringed on the rights of the Appli ants£ 23 I Page @ 61. The Court considers that the obligation of the State concerning Article 14 of the ACHPR can be summarized as not to: • interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of property; or • deprive a person of their possessions; or • subject a person's possession to control. 62. It is, however, accepted that this right can be interfered with lawfu lly and in the public interest. The concept of property and possessions includes tangible things like land and money, but also includes contractual rights, shares, leases, claims for compensation, intellectual property rights, statutory rights to benefits, etc. The genuine, effective exercise of this right does not only depend on the State's duty not to interfere, but it may also require positive measures to protect property to be acquired. This is paiiicularly the case where there is a direct link between the measures a prope1iy owner may legitimately expect from the authorities and the effective enjoyment of his or her possessions. So, for example, a public authority's negligence that leads to prope1iy destruction may breach this right. Any interference with this right must be subject to conditions provided for by law and must achieve a fair balance between the general public interest and the protection of an individual's prope1iy rights. What is considered to be in the public interest is often left to the government to decide, but any interference must strike a fair balance between the demands of the general interests of the community and the requirements of the individual's fundamental rights. A lack of appropriate compensation would likely be considered disproportionate. 63. The Com1 has gone into this academic analysis so that the pai1ies can appreciate what a claim for violation of prope1iy rights entails. In this instance, therefore, the Court is concerned that the Applicants are claiming theft of their proprietary interest, not a violation of the right to property. Tl)1€ Court finds it 24 I Page t ~ necessary to instruct that couching a claim as a human rights v iolation will only allow the Court to assume jurisdiction. However, the claim must be sufficiently proved before it is found on the merits for it to find purchase as a violation. This Court is civil in character and does not have a mandate to adjudicate on criminal matters. Hence, in the instance of a claim of theft, which is a crime, the Court cannot develop competence outside that which the law has bestowed on it. Article 14 of the ACHPR denotes a guarantee for the right to property, and a breach of the same would amount to a violation. However, the facts and evidence before this Court establish that the claim is a crime and not a violation as envisaged under Article 14 of the ACHPR, which puts it out of its competence under Article 9 ( 4) of the Supplementary Protocol. Consequently, the Comt dismisses the claim of theft as sought by the Applicants. 64. With regard to the claim of infringement, the Court notes that the Respondent has confirmed ownership of the Applicants1 web design, i.e., that the right to prope1ty is vested in the Applicants. It also notes that the same has not been withdrawn at any point, either arbitrarily or lawfully. The facts and evidence point to allegations of passing-off and theft. When it comes to a violation of Article 14 of the ACHPR, this Court is concerned with a deprivation of property occasioned by the Respondent or its agent or subjecting a person 1s possession to control. The said owner must be divested of his proprietary rights for the act to qualify as a v iolation under Article 14 (supra). Hence, the allegations of the Respondent copying the web application fall short of divesting the said Applicants of their proprietary interest. The Court notes that the Applicant still possesses the ownership of their web ere ion, which flaws the argument of a deprivation of ownership. i 25 I Page 65. Where the proprietary interest is still vested in the owner and no unlawful control has been so exercised, the act cannot be said to be in consonance with a breach under A1t icle 14 of the ACHPR. 66. Given the foregoing, the Court holds that the Respondent has not acted outside its obligation under Article 14. Furthermore, the Court holds that it cannot determine a claim of theft clothed in a violation for human rights as its scope of application excludes criminal claims. As a consequence of the analysis under this rubric, the Court dismisses the claim of a violation under Article 14 of the ACHPR in its entirety. Article 26 of the /CCPR 67. The Comt notes that the Applicant has listed Article 26 of the ICCPR, wh ich provides that "All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrim,ination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." 68. It further recalls the Applicants' relief to w it: "A declaration that the Defendant's Ministry of Interior in reproducing and aping the Applicants' Nigeria Secure Portal a web agent created by the First Applicant to serve as an electronic reporting platform and remolding the said Portal into a Nigeria Internal Security and Public Safety Alert System (NISPSAS), safety and security portal using the same structure, content, framework, development techniques, reporting and administrative concept and the consumer-to national safety and security ,nechanism, is an inj ingement on the property 26 I Page rights of the Applicants and a violation of their fimda,n ental rights guaranteed and enshrined under Article 14, of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Sections 42 and 43 of the Respondent's Constitution." 69 . The Respondent, on the other hand, submits that the Applicants merely glossed over their claims, which are speculations, as they have failed to prove their claims. It is the prayer of the Respondent that the Court should dismiss the application w ith costs. 70. The Court is mindfu l to re ly on its jurisprudence in the determination of a breach of Article 26 of the ICCPR. In the case of ABDO ULA YE BALDE & ORS. V REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL (201 3) CCJELR at page 96, 136 §41, 65 it stated that "The violation of equality before the law would therefore result from the pe,formance of discrim.inatory acts against a citizen by an administration or any person in authority, which acts could be based on his sex, race, origin, nationality, ethnicity, religion ,,. The principle of equality of citizens before the law implies that citizens are made to go through the same mode of application of the law by a particular judicial institution, in the sense that citizens coming before the Court to seek justice and finding themselves in the same situation shall be tried by the same Court or Tribunal and according to the same legal rules of procedure. " 7 1. The jurisprudence imp lies that everyone, regardless of their status, background, or any other attribute, is subject to the same laws and legal processes, Without more, this principle does not allow for privileged exemptions from legal sanctions but guarantees equal treatment for all, The Court finds instru ctive the African Commission's decision in the case of CIVIL LIBERTIES ORGANISATION & OR S. V FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2001 ) AHRLR 75 (ACHPR 2001 ) par graphs 27 & 44 that ad \ 27 I Page hoc tribunals should be subject to the same requirements of fairness, openness, justice, independence, and due process as in regular tribunals. 72. Essentially, the Court notes that the right to equality before the law has not been canvassed by the Applicants. Having carefully analyzed the import of Article 26 of the ICCPR and the facts and evidence before it, the Court dismisses the plea thereunder as fri volous. XI. COSTS 73. A11icle 66 (1) of the Rules of the Court provides that: "A decision as to costs shall be given in the final judgment or in the order, which closes the proceedings." The Court orders hereunder that the parties are to bear their own costs. XII. OPERATIVE CLAUSE 74. For the reasons stated above, the court sitting in public after hearing both parties: As to jurisdiction: 1. Declares that it has jurisdiction. As to admissibility 11. Declares the application admissible with regards to Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and Article 26 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. 111. Dismisses the claims under the Berne Convention, WIPO Treaty and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. As to the merits of the case: 28 I Page 1v. Dismisses the claim for violation of the right to prope1iy pursuant to Article 14 of the ACHPR. v. Dismisses the claim for violation of the right to equality before the law pursuant to Article 26 of the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. v1. Dismisses all other claims. COSTS v11. Orders that the parties bear their own costs. Hon. Justice Sengu Mohamed KOROMPresiding/Rappo Hon. Justice Gberi-Be OUATT ARA Hon. Justice Edward Amoako ASANTE Dr. Y aouza OURO-SAMA - Chief Registrar Done in Abuja, this 12th day of MaY., 5 i English and translated into French and Po1iuguese. 29 I Page