The Attorney General v Krishnamart &Company Proprietary Limited (SCA 15/2025 (Arising in MA 288/2024 out of CS 88 of 2024)) [2025] SCCA 31 (15 December 2025)

contents of #navigation-content will be placed in [data-offcanvas-body] for tablet/mobile screensize and #navigation-column for desktop screensize. Skip to document content Summary Table of contents Search [] -IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF SEYCHELLES Reportable [2025] (15. December 2025) SCA 15/2025 (Arising in MA 288/2024 out of CS 88 of 2024) In the matter Between The Attorney General Appellant (rep. by Mr. Alexandre Adam Afif) And Krishnamart & Company Proprietary Limited Respondent (Unserved and Unrepresented) Neutral Citation: The Attorney General v Krishnamart &Company Proprietary Limited (SCA 15/2025 [2025] (Arising in MA 288/2024 out of CS 88 of 2024) (15 December 2025) Before: Twomey-Woods, Robinson, Andre, JJA Summary: Substituted service – Sections 42 Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure – Companies Act, section 100(4). Heard: 1st December 2025 Delivered: 15th December 2025 ______________________________________________________________________________ ORDER Substituted service is to be effected by affixing the summons at the respondent’s last known place of business at English River where the respondent formerly operated its business and at the Supreme Court. TWOMEY-WOODS JA (Robinson JA, concurring) The plain meaning of Section 42 of the SCCP The dispute hinges on the interpretation of section 42 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure (SCCP), which in my considered view states clearly and unambiguously: “If the defendant cannot be found and there is no agent empowered to accept service on his behalf, nor any other person on whom service can be made, or if the defendant is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service, it shall be sufficient service to affix the summons on the outer door of the house or place of business of such defendant and a copy thereof in some conspicuous part of the Court House." The grammatical structure of the provision is conditional and consequential. If certain preconditions are met (such as the defendant cannot be located), then a prescribed act (affixing the summons in two locations) "shall be sufficient service." The word "shall" is mandatory. The phrase “sufficient service" is a deeming provision; it establishes a legal status whereby service is deemed effective upon the completion of the statutory act. This literal reading is not merely an option but a requirement, as consistently held by this Court. In Georges v Electoral Commission (2012) SLR 199, it was stated: “When the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences.” Similarly, in Gemuenden v Seychelles Investment Board SCA 14/2024 [2024], the Court reaffirmed that when a provision has a single clear meaning, it should be given that plain meaning. The plain meaning of Section 42 is that compliance with its form constitutes valid service. There is no textual basis for a further inquiry into the likelihood of that act resulting in actual notice. This interpretation is fortified by the legislative policy evident in section 100 (4) of the Companies Ordinance which provides an analogous principle relevant to the context of this appeal: "The service on a company of a document at the address shown as its registered office in the most recent notice given by it to the Registrar under this section shall be effective, even though that address is not its registered office, or the address of its registered office has been changed." This provision has a clear rationale: to protect third parties who rely in good faith on the official register and to place the burden of maintaining accurate information squarely on the company. It establishes that the law will deem service effective at an outdated or incorrect registered office to prevent a company from evading process through its own neglect. This statutory context underscores that the legislature has already balanced the interests between perfect notice and procedural finality where a defendant is unavailable. The Supreme Court and, with respect, the decision of my learned sister, André, JA in this Court, have read into section 42 a requirement that does not exist. They have required the applicant to prove that affixing the summons is likely to bring the proceedings to the defendant's attention. This is an impermissible judicial amendment. The statute itself balances the interests: once the defendant has made themselves unfindable or is evading service, the plaintiff is entitled to rely on a formal, alternative method that the law deems sufficient. To add a hurdle of practical effectiveness in these very circumstances where effectiveness is inherently uncertain is to negate the remedy. The purpose of substituted service and the evasion of justice André, JA, cites the noble purpose of "bringing proceedings to the attention of the defendant," referring to Abela v Baadarani [2013] UKSC 44. However, this general principle must be applied within the specific statutory framework of our jurisdiction. The specific purpose of section 42 is to provide a conclusive, last-resort mechanism to prevent the evasion of justice. It is the legislature’s answer to the question: "What suffices when actual notice is impossible to achieve?" Comparative authorities support this procedural finality. In Cranfield v Bridgegrove Ltd [2003] EWCA 656, the English Court of Appeal, interpreting a similar deemed service provision, held: “The rule is plain and unqualified. We see no basis for holding that... the rule does not say that it is not good service if the defendant does not in fact receive the document. If that had been intended to be the position, the rule would have said so in terms." This logic applies directly to section 42. If the legislature intended the court to assess the likelihood of actual notice, it would have said so. It did not. It established a bright-line rule. Furthermore, the alternative interpretation adopted by the court below and my sister, André JA, in this Court would create a perverse incentive. The evidence before the Supreme Court was that this company is defunct, its directors are deceased or abroad, and its registered office is untraceable. This is the precise scenario section 42 was designed to address. By refusing the order because the company is so effectively defunct that notice is unlikely, the courts have rewarded the respondent for its complete dereliction of its statutory duties under the Companies Act. The company, through its inaction, has created the very situation that makes ordinary service impossible and is now shielded from claims because of it. This cannot be right. This outcome is at odds with the policy of Section 100(4) of the Companies Act, which places the risk of outdated information on the company, not the innocent plaintiff. The Irrelevance of Property Ownership The second error, in my considered view, was the Supreme Court's reliance on the fact that the land title for the English River premises was not in the respondent's name. Section 42 requires affixation at the "place of business," not the "owned place of business." The provision concerns factual association, not proprietary interest. A company's last known operational address remains its "place of business" for this procedural mechanism whether it owns, rents, or has abandoned the premises since. The case of Boettcher v Xio (UK) LLP [2023] EWHC 801 (Comm), while only persuasive, illustrates the relevant test: whether there is a good arguable case that the address was the defendant’s last known residence. The focus is on historical association and the applicant’s knowledge, not current occupation or title. The appellant provided evidence that English River was the Respondent's last known business address. That should have ended the inquiry under the statute. Injecting a requirement for ownership imports a property law concept into a pure procedural rule, again adding a condition the legislature did not prescribe. Conclusion and Disposition The learned judge of the Supreme Court, with respect, asked the wrong question. She asked: "Will this method probably work?" The statute commands her to ask: "Are the preconditions met, and has the formal alternative been proposed?" The answer to the latter was yes. By conditioning the grant of substituted service on an assessment of its practical efficacy in circumstances crafted by the respondent’s own absence, the courts below have undermined the certainty and utility of Section 42. They have replaced a clear procedural rule with an unpredictable discretionary standard, placing an impossible burden on applicants. I would allow the appeal. As my sister Robinson JA agrees with my dissenting, and this decision is the majority view I now make formal orders. Order I set aside the order of the Supreme Court and grant an order for substituted service to be effected by affixing the summons at the respondent’s last known place of business at English River where the respondent formerly operated its business and at the Supreme Court, as requested by the appellant. Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 15 December 2025. _______________________ Dr. M. Twomey-Woods, JA I concur ______________________ F. Robinson, JA ANDRE JA DISSENTING INTRODUCTION [1] I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of the majority. With respect, I am unable to agree with their reasoning and conclusion. In particular, I cannot adopt the purely literal construction of section 42 advanced in the appeal and in the majority judgment, which in my view fails to give effect to the purpose and context of the provision. Having considered the record, the statutory framework and the reasoning of the Learned Judge of the Supreme Court, I am satisfied that the Judge below correctly interpreted and applied section 42 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure and properly exercised her discretion in refusing the application for substituted service. For the reasons that follow, I would affirm the ruling in the court below. [2] This is an appeal arising from the Notice of Appeal dated and filed on the 23rd June 2025, by the Attorney General (“the Appellant”) against the ruling of Carolus J delivered on 25th February 2025 in MA 288/2024, by which the Supreme Court dismissed an application for substituted service of a plaint filed against Krishna Mart & Company (Proprietary) Limited (“the Respondent”). [3] The learned Judge declined to authorize substituted service on the basis that the proposed method of affixing summons at the Respondent’s last known place of business at English River would be unlikely to give notice to the company of the proceedings and that the premises were not registered in the name of the Respondent or its directors. [4] Leave to appeal was subsequently granted by the Supreme Court on 13th June 2025 and the matter now comes before this Court for determination. GROUNDS OF APPEAL [5] The Appellant raises two grounds of appeal, which state verbatim as follows: (1) The learned judge erred in law in factoring in the likeliness that affixing the summons to the last place of business of the Respondent would give sufficient notice to the Respondent Company which is not a requirement under the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure ('SCCP'). (2) The learned judge erred in law in factoring in that the name of the registered proprietor of land title V3146, (being the last known business address of the Respondent) was not in the name of the Respondent or a director of the Respondent, as it is not a requirement under the SCCP that an address to effect substituted service be situated on property registered in the name of the Respondent or any director thereof. [6] The Appellant further seeks the relief set out in paragraph 3 as follows: That this Honourable Court: sets aside the order of learned Judge E. Carolus delivered on 25th February 2025 in MA 288/2024; and makes an order allowing substituted service of the plaint to be effected on the Respondent by affixing the summons to an outer door at the Respondent’s last known business address at English River, Mahe, Seychelles and a conspicuous place in the Court House; or in the alternative makes an order that service of the plaint in the main case CS 88/2024 be effected at Castor Road, Mahe, Seychelles even in the absence of a registered office belonging to the Respondent, as permitted under s.100 (4) of the Companies Act and in accordance with the principle of lex specialis derogate legi generali. makes such further order as the Court may deem just and proper in the circumstances of the case. APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS [7] On the first ground, the Appellant contends that section 42 of the SCCP provides a complete statutory framework for substituted service and deems service sufficient when effected in the prescribed manner. The test is compliance with statutory form, not likelihood of notice. By requiring proof of probable notice, the Judge effectively rewrote section 42 and departed from its plain meaning, contrary to the literal rule of interpretation affirmed in Georges v Electoral Commission (2012) SLR 199 and Gemuenden v Seychelles Investment Board (SCA 14/2024). Comparative authorities such as Cranfield v Bridgegrove Ltd [2003] EWCA 656 and Boettcher v Xio (UK) LLP [2023] EWHC 801 (Comm) further establish that service is valid once statutory conditions are met, even if the defendant does not actually receive notice. [8] The Appellant submits that the Respondent’s registered office at Castor Road could not be located, no agent or director was available for service and its last known business premises were at English River. These circumstances, together with affixing a copy at the Supreme Court, satisfied the statutory preconditions for substituted service. [9] On the second ground, the Appellant argues that section 42 requires only that service be effected at the defendant’s “outer door of the house or place of business,” not that the property be owned by the defendant. The English River premises remained the Respondent’s last known business address despite being registered to a third party. Ownership is not a statutory requirement, and imposing it defeats the purpose of substituted service, which is to prevent evasion of justice. [10] The Appellant relies on section 100(4) of the Companies Act, 1972 and on English decisions such as PJSC Bank “Finance and Credit” v Zhevago [2021] EWHC 2522 (Ch) affirming that service remains valid even where the addressee is no longer physically present. [11] In conclusion, the Appellant maintains that the learned Judge erred in law by adding extraneous conditions to section 42 and by refusing substituted service despite the statutory requirements being met. It therefore seeks to have the ruling set aside and substituted service allowed at the Respondent’s last known place of business and at the Supreme Court. ANALYSIS BY THE COURT [12] An ex tempore ruling was delivered by this Court on 21st October 2025 pursuant to Rule 11 and Rule 16 of the Court of Appeal Rules. The Court directed that, where an appeal arises solely from a refusal by the Supreme Court to grant substituted service under section 42 of the SCCP, the respondent (having never been served or appeared in the court below) is not required to be served with or present for the appeal. [13] The Court held that compelling service in such circumstances would create a procedural paradox, as the very subject of the appeal is the refusal to permit service. Accordingly, the appeal was permitted to proceed ex parte as against the respondent, who was cited only formally, pending the Court’s determination of whether substituted service should be authorized. [14] As the procedural issue has already been conclusively addressed, no further consideration of it is required for present purposes. The Court therefore proceeds directly to the determination of the appeal on its merits. GROUND 1 - Whether the learned Judge erred in law by factoring in the likelihood that affixing the summons at the Respondent’s last known place of business would give sufficient notice to the Respondent. [15] The first ground of appeal challenges the learned Judge’s finding that the proposed method of substituted service (affixing the summons at the English River premises) was unlikely to give notice to the Respondent. The Appellant avers that this was an error of law, as section 42 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure (“SCCP”) deems service sufficient irrespective of whether the defendant is likely to receive notice6] Section 42 provides: “If the defendant cannot be found and there is no agent empowered to accept service on his behalf, nor any other person on whom service can be made, or if the defendant is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service, it shall be sufficient service to affix the summons on the outer door of the house or place of business of such defendant and a copy thereof in some conspicuous part of the Court House.” [16] Section 55(1)(d) of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act (Cap 103) provides that service on a body corporate may be effected “by leaving it at or sending it by post to the registered or principal office of the body corporate.” This provision, read together with section 100(4) of the Companies Act (Cap 40), establishes the ordinary method of service on companies. [17] It follows that recourse to substituted service under section 42 of the SCCP arises only where such ordinary means are unavailable or ineffective. The instant case falls within that category, as the Respondent’s registered office at Castor Road could not be located and no person authorized to accept service was found. [18] In Gemuenden v Seychelles Investment Board (supra), this Court reaffirmed that statutory provisions must be interpreted so as to give effect to their purpose: “It is trite that when a court is called upon to interpret the provisions of a statute, the court should aim to give effect to the purpose of the legislation by interpreting its language, so far as possible, in a way which best gives effect to that purpose. There is, thus, a presumption that the grammatical meaning of an enactment is the meaning intended by the legislator. Where the statutory provision is capable of only one meaning and other interpretive principles or factors do not raise any real doubt as to the meaning, the provision is to be given its plain meaning. This is why the golden rule of statutory interpretation, as can be gleaned from authorities such as Cinan & Another v R (SCA 26 & 27 of 2009) [2013] SCCA 12, is that words should be given their ordinary or plain meaning.” [19] A literal reading of section 42 would indeed permit the Court to look only at the conditions expressly stated therein, namely that the defendant cannot be found, that no agent or other person is available to accept service or that the defendant is keeping out of the way to avoid service. Once these statutory preconditions are met, the section states that affixing the summons in the prescribed manner “shall be sufficient service.” On this reading, the learned Judge’s consideration of whether the affixing would in fact bring notice to the Respondent may appear to introduce an additional requirement not found in the text. [20] In my respectful view, a purely literal approach to section 42, such as that advocated by the Appellant, cannot be reconciled with either the structure of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure or the constitutional guarantee of a fair hearing. The words “shall be sufficient service” cannot be read in isolation from the condition that service be effected at the “house or place of business” of the defendant. Those words presuppose a real, factual nexus between the address used and the defendant. Where that nexus has demonstrably disappeared, to insist that form alone suffices would be to elevate technicality over the very notice which service is intended to secure. [21] The Court is not relieved of the obligation to interpret the provision in light of its underlying purpose. As articulated in Gemuenden (supra), the grammatical meaning of an enactment is not applied in a vacuum. The interpretation must, so far as possible, give effect to the legislative purpose. The purpose behind section 42 is to ensure that proceedings are brought to the attention of a defendant in circumstances where ordinary methods of service have failed or are impossible. Substituted service is therefore not intended to be a mere technical exercise but a mechanism to ensure the defendant receives proper notice. [22] In Abela v Baadarani [2013] UKSC 44, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom held that “the purpose of service is to bring proceedings to the attention of the defendant; it is not about playing technical games.” That principle, though persuasive, reflects the same procedural philosophy embodied in sections 42 and 43. [23] In the present case, the learned Judge found that the Respondent Company had long ceased operations, its directors were abroad and the premises at English River bore no connection to the company. On these facts, she concluded that affixing the summons there would not bring the proceedings to the company’s notice and would defeat the very purpose of substituted service. That finding reflects a sound exercise of judicial discretion consistent with sections 42 and 43 and the principles of natural justice. [24] When the learned Judge considered whether affixing the summons at the English River premises would be likely to bring the proceedings to the attention of the Respondent, she was not, as suggested, inventing an extra-statutory requirement. She was performing the very evaluation that a purposive reading of section 42 demands: determining whether the address identified could still bring notice to the Defendant. The conclusion that affixation at premises with no subsisting connection to the Respondent would not serve the function of service is not a departure from the statute; it is an application of it. [25] It is well-established that the exercise of discretion by a judge of the Supreme Court should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the judge acted on a wrong principle of law, misdirected herself on the facts, took into account irrelevant considerations, failed to consider relevant ones or reached a conclusion that was plainly unreasonable. In Audrey Kimberly Esparon v Gerard Philo (Civil Appeal SCA 17/2021) [2023] SCCA 15 (26 April 2023) (Arising in CS 150/2019) SCSC 246), the court held as follows: It is trite law that a trial court’s discretion ought not to be interfered with by an appellate court if the exercise of the discretion is based on a correct principle of law, even though the appellate court could have come to a different decision. In the case of Verlaque v Government of Seychelles (2000-2001) SCAR 165, this Court held that the Court of Appeal will not interfere with the discretion of a court unless there was an error of law, the discretion was made without proper appreciation of the facts, the decision was so unreasonable that it was erroneous, or it was made unjudicially. [26] No basis has been shown for this Court to interfere with the exercise of the learned Judge’s discretion. [27] Ground 1 therefore fails. GROUND 2 - Whether the learned Judge erred in law by factoring in the fact that the name of the registered proprietor of land title V3146, which was the last known business address of the Respondent, was not in the name of the Respondent or a director of the Respondent. [28] Ground 2 challenges the learned Judge’s consideration that the property at English River, where the Appellant sought to affix the summons, was not registered in the name of the Respondent company or any of its directors. The Appellant argues that ownership of the premises was irrelevant under section 42 of the SCCP and that the court erred by taking it into account. [29] The record shows however, that the learned Judge did not treat ownership as a legal requirement under Section 42. She referred to the ownership of Title V3146 to assess whether service at that address would, in fact, be capable of bringing notice of the proceedings to the Respondent Company. The certificate of official search showed that the land was registered in the name of one Rajarajacholan Pillay, a person with no proven connection to the Respondent or its directors. In the absence of any evidence that the company still operated from those premises or had any ongoing link to them, the Judge was entitled to doubt that affixing the summons there would reach anyone authorized to act for the company. [30] The learned Judge’s reasoning was consistent with the objective of sections 42 and 43 of the SCCP, which is to ensure that substituted service, though an exception to ordinary service, remains a practical means of giving notice. Her consideration of ownership simply formed part of that factual evaluation. It was not an additional legal threshold. Without evidence of occupation, control or even association with the Respondent, there was no realistic prospect that the proposed affixing would fulfil the purpose of service. [31] The Judge’s conclusion that substituted service at English River would be unlikely to achieve notice was therefore a proper exercise of discretion grounded in the evidence. There is no indication that she misdirected herself in law or considered irrelevant factors. [32] Accordingly, Ground 2 also fails. ISSUES RELATING TO EX PARTE DISPOSAL AND SUBSTITUTED SERVICE [33] It is appropriate to address the questions whether the matter may be remitted to the Supreme Court for ex parte disposal and whether substituted service by newspaper advertisement is available in the present proceedings as these emerged as live issues during the hearing following observations from the majority. Whether Remittal for Ex Parte Disposal Is Legally Possible? [34] Before turning to the conclusion, I consider it necessary, for the assistance of my colleagues, to address the suggestion that the matter might be remitted to the Supreme Court for ex parte disposal. With respect, such a course is not permissible under the statutory framework governing service of process in Seychelles. An ex parte judgment is not a substitute for service. It is a consequence that arises after service has been validly effected and the defendant defaults.1 Where no service (ordinary or substituted) has been achieved, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to proceed at all. [35] The only provisions governing service upon a corporate defendant are section 55(1)(d) of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act, section 100(4) of the Companies Act, and section 42 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure. These provisions are exhaustive. They do not empower a court to waive service, nor do they create any third category of “proceeding ex parte without service.” The inability to locate the registered office or the company’s principals does not confer jurisdiction to bypass service; it merely determines whether substituted service may be authorised. Once the learned trial judge found, on the evidence, that service under section 42 would not bring the proceedings to the company’s notice, the statutory gateway closed. [36] To remit the suit for ex parte hearing would therefore amount to judicial legislation. It would effectively create a new procedural mechanism enabling the court to proceed without service. Neither the SCCP nor the Companies Act provides such authority. The foundational principle remains that service is the act that vests jurisdiction, and without jurisdiction, no adjudication, whether inter partes or ex parte, can validly take place. [37] Appellate interference with the trial judge’s discretion is possible only where there is error of law, misdirection, failure to consider relevant matters or conclusions that are plainly unreasonable. None of those circumstances arise here. The learned Judge acted within the confines of the statutory scheme and her conclusion that substituted service would not achieve notice was neither irrational nor legally flawed. Without an error of law, this Court cannot intervene merely to fashion a procedural avenue where the statute provides none. [38] Accordingly, and with respect, remittal for ex parte judgment is not available in law. The consequence of the statutory limitations is that the suit cannot progress in the absence of proper service. While undesirable, that result reflects the boundaries imposed by the Legislature rather than any failure of judicial process. SERVICE BY ADVERTISEMENT [39] Rule 5(b) of the Companies (Supreme Court Proceedings) Rules 1972, empowers the Court, in proceedings instituted under the Companies Act, to give directions on the manner of service, including service by advertisement. However, this flexibility is expressly confined to petitions brought under the Companies Act and does not extend to ordinary civil actions governed by the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure. The present matter was initiated by way of a plaint and the application for substituted service was brought under section 42 SCCP, an exhaustive statutory provision that permits only two forms of substituted service being, affixing at the defendant’s house or place of business and affixing at the court-house. [40] Section 52 SCCP concerns substituted service out of the jurisdiction and permits service by advertisement where the defendant is outside Seychelles. It has no application in the current case. OBSERVATIONS [41] The Court recognizes that the dismissal of this appeal, while legally correct, leaves the Appellant without an avenue to proceed with the main suit, given that the specific mode of service sought has been refused and no alternative method has been identified or approved at this stage. This outcome illustrates a procedural gap in our civil justice system. One that may prevent a claimant with a legitimate cause of action from obtaining a hearing on the merits merely because the defendant company is no longer operational or traceable. [42] It is noteworthy that in its original motion for substituted service, the Appellant expressly prayed for “such further or other orders as the Court may deem just and proper in the circumstances.” However, the scope of the Supreme Court’s discretion is confined to the modes of substituted service expressly authorized under section 42 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure. [43] Once the learned Judge determined that affixing summons at the last known place of business of the Respondent in English River was not viable, the statutory framework provided no remaining avenue for substituted service. The Court of Appeal cannot expand the statutory scheme and the Supreme Court would have acted ultra vires had it attempted to devise a new form of service outside the Code. The unfortunate consequence is that the Appellant is left without a procedural route to advance the suit, an outcome that underscores the need for legislative attention rather than judicial innovation. [44] Under section 55(1)(d) of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act and section 100(4) of the Companies Act, the registered office of a company constitutes the ordinary locus for service. These provisions presuppose the continued existence of an identifiable physical office from which the company operates. They do not, however, address situations in which the company has dissolved, ceased local operations, abandoned its premises or otherwise lacks any meaningful physical presence. In such circumstances, the statutory mechanisms for service become difficult, if not impossible, to apply. [45] Against this background, the constraints of sections 42 and 43 SCCP become acutely apparent. They enumerate only two recognized forms of substituted service, neither of which reflects the operational realities of modern commercial entities which may relocate or abandon premises. These provisions do not explicitly guide courts in circumstances where companies are defunct, untraceable or operating without stable physical locations. Further, they do not address emerging modes of communication such as email, electronic messaging, publication in official gazette or official registries that are frequently more effective than affixing documents to premises no longer associated with the defendant. [46] This is a matter that warrants consideration by the Law Reform Commissioner and the National Assembly either through amendment of the existing provisions or the promulgation of subsidiary rules. Such reform may consider expressly empowering courts to direct alternative modes of service such as service through the Registrar of Companies, publication in the national Gazette or electronic transmission, even in cases involving defunct or untraceable corporate defendants and where traditional statutory mechanisms are incapable of securing notice. [47] Comparative jurisdictions suggest a more flexible approach. Section 65 of the Mauritian Courts (Civil Procedure) Act allows substituted service “by advertisement or otherwise as seems just” once reasonable efforts at personal service have failed. Order 5 rule 17 of the Kenyan Civil Procedure Rules empowers courts to direct service “…in such manner as the court thinks fit.” In England, CPR 6.15 authorizes service “by an alternative method or at an alternative place” where good reason exists. These regimes recognize that substituted service must evolve to reflect changing modes of business and communication. [48] In contrast, the Seychelles provisions contain no equivalent flexibility, thereby limiting the courts’ ability to ensure that proceedings are brought to a defendant’s attention. Aligning Seychelles’ procedure with such practice would strengthen procedural fairness and reinforce the constitutional guarantee of access to justice under Article 19. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS OF THE COURT [49] For the reasons set out above, both grounds of appeal fail. The learned Judge correctly interpreted and applied the statutory provisions governing substituted service and exercised her discretion judicially. This Court therefore declines to interfere with her ruling. [50] The circumstances of this case have exposed limitations not only within sections 42 and 43 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure but within the broader statutory framework governing service on corporate entities, including section 55 of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act and section 100(4) of the Companies Act. This is a matter that may warrant consideration by the Legislature to ensure practicality in the law of service. [51] Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. No order is made as to costs in view of the nature of the proceedings. Signed, dated, and delivered at Ile du Port on 15 December 2025 ____________________________ S. Andre, JA 1 Section 65 of the SCCP. 10