Sun International of Lesotho v Mathibeli (CIV/APN 411 of 96) [2000] LSCA 75 (15 June 2000) | Unlawful dismissal | Esheria

Sun International of Lesotho v Mathibeli (CIV/APN 411 of 96) [2000] LSCA 75 (15 June 2000)

Full Case Text

C I V / A P N / 4 1 1 / 96 IN T HE H I GH C O U RT OF L E S O T HO In the matter between:- S UN I N T E R N A T I O N AL OF L E S O T HO A P P L I C A NT and P U L E NG M A T H I B E LI R E S P O N D E NT J U D G M E NT D e l i v e r ed by the H o n o u r a b le Mr Justice S . N. P e e te on the 15th J u ne 2 0 00 In this application, the applicant m o v ed the court for a nd w as g r a n t ed by My B r o t h er M o l ai J. an order calling u p on the r e s p o n d e n ts to s h ow c a u se w hy the j u d g m e nt of the L a b o ur C o u rt in c a se N o . L C 2 3 / 95 shall n ot be stayed, reversed a nd set aside a nd w hy p e n d i ng finalisation thereof, the e x e c u t i on of the said j u d g m e nt shall n ot be stayed. H i s t o ry of t he c a se It appears that the first respondent had b e en e m p l o y ed since 1 9 88 as a slots cleaner by the S un International of Lesotho and w as w o r k i ng at the M a s e ru S un C a b a n a s. On the 15th January 1995 she w as dismissed by the chairman, a Mr Wilson, w ho presided over a disciplinary hearing set up to inquire into a theft s c am in w h i ch overage m o n i es f r om the slot machines w e re being systematically pilfered by the staff of the gambling department. Preliminary investigations had b e en conducted by a Mr W i l h e hn Pieterse, a security m a n a g er from a sister S un Hotel - the T h a b a - N c hu Hotel. T he first respondent allegedly m a de a written statement in w h i ch she admitted to h a ve taken s o me bags containing coins on t wo occasions f r om the trays of the slot m a c h i n es but also explained that she h ad b e en asked to do so by o ne Calex w ho had given her on those t wo occasions s o me m o n ey as a reward for her assistance. In this proceedings it is not necessary h o w e v er to go over the merits of the disciplinary hearing once m o re because the L a b o ur Court decided that evidence supported the charge. H a v i ng thus found, the L a b o ur Court in its j u d g m e nt of the 17th S e p t e m b er 1 9 96 c a me to a finding that- "There being no evidence of delegation of p o w er we are not the v i ew that the purported dismissal of the applicant by Mr W i l s on on the 15/1/95 w as materially flawed and as such of no force or effect in l aw as he had no p o w er to dismiss" and in its a w a rd ruled that- " S he is lawfully a nd properly terminated as of the 17th S e p t e m b er 1 9 96 w h en the j u d g m e nt of this court w as delivered. It is therefore, only fair that she be c o m p e n s a t ed for the loss she h as suffered since 15th January 1 9 95 to that date" It is this E n d i ng of the L a b o ur C o u rt that is being challenged by the applicant in the present proceedings. In her originating application the first respondent states:- "I w as unlawfully dismissed on the allegations against me ( w h i c h) w e re not p r o v e d. I w as unlawfully p u n i s h ed for the w r o n gs (if a n y) of another person. I w as not in charge. I w as not g i v en notice of termination, n or p a y m e nt in lieu thereof; no severance p a y m e n t. 4. N a t u re of relief s o u g ht or reference or question for determination of C o u rt - D a m a g e s, notice of p a y, severance of p a y ." It is clear that the g r o u n ds on w h i ch relief w as sought did not challenge per se the authority or p o w er of Mr W i l s on as c h a i r m an to dismiss after the inquiry w as concluded. In her supporting affidavit she states:- 6. "I s u b m it that my dismissal is unlawful for the following reasons:- 6.1. I w as g i v en no tice of termination in t e r ms of section 63 of L a b o ur C o de O r d er no 24 of 1 9 9 2. 6.2. I w as not given p a y m e nt in lieu (sic) of N o t i ce in t e r ms of Section 64 of the O r d er m e n t i on (in) 6.1. a b o ve 6.3. I w as not given severance p a y m e nt in t e r ms of section 79 of the said Order". In her originating application she did not pray for an order that the purported dismissal by Mr W i l s on be declared null a nd void for the reasons that Mr W i l s on did not h a ve authority or p o w er to dismiss. T he replying affidavit of the first respondent alleges that: " T he dismissal w as n e v er real w h en the purported dismissal F o rm w as signed by the chairman." It is p e r h a ps important to reproduce the notice of Dismissal F o rm in full- D a t e: 15-1-95 E m p l o y e e 's n a me a nd address: P u l e ng Mathibeli Thetsane M r ( s) Mathibeli N O T I CE OF D I S M I S S AL This serves to confirm that, following the hearing held on 15-1-95 (date) concerning your serious m i s c o n d u c t, y o ur services are hereby terminated. Y o ur are s u m m a r i ly " S he is lawfully a nd properly terminated as of the 17th S e p t e m b er 1 9 96 w h en the j u d g m e nt of this court w as delivered. It is therefore, only fair that she be compensated for the loss she has suffered since 15th January 1 9 95 to that date" It is this finding of the L a b o ur Court that is being challenged by the applicant in the present proceedings. In her originating application the first respondent states:- "I w as unlawfully dismissed on the allegations against me (which) w e re not proved. I w as unlawfully punished for the w r o n gs (if a n y) of another person. I w as not in charge. I w as not given notice of termination, nor p a y m e nt in lieu thereof; no severance p a y m e n t. 4. Nature of relief sought or reference or question for determination of Court - D a m a g e s, notice of pay, severance of pay." It is clear that the grounds on w h i ch relief w as sought did not challenge per se the authority or p o w er of Mr W i l s on as chairman to dismiss after the inquiry w as concluded. In her supporting affidavit she states:- 6. "I submit that my dismissal is unlawful for the following reasons:- 6.1. I w as given no tice of termination in terms of section 63 of L a b o ur C o de Order no 24 of 1992. d i s m i s s ed a nd y o ur e m p l o y m e nt relationship w i th the c o m p a ny e n ds on 1 5 - 1 - 95 (date) we also c o n f i rm that y ou h a ve the right to a p p e al in writing, w i t h in three ( 3) w o r k i ng d a ys against this dismissal. K i n d ly a c k n o w l e d ge receipt of this letter by signing w h e re indicated b e l ow C h a i r m a n 's signature N a me Position E m p l o y e e 's signature : : : : K . E . W i l s on K e i th W i l s on Slots M a n a g er P. M a t h i b e li D a t e: 1 5 - 1 - 9 5" D u r i ng the h e a r i ng in the L a b o ur C o u rt Mr M o n y a ka M a k h e t ha P e r s o n n el M a n a g er of applicant w as c r o s s - e x a m i n ed as follows by Mr F o s a- " Q u e s t i o n: It is correct that w h en a p e r s on is d i s m i s s ed there is a dismissal f o rm that is filled? A n s w e r: Y e s, there is b ut it is n ot a l w a ys filled s o m e t i m es it is a dismissal letter. Q u e s t i o n: After signing dismissal f o rm is a dismissal c o m p l e te or there is still s o m e t h i ng else? A n s w e r: T he dismissal is c o m p l e t e, a p e r s on is d i s m i s s e d. Q u e s t i o n: Is he d i s m i s s ed by the p e r s on w ho signs the f o r m? A n s w e r: Y e s. Q u e s t i o n: A nd this is s i g n ed by Mr W i l s on f r om T h a b a - N c hu w ho chaired the h e a r i n g? A n s w e r: Y e s. Q u e s t i o n: W h at p o w er d o es Mr W i l s on h a ve to d i s m i ss p e o p le in L e s o t h o? A n s w e r: He h ad b e en e m p o w e r ed by the M a n a g e m e nt of M a s e ru S un Hotel as a chairperson of that hearing Question: Do y ou m e an that w h en a person is p o w e r ed to chair a hearing he is also given p o w er to dismiss? A n s w e r: Y e s, o n ce y ou are given p o w er to chair a hearing at that time y ou w e re also g i v en p o w er to dismiss. Question: No e v en p o w er to r e c o m m e n d? A n s w e r: N o, he is g i v en all p o w e rs to dismiss Question: This is ridiculous, is this position k n o wn by the w o r k e r s? A n s w e r: Y es Question: P u l e ng says she did not k n ow this? A n s w e r: At the beginning the c h a i r m an explained his position as c h a i r m an a nd his p o w e rs so P u l e ng k n ew a b o ut this." To his founding affidavit, M u r t u za R a h m an the General M a n a g er of S un International of L e s o t ho attached w h at is called "Grievance a nd Disciplinary P r o c e d u r e s" "(viii) T he following people will normally be present: Y ou Y o ur supervisor/charging officer Y o ur m a n a g er ( C h a i r m an of the H e a r i n g) Y o ur representative (if required) Y o ur witness (if required) O t h er witnesses (if required) - - - - - - Y o ur interpreter (if r e q u i r e d) A f t er h e a r i ng all parties a nd a l l o w i ng questions, the C h a i r m an will d e c i de if y ou are guilty or not. He will t h en c o n s i d er y o ur w o rk r e c o rd a nd d e c i de on w h at action m ay b e t a k e n. T h is m ay b e: - - - - V e r b al w a r n i ng W r i t t en w a r n i ng Final w a r n i ng D i s m i s s a l. He will notify y ou of the action to be t a k en a nd g i ve y ou t he right to a p p e a l. He will also issue y ou w i th a disciplinary action f o rm (see A p p e n d ix 3 ). A c o py of this will be p l a c ed on y o ur file a nd will n o r m a l ly be valid for 12 m o n t h s" T he ordinary i m p o rt of this d o c u m e nt despite its inelegant drafting implies that it is the c h a i r m an of the disciplinary h e a r i ng w ho d e c i d es u p on the guilt or o t h e r w i se of the e m p l o y ee a nd it is the c h a i r m an m ay i m p o se appropriate p u n i s h m e nt i.e. verbal w a r n i n g, written w a r n i ng final w a r n i n g, or dismissal. T he fact that t he c o n v i c t ed e m p l o y ee h as a right of a p p e al f r om the decision of the c h a i r m an also implies that the C h a i r m a n 's decision is definitive a nd n ot m e r e ly a r e c o m m e n d a t i on to be f o r w a r d ed to the general m a n a g e r. A l so attached is a letter p u r p o r t e d ly written by Mr R a h m an to Mr W i l s on a p p o i n t i ng h im to chair o v er the disciplinary hearing. It reads:- " R M / m am 9th J a n u a r y, 1 9 95 Mr K. W i l s o n, Slots M a n a g e r, T h a b a - N c hu S u n. D e ar Sir, T h is is to c o n f i rm that y ou h a ve b e en appointed to chair a nd preside o v er disciplinary hearings of cases of the following e m p l o y e es of L e s o t ho S un H o t e ls w o r k i ng at the slots d e p a r t m e nt of M a s e ru S u n, Violet L e s e n y a, Julia M o h o l o b e l a, P u l e ng Mathibeli a nd C a l ex K o l o i. We h a ve a p p o i n t ed y ou b e c a u se y ou are a senior m a n a g er w i t h in the S un G r o up w i th k n o w l e d ge of the operations of Slots D e p a r t m e n t s. T h e se e m p l o y e es are facing v e ry serious c h a r g es w h i ch if p r o v en m ay w a r r a nt dismissals; a nd since y ou do n ot w o rk at M a s e ru S u n, y ou are n ot intimate w i th the facts of the cases a nd y ou are thus the m o st neutral a nd u n b i a s ed C h a i r m an we c an get w h i le still r e m a i n i ng w i t h in the S un G r o up as these p r o c e e d i n gs are an internal M a n a g e m e nt tool. E v en t h o u gh y ou are familiar w i th p r o c e d u re f o r ms to be f o l l o w e d, we attach a c o py for ease of reference. Y o u rs sincerely R A H M AN M U R T U ZA G E N E R AL M A N A G E R" T h is letter in fact in my v i ew authorises Mr W i l s on to e x e r c i se all disciplinary p o w e rs in the said h e a r i ng i n c l u d i ng " d i s m i s s a l s ". If d e l e g a t i on of p o w er w as n e c e s s a r y, this letter constituted o n e. I discern no procedure for r e c o m m e n d a t i on but for appeal after the conclusion of the proceedings; I do not see a ny negation of the principles of natural justice. In their originating application it w as i n c u m b e nt u p on the first r e s p o n d e nt to h a ve placed the validity or nullity of dismissal directly in issue before the L a b o ur C o u rt in order that the applicant could avail that court with necessary d o c u m e n t a t i o n. T he L e s o t ho S un International is not a public or statutory b o dy b ut a private entity (see K o a t sa v N UL C . of A. (civ) N o. 15 of 1 9 8 6) In the cited case of M a k h u t la vs C o u rt President a nd L e s o t ho Agricultural D e v e l o p m e nt B a nk - C I V / A P N / 2 9 3 / 95 M o f o lo J. said:- "In the first place, p o w e rs vested on the M a n a g i ng Director are by statute a nd the expectation is that they c an be t a k en a w ay f r om h im or diminished by statute" T he learned j u d ge decided that u n d er the principle of d e l e g a t us potestas n on potest delegare w h e re a function is entrusted to an administrative o r g a n, the task or function m ay not be carried o v er to another person in the a b s e n ce of statutory authorization for this. T h us w h e re an official purports to exercise a function that is not entrusted to h im under statute, s u ch act is ultra vires - In M a k h u p a ne vs L e s o t ho P h a r m a c e u t i c al C o r p o r a t i on & A n o t h er - C I V / A P N / 8 0 / 96 per K h e o la J. as he then w a s, decided that purported dismissal by a d e p a r t m e nt h e ad w as ultra vires b e c a u se the letter of dismissal h ad not b e en written in terms of section 12 of the L e s o t ho Pharmaceutical O r d er 1 9 8 7. S ee also L e s o t ho T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o ns C o r p o r a t i on vs T h a m a h a ne R a s e k i la - C of A (civ) N o . 24 of 1 9 91 w h e re B r o w de JA stated:- "I h a ve c o me to the c o n c l u s i o n, therefore, that the decision to d i s m i ss the r e s p o n d e nt w as t a k en by the B o a rd of Directors a nd that b e i ng so the decision w as in b r e a ch of the regulations w h i ch g o v e r n ed the relationship b e t w e en the parties." - p . 8. T he learned j u d ge of a p p e al also n o t ed that it m u st be b o r ne in m i nd that the o n us of p r o of on the issue of u n l a w f u l n e ss of the dismissal is on r e s p o n d e n t. I am also of the v i ew that since the issue of authority to d i s m i ss o n ly s u r f a c ed d u r i ng the cross e x a m i n a t i on of Mr M a k h e t ha it w as i n c u m b e nt u p on the first r e s p o n d e nt t h r o u gh his l a w y er to h a ve m a de an application b e f o re L a b o ur C o u rt to a m p l i fy or a m e nd his g r o u n ds for relief-which-I s h o u ld h a s t en to s ay - w e re of c o m p e n s a t o ry nature a nd d id n ot directly c h a l l e n ge Mr W i l s o n 's authority to d i s m i s s. T h is w as a n e c e s s a ry step b e c a u se the L a b o ur C o u rt - e v en as a court of equity c o u ld n ot - grant a relief n ot s o u g ht in the p a p e r s. It is my v i ew that the finding of the L a b o ur C o u rt that the c h a i r m an of t he disciplinary h e a r i ng Mr W i l s on h ad no authority to d i s m i ss is n ot b a s ed on a ny e v i d e n ce b ut on an a s s u m p t i on that o n ly the general m a n a g er h ad this p o w e r. T he o n us on this issue w as on the first r e s p o n d e nt to s h ow that the dismissal w as null a nd v o id b e c a u se Mr W i l s on h ad no authority to dismiss; there is no iota of e v i d e n ce in this regard. In the c i r c u m s t a n c e s, the finding of the L a b o ur C o u rt declaring t he dismissal of the first r e s p o n d e nt of t he 15th J a n u a ry 1 9 95 null a nd v o id is set aside. C o n s e q u e n t ly a ny benefits d ue to first r e s p o n d e nt s h o u ld be c o m p u t ed up to that date. S . N . P E E T ET J U D GE For Applicant: Mr M a k e ka For Respondent: Mr F o sa