Teaching Service Commission and Others v Learned Judge of Labour Appeal Court and Others (C of A (CIV) 21 of 2007) [2008] LSCA 15 (11 April 2008)

C of A (CIV) No. 21 of 2007 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF LESOTHO st nd 2  APPELLANT  APPELLANT rd th 4  APPELLANT  APPELLANT st  RESPONDENT nd rd 3  RESPONDENT  RESPONDENT th th 5  RESPONDENT  RESPONDENT In the matter between: TEACHING SERVICE COMMISSION TEACHING SERVICE DEPARTMENT PRINCIPAL SECRETARY MINISTRY OF EDUCATION ATTORNEY­GENERAL AND THE LEARNED JUDGE OF LABOUR APPEAL COURT THE REGISTRAR, LABOUR APPEAL COURT THE PRESIDENT, LABOUR COURT THE LEARNED ARBITRATOR DIRECTORATE OF DISPUTE PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION BOKANG LELIMO 8 April 2008 HEARD DELIVERED:     11 April 2008 CORAM:    Steyn, P Melunsky,JA Gauntlett, JA SUMMARY Review ­ appellants seeking to review decision of Labour Appeal Court ­ Distinction between appeal and review ­ Appellants' purported review in substance an appeal ­ this impermissible. Further, there is no right to review the decision of a judge of the High Court ­ judge sitting on Labour Appeal Court ­ not permitted to review decision of that court. JUDGMENT MELUNSKY. JA [1]   The   single   issue   that   came   before   us   in   this   appeal   was   whether, having   regard   to   section   119   of   the   Constitution   of   Lesotho   and   other statutory provisions, the High Court was entitled to review and set aside a decision of the Labour Appeal Court ("the LAC"). During the hearing of the appeal other questions were raised by the Court which are of fundamental importance and, indeed, determine the outcome of this matter. [2] As far as it is possible to ascertain from the affidavits, which regrettably do   not   set   out   the   facts   in   a   clear   and   chronological   order,   the   fifth respondent (who is the only respondent who opposes the appeal and is referred to herein as the respondent) was employed by the Semonkong High School. His salary was paid out of public funds. He was dismissed by the   Teaching   Service   Commission,   the   first   appellant,   as   long   ago   as September   2002.   He   challenged   his  dismissal   before   the   Directorate   of Dispute   Prevention   and   Resolution   ("the   DDPR"),   a   body   established under   the   Labour   Code   (Amendment)   Act,   3   of   2000   ("the   Amendment Act"). Subsequently an arbitrator of the DDPR ordered his reinstatement and, pursuant to a further arbitration, the first appellant was directed to pay him an amount of M12 892.85 in respect of salary arrears. The respondent applied   to   the   Labour   Court   to   enforce   the   award.   His   application   was rejected by that court on the ground, inter alia, that he was a public officer and, in terms of the Exemption Order (LLN 22 of 1995) made under section 2(2)(b) of the Labour Code Order 1992, and was, therefore not subject to the Code. [3] Against that decision the respondent appealed to the LAC, consisting of Peete J and two assessors. The LAC held that a teacher in the position of the respondent was not a public officer for the purposes of LLN 22 of 1995 and   it   directed   the   Labour   Court   to   enforce   the   award.   This   led   to   the appellants seeking an order in the High Court for the following relief, inter alia: "Directing   and   ordering   that   the   proceedings   and   judgment   in   LAC/A/04/05   a matter of the Labour Appeal Court and subsequent order of the Labour Court be reviewed and corrected and set aside". [4]   The application came before Majara J who directed the parties to argue   one   point  in   limine,  namely   whether   the   High   Court   had   the jurisdiction   to   review   a   decision   of   the   LAC.   The   respective   arguments were put before the learned judge by means of written submissions. She concluded that the High Court did not have the power to review a decision of the LAC and she therefore dismissed the application with costs. It is against that decision that the appellants appeal to this Court. [5] Majara J arrived at her decision on the ground that the LAC was not a "subordinate   or   inferior   court"   within   the   meaning   of   that   expression   in section   119(1)   of   the   Constitution   of   Lesotho,   and   that   it   was   not   a "subordinate court of justice" in terms of section 7 of the High Court Act. It is, however,  not  necessary   for us  to consider  whether  the  reasoning  of Majara J was correct. We arrive at the same result on different grounds, for in our view the application brought by the appellants in the court a quo was totally flawed for two reasons: first, that the purported review of the LAC was   in   substance   an   appeal,   and   second,   that   it   is   not   permissible   at common   law   or   by   statute   for   the   High   Court   or,   indeed,   this   Court,   to review   a   decision   of   a   judge   of   a   superior   court,   save,   possibly,   in exceptional circumstances. These points will be addressed consecutively. [6]   The   distinction   between   an   appeal   and   a   review   is   well­known   and hardly requires elaboration. Appeal is the appropriate procedure where a litigant contends that a court came to an incorrect decision whether on the law or on the facts. Review, however, as Schutz JA emphasized in Pretoria Portland   Cement   Co.   Ltd   and   Another   v   Competition   Commission   and Others 2003 (2) SA 385 (A) at 401 I to 402 C (pars [34] and [35]), is not directed   at   correcting   a   decision   on   the   merits.   It   is   aimed   at   the maintenance of legality, being a means by which those in authority may be compelled to behave lawfully. In  Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg Town Council 1909 TS 111, Innes CJ said at 114 that a review is "...   the  process   by  which  ....  the   proceedings   of   inferior   courts   of justice, both civil and criminal, are brought before the court (i.e. the reviewing   superior   court)   in   respect   of   grave   irregularities   or illegalities occurring during the course of such proceedings." It only needs to be added that in an appeal the court is bound by the record of proceedings, whereas in review proceedings facts and information not appearing on the record may be placed before the reviewing court. [7]   In   terms   of   section   38A   (4)   of   the   Amendment   Act,   no   appeal   lies against   any   decision,   judgment   or   order   given   by   the   LAC   (see   also Tseuoa   v   Labour   Appeal   Court   of   Lesotho   and   Others,   C   of   A   (CIV) 27/2004   at   par   [10]).   In   this   matter   the   appellants   did   not   attack   the constitutionality of the section: it contended that the LAC did not deal with all   of   the   issues   before   it   and   that   it   only   addressed   "the   issue   of jurisdiction", i.e. whether the respondent was a public officer. The deponent in the founding affidavit for the application for review went on to say: "I   aver   therefore   that   the   leaving   out   of   the   other   issues   by   the Honourable   Court   was   a   gross   irregularity   which   has   vitiated   the entire proceedings and the resultant judgment". The   omission   by   Peete   J   to   deal   with   all   of   the   points   raised   by   the appellants­ if, indeed, there was such an omission ­ does not amount to an irregularity, much less one that was "gross". The LAC might have been of the view that the finding made by it was dispositive of the case and that there   was   no   need   to   deal   with   the   other   points;   moreover   the   court's failure   to   mention   the   other   issues   does   not   mean   that   they   were   not considered. What is clear is that the appellants were dissatisfied with the outcome and considered that the judgment was incorrect. The proceedings in the court a quo were not aimed at the maintenance of legality; what the appellants sought to do was simply to overturn the LAC's decision on the merits. In substance and in its essence the appellants attempted to argue an appeal in the High Court under the cloak of a review. This was clearly impermissible. An appeal remains an appeal by whatever name it is called. In our view the appeal to this Court cannot succeed. [8] The second point raised by this Court on appeal  is also fatal  to the appellants' contentions. In terms of section 38 (3) of the Amendment Act, the LAC is to consist of a judge of the High Court and two assessors. The judge, however, is the sole adjudicator on matters of law (section 38 (8) (b)). It is clear from  Pretoria Portland Cement Co. Ltd  at p 400 ­ ff that there   is   no   right   to   review   a   decision   of   a   judge   at   common   law.   This principle was approved by this Court in  PM Mosuoe v Judge of the High Court  C   of   A   (CIV)   18/2007,   a   judgment   that   will   be   delivered simultaneously with this one. I only have to add that there is no statute in Lesotho   which   authorises   review   proceedings   against   the   decision   of   a judge of the High Court. [9]   The   fact   that   Peete   J  was   sitting   as   a   judge   of   the   LAC   is,   for   the purposes of the right to review his decision, of no consequence. He was ­ and still is ­ a judge of the High Court and in the LAC he was exercising a judicial function.  This is not to say that a decision  of a judge  would be subject to review if he acted in an administrative capacity. Nor is it of any significance that the assessors ­ contrary to the afore­stated provision of section 38 (8) (b) ­ concurred in Peete J's decision on a matter of law. It is conceivable that there may be cases in which a judge's misconduct is so obviously grave and serious that a litigant would not be without a remedy. This, of course, is most certainly not such a case. Indeed,  as we have already   pointed   out,   there   was   no   misconduct   at   all   on   the   part   of   the learned judge. [11]   The order which is made if the following: The appeal is dismissed with costs. I agree: I agree: L. S. MELUNSKY Judge of Appeal J. H. STEYN President of the Court of Appeal J. J. GAUNTLETT Judge of Appeal For the Appellant: Adv. M Mapetla and Adv. M. Nkaota For the 5  Respondent: Adv. P. Kgoadi th