Thoso v Attorney General (CIV/T 533 of 91) [1997] LSHC 23 (17 February 1997)

CIV/T/533/91 IN T HE H I GH C O U RT OF L E S O T HO In the m a t t er of: T A N K I SO T H O SO Plaintiff a nd A T T O R N EY G E N E R AL Defendant J U D G M E NT D e l i v e r ed by the H o n. M r. Justice B . K. M o l ai on the 17th d ay of F e b r u a r y. 1 9 9 7. In an action w h e r e in plaintiff claims, against defendant, for an o r d er declaring his dismissal w r o n g f ul a nd u n l a w f u l, alternatively p a y m e nt of his terminal benefits, costs of suit, farther and/or alternative relief the latter h as raised a special p l ea of prescription, in t e r ms of section 6 of the G o v e r n m e nt P r o c e e d i n gs a nd C o n t r a c ts A c t, 1 9 6 5. T he facts disclosed by the p l e a d i n gs a re briefly that, in or a b o ut J u ne 1 9 8 0, plaintiff w as e m p l o y e d, by the L e s o t ho G o v e r n m e n t, as a clerk on m o n t h ly basis. On or a b o ut July 1 9 8 8, he w as verbally a nd s u m m a r i ly d i s m i s s ed by the Minister of H e a l th a nd Social W e l f a re w i t h o ut p a y m e nt of a ny terminal benefit. I n a s m c uh as the M i n i s t er h ad no p o w er to d i s m i ss h i m, the dismissal w a s, in the contention of the plaintiff w r o n g f ul a nd u n l a w f u l. In his plea, d e f e n d a nt alleged that after he h ad b e en e m p l o y ed in 1 9 8 1, a nd not 1 9 8 0, plaintiff deserted. D e f e n d a nt denied, therefore, plaintiffs allegations that he w as e m p l o y ed in 1 9 80 a nd s u b s e q u e n t ly d i s m i s s ed by the minister. Be that as it m a y, plaintiff w e nt on to allege that, in his o p i n i o n, this m a t t er c o u ld be r e s o l v ed administratively. F or that r e a s o n, he a t t e m p t e d, o v er the y e a r s, to resolve it administratively b ut all in v a i n, a fact, h o w e v e r, d e n i ed by the defendant, in his plea. Plaintiff g a ve d e f e n d a nt d ue notice in t e r ms of l aw a nd filed, w i th the Registrar of the H i gh C o u r t, s u m m o ns c o m m e n c i ng this action for relief as aforesaid on 2 5 th M a r c h, 1 9 91 a nd 1 8 th D e c e m b e r, 1 9 9 1, respectively. A c c o r d i ng to d e f e n d a n t, on the basis of his desertion, plaintiff w as n ot entitled to the relief s o u g ht for in the s u m m o n s .. C o n s e q u e n t l y, d e f e n d a nt p r a y ed that plaintiffs action be d i s m i s s ed w i th costs. It is significant to o b s e r ve that section 6 of G o v e r n m e nt P r o c e e d i n gs a nd C o n t r a c ts A c t, 1 9 6 5, u p on w h i ch the d e f e n d a nt relies for his special plea, p r o v i d e s: " 6. Subject to the provisions of sections six, s e v e n, eight, nine, ten e l e v e n, t w e l ve a nd thirteen of the Prescription A ct ( 1 8 6 1) no action or other p r o c e e d i n gs shall be c a p a b le of b e i ng b r o u g ht against H er M a j e s ty in H er G o v e r n m e nt of B a s u t o l a nd by virtue of the provisions of section t wo of this A ct after the expiration of the p e r i od of t wo y e a rs f r om the t i me w h en the c a u se of action or other p r o c e e d i n gs first a c c r u e d ." ( my underlining) I h a ve u n d e r s c o r ed the w o rd "shall" in the a b o ve cited section 6 of G o v e r n m e nt P r o c e e d i n gs a nd C o n t r a c ts A c t, s u p r a, to indicate my v i ew that the provisions thereof are m a n d a t o r y. A s s u m i n g, for the s a ke of a r g u m e n t, that plaintiff w as correct in his allegation that he h ad b e en d i s m i s s ed f r om his e m p l o y m e nt on or a b o ut July 1 9 8 8, it is to be b o r ne in m i nd that he admittedly did n ot institute the present p r o c e e d i n gs until 18th D e c e m b er 1 9 91 i.e. s o me 17 m o n t hs after the p e r i od of t wo years, f r om the time w h en the c a u se of action first a c c r u ed h ad lapsed. T h at b e i ng s o, it m u st be a c c e p t ed that w h en on 18th D e c e m b e r, 1 9 91 he b r o u g ht it plaintiffs action w a s, on the authority of the provisions of the a b o ve cited section 6 of G o v e r n m e nt P r o c e e d i n gs a nd C o n t r a c ts A c t, 1 9 6 5, t i me barred. It w a s, h o w e v e r, argued, on behalf of the plaintiff, that the P r e s c r i p t i on A c t, 1 8 61 w as subject to liquid claims. In the instant case, the r e m e dy s o u g ht by plaintiff w as for declaratory o r d er w h i ch w as subject to the discretion of the court a n d, therefore, n ot c o v e r ed by the A c t. In my v i e w, the special plea on w h i ch defendant relies is clearly b a s ed on the p r o v i s i o ns of G o v e r n m e nt P r o c e e d i n gs a nd C o n t r a c ts A c t, 1 9 65 a nd n ot the P r e s c r i p t i on A c t, 1 8 6 1. T he a r g u m e nt b a s ed on the P r e s c r i p t i on A c t, s u p ra is, therefore, irrelevant. In t he result, I c o me to t he c o n c l u s i on that t he special plea, raised by t he d e f e n d a n t, o u g ht to s u c c e ed a nd it is a c c o r d i n g ly o r d e r e d. J U D GE 17th February, 1 9 9 7. F or Plaintiff: M r. N a t h a ne F or Defendant: M r. Putsoane