Stevenson-Delhomme v Government of Seychelles & Anor (CP 03 of 2024) [2025] SCCC 3 (27 March 2025)

contents of #navigation-content will be placed in [data-offcanvas-body] for tablet/mobile screensize and #navigation-column for desktop screensize. Skip to document content Summary Table of contents Search [] CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SEYCHELLES Reportable CP 03/2024 In the matter between: ESTATE OF THE LATE DR HILDA Petitioner STEVENSON-DELHOMME Vested in the executors to the succession herein Rep by an executor Mr. Allen Hoareau (rep. by Philippe Boullé) and GOVERNMENT OF SEYCHELLES 1st Respondent (rep. by Ria Alcindor) ATTORNEY GENERAL 2nd Respondent (rep. by Ria Alcindor) Neutral Citation: Stevenson-Delhomme v GOS & Or (CP 03/2024) Before: Burhan (presiding), Dodin, Vidot JJJ Summary: For a judgment ordering the 1st Respondent to return the parcels of land and pay compensation for the compulsory acquisition of two land parcels that originally belonged a Seychellois citizen who is since deceased and now represented by executors of her estate. Rule 4(1) of Part III Schedule 7 and Articles 130 and 46 of the Constitution Heard: parties filed written submission. Delivered: 27 March 2025 ORDER Petition dismissed for being prescribed JUDGMENT Vidot J (Burhan and Dodin JJ (concurring)) The Petition [1] The late Dr Hilda Stevenson-Delhomme was the owner of two parcels of land registered as Title Nos V962 and V1099 of the extent of 346,681 sq. metres and 6,332 sq. metres respectively, situated at Beau Vallon, Mahe, Seychelles. Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme died on 04th January 2002. [2] One the 31st day of March 1984, the 1st Respondent compulsorily acquired the two parcels of land mentioned above. The acquisition was made pursuant to section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1977 (now repealed) and acting in terms of section 10(1) of that Act. That means that the land parcels were deemed to have been acquired in the national interest. These parcels have since been sub-divided. The Petitioner now seeks the return of the acquired parcels of land that remain undeveloped and compensation for those parcels that have been developed and transferred to third parties. In all the Petitioner seeks the return 36 parcels of land (of the sub-division) which is still owned by Government and that remain undeveloped and SR433,147,354.00 as compensation for the developed parcels. The Petitioner has attached to the Petition a list of those 36 parcels. [3] Acting pursuant to Article 14(1) of Part III Schedule 7 of the Constitution, by letter dated 08th August 1993, the late Dr Hilda Stevenson-Delhomme made an application for compensation and return of the undeveloped land parcels. That letter was issued within 12 months prescribed following the promulgation of the 1993 Constitution. The 1st Respondent acknowledged receipt of that application on 30th May 1994. Mr. J. A Nourrice, the then Principal Secretary of the then Ministry of Community Development, issued a letter in reply to the application the 08th November 1995 informing the applicant that the 1st Respondent has received a large number of claims under the said provision of the Constitution and that the applications were being entertained as a matter of priority and ex-owners of acquired lands who for one reason or another had not received compensation were being granted priority. The letter adds that since the Petitioner had received “some compensation” her application has been classified as low priority. However, the letter further adds that the said Ministry would consider the Petitioner’s claim by the latest 31st December 1996, and that around that period a technical advisor of that Ministry will communicate further with the Petitioner. Thereafter nothing happened. The Petitioner considers such to be tantamount to frivolous treatment of the constitutional rights of the applicant. It is further alleged that at the time of Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme’s death she had not heard further from the Principal Secretary nor the Technical Advisor as promised in the letter 8th November 1995. [4] The Petitioner describes the communication from Mr Joseph Nourrice to have been but a deception to allow the Government to abuse the applicant’s constitutional right and that the 1st Respondent had sold part of the land to deprive her of her redress and remedy under the Constitution, which was an unbecoming act of a government official which deprived the late Dr Stevenson-Delhomme of her constitutional right during her lifetime. Thus, it is the contention of the Petitioner that by ignoring the promise made in the letter dated 8th November 1995, the 1st Respondent breached its constitutional undertaking under Part III of schedule 7 to the Constitution to consider the application and negotiate in good faith to grant the Petitioner her constitutional right during her lifetime. [5] Thereafter, exploring options available for claiming compensation for land acquisitions before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a co-executor, Mr Allen Hoareau requested and obtained a copy of the Government file in respect of the said compulsory land acquisitioned and it is alleged that the file revealed the Petitioner’s right to compensation under the Constitution and the abuse of that constitutional right by the 1st Respondent. [6] The Petitioner avers that as a result of the violation by the 1st Respondent of its undertaking and obligation under Part III Schedule 7 of the Constitution, the Petitioner has been deprived of the constitutional redress and remedy to which the heirs of the late Dr Hilda Stevenson-Delhomme are now entitled to. [7] The Petitioner at this present juncture claims to be entitled to the following constitutional right and redress: The return of 36 parcels of undeveloped land of the extent of 132,042 sq. metres which has been set out in an attached list to the petition. Compensation in the sum of SCR 433,147,354.00 for land which has been sold by Government to third parties and land which has been developed. Preliminary Objections [8] Counsel for the Respondents filed Preliminary objections to the Petition. These objections that have been raised in terms of the provisions of Rule 9 of the Constitutional Court (Application, Contravention, Enforcement or Interpretation of the Constitution) Rules (“Constitutional Court Rules”) are as follows; the Respondents claims prescription. The Respondents submit that following the averments contained in the petition, the application is time barred in terms of Rule 4 of the Constitutional Court Rules, in that; the last communication from Dr. Stevenson Delhomme, whose land was acquired and who has since deceased is dated 08th November 1995; in response to that letter the 1st Respondent acting through its relevant Ministry, issued a letter stating that it would communicate its position regarding the claim to Dr. Stevenson -Delhomme by 31st December1996; the Respondents avers that an application (petition) of such nature should have been filed within 03 months from 31st December 1996) and the same was not done; and that since the redress being sought in relation to the acquisition was time barred against the deceased at the time of her death in 2002, therefore, the Petitioner being executors of the estate of the said deceased, are not entitled to make this application around 22 years after the death of the deceased and altogether around 27 years after the occurrence of the relevant event. The Respondents submit that the petition is bad in law and/ or misconceived, in that; the Petition is ambiguous and does not clearly state whether this petition pertains to a contravention of a Constitutional Right or enforcement of the provisions of the Constitution; and whereas Paragraph 11 of the Petition alleges that there was a violation of the undertaking in terms of Part III Schedule 7 of the Constitution, it is averred at Paragraph 15 that the Petitioner is entitled to a constitutional right and the particular constitutional right is not specifically identified therein. The Respondents pleads estoppel. They state that the Petitioner estopped from making this petition for the reason that the application and the reliefs sought are inconsistent with the will and/ or the intention of the deceased based on the averments contained in the Petition. In particular; The application is inconsistent with the expressed clear will of the deceased as reflected in Annexure 6 of the Petition, which is the letter dated 08th August 1993 from Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme, wherein it states that she does “not wish to complicate the objectives of the Government by asking for the return of the land …”; and Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme’s conduct of not following up with the relevant claim after receiving the letter dated 08th November 1995, from the 1st Respondent, until her death in the year 2002 and her failure to initiate proceedings to enforce the provisions of Part III of Schedule 7 of the Constitution can be construed as her having abandoned the said claim. Compensation for Past Land Acquisition [9] Article 14(1) of Schedule 7 to the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles provides; “(1) The State undertakes to continue to consider all applications made during the period of twelve months from the date of coming into force of this Constitution by a person whose land was compulsorily acquired under the Lands Acquisition Act, 1977 during the period starting June, 1977 and ending on the date of coming into force of this Constitution and to negotiate in good faith with the person with a view to— where on the date of the receipt of the application the land has not been developed or there is no Government plan to develop it, transferring back the land the person; where there is a Government plan to develop the land and the person from whom the land was acquired satisfies the Government that the person will implement the plan or a similar plan, transfer the land back to the person; where the land cannot be transferred back under subparagraphs (a) or subparagraph (b)— as full compensation for the land acquired, transferring to the person another parcel of land of corresponding value to the land acquired; paying the person full monetary compensation for the land acquired; or(iii)as full compensation for the land acquired, devising a scheme of compensation combining items (i) and (ii) up to the value of the land acquired.” [10] In pursuance of that provision, the 1st Respondent gave an undertaking to continue to consider claims made for compensation or return of land that had been compulsorily acquired in terms of the Land Acquisition Act 1977, so long as the application is made within 12 months of the coming into force of the Constitution. Such claim for compensation or return has to be negotiated in good faith; see Umarji & Sons (Pty) Ltd v Government of Seychelles [2017] SCSC 3. Under that provision, lands that have been compulsorily acquired but remain undeveloped were to be returned and adequate compensation be given in instances where land has been developed. Such compensation could be monetary or alternative land of similar value. The rationale behind that provision was to correct past injustices done to citizens through land acquisition and considered to have been effected unfairly. In Moulinie v Government of Seychelles [2012] SLR 116, the Court ruled that land compensation is not precluded by prior partial payment under the Lands Acquisition Act, if the compensation was not full and adequate. The Petitioner claims that compensation that was given was inadequate as evidenced in the letter of 08th August 1993. The 1st Respondent’s position is that Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme had been compensated, thus the reason why in the letter from Mr. Nourrice, he considered her application as low priority, thus by implication suggesting that 1st Respondent considered the compensation adequate. Prescription [11] The Respondents raised objection to the petition and argue that the petition is time-barred under Rule 4 of the Constitutional Court (Application, Contravention, Enforcement, or Interpretation) Rules 2010, which provides that petition to be filed within three months of the act or omission, or within twelve months of the Constitution coming into force. In order to assess the validity of this objection, we must carefully examine both the statutory framework and the facts presented in the petition [12] The Petitioner argues that the issue of time bar was decisively settled by the Court of Appeal in Poole v Government of Seychelles SCA CP wherein in allowing the appeal, the Court of Appeal concluded that; “On the matter of Article 14(1)(a), Part 111, Schedule 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles, we need to state as forcefully as possible that the sun will set on it only when the last timely application has been disposed of good faith. And not before. This is destined to be the Day of Redemption of the past injustices. And no other.” In that case, the application was made within the 12 months constitutionally provided for. There was an exchange of letters between the Applicant and the Principal Secretary (“the PS”) of the relevant Ministry of the 1st Respondent. The latter, by letter responded that the application was receiving attention. The applicant continued negotiating with Government. The applicant fell into a technical trap and accepted compensation rather than the return of the land. Thereafter, by further letter from the PS, the applicant was informed he could not take the negotiations further. The application tried to engage further with the Government. The initial application had been made in 1993. The applicants filed a constitutional court petition in 1996. The Court of Appeal found that the Government was not acting in good faith and that the time bar defence was invalidated. [13] Similar position was adopted in the Umarji & Sons (Pty) Ltd v Government of Seychelles (supra). The objection to an application on ground of prescription was defeated as there was ongoing negotiations between the parties and bad faith on the part of Government. It reinforces the argument that a petition may not be time-barred if the delay is due to the respondent’s inactions or ongoing negotiations. The position was reinforced in Jumeau v Government of Seychelles [2021] SLR 116 where again it was held that delays attributable to Government inaction prevented the application of the time-bar limitations. In that case, the Court indirectly addressed the issue of prescription under Part III of Schedule 7 of the Constitution, even though Rule 4 of the Constitutional Court Rules was not directly discussed. The petitioner had filed for redress years after the constitutional timeframe, but court found that negotiations for compensation had been ongoing since 1993, indicating that there was continuity in pursuit of justice. [14] The issue of time-bar was further explained in Verlaque & Anor v Seychelles Government & Anor (CC5 of 1999) [2020] SCSC1. This case concerns an application for the return of two plots of land, PR2109 and PR2111. The petitionER had made application for the return of these parcels of land. The petitioner argued that the contravention occurred when the Government refused to transfer the land parcels despite an agreement confirmed in a letter dated 8th February 1996. The Government argued that refusal occurred earlier and therefore the petition was time-barred. The court held that the contravention occurred when the final refusal was communicated in a letter dated 07th October 1999, thus making the petition within time for PR2190 but time barred for PR 2111 due to Government’s earlier indication that it was retaining that latter parcel. [15] The above-mentioned cases illustrate that constitutional redress for land acquisition is governed by a special regime that overrides general rules pertaining to time limitations. Further it supports the argument that compensation should reflect current market value, and not value of the land at time of acquisition nor when the Constitution came into force. The Court have in many of its decisions adopted such framework for calculating compensation. Furthermore, it is a settled principle that that such constitutional obligations are not extinguished if negotiations were not in good faith. Jumeau v Government of Seychelles (supra) made it clear that government inaction prevented the application of time-bar limitation. It considered that lengthy delays or government inaction amounted to denial of constitutional justice. In that case, the court explored the scope of constitutional redress under Part III of Schedule 7 and Article 130(1) of the Constitution and upheld the principle that Part III Schedule 7 created a special cause of action for compensation for past land acquisitions, distinct from general provisions of Article 130. It also held that Article 20 (Right to Property) is inherently linked to Part III of Schedule 7 in that the right to compensation is constitutionally protected. It concludes that Part III Schedule 7 was intended to correct past injustices retroactively and therefore cannot be limited by time especially when such delays were due to government inaction. [16] In the present case Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme made an application within the one year of the coming into force of the 1993 Constitution. On 30th May 1994 she had received written confirmation from the 1st Respondent that her application was receiving attention and that she would be informed of the outcome in due course. From 1996 to the time of her death there was no correspondence between the Petitioner and the 1st Respondent. There was no negotiation going on. At the time of making her application Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme acknowledged payment of compensation made to her at the time of the compulsory acquisition. It appears from her letter that she was not seeking return of the properties but solely for monetary compensation. She states in the letter; “I do not wish to complicate the objectives of the Government by asking for return of my land, but I feel that I have been unfairly treated having lost my inheritance by compulsory acquisition without what I consider adequate compensation.” We opine that by that statement she was not reneging all claim of rights for return of her properties. It is felt that she merely wanted to negotiate on a platform of compensation because it was stipulated in the Certificate of the Minister for the acquisition that the objective of land acquisition was in the national interest. [17] However after her death, it appears nothing was done by her executors. Therefore, even if the 1st Respondent had wanted to negotiate, no one came forward. On 08th July 2002 by Order of the Supreme Court, Mrs. Veronique Greewas appointed executrix. Again there is no evidence of any communication between the executrix and the 1st Respondent in regards to the compulsory acquisition of parcel V962 and V1099. Then, until recently, in January 2024, Mr Allen Hoareau was appointed joint executor. Mr. Allen Hoareau approached the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in respect of the land acquisition. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition dated 10th July 2023 which was similar to the present one. That petition was dismissed due to certain irregularity as Mr. Hoareau was named as an executor when he had not been so appointed. He lacked legal capacity to assume such a role. The present petition was filed on 28th June 2024, after the appointment of Mr. Hoareau as a joint executor. [18] The question to be asked is whether there was ongoing negotiations from the time of lodging the application by letter dated 08th August 1993 to the time when the petition was filed. In Government of Seychelles v Jumeau (SCA CL 1 of 2021) 2021 SCCA 68 (17 December 2021), which was a case of similar nature as the present, the Court emphasized that 20 year silence was unreasonable. The Court addressed the issue of time-barred applications under Rule 4(1)(b) of the Constitutional Court Rules. It ruled that the Respondent failed to bring his action within the prescriptive time period set under Rule 4(1)(b) which requires that actions be filed within a reasonable time after the breakdown of negotiations. The letter from Mr. Nourrice of 08th November 1995, made it clear that Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme had already been compensated and therefore was of low priority and up to the filing of the present petition there has been absolute silence from the Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme and after her death, the executrix who was appointed 08th July 2002. The time period is more than 27 years. [19] The case of Government of Seychelles v Jumeau (supra) is highly persuasive in establishing that this petition is time barred under Rule 4(1)(b) due to inordinate delay. It establishes what is considered unreasonable time. The case supports the argument that prolonged inaction after breakdown of negotiations as a bar to claims under the Constitutional Court Rules. [20] Administrative silence can affect rights of individuals. Individuals have a right to expect a response from public authorities when they submit requests under administrative procedure. The failure to act can be framed legally as silence especially after a mandated response has elapsed. This concept is not uniform in all legal systems. While it generally indicates some form of inactivity, the legal implications of such silence can range from presumed acceptance of the request (positive silence) to an implicit denial (negative silence. Blagojevic B (2012) Legal Protection of Administrative Silence, explains that negative silence operates under the presumption that if an administrative body does not respond within a specified time frame, the request is deemed rejected. This model is intended to safeguard the administration against inefficiencies. This model allows administration to effectively ignore requests without consequences leading to delays and inefficiencies. On the other hand, positive silence presumes that silence on the part of the administration equates acceptance. This positive model is designed to expedite administrative processes and provide citizens enjoyment of their rights without delay. [21] In this case, Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme first made her application on 08th August 1993. That letter was acknowledged on 30 May 1994 and a response to the letter was issued on 08th November 1994. From that letter it was clear that 1st Respondent was telling the Petitioner that since she had already received compensation her application was considered low priority, she was told that by the latest 31st December 1996 a technical advisor will communicate with her. That did not happen. There is no record of the any communication either from the Petitioner or the Respondent since then to the present. This can in no way be said to postulate the positive model. It could well be interpreted that the silence meant that the application has been rejected and the delay could have well been due to the fact that after Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme passed away nobody came forward to revive the application. Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme and subsequently the Executors slept on their alleged rights. It could be that their continued silence until now can be interpreted as acceptance that since compensation had already been paid, they would not push the matter further. [22] This Court finds that the lapse of time is too significant. The executors cannot now come for redress and enforce property rights. The delay is not merely a technical lapse but reflects a substantial lapse in time, during which there has been clear failure and disinterest to take any steps to challenge the acquisition or to seek remedy provided for in the Constitution, save for the letter 08th August 1993 from Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme. In the letter of 08th November 2995, Mr. Nourrice had clearly stated that her application was of law priority and that by latest the 31st December 1996 a decision will be communicated to her. When there was no communication by that date, nothing was done until the filing of this Petition. This Court considers the Petition time-barred and therefore uphold the objection of the Respondents. Further, if the Petitioner was to argue that its claim was continuous until the claim is fully settled, such argument cannot succeed as such claim is transitional and temporary but not perpetual as was decided in Verbene Development Company Ltd. V Government of Seychelles [2020] SCCC. The Court finds in favour of the Respondents that the Petition is time barred. The Petition is bad in Law and Misconceived. [23] The second objection of the Respondents is that the petition is bad in law and misconceived. The nature of this objection has been reproduced at paragraphs [8] 2 above. The Respondents submit that the Petitioner’s claim arises from an alleged breach of obligations under Part III of Schedule 7 of the Constitution which does not create enforceable constitutional rights for the Petitioner. The Respondents state that the provision merely outlines the 1st Respondent’s obligations which are not directly actionable under Article 46 of the Constitution. Such obligations do not fall within the scope of fundamental rights under Chapter III of the Constitution. Counsel for the Respondents state that the proper legal framework for such claims is Article 130 which refers to constitutional questions and remedies where constitutional provisions have been contravened. [24] In response, Counsel for the Petitioner argues that the Respondents fail to appreciate that Part III Schedule 7 of the Constitution is sui generis and does not import the concept of contravention of a constitutional right or enforcement of the provisions of the Constitution referred to by the Respondents, within the context of the broad spectrum of the Constitution. Counsel submits that Part III Schedule 7 creates obligations on the state in the form of an undertaking for specific remedies. Further that the Petition is evoking a breach of the said Constitutional obligation and as a result, the constitutional remedy available before the Constitutional Court is to seek the provided forms of compensation to which the Petitioner is entitled to under Part III Schedule 7 as prayed for in the Petition. [25] Effectively what Counsel for the Respondents is espousing is that the Petition should have been framed either under Article 130 or Article 46 of the Constitution. The former deals with contravention of the Constitution other than Chapter III which deals with fundamental human rights. The breach of such fundamental rights is catered for under the latter article. Article 130(1) and of the Constitution provides as follows; “(1) A person who alleges that any provisions of this Constitution, other than a provision of Chapter III, has been contravened and that the person’s interest is being or is likely to be affected by the contravention may, subject to this article, apply to the Constitutional Court for redress. (2) ………. (3) ………. (4) Upon hearing an application under clause (1), the Constitutional Court may— (a) declare any act or omission which is the subject of the application to be a contravention of this Constitution; (b) declare any law or the provision of any law which contravenes this Constitution to be void; (c) grant any remedy available to the Supreme Court against any person or authority which is the subject of the application or which is a party to any proceedings before the Constitutional Court, as the Court considers appropriate. [26] Article 46(1) of the Constitution reads as follows; “A person who claims that a provision of this Charter has been or is likely to be contravened in relation to the person by any law, act or omission may, subject to this article, apply to the Constitutional Court for redress.” One of the fundamental human rights under Chapter III of the Constitution right to property found in Article 26. [27] In Jumeau v Government of Seychelles (supra) the Court explored the scope of constitutional redress under Part III of Schedule 7 and Article 130(1) of the Constitution. The Court upheld the principle that Part III of Schedule 7 created a special cause of action for compensation for past land acquisitions, distinct from the general provisions of Article 130. The court further emphasized that Article 26 of the Constitution is inherently linked to Part III of Schedule 7, meaning that the right to compensation is constitutionally protected. The court also underlined the importance of constitutional guarantee for compensation under Schedule 7 and noted that Schedule 7 is designed to correct historical land injustices and provide specific reliefs that include (a) return of acquired land if not developed or if the proposed land development plan can be carried out by the original owner and (b) full compensation if the land cannot be returned. In agreement with Schedule 7, in the present case, the Petitioner seeks compensation and return of undeveloped land. It could be said that based on that premise the petition falls directly under Article 130(1) of the Constitution. This approach was also espoused in Moulinie v Government of Seychelles (supra) wherein it was held that the reliefs are not legally misconceived if they fall within the framework of Part III Schedule 7. It illustrates that the constitutional obligation to return land or provide full compensation overrides ordinary compulsory acquisition laws. [28] In Herminie & Anor v Pillay & Ors (CP2 of 2017) [2018] SCCA 17 (20 March 2018) held that Article 46(1) focusses specifically on violations related to Chapter III of the Constitution, which deals with fundamental human rights and freedoms. A person is granted a right to petition the constitutional court if he believes that a provision of the Charter has been contravened, or is likely to be contravened, by any law act or omission. This article allows for action to be taken without the need to prove that the violation has already occurred. It is clear, on the other hand that Article 130(1) addresses a violation of the Constitution. It states that any person who believes that a constitutional provision (excluding those falling under Chapter III) has been contravened and that his interest is being or likely to be affected, may apply to the Constitutional Court for redress. The Petitioner suggests that is exactly what they have done. Under paragraph 11 of the petition the Petitioner avers that the 1st Respondent has breached its obligations under Part III Schedule 7, Rule 14(1). That provision places an obligation on the Government to consider applications made within 12 months from the date of the coming into force of the Constitution by persons whose lands were compulsorily acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. [29] In Dhanjee v Michel & Ors (CP15 of 2021) [2012] SCCC 1 (17 January 2021) the Court of Appeal made the following remarks; “it is evident from article 130(4)(c) of the Constitution that the Constitutional Court, in addition to its jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief as to any contravention of the Constitution, has also been conferred the jurisdiction to grant any consequential relief or remedy available to the Supreme Court against any person or authority which is the subject of the application or which is a party to any proceedings before the Constitutional Court. In such circumstances, it can grant any consequential relief as the Court considers appropriate. In our view, this Court, in the absence of anything to the contrary in the Constitution, has unfettered jurisdiction to grant any such consequential relief as it deems appropriate, following the declaratory relief in matters relating to the application, contravention, enforcement or interpretation of the Constitution vide article 129(1) thereof. It is truism that a special procedure has been prescribed under article 134 of the Constitution for removal of a Justice of Appeal or a Judge from office for his or her inability to perform the functions of the office, due to infirmity of body or mind or any other cause or misbehaviour. But, this article in our considered view has nothing to do with the unfettered jurisdiction conferred on this Court by article 130(4)(c) of the Constitution to grant any consequential relief or remedy, as it considers appropriate, having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Obviously, "where there is a right there is a remedy": Ubi jus, ibi remedium.” [30] The Petitioner is correct in its statement that the Part III of Article 7 is sui generis. The legislative provision creates a special regime for making claims is regards to land acquisition. The Respondents contends that the Court “may not” order the return of the property or compensation as sought by the Petitioner. The word may not, does necessarily import the reverse. That means that the reliefs being sought could be granted. Michel & Ors v Dhanjee (SCA5 of 2012) [2012] SCCA10 (31 August 2012) it was explained that under Article 130(1) the test is not as stringent as under Article 46(1). All that one has to show is that there has been a contravention and that person’s interest is being or is likely to be affected by such contravention. Under Article 46(1) the contravention needs necessarily be a contravention in respect to a person. Article 130(1) on the other hand is more general and deals with contraventions of the Constitution which may affect anyone. [31] We find that the Petition is lacking in that it does not state under which provision of the Constitution the petition is being prosecuted. Nonetheless, the petition alleges a violation by the 1st Respondent of its undertaking and obligation under Part III Schedule 7. Therefore, the Petition falls under Article 130(1). It is to be noted that Part III Schedule 7 does not create a right but rather an obligation on the part of the 1st Respondent. That obligation is not directly actionable under Article 46 which deals with breaches of fundamental rights and freedoms. We also find the petition lacking in that the prayer does not seek declaration of any alleged omission on the part of the Respondent which essentially would be in contravention of the Constitution. There is a requirement for such declaration if the reliefs being demanded is granted. [32] Nonetheless, in Jumeau v Government of Seychelles (supra) the Court ruled that Article 26 which guarantees a right to property is inherently linked to Part III Schedule 7 and in Moulinie v Government of Seychelles (supra) the Court held that petitions is not misconceived if they fall within Part III Schedule 7. In Government of Seychelles & Anor v Poole & Ors SCA 4 of 2016) [2017] SCCA 17 (20 April 2017) Twomey JA said; “Indeed, there is more to paragraph 14(1) of Schedule 7 of Part 3 of the Constitution than meets the eye. Could the framers of the Constitution have created a regime in the Schedule to the Constitution which was in derogation of the Constitutional provisions regarding the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual? Our answer must be in the negative. The 1993 compensation regime could only be a reaffirmation and an extension of those rights to pre-1993 events, in keeping with the right to property enshrined in Article 26 of the Constitution. Part III was a redeeming “tour de force” meant for the retroactive correction of past injustices along the newly introduced democratic principles. This is amply reflected in the choice of the title “Compensation for Past Land Acquisitions,” the content of the provisions and the specified implementation provisions. Designed to redress old wrongs, it cannot be used today to perpetuate those wrongs nor to create new wrongs.” [33] Therefore, we do not find the petition to be misconceived and therefore that ground of objection is dismissed. Estoppel [34] For its third objection, the Respondents (a) pleads estoppel. It is the Respondents’ submission that the petition contradicts Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme’s wishes as per her letter of application which states that she did not wish to hinder the government’s objectives suggesting abandonment of the claim for return of the properties and (b), that failure by Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme to follow up the relevant claim after Mr. Nourrice issued the letter of 08th November 1995 until her death and her failure and that of her executors to not initiate proceedings to enforce the provisions of Part III Schedule 7 of the Constitution can be construed as her abandoning her claim. [35] Counsel for the Petitioner answered that as to first point of objection, the relevant fact is not that the deceased originally applied for financial compensation, but the failure of Government to negotiate in good faith which constitutes a constitutional breach, thus justifying alternative remedies. The Respondents argue that in such circumstances the Petitioner is not estopped from seeking any form of remedy available under Part III of Schedule 7. The Petitioner refers to Seychelles Government & Attorney General v Moulinie SCA 16 of 2012 wherein it was stated “We hold, therefore, that payment of compensation, where the quantum is disputed, is not a bar to a demand for the return of the land under the relevant constitutional provisions. Inherent in the constitutional provision is the concept of full compensation. If government is not prepared to pay full compensation for any plot of land subject to the section 14 applications, it cannot argue that the applicant cannot ask for the return of the lands. In this case, the respondent has always disputed the quantum of compensation it has received. Accordingly, he is entitled to be considered for the return if the conditions for return are satisfied. And the conditions are those which have been specified in section 14(1) (a) and (b): namely, the land has not been developed or there is no government plan to develop it; however, where there is a government plan to develop it, an option should be given to the owner to develop it.” [36] In response to second limb of objection under estoppel, the Petitioner states that it is disturbing that the Government is seeking to obtain a benefit from a blatant violation of the Constitution. The Petitioner questions the stance of the Attorney General who it claims that by appearing for the Government appears to have abdicated his Constitutional mandate to safeguard the rights and interests of citizens in such a case where he is acting as amicus curae. [37] In respect of point (a) of the objection, this Court refers to Richard Philip Ernestine v Government of Seychelles (2023) SCCC2 wherein the court in applying the principles of estoppel, held that acceptance of initial compensation extinguished any further rights. The court found that the deceased was compensated for the property in 1995 and the acceptance of that compensation extinguished claims for additional compensation. In that case, it was concluded that there was no continuing breach of constitutional rights as the compensation was accepted. This is in accordance with the principle of finality once compensation is accepted. [38] In the present case Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme accepted the compensation. The petition fails to aver whether that compensation was accepted under protest. Nonetheless, Part III Schedule 7 opened the floodgates for applicants to request additional compensation where it is felt that the initial compensation was not adequate. The Constitution does not preclude the Petitioner from claiming further compensation. In his letter dated 08th November 1995, Mr. Nourrice had intimated to Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme that her request was low priority as she had been compensated. Dr. Stevenson Delhomme did not consider the compensation adequate. When V1099 and V962 were compulsorily acquired in 1984, she was given SR200,000.00 as compensation for 87 acres of land. It is our opinion that this was not adequate compensation. However, we do not have any evidence of the circumstances under which she accepted the compensation. [38] In her letter of 08 August 1993, Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme made it clear that she was not seeking the return of her land but merely for adequate compensation. However, now the Petitioner claims the return of properties that is undeveloped is agreement with Part III Schedule 7. We do not agree with Counsel for the Respondents that since in her letter she only demanded monetary compensation that the Petitioner is now precluded from making a request for return of undeveloped land. We opine that the objection cannot succeed in such circumstances. This is in agreement with Seychelles Government & Attorney General v Moulinie (supra) wherein the court ruled that prior acceptance of compensation does not estop an applicant from demanding the return of land if the compensation was not full. It emphasized that the right to demand land return or full compensation is not waived by prior negotiations or acceptance of partial compensation. It adds that the constitutional obligation to return land and provide full compensation under Schedule 7 is not affected by prior dealings unless the full compensation was agreed upon and valid. [39] However, secondly Counsel for the Respondents argues that since Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme did not pursue her initial application combined with the subsequent inaction of the executors following her death, can be interpreted as abandonment of the claim. We have already ruled that the petition is time barred in view that for over two and a half decades the Petitioner did not pursue the claim. The initial executrix, Mrs. Veronique Green should have acted immediately following the death of Dr. Stevenson-Delhomme. She waited for over two decades before taking any step. At the least she should have informed the 1st Respondent of her appointment. That being the situation, we feel that it is unfair to qualify the 1st Respondent as not being of good faith. On this point, we are in total agreement with Counsel for the Respondent. Determination [40] We therefore find that the petition is time barred and therefore dismiss the same. We make no order as to cost. Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 27 March 2025 ____________ ____________ Burhan J Dodin J Vidot J 9