Attorney General v Panaretos and Ors (Appeal 39 of 1989) [1993] ZMSC 78 (12 January 1993)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ZAMBIA Appeal no. 39 of 1989 HOLDEN AT LUSAKA (Civil jurisdiction) THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL Appellants STEPHEN PANARETOS (also known as STEPHEN PETER PANARETOS (ATTORNEY FOR EFSTATHIOUS KALDIS AND DEMETRIOS KALDIS AND EIGHT OTHERS Respondents CORAM: Ngulube, D. C. J., Gardner, A. D. C. J. and Sakala, J. S On 12th January, 1993 For the appellant, Mr. S. A. G. Twumasi 7 1:-’; .i; 4 •' ' ■_ 7$*$^ *1* • ' • ‘ ■ 1 'J ' V For the respondents, Mr. Malania and Mr. Nylrenda * * . H f JUDGMENT ■ v • ■ • Igulube, A. C. J. delivered the judgment of the court This is an appeal by the State which has been consolidated with a notice of motion by the plaintiffs in the case. We have carefully considered the arguments and submissions by both sides^ Jhe issue was; whether the High Court judge could make an order that unless the parties agreed to a scheme it would only accept the scheme put forward by the plaintiffs. The unfortunate consequence was that/the court was<;: not prepared to consider anything put forward by the defendants. The question ? below was whether, in accordance with our judgment when, this matter first came before us, the properties must first be physically delivered to the plaintiff before an audit was carried out to put into effect the other requirements of our judgment. These matters were, of course, not dealt with by the judge below and have never been resolved. We are satisfied that the failure to consider the scheme put forward by the defendant, however late, was wrong and was not in accordance with the purport of our judgment on appeal^/Despite the entreaties of the parties, thisj court is not the appropriate forum for the determination of running . litigation or the supervision of a matter which may necessitate frequent access to a judge. There seems to have been some doubt as to what we meant when we said in the first instance there would be restitution. To »I J ■ •. put the matter beyond doubt, our use of the words "in the first instance" was meant to indicate that in any event the plaintiffs were entitled to the return of the properties but the rest of our judgment indicated that the time for such return should be at the discretion of the High Court Judge j. The appeal is, for the reasons Restated, allowed and the motion X falls away. This matter is sent back to tne High Court with the direction that the learned judge must make a decision on the merits as to which proposals as to hand over and appointment of auditors to accept^which can be decided either on the evidence already before him or on such further evidence and arguments as he may call for. Thereafter, an order must be made setting out the times within which the various steps ordered may be must be taken and the judge may give such further directions as required. As both parties wanted this court to clarify these there will be no order as to costs in this appeal. issues. x• • ; ■ -, ■ r / Since the judgment of this court (which was delivered year) has not been performed,and by consent .that judgment is the extent that the compesation payable to the plaintiffs will A ' / . A ■ ‘ . up to the date when the milling plants will be handed over. last varied to be computed