STEPHEN GICHUHI & 30 0THERS vs THE REPUBLIC [2004] KEHC 1756 (KLR)
Full Case Text
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI
H.C. CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 820 OF 2002
STEPHEN GICHUHI & 30 0THERS ……………….… APPLICANTS
V E R S U S
THE REPUBLIC ……………………………….………RESPONDENTS
R U L I N G
This matter before us has come by way of reference from the Chief Magistrate’s Court at Thika in Misc. Criminal Case No. 8 of 2001. As it raised an issue of interpretation of Constitution, the Hon. The Chief Justice constituted this Bench as per provisions of Section 67 (3) of the Constitution.
The issue which is referred before us to be determined is
whether the right to institute Private Prosecution Conferred by
Section 88 (1)of the Criminal Procedure Code contravenes or
is inconsistent with Section 26of the Constitution.
For the sake of clarity we shall quote relevant parts of the
aforesaid two provisions. Section 88 (1) of the Criminal
Procedure Code stipulates:
88. (1) A magistrate trying a case may
permit the prosecution to be
conducted by any person, but no
person other than a pu blic
prosecutor or other officer
generally or specially authorized
by the Attorney General in this
behalf shall be entitled to do so
without permission.
Section 26 (3), (5) & (6) of the Constitution stipulates:
26. (3) The Attorney -General shall have p ower in
any case in which he considers it
desirable so to do –
(a) to institute and undertake criminal
proceedings against any person before
any court (other than a court -martial)
in respect of any offence alleged to
have been committed by that perso n:
(b) To take over and continue any such
criminal proceedings that have been
instituted or undertaken by another
person or authority: and
(c) to discontinue at any stage before
judgment is delivered any such
criminal proceedings instituted or
undertaken by himself or another
person or authority.
………………………………………………….
(5) The powers of the Attorney -General under
subsections (3) and (4) may be exercised by
him in person or by officers subordinate to
him acting in accordance with his general
or special in structions.
(6) The powers conferred on the Attorney -
General by paragraphs (b) and (c) of
subsection (3) shall be vested in him to the
exclusion of any other person or authority.
Provided that where any other person or
authority has instituted criminal proc eedings,
nothing in this subsection shall prevent the
withdrawal of those proceedings by or at the
instance of that person or authority and with
the leave of the court.
Mr. Karago the learned Counsel for the Applicant
contended that because the right to institute any criminal
proceedings is conferred only on the Attorney General as per
Section 26 (3) (a)of the Constitution, the provisions of
Section 88 (1)allowing a magistrate to permit institution of
criminal proceedings is in direct conflict with the
Constitutional Provision and thus is unconstitutional and
should be declared as null and void.
He relied on two cases to substantiate his contentions
namely:- (1) Jopley Constatine Oyieng –V- Republic
Criminal Appeal No. 45 of 1988 and (2) Stephen Mwai
Gachiengo and another –Versus- Republic Misc
Application No. 302 of 2000.
The first case was an appeal against the order of the High
court where the appellant had gone to High Court under
Section 67and Section 84of the Constitution. The
application arose against the refusal by the Magistrate to
admit a Complaint made under Section 88 (1)of the Criminal
Procedure Code. The refusal was admittedly under Section
89 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The issue of Constitutionality of Section 88 (1) was not
before the Court of Appeal which dismissed the appeal on the
ground that question of interpretation under Section 67of
the Constitution was neither before the Magistrate nor before
the High Court. Similarly no matters were raised to bring the
Application under Section 84of the Constitution. While
determining these issues which were properly before the court,
the Judgesinteralia(emphasis ours) observed and we quote:
“Only the Attorney General has the
right under section 26 of the Constitution
to institute criminal proceedings. No
similar right is extended to a private
individual and it is obvious that section
88 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code does
not override Section 26 of the
Constitution.”
We think the aforesaid observations do not conclude that
Section 88 (1)of Criminal procedure Code is unconstitutional.
What is said is plainly that Section 26shall take precedence
over the provisions of Section 88 of Criminal Procedure Code.
We refrain from commenting further on those observations.
However, we also note that the court did not stop there.
The Judges went further and immediately after the above
observation, they stated:-
“Section 26 (3) contemplates prosecutions
by authorized parties in respect of which
the Attorney General may act as provided
in the sub -section.”
In our opinion, with these observations, the court has
accepted the prosecutions by others, other than the Attorney
General. Thus in our opinion, this authority does not help the
Applicant to further his contention.
Second authority relied by the applicant is a famous case
popularly known as ‘KACA case’(Misc. Criminal Appeal
820/2002. ) The Constitutional Court comprising of three
Judges declared Section 11Bof Prevention of Corruption
Act (Cap 65) voidbeing inconsistent with Section 26of the
Constitution. Their reasons for such finding are on page 8 of
the unreported Judgment and we deem it fit to quote the
same:
“When Section 11B was inserted into
Cap. 65 the Provisions of Section 26 of the
Constitution remained unamended. Under
Section Section 26 of the Constitution the
Attorney General is the Principal Legal
adviser to the Government of Kenya. He
has powers under the Constitution to
institute and undertake proceedings
against any person and to take over or
discontinue criminal proceedings
instituted or undertaken by any person or
authority. Under Section 26 (4) the
Attorney General may require the
Commissioner of Police to investigate a
matter as relates to any offence. Section
11 B(5) provides that the Dire ctor of KACA
may assume responsibility for any
investigation or prosecution commenced
by the police. Section 10 of Cap 65 gives
powers to the Director of KACA to cause a
police officer to investigate any bank
account, share account or purchase
account of any person (underlining ours)”
It is clear from the above passage that the KACA by the
said Act was usurping the Constitutional powers vested in the
Attorney General and that the provisions were made in the Act
to take over the powers of the Attorney General which the
Constitution itself has not allowed to be delegated.
Does Section 88 of the Criminal Procedure Code take
over the powers of the Attorney General which are not
supposed to be carried out by anyone else except the Attorney
General?
In our considered opinion, it does not.
We do not have to go further to substantiate our opinion
but only to look at the provisions of section 26of the
Constitution.
26. (3) (b) and (c)do postulate that the criminal
proceedings can be instituted or undertaken by another
person or authority or sub-ordinate officers are allowed to
exercise powers of Attorney General in accordance with his
general or special instruction which the Attorney General can
take over, continue or discontinue at any stage before the Judgment is delivered.
Similarly the language of Section 26 (6)does postulate
that the proceedings can be instituted or undertaken by any
person or authority.
It was argued by the learned counsel for the Applicant
that any person or authority stipulated in those provisions
have to be those on whom the Attorney General has delegated
those powers.
We do not agree to that contention in the face of the clear
provisions of Section 26 (5)of the Constitution if that was the
intention of the makers of the Constitution, as contended by
the Respondent it could have been specifically provided as has
been done in respect of Section 26 (5)of the Constitution. It
has to be noted that all these provisions are contained in one
section.
Further more, we do note that the proceedings can not be
instituted without following the provisions of Section 89of
the Criminal Procedure Codewhich provides for the
institution of proceedings culminating in issuance of summons or warrant against the accused persons. The said
section Vis - a- vis Section26 of the Constitution was
scrutinized by the Constitutional Court in the case of Raila
Odinga V. Professor George Saitoti (Misc application No. 3
of 1995 (Unreported). The Court cited the case of Shah V.
Patel (1954) 21 E. A. C. A. 236 with approval and specifically
the following passage Viz
“Even in private Prosecution, the
prosecutor in law is the crown (that is the
Republic) at the instance of the private
prosecutor whoever he may be. That must
be so ……….. flows directly from Section
82 of the code which gives the Attorney
General a residural control over every
Criminal proceeding at any stage
thereof.”
We agree with the reasoning of the said case and reaffirm
that the Attorney General has over all control on all Criminal
proceedings including a private Prosecution at any stage
thereof before a verdict or judgment is pronounced.
We also reiterate that the provisions of Section 26 3 (b)
&(c) coming after Section 26 3 (a)make the provisions of
Section 88of the Criminal Procedure Code in complete
harmony with Section 26of the Constitution, and not to the
contrary.
In the premises, we find that Section 88 of the Criminal
Procedure Code (Cap. 75) does not contravene provisions of
Section 26 of the Constitution.
This reference thus fails and we direct that the matter i.e
Misc. Criminal Case No. 8 of 2001 be referred back to Chief
Magistrates’ court at Thika to proceed as per law.
Applicant shall pay costs of this reference.
Dated and delivered at Nairobi this 18th day of May,
2004.
……………………………..
K. H. RAWAL
JUDGE.
………………………….
M. G. MUGO
Ag. JUDGE
……………………………………
L.K. KIMARU
Ag. JUDGE