Starways Express Limited v National Transport & Safety Authority,Traffic Commandant & Attorney General [2017] KEHC 4249 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW NO.  211 OF 2017

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS FOR ORDERS OF CERTIORARI & PROHIBITION

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE NATIONAL TRANSPORT AND AUTHORITY ACT,  (ACT NO. 33 OF 2012)

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE FAIR   ADMINISTRATION ACTION ACT, 2015

AND

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION

BETWEEN

STARWAYS EXPRESS LIMITED………...…………...........…………..APPLICANT

VERSUS

THE NATIONAL TRANSPORT & SAFETY AUTHORITY .........1ST RESPONDENT

THE TRAFFIC COMMANDANT…………..……........................2ND RESPONDENT

THE HONOURABLE ATTORNEY GENERAL…...............…….3RD RESPONDENT

RULING

(On exemption under section 9(4) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015)

1. For determination is the applicant’s application by way of notice of motion  dated  3rd  May 2017  seeking from this court  orders that  the court do  grant  leave  to the  applicant to lodge  Judicial Review proceedings pursuant to Section 11 of the Fair  Administrative Action Act, 2015 notwithstanding that the applicant  has not pursued  an appeal to the Transport Licencing Appeals Board for  special  reasons  stated by the  applicant; that  upon grant  of  such leave, the  process  filed herewith for the court  to form  it is opinion  on the  justification of  the order   sought  in prayer 3  above be  deemed  as properly  filed under Section  9(4)  of the  Fair Administrative  Action  Act, 2015, upon payment of the necessary court fees and  prosecuted  henceforth; and that costs  be in the  cause.

2. The motion is brought  under the  provisions  of Section 9(4)  of the Fair  Administrative  Action Act, 2015, Article  48  of the Constitution of Kenya, and   the inherent  powers  if the court.

3. The applicant has listed what is considered to be special circumstances warranting invocation of Section 9(4) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015.

4. The application is also supported by the applicant’s supporting affidavit sworn by Ali Mohammed Abubakar who is a Director of the applicant company.

5. According  to the applicant, its  members operate  47 Public Service Vehicles/buses  plying  the long  distance  route   of Nairobi- Mombasa  Malindi  and  by letter  dated 28th April  2017  purportedly  from the  1st respondent’s   Director General, all the buses have been  ordered  grounded at  a  speed of  97 kilometers per hour.

6. That the applicant’s  members are  servicing  bank loans   for the  47 buses and that although one was involved in a  road  accident, it is harsh and disproportionate  to order the grounding of all the  46  buses  minus  one  which  was involved  in the accident.

7. Further, that the appeal process with National Transport  and  Safety Authority  involves  administrative  procedures  which take  a  minimum  of  14 days, and that  any delay in disposing off the dispute will occasion financial  haemorrhage and cripple the applicant’s members   operating  42  unaffected  buses.

8. That  punishing 46  buses   amounts to  collective   punishment  not envisaged  in the Constitution  and that their  grounding  will lead to the liquidation of  the said  members.

9. That the applicant  was never  given fair hearing  before  adverse  action was taken  against them  by the 1st   respondent  and that the said  actions  violates  Section 4 of the Fair  Administrative  Action Act, 2016.

10. That  there is  no justification for  grounding  46  buses  when only 5   buses are said  to be on the offensive, as  per the letter   of 28th April, 2017.

11. That  moreso, the impugned  letter  was  signed by one  Leparan C. Tialal, yet he is not the Director General of National Transport and Safety Authority, contrary to Section  7(2)(g)  of the Fair Administrative Action Act which Section  outlaws  such an act since it is  an act  acted  on the direction of a person not authorized  or empowered  by any written  law to give such directions.

12. That the  National Transport and Safety Authority Act  does not  sub-delegate such  drastic  action by a non gazetted  appointed  officer of the National Transport and Safety Authority, rendering  the act  amenable to Judicial Review  as  opposed to an  appeal hence  this plea.

13. That an appeal will take long to be heard  and  determined, to the financial detriment of the applicant’s  members   and that the  applicants’  over  2000 employees  will lose  employment  and  livelihoods unless this court  intervenes.

14. That the suspension of the Road Service  Licences of the entire  47  Public Service Vehicles  of  the applicants  violated Article 47(2)  of the Constitution as no reasons  have been  given to the  bus owners  and  in writing  for the said  blanket  action by the  1st respondent.

15. That the collective punishment is offensive to Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, to which Kenya is a party.

16. The applicant however, does not seek exemption of the 5 allegedly offensive vehicles to scrutiny of the National Transport and Safety Authority.

17. The applicant annexed its Certificate  of Incorporation and the impugned  letter of  28th April  2017  suspending  the operations  of the applicant’s  vehicles  until certain conditions  are met.

18. The 1st  respondent  filed  grounds  of opposition  and  notice of preliminary objection  dated 8th May  2017  contending that  the  application is  fatally  defective, does not  lie  in law and  or fact  and is an abuse  of the due process of the court.

19. That on 28th April 2017 the  authority  invited he applicant for  a  meeting to discuss the non compliance with the National Transport and Safety Authority Act and Regulations  culminating  in the accident of  28th April  2017  at  Kalulu  Mtito Andei  where  27  innocent  passengers  died but  the  applicant refused to accept the proposals  to have all its vehicles inspected hence the temporary  suspension of the operations of the  vehicles until  the conditions  imposed  are fulfilled  to determine  road worthiness  of the fleet  and  that  5 vehicles    were found to be  unroadworthy  contrary to Section  34(1) (a)  of the National Transport and Safety Authority Act.

20. That  to allow the operations of  the fleet  would defeat  the  purposes of the National Transport and Safety Authority Act and  Regulations and that the applicant   has been  unable  to manage   its members   hence the  decision to revoke  the licences  was for  the public interest  and  safety of passengers  and  taken in  good faith to save  many lives  as opposed to  promoting  commercial interests  of the  applicant.

21. That the suspension of operations was a temporary  inconvenience   that cannot  be equated  to the health  and  lives of  passengers  who perish  hence the 1st  respondent should  be left  to do its  job to ensure road   safety  and  reduce  road carnage.

22. In the preliminary objection notice, the 1st   respondent  contends that  this court  lacks jurisdiction  to entertain  the  application  by virtue  of express  provisions of Section  9(2)  of the Fair  Administrative  Action Act as read with  Sections  38(1) (c ) and  39  of the  National Transport and Safety Authority Act, 2012; That the application  seeks to  restrain the  1st respondent  from carrying  out its  lawful  mandate  as stipulated under Sections  4,29,30 and  34  of the National Transport and Safety Authority Act and that  the  application  is  vexatious, frivolous  and  premature  and  an abuse of the  court process.

23. As the  application  was  certified  urgent on  4th May  2017, the applicant  dutifully  served the respondents  and  on 10th May 2017 the application was canvassed orally between the  applicant ant  1st respondent before me.

24. According to the applicant  through Mr H. Kinyanjui advocate, it  was submitted that Section 9(4) of the Fair Administrative  Action Act is to be  applied  on a case by case  basis  and is  intended to  ameliorate  the  loss and  suffering  of parties, in  furtherance of Article 48 of the Constitution.  That the  applicants stand to loose heavily as they have taken loans  which they are servicing  and that the  respondents will in no way be  prejudiced  if the orders  of leave sought are granted  and  Judicial Review  instituted.  That the  1st respondents  decision is  irrational, illegal  and  unconstitutional  in that the 1st respondent has refused to isolate the  offenders  and  instead  collectively punished the  applicants.

25. In opposition, Mr Agwara counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that Section 9(2) of the  Fair Administrative  Action Act is clear that a party must   exhaust available remedies and only in exceptional  circumstances would the court hear by way of Judicial Review.  That exceptional  circumstances  must be  looked at   in light of facts of the case  and  that the court  must determine  whether the  tribunal  must hear  and  determine  the dispute.

26. That the  suspension of operations  of the buses  was done  in the public  interest  for the applicant to  comply with the law  and that  there is no evidence  of loans  and  losses.  That Article 159(2) of the Constitution is clear on Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms hence the matter should first be exhausted   by the tribunal, and that in any event, the suspension was only temporary.

27. Counsel for the 1st respondent urged the court to safeguard public interest and lives as there is no allegation of delay on the part of the tribunal in considering the appeal if filed.

28. On the part of the 2nd and  3rd  respondents, Miss  Ngelechei  associated  herself  with  the submissions  by Mr Agwara  albeit  she had not  filed any  response in writing.

29. In a brief  rejoinder, Mr  Kinyanjui  submitted that the applicants  had  demonstrated  loss occasioned  by the suspension of the applicant’s  vehicles  operations  which letter  of  suspension  is not signed by the Director  General.

30. Further, that the Principles of Article 10(2)(b)of the Constitution  on proportionality bind the  1st respondent  as there are  innocent  vehicles  affected   by the blanket  collective  suspension   of the fleet operated by the applicant.  Counsel urged the court to grant the prayers sought.

DETERMINATION.

31. I have considered the foregoing and in my humble view, the main question to be answered in these proceedings is whether the application for leave under Section 9(4) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015 to exempt the applicant from exhausting alternative remedy or pursuing its remedy through an established forum which is an appeal to the Transport Licencing Appeals Board is merited.

32. Article 165(b) of the Constitution vests in the High Court supervisory jurisdiction over the subordinate courts   and over any person, body or authority exercising a judicial or quasi judicial function but not over a superior court.

33. The above  is the jurisdiction  which the applicant  herein wishes  to invoke  to seek leave  of court to  quash the decision  of the 1st respondent. The applicant claims  that the  1st respondent   unilaterally  and  unreasonably  suspended  its fleet  of  vehicles  from operating  long distance  travels  because of one  accident  that  claimed  27 lives  and   5  vehicles  out  of its  47  vehicles  being found to have been defective.  That the 1st respondent’s decision was illegal and amounted to  collective  punishment  hence the  decision should  be subjected  to Judicial Review proceedings   and not  an appeal  to the Transport Licencing Appeals Board  owing to the urgency  of the matter  such that  any delay  in the determination of  the matter  will  occasion more financial  haemorhage  and  economic  loss to the applicants  and over  2000 employee’s livelihoods.

34. The  1st  respondent   on the  other hand  maintains that  the Transport Licencing Appeals Board is the right avenue  for considering  any appeals  regarding   the  suspension   of  Public Services Licences (PSL) since the Board is a  specialized body  of experts  in  handling  such disputes as  contemplated  in the National Transport and Safety Authority Act.

35. Further, that no special  circumstances  have been  demonstrated  from the facts, to warrant exemption from the exhausting  available  legal  mechanisms  as stipulated  in Article 159(2)  (e)  of the Constitution  which  commands   the  courts in exercising  judicial authority, to be guided  by the principle  that alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms including reconciliation, mediation, arbitration mechanisms  shall be  promoted, subject   to clause 3.

36. According to the  1st respondent, the  suspension of the fleet  is in the public interest  for public  safety and  preservation of lives  and that it is a temporary measure subject  to the applicant  meeting the  set conditions of  subjecting  all its  vehicles for  inspection  on their road worthiness  and  retesting  of their  drivers but which  the applicant  refused.

37. Article 47 (1) of the Constitution stipulates   that every person has the right to administrative action that is expeditions,   efficient, lawful, reasonable and   procedurally fair.

(2) If  a right   or fundamental  freedom  of a person has been or is likely to  be adversely  affected  by administrative  action,  the  person has the right  to be given   written reasons  for the action.

(3) Parliament shall enact legislation to give effect to the rights in clause (1) and that legislation shall-

a) Provide for the review  of administrative   action  by a court  or, if appropriate  an independent  and  impartial tribunal; and

b) Promote efficient administration.

38. Under  Article  50(1) of the  Constitution, every person  has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the  application  of  law decided  in a fair  and  public hearing  before a court  or, if appropriate, another  independent  and  impartial  tribunal  or body.

39. Section 34  of the National Transport and Safety Authority Act confers  on the Authority- 1st   respondent  herein, the power to revoke  licences  or suspend  them where the  licence, inter alia, fails to comply  with a  condition for the issuance  of the licence  or (b)  fails to  operate  the motor vehicle  with respect  to which the licence  is issued  for a period d of three months   during the period for  which the  license is  issued. And where the Authority revokes or suspends   the licence it shall, at the request of the licensee give reasons for such revocation or suspension, in writing.

40. In this case, the letter  of 28th April  2017  which is  impugned  herein  only  suspended  the operations of the fleet  and  directed the  applicant  to submit  its vehicles   for inspection  as to their  road worthiness in order to safeguard the safety of the   passengers  and  to  retest their  drivers  including  their eye sight  following  a  fatal road  accident   on  25th April  2017  at Kalulu bridge  near Mtito Andei  where  27  passengers died.

41. There is  no indication  that the  applicant  complied  with the two conditions  given by  the 1st respondent  and there is no  allegation that the  applicant is  incapable of  complying with the said conditions or that the said conditions  are illegal  or irrational  or unreasonable  in the circumstances of the case.

42. There is also  nothing to show  that the applicants   sought for  reasons for  the suspension of  the fleet   and  were denied, as such reasons  are clearly spelt  out in the letter  of  28th  April  2017.

43. Albeit there is a claim that the suspension of the operations of the vehicles was  indefinite, the  impugned   letter is clear  that the suspension  was to enable  the applicant comply with the  two conditions  and the 1st respondent Authority even offered to assist the applicant  to comply with the conditions to enable  the applicant  resume its normal  operations.

44. The 1st respondent  had more  serious  options stipulated in Section 34 (3) (4)  of the National Transport and Safety Authority Act including that of  expunging the vehicles  from the licence  but it did  not invoke  that option.  The suspension of the operations of the applicant’s vehicles, in my humble understanding was temporary  and the applicant instead of  complying as directed, on  4th May  2017, five days  later, was in court  seeking  leave to apply  for  exemption  from following  the  procedure laid down  under the  National Transport and Safety Authority Act for challenging   the decision  of the Authority.

45. Section 39 of the National Transport and Safety Authority Act establishes the Transport Licencing Appeals Board.  Under Section  38  of the Act, a person  who being  a licensee  is aggrieved  by the revocation or suspension of a licence  may, within  the time  and   in a manner  prescribed  appeal to  the Appeals Board  established  under Section  39  of the Act.

46. According to the  applicant, there  are special  circumstances  warranting  exemption   from appealing  to  the Appeals  Board  under the Act, and that  it  will take  long  to determine  the  Appeal thereby  occasioning  it and its  employees  economic  hardship as there will  be loss of  livelihoods   and the owners of  buses  could be  liquidated  due to the  hefty loan  that they  are servicing.  It is for  that reason that  the  applicant  seeks by this application as stipulated in Section 9(4) of the Fair Administrative  Action Act,  2015   which implements Article 47(1)  of the Constitution, to  be exempted from exhausting  the  appeal mechanisms  provided for   under the National Transport and Safety Authority Act.

47. Section 9(2), 3 and (4) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015   stipulates that:

(2)  The High Court or a subordinate  court under  Subsection (1)  shall not  review  an administrative  action or  decision  under this Act unless  the mechanisms  including  internal  mechanisms  for appeal  or review   and  all remedies  available  under any other written   law are  first exhausted;

(3) The High Court  or  a subordinate court shall, if  not satisfied  that the remedies  referred to in Subsection (2) have  been exhausted, direct  that applicant  shall first  exhaust   such remedy before  instituting  proceedings  under Subsection (1)

(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3), the High Court  or a subordinate court may  in exceptional  circumstances  and  on application by the  applicant,  exempt   such person  from the obligation   to exhaust  any remedy if the court  considers  such exemption to be in the interest  of justice.

48. In this case, the applicant’s first port of call is the  appeals mechanisms stipulated  under Section 38 of the National Transport and Safety Authority Act unless it is demonstrated that the Appeals Board shall  not provide an efficacious  remedy  or that  such remedy  cannot be availed  without  undue  delay or  hardship.

49. The position espoused above is not new.  It  was  articulated in Republic vs National Environment  Management  Authority [2011] e KLR  where it  was held  that  where there  is an alternative  remedy and  especially where  Parliament  has provided  a statutory  appeal  procedure, it is  only in exceptional  circumstances that  an order  for  Judicial Review  would be  granted.  The Court of Appeal observed as follows after examining several decisions:

“The principles running  through  these cases   is where  there  was  an alternative  remedy  and  especially  when parliament  had provided a statutory appeal process, it is only in exceptional circumstances  that an order for judicial review  would be granted, and that in determining whether an exception should  be made  and  Judicial Review granted, it has  necessary for the court to  look carefully at the suitability  of the statutory   appeal in the  context  of the particular  case and  ask itself what, in  the context of the statutory  powers, was the real issue to be determined  and  whether  the statutory  appeal procedure  was suitable to determine it. See for example Republic v Birmingham City Council exparte Fenero Ltd case.  The learned judge, in our respectful view, considered these structures and came to the  conclusion  that the appellant  had  failed to  demonstrate to her  what exceptional  circumstances  existed  in its case  which would  remove  it from  the  appeal  process   set out in the  statute, with respect, we  agree with  the  judge.”

50. The above  decision followed /applied earlier  decisions  such as speaker  of the Speaker of the National  Assembly  vs  Njenga  Karume  2008] 1 KLR  425and later in Revital Health care(EPZ) Ltd & Another V Ministry  of   Health  & 5 Others  [2015]  e KLR  page 10where  Emukule J ( as  he then  was) citingDamian Belfonte V Attorney General  of  Trinidad  and  Tabago  C.A. 84/2014held:

“…….where  there is   a parallel  remedy, constitutional  relief   should  not be  sought unless  the circumstances  of which   the complaint  is made  include  some feature  which makes  it appropriate  to take   that course.

As general rule, there must be some feature, which at least arguably indicates that the means of least redress otherwise available would not be adequate.

To seek constitutional relief in the absence of such feature would be   a misuse, an abuse of the court’s process.”

51. In the instant case, there is a power conferred   upon the 1st respondent under Section  34  of the Act,  that of suspending  the licence  or even  revoking  it and circumstances   under which  that can be  done  as set out.

52.  The Act  also specifically  provides for  a  specific  remedy  for an  aggrieved  licence by  way of an appeal to the Appeals Board  which Board, it has not  been suggested, that it is  inoperational or incapable of resolving  the impasse and  more so, as to  whether  the applicant should  comply with the  conditions  set out in the suspension letter prior to  resuming  fleet  operations  or not.

53. That, in my view, should be the approach  to take  since the  1st respondent  did provide  reasons  for  the suspension of operations as  stipulated  in Section  34(3) of National Transport and  Safety Act  and  Section 4 of the Fair  Administrative  Action Act, 2015.

54. The Appeals  to the Appeals  Board  is an alternative forum  contemplated  in Article 159(2) (c)  of the Constitution  which courts  and  Tribunals  are commanded  to promote, especially  where like in  this case, it has not been demonstrated  that the alternative  mode of  dispute  resolution is inconsistent  with the Constitution in particular, Articles   22 and  23  of the Constitution.

55. The applicant  has not demonstrated  that it will not get   justice   before the Appeals Board, for  this court to  find in its  favour, that its  in the interest  of  justice that  an exemption be granted.

56. On the issue of  delay in appeal, the court notes that the Appeals  Board being  a  specialized  body  comprising  experts  in the  road  transport sector  is best  placed to consider  and  determine  disputes  between the   Authority  and  Licensees  upon which  an aggrieved party can/may  approach the court.  There is absolutely  no evidence or  guarantee  that the court is  likely to conclude  the dispute  between these parties much faster  through  Judicial Review  procedure  as there are  no time lines  set in law  for the determination  of such disputes  and  even if  there  were   such  timelines, the courts  are overloaded  with a variety of disputes, compared  to the available  human resource  capacity  to consider  and  determine  those disputes.

57. As an example, for nearly two months now, the Judicial Review Division of the High Court at Nairobi has been operating at half capacity of one judge who, besides the pending work, receives nearly 10 new cases for consideration on a daily basis.  It is  therefore  my humble  view that  in the circumstances  of this case, Judicial  review  would not  be an appropriate  avenue  and  remedy  for the applicant and therefore an exemption from exhausting  a  statutory remedy of  Appeal to the  Appeals  Board as  stipulated  in Section  38  of the National Transport and Safety Authority Act is not  a viable  option for the  applicant.

58. In Nasieku  Tarayia  V Board of Directors, AFC &  another [2012] e KLR the court held that Judicial Review is an alternative  remedy of last resort and  where  alternative  remedy exists, the court  has to be satisfied  that Judicial  Review  is the most  efficacious, beneficial, convenient alternative remedy  available  for the court  to grant.

59. As  was observed by Mwera J.(as he then was) in Safmarine  Container  N.V. of Antwerp  vs Kenya  Ports Authority Mombasa  High Court  Civil Case  No. 263   of  2010,courts  and  Tribunals cannot  be said  to be promoting  alternative  dispute  resolution  mechanisms  espoused  in Article  159(2) (c )  of the Constitution  when they  readily  entertain  disputes  which ought  to be resolved  in other legal  fora.  ( see  also Dickson  Mukwelukeine  vs  Attorney General  & 4 Others  Nairobi HCC Petition  No. 390/2012.

60. I wholly  ascribe  to the principle  that where  there is  an alternative  remedy  and procedure  available  for the resolution  of the dispute, unless there are  exceptional circumstances to warrant  a departure, that  remedy  ought  to be pursued  and the procedure  adhered  to.  This is because Parliament had good reasons for establishing.  Such alternative processes for specific purposes of realizing, promoting and protecting   certain rights.

61. In addition, Iam of the view that even in  cases  where the  alternative  remedy is in addition to the right to access  the  court,  courts ought not to  interpret  the provisions  of the statute  in such  a  manner as  to render  the  provisions for  alternative remedy  illusory  as that would  defeat  the  whole  purpose  for making  provisions  for  alternative  remedies.

62. Therefore, where the alternative route does not necessarily lock out judicial process, the alternative   remedies   being a  route provided  under the relevant  Act of Parliament  ought to be adhered to unless  circumstances  militate against  that route.  Such  circumstances  would be  such as where  the alternative  procedure  is manifestly illusory  with a   result  that it is  practically  a mirage  and therefore  would or is  likely to negate  the right  to a fair hearing  guaranteed under Article 50(1) of the Constitution. That is not the case here.

63. The applicant has not demonstrated that is shall be denied   justice if its grievance is ventilated before the Appeals Board.

64. Accordingly, and for the above reasons, I find and hold that the applicant’s application for exemption from exhausting the alternative remedy provided for under section 39 of the NTSA Act is not merited.  I decline to allow the application for exemption and dismiss it.  The applicant is at liberty to pursue the alternative remedy of Appeal before the Appeals Board as contemplated in Section 38 of the National Transport and Safety Authority Act.

65. I order that each party shall bear their own costs of this application.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 11th day of May 2017.

R. E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Mr H. Kinyanjui for the Applicant

Miss Ngelechei h/b for Odhiambo for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents

Mr Agwara for the 1st Respondent

CA: Mohamed