Standard Resource Group Ltd v Ali Badawy, Richard Mutinda & David Killoran [2017] KEHC 5913 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION

PETITION NO.  342 OF 2016

IN THE MATER IF ARTICLE 22(1), 165, 258 AND 259 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010

IN THE  MATTER OF ALLEGED  CONTRAVENTION  OF RIGHTS OR  FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS UNDER ARTICLES 10,27,35(2),40 ,47,50(1)  AND 73  (1)  OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010.

AND

IN THE MATTER OF COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS & BORDER CONTROLS

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE WRONGFUL IMPOUNDMENT AND DETENTION    OF IMPORTED GOODS UNDER ENTRY NO.  2016MSA 6030784

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY CUSTOMS MANAGEMENT ACT, 2009 AND THE EAST AFRICAN CUSTOMS   REGULATIONS, 2010

BETWEEN

STANDARD RESOURCE GROUP LTD…….....…..PETITIONER/APPLICANT

VERSUS

ALI BADAWY……………………………………………….1ST RESPONDENT

RICHARD MUTINDA……………………..………………...2ND RESPONDENT

DAVID KILLORAN …………………..……………………..3RD RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT ON CONTEMPT OF COURT

1. On  2nd September  2016 this court  delivered  a  ruling  granting  conservatory  mandatory  orders, ordering  the  3rd  respondent  to release  the  petitioner/applicant’s wrongfully impounded goods  under  Entry No.  2016, MSA  6-30784  to the petitioner  free of  any warehousing  demurrage, port plus  VAT and  storage charges accrued  on the petitioner  depositing  kshs  20,000,000 twenty million  in the form of  a reputable bank guarantee deposited  with the court and  the  3rd respondent   Commissioner  of Customs and  Border  Controls within 7 days  of the ruling.

2. The court  also implored  on the parties  to explore  possible  alternative  dispute  resolution  mechanisms  as espoused  in Article  159  of the constitution.  The 3rd respondent was ordered to bear costs of the application.

3. The said order   was extracted and issued on 9th September 2016   and it had a penal notice on the face   thereof.

4. The affidavit of service sworn by Nixon Muhatia on 10th October  2016  shows that on 3rd October  2016  he served the order  upon Makupa  Transit Shades  Ltd who   were enjoined  as interested  parties to  this petition.  The  2nd respondent   was served  on 14th September  2016   as per the affidavit  of service sworn  by the same  Nixon Muhatia  on  19th September  2016.

5. On  17th October  2016, the petitioner/applicant’s  counsel  Dr Kamau  Kuria  filed an application  notice seeking  to declare  and  hold that the following people  (persons)  be held to be in contempt  of court for  disobeying  the court order  issued on  9th September  2016:

a) Ali Badawy, Richard Mutinda   and  David  Killoran ; and that  the said persons  be committed to civil  jail for  a period of six months  or any other  period that  the court may sanction  as appropriate.  He also prayed for costs.

6. The particulars  of contempt  as contained  in the grounds  and supporting  affidavit of  Mr Wu Jun  are  that the  3rd  respondent  was  ordered to  unconditionally release the impounded   goods belonging to the applicant.  That on  17th September  2016   the  3rd respondent  directed  the alleged  contemnors  who were  holding  the goods to  forthwith  release  them to the applicant  but that the alleged  contemnors  undermined  the authority  of the court and refused  to release the goods  namely the deformed  steel bars  which  had been  lying  in their customs  warehouse since  26th May  2016.

7. The applicant  therefore urged the court to cite and punish  the alleged  contemnors for  contempt  of  court  and sentence  them to a jail  term as  prescribed  in law, maintaining  that agents   of the principal  could be  cited for  contempt  of court  if  they undermined the authority of the court.

8. The  1st, 2nd  and  3rd respondents filed  replying   affidavits  on  2nd  and  4th November 2016  respectively.  The affidavits  sworn by Ali Badawy deposes that he  was  a sales person of Makupa  Transit  Shade Limited and adopted  the affidavit of his  General Manager  Richard Mutinda, while  denying  that they  were in contempt  of court  at all and  that they were  only seeking to establish their claim.  Further  that as a sales person, he  was not in a position  to make  any decisions  regarding the  release of goods  or waiver, which  decision  could only  be made by  Board of Directors, not the  General Manager  or Chief Executive  Officer.

9. Richard Mutinda also swore a replying  affidavit on 25th October  2016  deposing  that  he is  the General Manager  of  Makupa  Transit  Shade Ltd  and  swore  the affidavit  on his behalf  and  on behalf  of his  co-contemnor (alleged), who is the Chief Executive Officer  of the Makupa  Transit  Shades Ltd  Mr David  Killoran and  Mr  Ali Badawy.

10. In the affidavit, the deponent denies that Makupa Transit Shades Ltd are agents of Kenya Revenue Authority.  That the Makupa Transit  Shades Ltd  receives  instructions to release  cargo from the Commissioner of Customs  and  Border Control  but in the manner stipulated  in paragraph 5 of the replying affidavit which is the procedure applicable for release of cargo, and not  through  a court order  and that  therefore a court  order must comply  with the procedures set out in the said paragraph for cargo to  released and on  instructions  of the Commissioner of Customs  and Border  Control.

11. That  release  orders must be obtained  from Kenya Revenue Authority and online  and that  Makupa  Transit  Shades  only  participates in verification, drawing  gate  passes  and  charging  storage.

12. That  they had  notified  the  petitioner  herein  that  they  could  not release  cargo without  clearance/approval of Commissioner of Customs and Border Controls and only upon proof of payment  by the petitioner  of the duty due  and  payable.

13. That in this case, they asked the importer to provide adequate security to enable release of cargo forthwith which is not tantamount to disobeying the court order.

14. That notwithstanding the court order, the release procedures which are internal must be adhered to.  That  it should  not be  blamed  for contempt  of court since  it is only  an agent  and not the  principals  who are  the Commissioner  of Customs  and  Border  Control.

15. That as  CFS, it acts  independent of the Port  and  Kenya Revenue Authority  and  the importer enters  into a legally  binding contract  with CFS for the storage  of  its cargo, which  charges accrue  after  21  days.

16. That the CFS  was never made  party to these proceedings  and that  the issue of  storage  charges  due  and the CFS  has never  been resolved.

17. That it  was difficult  to release  the cargo  with unpaid  charges because Kenya Revenue Authority had not formally advised  Makupa  Transit Shades Limited to  release  the cargo through any acceptable  mode  until  19th September  2016.

18. That the guarantee for  20 million deposited by the petitioner  only takes  care of  additional duty, but not  warehousing, demurrage, port charges, marshaling, and  remarshaling  which issues  are dealt  with separately  by the  importer and the CFS hence  it  is not  proper to assume that  the  order  as issued  herein caters  for the above.

19. That it is upon the importer to clear with CFS and claim any damages from Kenya Revenue Authority for unlawful detention of its cargo.

20. That all that Makupa Transit Shades demanded was due process to be followed i.e Payment of storage charges and in lieu thereof, a suitable   guarantee to be provided by the petitioner as is standard  practice, which does not amount  to contempt of court; and release to be  followed  ie

i) Valid  court order as presented  and

ii) Release   process described above followed.

21. That if there was any irregular or unlawful act on the part of the Commissioner of Customs and Border Control, it should not be attributed to the Makupa Transit Shades Ltd.  That there is no reason why the Commissioner of Customs and Border Control had not been enjoined to the contempt proceedings.

22. That the letter of 27th September 2016 by Kenya Revenue Authority to the petitioner’s advocates is very telling.  That CFS and Makupa Transit  Shades Ltd are not  agents  of Kenya Revenue Authority but independent entities and that the  letter dated  29th September  2016 was never  copied  to Makupa Transit  Shades Ltd  and that  total charges  as at  27th  September  2016  were shs  53,011 890.  That their  letter dated  30th September  2016  discusses  salient facts of a commercial nature  between  importer and  CFS  which cannot  be contempt  of court.

23. That the first time  the alleged contemnors heard  of contempt  of court   was on 3rd October  2016  as all  correspondence   was addressed  directly  to Kenya Revenue Authority  and not copied to  the CFS.

24. That  legally, contempt  application is  not available  for the aforestated reasons since there is a separate agreement   between the CFS  and the importer  and unless the procedure  for release  of cargo is  complied  with, the court order alone  could not compel  them to release  the cargo to the petitioner.

25. The parties’ advocates agreed  and orally submitted on the merits  and the demerits of the application for contempt, which  submissions were quite detailed and as they mirror the depositions  in the respective  affidavits, I need not replicate  them here  save to  state that the  oral submissions  were very comprehensive, useful and relevant  to this case. They also relied on several authorities.

26. From the detailed submissions and statute and case law cited, the following issues flow for determination:

a) Whether there was a court order capable of being disobeyed.

b) Whether the alleged contemnors were served with order and or whether they were aware of the court order.

c) Whether contemnors   acted as agents of respondent.

d) Whether an agent can be liable in contempt proceedings.

e) Whether the alleged contemnors disobeyed   the court order of 2nd September 2016.

f) What orders should this court  make and

g) Who should bear costs of the application?

27. I reiterate that on  2nd September  2016 this court  issued  a conservatory  order of a mandatory nature directing the 3rdrespondent  Commissioner  for Customs  and  Border Controls  to release   to the petitioner  Standard  Resource Group Ltd  if wrongfully  impounded imported goods under Entry No.2016MSA  6030784  to the petitioner free  of any warehousing, demurrage, port  plus VAT  and storage  charges  that would  have  accrued  on the petitioner depositing  kshs  20,000,000 in the form of a reputable   bank guarantee deposited  with the court  and  the 3rd respondent  within 7 days  of this ruling  as security pending  the hearing and  determination of this petition.

28. The above  order  was  extracted  on 9th September  2016  and  served upon the  3rd respondent  for  implementation.

29. The 2nd  respondent  Kenya Revenue Authority  and  the interested  party herein  Makupa Transit  Shades  Ltd  were also  served  with the said order  on 14th September  2016  and  3rd October  2016  respectively  and affidavits  of service filed  in court by the court  process server  Nixon Muhatia.

30. Upon receiving  the orders for  release  of the cargo, Kenya Revenue  Authority   wrote to the 2nd and  3rd  respondents  clearly  indicating  that they had  no objection  to the release of the cargo  save that  the Makupa Transit  Shades, the port  container  stations (CFS) and any  other party  in line of the  clearance  of goods  into the country had  distinct  roles  and  are not  agents of  the respondents    for purposes of  collection  of taxes.  And that Makupa Transit Shades Ltd is therefore an independent entity distinct from the respondent.

31. The  petitioner’s  advocate  wrote several letters  as annexed,  demanding  for the release  of the cargo only on conditions given by the court which conditions  of bank guarantee his client  had fulfilled  but there  was serious  resistance  as shown by the affidavits  sworn by  Ali Badawy and  David Killoran  in reply to the contempt application.

32. I have no doubt  that there  was   a valid  court  order of  this court  issued against  the  3rd respondent  for release  of the cargo upon  the petitioner depositing  with the court  and the  3rd  respondent  a bank  guarantee  of shs   20 million.  There  is also no dispute that the respondents  and the alleged  contemnors  hereto  were served  with the court  order in question and  were fully aware of the contents  of the said  court order  requiring  release of the cargo and this is all reflected in their respective replying affidavits in opposition to the contempt application.

33. Although the 2nd  and 3rd  respondents  claim that they have no issues  with the court  order and  therefore left  it upon  the CFS  to act  upon it  as an  independent  entity distinct  from  the respondents, it is clear that  the Makupa Transit Shades Limited represented by the alleged contemnors hereto was reluctant  to release  the cargo  because of  the tax dispute  that the petitioner  had with the  respondents  and this  is reflected  in the  Makupa Transit Shades Limited(MTSL) insisting that the procedures  for  release  of the cargo must be  adhered to,  notwithstanding the  court order.

34. Accordingly, I find that there was a  valid court  order which  was not  only served upon the alleged  contemnors  but that  the alleged contemnors were  too aware of the same, and that is why it  engaged the petitioner  in correspondence including  the letter of 30th September  2016  asking for  commercial handling charges  to be cleared first.  MTSL even offered  to release  the cargo upon  the petitioner  paying  50%  of the amount  owing  with the balance  due upon determination  of the matter  in order to ease  the burden on the petitioner and in the best interest of mitigating  further  expenses  accruing.  The letter was signed by David Killoran Chief Executive Officer and one of the alleged contemnors hereto, attaching a pro forma invoice dated the same day.

35. The Makupa Transit Shades Ltd claim that they  are independent  of Kenya Revenue Authority and the Commissioner  of Customs  and Border  Controls  and that  as it is  not an agent  of Kenya Revenue  Authority  or any of the  respondents, it cannot  be held  to have disobeyed  the orders of  2nd September  2016  which were  addressed  to the  3rd  respondent.

36. The court at paragraph 80 of its ruling made on 2nd September 2016 was  clear  that  the 3rd  respondent  had not  indicated  to court  who the  third parties  were and  or  whether  those  third parties  were its   agents.  It  further  found that  as prima facie, the  detention of the goods by the 3rd respondent was unjustified, arbitrary and unreasonable, any damages/loss would be  attributed  to the  actions  of the 3rd  respondent.

37. It is not  in dispute  that there  is a dispute  as to whether  the petitioner  owes  any more  money  to the 3rd  respondent  or not following  allegations of undervaluation  of the goods  imported, and  that is the  main reason  why the cargo  was  detained  longer  than the  stipulated  30 days  free storage, until the issue  could  be resolved  but there   was no solution on site  hence  this petition  and  the application for mandatory  conservatory  orders which this court considered and granted.

38. This court is  also alive  to the fact that Kenya Revenue Authority  or Commissioner of Customs and Border Control  (CC& BC)  have no  storage facilities  for cargo  at the Port  and that  such storage  is done by  other agencies  pending clearance  of duty  and  other charges  before cargo  can be  released to the importers.

39. Furthermore, the storage agencies cannot and would not release the cargo without the authority of the 2nd and 3rd respondents.  In my humble view, only a principal has authority over an agent.  In this case, the respondents had authority over the Makupa Transit Shades Ltd to hold onto the cargo until all the tax  claimed is cleared by the petitioner. However, even  assuming  that the  respondents  were not  agents  of the Kenya Revenue Authority or  CC& BC, liability  of contempt   of a person  with notice of the  order is described  as follows  at page  651  of Snell’s  Principles  of Equity, 28th Edition;

“ The court  may commit  not only  the parties  enjoined but also  directors  and  officers of any corporate  entity  enjoined and also any persons  who knowingly albeit the parties  in their breach of  injunction on the ground  that they are  obstructing the course of justice.”

40. However, as to whether agents or person not named in the order can be committed for contempt of court, J.M. Paterson in his 6th Edition of Kerr on injunctions stated:

“ The  agents, however, of a man  against  whom an  injunction  has been  awarded, although  not named  in the order, may be committed for  contempt, if having  knowledge  of the injunction, they act in  contravention of the order of  the court.  Moreover, any person, whether an agent or not, who knowing of an injunction, aids and abets the party enjoined in committing a breach of it, is liable to be committed.  In such cases, the committal is not, technically for breach of an injunction but for a contempt of court tending to obstruct the course of justice.

41. On the basis of the above authoritative writings, I have no hesitation in finding that the alleged contemnors, whether  agents of the respondents or not, could be committed for  contempt  of court if  they are  found to have  by their  conduct, tended  to obstruct  the cause of justice.

42. The next question is whether the alleged contemnors therefore, directly or indirectly and or knowingly by their actions or conduct, tended to obstruct the cause of justice. In Republic v Attorney General Exparte Evanson Gidraph KamauWaitiki & Another Mombasa Civil Application 40/2000, Honourable Muriithi J stated inter alia:

“ No matter  how judicious  an order of the court is, if it is not complied  with, or  implemented, the  same remains  a worthless paper  directive  with no  practical effect in  resolution  of the dispute  adjudicated by the court.

It is now settled law that court orders must be obeyed and as was stated by Romer LJ.  In Hadkinson v Hadkinson.

“   It is  the plain and unqualified  obligations of every  person against or  in respect  f whom an  order  has been made by  a court of competent  jurisdiction to obey it  unless  and  until that  order is  discharged.  The uncompromising  mature  of this  obligation  is shown  by the fact  that it extends  even to cases  where the person  affected  by an order  believes it to be  irregular  or even void.”

43. Section 5  of the Judicature  Act ( now repealed  by Contempt  of Court   Act (2016) conferred  upon the High Court  and  the Court of Appeal  the power to punish  for contempt  of court.

44. In this  case, the alleged  contemnors  maintained  that they  could not  release  the goods  because they were not parties  to this  petition; that they were  querying  as to who  will pay their  storage  charges; that they  were not agents of  Kenya Revenue Authority and  that although Kenya Revenue Authority  released  the cargo, the alleged  contemnors  were only  facilitative  of the process   for release  of the goods   as per the affidavit  of Mr Mutinda  which  process of release involves verification that  duty  is paid  and that  for Makupa Transit Shades Limited to release  cargo  it must  receive   an endorsement  on the release  order that duty  had been  paid by  virtue of a  court order.  That  in this  case, the alleged contemnors  had no  release order with endorsement by Kenya Revenue Authority, upon  which they could  issue  final  invoice  and release  the  cargo.

45. Further, that  knowledge of court order  does not  constitute  contempt  especially  when they  were never  given an  opportunity  to be  heard; that they are victims of  more  than one actor,  albeit  they acknowledged  that  court orders   must be  obeyed.

46. As earlier stated, court orders must be obeyed and challenged if there is need to do so.  In this case, albeit  the alleged  contemnors were not  primary  parties to the petition  and   therefore  were not  heard before  the  orders of  2nd September  2016  were made, it  is clear that they were  in   possession of the cargo  subject of these proceedings as bailees and  when the order  of the court was  served  upon them, which service  and acknowledgement  of the order  they  admit, they  started  engaging   in what they call factual commercial  deliberations.  They  also claim that it  was  difficult  to obey the  court  order because  the  Petitioner, knowing    very well  that   the goods  were  in the  custody of Makupa  Transit  Shades Limited, deliberately omitted  the latter   from these proceedings  and  instead  crafted an order   purposely and  issued with the impression that Kenya Revenue Authority  charges storage  charges.

47. In my  humble view, what the  alleged  contemnors  were putting  forth in their  terse  submissions and  depositions   are their  defence  as  to why they  did  not obey the court order, yet as at the hearing  of these contempt  proceedings, they had not  sought  by way of an application   to vary, set aside or  review  the said court order.  And   as earlier  stated, obedience  of a  court order   is not for  parties or  agents of parties to  the suit or  petitioner but for  every other  person who  is expected to facilitate its obedience or implementation.  If that were  not to  be the case, the chain of parties  to suits  would never  end. what also emerges  from the alleged   contemnor’s terse stand is that they  were  obstructing  the cause  of justice   and  tended to so obstruct   the cause of justice  for  reasons   that they knew  that they   were at the tail end of the process  of releasing   the cargo as per the court  order, but  were not  prepared  to obey the court order unless certain conditions  in the  name of  procedures for release  of  the cargo, were fulfilled.

48. The alleged contyemnors’ advocate, Mr Akanga in his submissions in opposition to this application for contempt   stated as follows on behalf his clients:

“We are ready and willing to obey the court order.  We  only need  release order  in the manner  we have  asked, irrespective  of storage charges  and secondly, the court to  give directions  on storage  charges  if any  should be  dealt with……the  court can  also give  us 48 hours  to comply  with the orders  or to direct  Kenya Revenue  Authority  to issue  a release  order.  There are two giants fighting my client is a victim.  A sales man, General Manager and Chief Executive Officer are not seized of capacity to obey court orders.  They will lose their jobs if they go to jail.  The court  can  now issue  a proper order  to Makupa  Transit  Shades  to be obeyed  within the next  48 hours  and  in default, contempt  be a recourse…..”

49. Mr Akanga went on and on  to indicate  that there  was  selective  justice against his clients as Kenya Revenue Authority had  disobeyed  the order  and so it  is the principal  contemnor, who  should bear  the  blame  up to when  they obeyed  the order and now that  his clients  were willing to obey the court  order, they should  not be  found to be  in contempt since  the proceedings for  contempt  were meant  to execute  the court order  hence his clients who were law  abiding citizens  should  not  be punished  through contempt  and jail term.

50. The upshot of all the above is that indeed there was disobedience   of the court order  by the alleged  contemnors  but that they  should not   be  solely  held responsible  and that they  had  very good  reasons  why they  could not  obey the  court order.  There is also very clear  and  unequivocal  admission on the part  of the alleged contemnors  that  they could not  obey the court order  but on  realizing the consequences  of  such  disobedience, they changed  tact and heart  and stated  that they  were now  willing to obey the court order  given 48  hours to do  so.

51. I am inclined to agree with  submissions by Dr Kamau Kuria that warehouses and their owners exist to facilitate  Kenya Revenue Authority to ensure it collects  taxes  and that the 3rd respondent(alleged) contemnor   is the altar  ego  of the Makupa  Transit  shades  Company Ltd  hence  the  one responsible  for releasing  of the cargo.  However, this is the  same person  who is  telling the  court that  unless  certain internal procedures  are followed  for release  of the  cargo, which release  order is in the terms acceptable  to his  company  the court order must  be ignored.

52. The legal  principle  is that court  order must be obeyed by all and  sundry and  any person who is  found to obstruct   the implementation of a court order  shall be  held to be  in contempt  of court.

53. Where there is  difficulty in  implementing   the court order, the prudent thing to do is to expeditiously seek the court’s  intervention and not to take too long like the alleged  contemnors  herein did   only to come to court   and  start  giving  defences of why they could not obey  the court order  including  their capacity  as employees; their  storage  charges  unpaid; No release order endorsed by Kenya Revenue Authority; they  were not  heard before the court order  was  issued and  bla bla bla.

54. This  country, as correctly submitted by  Dr Kamau Kuria, is governed  by the  rule of law, which is one  of the  pillars  of constitutionalism and  good governance, as espoused in Article  10 of the  Constitution.  Disobeying a court order can never be an option or the last   resort.

55. Obedience of  court orders  can and should never  be  at the alleged  contemnor’s  terms  and  conditions. It should  be and is unconditional.  Our nation is indeed  governed  by laws  and the  courts are vested  with the  judicial  authority  by the people   of Kenya   pursuant  to Article  159 of the  Constitution to declare  the law and the obligations  of parties  and non-parties  is to obey  that law.

56. In Spoke V Bankany Board of Health, Wood VC stated and I agree:

“The simple and only view is that an order must be obeyed.  That those who wish to get rid of that order must do so by the proper cause, an appeal.  So long as it exists the order must be obeyed and obeyed to the letter.”

57. The above view is shared by J.M. Paterson in his book the 6th Editionof Kerr on Injunctions wherein he states at page 668.

“An order for an injunction must be implicitly observed an every diligence must be exercised to obey it the letter.  However, erroneously or irregularly obtained, the order must be implicitly observed so long as it exists.  A party affected  by court  cannot  disregard  it or  treat  it as  a nullity  but have it  discharged  on a proper  application.”

58. In Stancrub V Trowbrudge UDC, Warrington J (cited in Mwaniki Silas Ngari v John S. Akama & Another [2015] e KLR, it was stated:

“ If  a person  or corporation  is restrained  by injunction  from doing  a particular act,  that person  or corporation  commits  a  breach of the injunction, and is liable for a process  of contempt, if he or it in fact does the act, and  if it  is no  answer   to say that  the act  was not contumacious in the sense that, in doing it, there  was no  direct  intention  to disobey the order.”

59. From  the foregoing, I have no hesitation in finding that  the alleged  contemnors committed contempt  of court orders  made on  2nd September 2016  by obstructing  the execution of the said orders in the sense that  knowing  that they  were the ones holding  the cargo  subject of the release order, they refused to release the cargo and instead gave various  excuses for their refusal  to release  the cargo.  The excuses given are not acceptable defences to obstruction of justice.

60. The three alleged contemnors who are Ali Badawy, Richard Mutinda  and David Killoran who are employees of the Makupa Transit  Shades Ltd, Mombasa, be and are hereby found to be in contempt  of court order  made on  2nd September  2016   and convicted  as such.

61. A person  who is found to be in contempt of court order is   liable to be punished for and such punishment includes  committal to  jail for  a period  not exceeding  six  months or to a fine or to  both fine  and  imprisonment.

62. In this case, however the court, before according the contemnors an opportunity  to mitigate  before meting  out appropriate sentence  as should be, notes  that  at the end  of the hearing  of the contempt  application on  4th November  2016, the  contemnors’  advocate  Mr Akanga   made  a passionate  plea  to the court,  urging  that his clients  be accorded an opportunity  to purge  the contempt  in 48 hours.  He stated: inter alia

“Upto and including  now, I  reiterate  that my client is willing to  obey  the court order  and  we  were willing  to enter  a consent  when he were  last  here  but there  was resistance  on the part  of the  applicant/petitioner.”

63. The court, after hearing  the contempt  application  and before  retiring  to write the judgment   observed that the order of 2nd September  2016   had not  been complied with  as far as  the release  of goods   were concerned  and  further, that counsel  for the respondents had unwaveringly submitted that his clients were willing to obey the court order.  The court noted that the purpose of issuing court orders is for obedience thereof.  It therefore  accorded  the contemnors  herein an  opportunity to purge the contempt  within 5 days by  releasing  to the petitioner all its  cargo without  any conditions  as to  storage charges   or otherwise, as those conditions are subject to the main petition being heard and determined on its merits.

64. On 9th November  when the  parties  returned  to court for  mention, it  was  reported by the petitioner’s  counsel  Dr Kamau  Kuria   that the  contemnors  had purged  the contempt   without any challenges  as his client’s  agents  were in the process  of taking  possession of the released   cargo.  He intimated  to court  that the minimal delay was  caused by  Kenya Bureau of Standards  who were  checking  the quality of the cargo.

65. Dr Kamau Kuria  also reported  that he  had consulted  Mr Akanga  who had  confirmed  the position  and  thanked him for assisting the court ensure   that the client  complied  with the orders  of 2nd September  2016  in favour  of the petitioner.

66. On the part of Mr Akanga  for the  contemnor  he urged the court in its  ruling hereto to consider  that  his clients  had purged  the contempt  by complying  with the  orders  of 2nd September  2016  at 100%.

67. With the above scenario, which positively reflects on the conduct  of the contemnors  in purging the contempt  which  was  contempt was essentially admitted in these proceedings  but with  explanations, I find  that  this is proper  case where  the court must  exercise  its discretion in favour of the contemnor who has  demonstrated, however, belated, that court orders  are not  mere suggestions  or opinion or points of view  but a directive  which  must be  obeyed and that  defiance  is  not an  option.

68. In addition, contempt  of court proceedings  are not  meant to massage  the ego  of any party  to the proceedings nor that of the  presiding Judge but to  protect and  uphold  the  fundamental  supremacy  of the law.  In this case, it is law that has had its day and not the petitioner or the court.

69. Accordingly, I proceed and discharge the contemnors unconditionally. I order that each party shall to bear   their own costs of these contempt proceedings.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 28th day of March 2017.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE