Estate of the late Andre Delhomme v AG (CS 79 of 2020) [2025] SCSC 60 (28 March 2025)

SUPREME COURT OF SEYCHELLES Reportable/ Not Reportable/ Redact [2025] CS 79/2020 In the matter between: THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ANDRE DELHOMME herein represented by its Executor Veronique, Marie, Hilda Huguette, Maryan Green-Delhomme represented by Allen, Andre, Joseph Hoareau. (rep. by F. Elizabeth) and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (rep. by Stefan R. Knights) Plaintiff Defendant Neutral Citation: Estate afthe late Andre Delhamme vAG (CS79/2020) [2025] (28 March Before: Summary: Delivered: 2025). Carolus J Action for rescission of contract of sale of immovable property - non - payment of part of purchase price - Burden of proof - Article 1315 Civil Code 1976 - Article 1184 Civil Code 1976- Proof of non-payment-. 28 March 2025 ORDER A. The Defendant shall, not later than two months from the date of this judgment, pay to the plaintiff the sum of SCR1,500,000.00 with interest at the rate of 4% per annum as from the date of filing of this suit i.e. 24thAugust 2020 up to the date of payment. Each party shall bear its own costs. Carolus J JUDGMENT Background [1] The plaintiff is the estate of the late Andre Delhomme. It is represented in these proceedings by Veronique Marie Hilda Huguette Maryan Green-Delhomme the executrix of the estate, appointed by a court order dated 14thSeptember 2000 (Exhibit PI). The executrix is in turn represented by Allen Andre Joseph Hoareau by virtue of a power of attorney dated 2nd March 2020 and registered on SthJune 2020 (Exhibit P2). The plaintiff is suing the Attorney General in its capacity as representative of the Government of Seychelles. [2] Veronique Marie Hilda Huguette Maryan Green-Delhomme and Helene Marie Amelie Gabrielle Delhomme are the daughters of the late Andre Delhomme and his wife Doctor Hilda Stevenson Delhomme. All three of them survived him when he passed away on ISth August 2000 in France. [3] The undisputed facts of the case are that the late Andre Delhomme ("the deceased"), before his death, had absolute ownership of % and bare ownership of l!4 of Coetivy Island ("the property"), Madeleine Hery having been granted usufructuary interest of l!4 of the property. Andre Delhomme and Madeleine Hery obtained their rights in the property from Myriam Helene Delhomme nee Hadee in terms of her will transcribed in Vo1.39/97. By deed of sale dated 13thDecember 1979 and transcribed in Vol 64 No.1S7, and registered in Register B30 No.3641 on 18thDecember 1979,the vendors (Andre Delhomme and Madeleine Hery) agreed to sell and the Government of Seychelles agreed to take the property at the price of Rupees Four Million (R4,000,000.00). According to the deed of sale the vendors acknowledged receipt of Rupees Two Million Five Hundred Thousand (R2,SOO,OOO. OO), and the Government undertook to pay the outstanding sum of Rupees One Million Five Hundred Thousand (Rl,SOO,OOO. OO) as follows: 1) Rupees Three Hundred Thousand (R300, 000.00) by 15th January 1980 11) Rupees Three Hundred Thousand (R300, 000. 00) by 15th February 1980 111)Rupees Three Hundred Thousand (R300, 000. 00) by 15th March 1980 IV) Rupees Three Hundred Thousand (R300, 000. 00) by 15th April 1980 V) Rupees Three Hundred Thousand (R300, 000. 00) by sl" May 1980. [4] In terms of the deed of sale, it was further agreed that in the event of the Government failing to make any two consecutive payments, the outstanding sum or part thereof remaining unpaid would immediately become due and payable. The Government also granted the vendors a seller's privilege under Article 2103 of the Civil Code to secure payment of the outstanding sum of Rupees One Million Five Hundred Thousand (Rl,500,000.00). [5] In terms of the plaint, the plaintiff avers that in breach of the agreement, the defendant has failed, refused or neglected to pay the plaintiff the sum of Rupees One Million Five Hundred Thousand (Rl,500,000.00) as agreed, and that consequently the agreement has become frustrated, null and void. The plaintiff prays for a declaration to that effect. The Plaintiff further prays for rescission of the contract of sale, cancellation of the registration of Coetivy Island in the name of the Government of Seychelles, and for an order directing the Land Registrar to rectify the Land Register by cancelling, deleting and replacing the name of the Government of Seychelles as the registered owner of the island and replacing it with the name of the plaintiff. Further and in the alternative the Plaintiff seeks an order for the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of Rupees One Million Five Hundred Thousand (Rl,500,000.00) together with interest at the commercial rate of 12% from the date of the said contract of sale namely 13th December 1979 until the date of judgment. [6] The defendant, raised a preliminary plea of prescription claiming that the plaintiff is time barred from bringing the cause of action. On the merits it denies that it has failed to pay the plaintiff the sum of Rupees One Million Five Hundred Thousand (Rl,500,000.00) and puts the plaintiff to strict proof that the payments stipulated in the deed of sale were not paid. It avers that the defendant has never acknowledged any debt owing to the plaintiff nor is there any evidence of the plaintiff making a demand or claim against the defendant at any time within the period offive years from the date that an instalment became due and payable for any debt owed by the defendant to the plaintiff in respect of the sale. The defendant further denies that the agreement has become frustrated, null and void and contends that it has never asserted or pleaded frustration of contract in any dealings with the plaintiff and that in any event frustration of contract is a defence to a breach of contract which is up to the defendant to raise and prove. It denies being liable to the plaintiff in any sum and avers that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief prayed for. The defendant prays for dismissal of the plaint with costs. [7] The matter was heard by this Court both on the plea of prescription raised in limine litis and on the merits. However, the matter was dismissed solely on the plea of prescription without a determination of the matter on the merits. This court found that the action was prescribed, having been filed more than 20 years after the accrual of the cause of action (Vide Estate of the late Andre Delhomme & Ors vAG (CS 79/2020) [2021] SCSC 227 (18 May 2021». The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against the decision of the Supreme Court: it quashed the Supreme Court's decision and substituted therefor an order dismissing the plea in limine litis, and further remitted the matter to the Supreme Court to deal with the action on the merits only (Vide The Estate of the late Andre Delhomme & Ors v The Attorney General (SCA 15/2021) [2023] SCCA16 (26 Apri12023». [8] The matter was accordingly remitted to the Supreme Court. At the sitting of the Supreme Court of the 21st June 2023, Mr Elizabeth informed the Court that the plaintiff/appellant had, in the course of proceedings before the Court of Appeal, withdrawn its first prayer in the plaint, namely for a declaration "that the contract of sale has becomefrustrated, null and void by reason of the Defendant'S failure to pay the Plaintiff the balance of the purchase price in the sum ofSCR1,500,OOO. OO". It follows that together with this prayer, the last paragraph of the plaint (paragraph 12) should also be deleted. Paragraph 12 reads: 12. By reason of the matters aforesaid, the Plaintiff avers that the agreement of sale has becomefrustrated, null and void. [9] Consequently, the only remedies sought from this Court by the plaintiff are rescission of the contract of sale and, in the alternative, the payment of the sum of SCRl,500,000.00 which is alleged to remain unpaid by the defendant, with interest. In terms of the plaint, these remedies are as follows: WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffprays this Honourable Court to make thefollowing orders: [...} 2. Make an order of rescission of the contract of sale, cancelling the registration of the island of COETIVY in the name of the Government of Seychelles and ordering the Registrar of Lands, to rectify the Land Register by cancelling, deleting and replacing the name of the Government of Seychelles as the registered owner of the said island and replacing the name of the Plaintiff; FURTHER AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE 3. Order the Defendant the sum of SCR1,500, 000 together with interest at the commercial rate of 12%from the date of the said contract of sale, 13th December 1979, until the date ofjudgment; to pay the Plaintiff 4. Make anyfurther or other order the Court deemsfit. The Evidence [10] Allen Andre Joseph Hoareau a semi-retired marine engineer of 60 years of age, testified on behalf of the plaintiff. He stated that he was raised by Mr. and Mrs. Delhomme from the age of three and therefore considers their daughter Veronique Marie Hilda Huguette Maryan Green-Delhomme, executrix of the estate of Mr. Delhomme, as his sister. Throughout his testimony he referred to Mr. Delhomme as his father. [11] He confirmed that Mr. Delhomme transferred Coetivy Island to the Government of Seychelles for the sum of Rupees Four Million (R4,000,000.00) and in support produced collectively a covering letter dated 8th January 1980, together with a transcription of the deed of sale dated 13til December 1979 and transcribed in Vol 64 N0.157, and registered in Register B30 No.3641 on 18th December 1979(Exhibit P3). He confirmed that according to the document, there was an outstanding amount of Rupees One Million Five Hundred Thousand (Rl ,500,000.00) remaining unpaid which was to be paid as stated at paragraph 3 above. He also confirmed that there was a charge registered against the property for the debt owed by the Government to the deceased. Mr. Hoareau stated that he could not truthfully say whether or not the outstanding balance of Rupees One Million Five Hundred Thousand (Rl,500,000.00) had been paid but said that according to what is stated in the transcript it has never been paid. [12] Mr. Hoareau testified that he only had knowledge that the estate of Mr. Delhomme had a claim against the Government when he returned to Seychelles five years ago and had sight of the transcription of the deed of sale and realised that the Government had not fully paid the deceased. He also stated that the charge over the property in the sum of Rupees One Million Five Hundred Thousand (Rl,SOO,OOO. OO)still subsists. [13] In cross examination he stated that in 1979 he was 19 years old and was living with Mr. and Mrs. Delhomme and although he was not fully aware of all the details of the agreement between Mr. Delhomme and the Government, he knew that that the Government was taking away their land. He only saw the agreement two years ago. He got to know about the agreement when he was about to leave France for Seychelles in 2014, and he told Veronique that after he had settled in he would start finding out what happened to the land owned by Mr. and Mrs. Delhomme. In response to whether Veronique knew about the agreement before, he stated that she must have as she is the executrix, but that the children of the deceased would not get involved in matters relating to Seychelles as they live in Europe. [14] In reply to whether he knew whether the Government had paid any money to the deceased for Coetivy Island, he stated that according to the deed of sale only Rupees Two Million Five Hundred Thousand (R2,SOO,OOO. OO)was paid, and that this sum was presumably paid into a bank account. He stated that he did not know where the bank statements of the deceased's bank accounts were and admitted that he did not have any papers where Mr. and Mrs. Delhomme are concerned. He stated that he has not had time to try to get the bank statements from the bank but now that he has a power of attorney he can try. In addition, the Notary who dealt with the affairs of the late Mr. Delhomme no longer has any documents regarding Mr. and Mrs. Delhomme. [IS] Mr Hoareau admitted that he had no letter from Mr. Delhomme demanding payment from the Government of the Rupees Two Million Five Hundred Thousand (R2,SOO,OOO. OO) owing to him. He explained that payment of the last instalment under the deed of sale was due in May 1980, and just after that in June 1980 Government acquired another piece of Mr. Delhomme's land. Mr. and Mrs Delhomme were therefore afraid to go and ask Government for anything. He admitted that he had no letter from Government acknowledging any debt due to the deceased but maintained that according to the "official Government papers" the outstanding debt of R1.5 million had not been paid to Mr. Delhomme. [16] Mr. Hoareau was unable to show any charge or mortgage on the deed of sale. As for the seller's privilege granted to the vendors, he stated that Mr and Mrs. Delhomme never acted on it because they were scared to go the Government for anything. After 1993, they left the country because Mr. Delhomme was very ill and they were unable to do anything. [17] In re-examination, Mr. Hoareau explained Mr. Delhomme's fear of the Government. According to him Mrs. Delhomme had been involved in politics until 1974, and belonged to the political party "Parti Seychellois". Being in charge of the Victoria District Council, she was the next important person after the Governor. In order of importance after the Governor she ranked first, former President Mancham ranked as number 2 and former President Rene ranked as number 3. Mr. Rene was against her for many reasons including that he considered them as "grands blancs" and because they owned islands and other properties. [18] He stated that Mr and Mrs. Delhomme left Seychelles in 1993 or 1994 because of poor health since they had been beaten up three times. He clarified that their property that was compulsorily acquired by Government in June 1980 consisted of two plots situated on both sides of the road at St. Louis. He stated that both Mr. and Mrs. Delhomme died in France and never came back to Seychelles. Mr. Delhomme died soon after leaving for France and Mrs. Delhomme's death followed two to three years later. Mr. Hoareau was living in Spain but went to see them two to three times a year when they were living in France. They never discussed the issue of payment of land whether in relation to Coetivy Island or other land as Mr. and Mrs. Delhomme were not in a state to talk about Seychelles. [19] The defendant's sole witness was Mr. Patrick Lablache, a 63 year old consultant with the Ministry of Habitat, Infrastructure, Land and Transport. He testified that in 1979 Government bought Coetivy Island from Mr. Delhomme after negotiations between the two. Mr. Lablache recalls going to the island with Mr. Delhomme's representative who at the time was MIle Marie-Therese Desaubin to make an inventory of the shop on the island and proceed with employment of the people working there. The purchase of the island was on a walk-in walk-out basis meaning that Government walked in and took possession of the island and Mr. Delhomme walked out leaving everything on the island including the personnel. [20] As to the reason why the island was sold to Government, he explained that in 1979 Government had a policy of returning ownership of most of the privately owned outer islands to itself, so that they became state owned. Coetivy was the first island that Government attempted to buy. At the time, Mr. Delhomme had also been trying to undertake some sort of project on the island which did not materialise. He pointed out that in 1979 the copra industry had basically failed and most of the outer islands relying on it as a source of income were facing financial difficulties. ~ [21] He stated that as far as he could remember, Mr. Delhomme negotiated the sale of the island personally and not through a representative. The representative only went to the island to conclude the practical aspects of the hand-over. He recalled that the negotiations were conducted in a civilised manner and that Mr. Delhomme was very pleasant. They exchanged letters and Mr. Delhomme started off with a very high price which was eventually reduced to Rupees Four million after various communications between him and Government, and which he agreed to. [22] He confirmed that Rupees Two Million Five Hundred Thousand was paid and that Government effects payment directly to bank accounts and never in cash. He stated that he does not know to which bank the payment was made as payments are made by the Treasury Department. [23] Mr. Lablache stated that after the agreement was entered into he would occasionally talk to Mr. Delhomme as the Government had other dealings with him after that. He remembers that Government subsequently bought the St. Louis property from him although he does not recall if it was in the same year that Coetivy was purchased. He emphasised that the St. Louis property was purchased and not acquired. After the purchase of the St. Louis property he states that he probably bumped into Mr. Delhomme, greeted him and chatted casually to him although he could not recall exactly when, but that was as far as it went. [24] He agreed with defendant's counsel that if Government owed a person money for the purchase of a plot of land and missed one payment, the person would make a demand for such payment. However, he himself had never come across a case where Government had defaulted on such payments although he could not confirm that this had never happened. Moreover, he was unaware of any default in payment in regards to Coetivy Island and had never seen any demand for payment. [25] In cross-examination Mr. Lablache stated that in 1979 he was 23 years old and was working as Lands Officer for the Government, and in that capacity negotiated the purchase of Coetivy with Mr. Delhomme on behalf of the Government. He subsequently also went to the island. At the time he had only been six months in the job. The price for the island was arrived at following negotiations based on correspondence between the parties and his recollection was that he finally made an offer of Rupees Four Million on behalf of Government which was accepted by Mr. Delhomme who sent an acceptance to Mr. Lablache. It was put to him that he had no communication or letters to prove all this, to which he replied that there was a file concerning the transaction which had been given to the defendant's counsel. [26] He confirmed that payment of money owed by the Government is dealt with by the Treasury and not the Lands Department. He explained that the Ministry responsible for land is allocated a budget for acquisition ofland but that it is the Ministry of Finance which actually holds that budget. Whenever there was a need for payment from that budget the Lands Department would make a request to the Ministry of Finance for payment which would then effect the payment through Treasury. [27] He stated that he was never present when agreements for sale of land to Government were signed, and that at the time of the sale it was the President of the Republic who signed on behalf of the Government before the Attorney General as Notary. He was therefore not present when the deed for the sale of Coetivy was signed by Mr. Delhomme. [28] He agreed with plaintiffs counsel that if any payment had been made by Government to Mr. Delhomme, it would have been made by the Ministry of Finance and not the Lands Department and that such payment would have been made by cheque and not by cash payment but admitted that he did not actually see the payment being made. He stated that he never witnesses those transactions. With regards to whether payment was made to Mr. Delhomme he stated that the fact that he signed the transfer deed before the official Notary is an acknowledgement by him that he received the first part of the payment in the sum of Rupees Two million Five Hundred Thousand (R2,500,000). As to whether he had any evidence to show that the outstanding sum of Rupees One Million Five Hundred Thousand (Rl,500,000) agreed to be paid by instalments by end of May 1980, was actually paid, he stated that he did some research on the matter and managed to find a letter giving instructions to the Chief Accountant and Treasury to effect these payments. He then went back to treasury to find out whether they had any record of the payments but was informed that they did not keep records extending that far back. He reiterated that the amount was paid as he cannot remember any cases of that nature where payment was not effected. [29] In re-examination Mr. Lablache clarified that if there is a schedule of payments and the Lands Department has already notified the Ministry of Finance of such schedule with the dates for payment, the Ministry of Finance would execute the payments on the said dates without coming back to the Lands Department. With regards to the document giving instructions for payment, he was unable to obtain full records for such payment because he was informed by the Ministry of Finance that they only kept such records for up to ten years. Analysis Submissions [30] Counsels representing both parties filed written submissions which I have carefully examined, and which I will refer to as appropriate in this Analysis. It is to be noted that following the initial hearing of the matter before the Supreme COUli,counsels for the defendant and the plaintiff filed written submissions dated 20th November 2020 and 8th January 2021 respectively. Thereafter, counsel for the plaintiff filed additional written submissions dated "16th day of 2021". Following the Court of Appeal decision pursuant to which the matter was remitted to the Supreme Court, this Court allowed the motion of the defendant to file additional submissions (Vide The Attorney General v The Estate of the Late Andre Delhomme (MA278/2023) [2023] (26 April 2024)). Additional written submissions were filed on behalf of the defendant dated 11th June 2024 and counsel for the plaintiff filed "Counter Submissions" on 16th September 2024. All these submissions have been considered. Prescription [31] Before dealing with this matter on the merits, I find it necessary to put the issue of prescription to rest insofar as it concerns proceedings before this court. As explained in this Court's Ruling on the motion of the defendant to allow filing of additional submissions (Vide The Attorney General v The Estate of the Late Andre Delhomme (MA278/2023) [2023] (26 April 2024), and as stated at paragraph [7] above, the Court of Appeal quashed the Supreme Court's decision dismissing the plaintiff/appellant's action in limine litis on the ground that the action is prescribed having been filed more than twenty years after the accrual of the cause of action, and "substitute[dJ therefor an order dismissing the plea in limine litis ". The Court of Appeal further remitted the matter to the Supreme Court "to deal with the action on the merits only". It is clear therefore that this court cannot make any further determination on the issue of prescription, contrary to the defendant's submissions that "[Tjhe Defendantpleaded prescription in its defence and argued that the claim is barred by prescription, which should be considered in the final judgment" (See para 7 of defendant's further submissions dated 11th June 2024) and further that "despite the Court of Appeal's judgment, prescription remains an issuefor the this Court to consider in its determination of the suit on the merits" (See para 16 of defendant's further submissions dated 11 th June 2024). [32] Counsel for plaintiff, in his "counter submissions", correctly submitted that that the defendant had not paid heed to this Court's Ruling allowing filing of additional submissions by addressing the issue of prescription. However, counsel for the plaintiff also submitted that the defendant had also raised other legal issues not addressed in their previous submission, and asks this COUli to disregard the defendant's additional submissions insofar as they concern these other legal issues. Counsel seems to be under the mistaken impression that the additional submissions were only to address "the issues of burden ofproof and article 1315 specifically". This Court was very clear that it allowed the motion to file submissions "insofar as it concerns relevant issues" and went on to state that "[I]n that regard, I note that neither party has addressed the issue of burden of proof in the light of Article 1315 in much depth". The issue of "burden of proof in the light of Article 1315" is only one among other "relevant issues" which the parties were entitled to address in terms of this Court's Order allowing the filing of additional submissions. The defendant was therefore entitled to address, in its additional submissions, matters not addressed in its previous submissions as long as they pertained to relevant issues. [33] As for para 6 of the further submissions dated 11th June 2024 made on behalf of the defendant, that "[T[he Court of Appeal held that the 20-year prescription considered by this Court was acquisitive prescription, not extinctive prescription, and thus the Learned Trial Judge wrongfully applied the time limit", suffice it to say that this is not the case, as shown by para 57 of the Court of Appeal's judgement which reads: 57. It follows, therefore, that the question of whether or not the learned Judge was correct to conclude in her judgment that the Appellant's action is "une action reelle't/ a real action and not "un actionpersonelle''/ apersonal action and whether or not the action is time-barred, does not arise for consideration. This judgment does not express any views on the correctness o(the learned Judge's conclusions. Emphasis added. On the Merits [34] The deed of sale made on 13th December 1979 (Exhibit P3) shows that the consideration for the transfer of Coetivy Island from the late Andre Delhomme and Madeleine Hery to the Government was SCR4,000,000.00 "of which sum the Vendorsacknowledge receipt of Rupees two million five hundred thousand, (R.2,500,OOO)". The deed also contains an undertaking by the Government "to pay to the Vendors the outstanding sum of Rupees one million five hundred thousand, (R.1,500,000) in the following manner: I) Rupees Three Hundred Thousand (R300, 000. 00) by 15thJanuary 1980 II) Rupees Three Hundred Thousand (R300, 000. 00) by J 5thFebruary 1980 III) Rupees Three Hundred Thousand (R300, 000. 00) by 15th March 1980 IV) Rupees Three Hundred Thousand (R300, 000. 00) by 15thApril 1980 V) Rupees Three Hundred Thousand (R300, 000. 00) by 3]St May 1980. [35] It was also a term of the deed of sale, that in the event of the Government failing to make any two consecutive payments, the outstanding sum or part thereof remaining unpaid would immediately become due and payable. [36] The plaintiff claims that the Government has failed to pay the outstanding balance of SCRl,500,000.00 of the purchase price of SCR4,000,000.00, and on that basis seeks rescission of the contract of sale of Coetivy Island to the Government and, in the alternative, the payment of the sum of SCRI ,500,000.00 which is alleged to remain unpaid by the defendant, with interest. The defendant on the other hand denies that it has failed to pay the plaintiff the sum of Rupees One Million Five Hundred Thousand (Rl,500,OOO.00), and puts the plaintiff to strict proof that the payments stipulated in the deed of sale were not paid. It is averred in the statement of defence that the defendant has never acknowledged any debt owing to the plaintiff nor has the plaintiff made any demand for the same. [37] It has been submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that it has discharged the burden of proof imposed upon it by Article 1315 of the Civil Code ofSeycheUes Act, Cap 33, ("the Civil Code") as the vendor, whereupon the burden had shifted on the defendant as the buyer to prove that such payment had been made, which the defendant had not discharged. Counsel for the defendant submitted that the burden was on the buyer to show that the outstanding sum had not been paid and that it did not shift to the defendant. He submits that since the plaintiff had not done so, it failed to prove its case. [38] Two issues arise for the court's consideration. Firstly, whether the plaintiff has proved its case to the required degree, which requires an assessment of whether the burden of proof has been discharged by the party who bears that burden. Secondly, if the plaintiff has proved its case, whether rescission of the contract of sale should be ordered or alternatively specific performance. Both issues shall be discussed below. Has the Plaintiff proved its case? [39] Article 1315 ofthe Civil Code of Seychelles Act, Cap 33, ("the Civil Code") provides: Article 1315 A person who demands theperformance of an obligationshall be bound to prove it. Conversely, a person who claims to have been released shall be bound to prove the payment or theperformance which has extinguished his obligation. [40] The plaintiff relies on this provision to submit, in its submissions dated 8th January 2021, that "once the seller asserts that he has not been paid, the burden shifts on the buyer to provide proof of payment ". He submits that having alleged that the purchase price had not been paid, the burden shifted to the defendant to prove that the whole sum has been paid, so as to extinguish his obligation to pay, which burden the defendant failed to discharge in contravention of Article 1315. [41] In its "Counter submissions" filed on 16th September 2024, the plaintiff goes further and states that in order to discharge the burden of proof imposed by Article 1315 upon it as the claimant/seller, which is limited to proving the existence of the defendant's legal obligation to pay, it suffices for it to produce the title deed evidencing the debt whereupon the burden shifts on the defendant to bring proof of payment. It is submitted that the law does not require a seller to prove a negative fact, i.e. non-payment, but rather allows the seller to rely on the existence of the obligation to pay and shifts the burden on the buyer to prove that he has discharged the obligation. The plaintiff further submits that the defendant is best placed to provide such proof of the discharge of its obligation as opposed to requiring the seller to provide evidence of non-payment. [42] The defendant on the other hand, in its submissions of 20th November 2020, states that under Article 1315,the onus is on the plaintiff to show that the obligation of the defendant to make payment under the contract was not performed, and that the onus does not shift to the defendant. It is the defendant's case that the plaintiff has not discharged that burden to the required standard, and that the plaintiffs sole witness Mr Hoareau was only speculating that the outstanding balance of SCRI ,500,000.00 was not paid. [43] It falls to this Court to determine whether, in terms of Article 1315, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the defendant's obligation to pay by producing the deed of sale which shows that at the date of signature of the deed the defendant had paid the sum of SCR2,500,OOO. OOand still had a balance ofSCRl,500,000. OO outstanding which was to be repaid in accordance with the terms of the deed, and it is up to the defendant to bring evidence that it has discharged its obligation of paying the outstanding balance, or whether in addition to proof of the defendant's obligation to pay the outstanding sum, the plaintiff also has to bring evidence of non-payment by the defendant. [44] The matter is not as straightforward as it would seem. It does not appear that in every case where a defendant contests an allegation of non-execution of its contractual obligation that the burden of proof shifts to such defendant to prove that the payment was made, which is what a literal reading of Article 1315 seems to suggest. It would seem that while there are circumstances where this this the case, there are other circumstances where the plaintiff who claims non-execution of the other party's obligation has to bring evidence of such obligation as well as evidence that it was not executed. [45] This issue is dealt with in Dalloz Encyclopedie Juridigue, Repertoire de Droit Civil, 2 e Edition, Tome VI, Preuve. At CHAP. 2 ("Objet et Charge de fa Preuve ") a distinction is made between the "objet de fa preuve" and "charge de fa preuve". The link between the two when determining the "charge de fa preuve" is also addressed, as follows: 54. L 'objet et fa charge de fa preuve sont deux notions distinctes, entre lesquelles existent cependant les rapports etroits. Preciser l'objet de fa preuve repond a fa question: « que faut-il prouver? » ,. determiner la charge de fa preuve repond a fa question: « qui doit prouver? ». Mais on s 'apercoit bien vile qu 'une des difJicuftes essentielles soufevees par fa charge de fa preuve consiste a determiner ce que chaque pfaideur doil prouver, c 'est-a-dire f 'etendue de f 'objet de fa preuve qui fui incombe [. ..). Emphasis added. [46] In the present case, the "objet de la preuve" is either the payment or non-payment of the balance ofSCRl,500,OOO. OOof the purchase price, while the "charge de la preuve'' will determine which party has to bring proof of such payment or non-payment. We are told in Dalloz (supra) at para 54 that the difficulty with the issue of the "charge de la preuve" lies in determining what each party has to prove i.e. "l'etendue de I 'objet de la preuve ", which in certain circumstances involves the "Deplacement de l 'objet de la preuve" which is dealt with below. [47] We are told that the "Objet de la prevue" i.e.whathas to be proved,"consiste en un fait, un fait conteste, un fait pertinent" (CHAP. 2, SECT. lrc, paragraph 55)." The fact that has to be proved may be proved in a manner of ways: for instance by "Preuve directe et preuve indirecte". The fact to be proved may also be a "fait negatif". Both issues are examined from the perspective of "Deplacement de I 'objet de la preuve ", as follows: A. - Preuve directe et preuve indirecte; 67. En principe, le fait a prouver est celui-la meme qui declenche I 'application de la regle de droit produisant Ie resultat don! le plaideur reclame Ie benefice. On appellera preuve directe celle qui a pour objet Ie fait a prouver lui-meme. Ainsi, le I 'ecrit, destine a Ie fait d 'un accord de volontes est directement prouve par constater, signe par les parties,' de meme, le fait a prouver peut eire relate par un temoin. 68. Mais it est assez frequent que la preuve directe du fait a prouver ne soit pas rapportee. Ce sont seulement des faits voisin ou connexes qui sont etablis et, par it en est intere l'existence du fait a prouver. En pareif cas, la un raisonnement, preuve est indirecte : son objet a ete deplace du fait a prouver a d'autres faits plus ou moins proches (AUBRYet RAU, t. 12, par ESMEIN, § 749, p. 56). Tel est Ie cas, tels que les traces de freinage et la position par exemple, de la preuve d'indices, d'un vehicule apres un accident, qui permettent aujuge de considerer comme etabli le comportement du conducteur qu'il qualifiera de fautif. Le fait a prouver etait ce comportement " if n'a pas ete prouve directement mais il a ete induit de la preuve de faits differents. 69. La certitude obtenue quant a la rea lite du fait n 'est pas necessairement plus grande en presence d'une preuve directe que lorsqu'il s'agit de preuve indirecte : c'est 10. une question de force probante et la conviction du juge peut etre plus surement formee a partir de certains indices que sur le fondement d'un temoignage direct entache de suspicion. Mais if reste que Ie deplacement de l'objet de la preuve cree par lui-meme un risque d'incertitude, puisque Ie passage des faits prouves au fait a prouver est Ie fruit d'un raisonnement qui ne donne jamais qu'une plus ou moins grande probabilite. Si Ie detour s'allonge, Ie risque s'accroft. C'est sans doute le legislateur n'autorise pas toujours un tel deplacement de I'objet de la pourquoi lorsque l'article 1341 du code civil impose la preconstitution d'une preuve. Ainsi, preuve ecrite pour etablir l'existence d'un accord de volontes portant sur une valeur superieure a 50 F (V. infra, nos 172 et s.) il s'agit certes de limiter les modes de preuve admissibles, mais cette disposition ren(erme egalement une prohibition du deplacement de I'objet de la preuve. A l'inverse, la loi prevoit par(ois eUe-meme un tel deplacement de l'objet de la preuve en instituant des presomptions. Lorsque la loi garde Ie silence, c'est au juge qu'if appartient d'apprecier dans queUe mesure il Ie fait a prouver peut se satisfaire d'une preuve dont l'objet n'est pas directement (sur le controle de la pertinence du fait offert en preuve, V infra, nos 91 et s.). Emphasis added. [48] The above paragraphs 67 to 69 from Dalloz (supra) explain that the fact that has to be proved! fact in issue i.e. the "objet de la preuve ", in this case the non-payment of part of the purchase price, may be proved directly - by direct proof of such fact, or indirectly - by inference of such fact from "des faits voisin ou connexes" which have to be established. Such indirect proof operates a "deplacement de l'objet de la preuve" in that the fact in issue is not proved by means of evidence which proves that fact directly. Paragraphs 80 to 82 consider the "deplacement de l'objet de la preuve" in the context of "Preuve d'un fait negatif". It is to be noted that counsel for the plaintiff has argued that proof of a negative fact i.e. that the buyer has not paid the price, is nearly impossible for the seller whilst the buyer is in a far better position to bring proof that it has paid. On the issue of "Preuve d'un fait negatif" paragraphs 80 to 83 read as follows: c. - Preuve d'un fait negatif 80. La preuve d'un fait negatif est parfois reputee impossible. L 'experience a demontre le contraire. II suffit de citer la preuve de la non-paternite resultant d'un exam en comparatif des sangs de I 'enfant et du pere pretendu (LARGUIER, La preuve d'un fait negatif Rev. trim. dr. civ. 1953. 1). Mais il est vrai que I 'etablissement d'un [ait negatifest un secteur oit Ie deplacement de I 'objet de la preuve s'impose Ie plus souvent. 81. 11ne s 'agit pas d'un veritable deplacement de I 'objet de la preuve lorsque Ie fait negatif comporte une antithese immediate sous forme d'une proposition positive contraire : en pareil cas, les faits a prouver ne sont presentes comme negatifs que « on peut dire alors que sous par I 'artifice d'une construction grammaticale; l'enveloppe d'une negative se cache une affirmative bien tranchee » (LARGUIER, loc.cit., no 0 3). Ainsi, l'ayant cause d'un assure, qui veut demontrer que Ie deces de celui-ci n'a pas eu pour cause un suicide, etablira de facon positive la cause du deces et prouvera de cette facon qu'elle est independante de la volonte de son auteur (Req. 29 oct. 1940, D. H 1940. 195 ; Compo pour la preuve du caractere involontaire d'un accident: Civ. 29 oct. 1958, Bull. civ. 1, n" 458). En ce cas, il ny a aucun effort de raisonnement afaire pour passer du fait preuve au fait a prouver : la preuve du fait negatif resulte immediatement et directement de la preuve de son contraire. Telle est l'interpretation de la preuve de l'absence de possession d'etat l'instruction d'enfant generale relative a l'etat civil : une reconnaissance de paternite etant nulle si l'enfant a la possession d'etat d'enfant le procureur de la Republique devra faire connaftre a l'auteur de la reconnaissance que celle-ci ne peut eire mentionnee en marge de l'acte de naissance de I'enfant, que s'illui est produit un acte de notoriete etablissant que I'enfant jouit de la possession d'etat a l'egard de son pere nature I, ce qui etablit par contre-coup l'absence de possession d'etat d'enfant legitime donnee par l'instruction du 26 avril 1974 modifiant legitime (n °301). legitime, 82. En revanche, loco cit.). Ainsi, negative inde(inie, c'est-a-dire la preuve d'un fait negatif ne peut generalement se faire que par lorsqu'il induction a partir de la preuve de faits positi(s plus ou moins proches, qui ne comporte pas s'agit d'une proposition la preuve directe de l'absence d'antithese immediate (LARGUIER, de faute ne pourrait-elle etre rapportee que par les dires d'un temoin ayant partout et toujours accompagne la personne, ce qui est pratiquement force est done de recourir en ce cas a la preuve indirecte. Tel est le cas, par exemple, de la preuve exigee des parents pour les exonerer de la responsabilite qui pese sur eux du fait de leurs enfants mineurs habitant avec eux : aux termes de l'article 1384, alinea 7, du code civil, ils doivent prouver « qu'ils n'ont pu empecher Ie fait qui donne lieu a cette responsabilite ». La preuve directe de l'absence de faute etant pratiquement impossible, on se contentera de la demonstration d'un faisceau de faits positifs d'ou le juge inferera Ie caractere irreprochable de la conduite des parents. Comme l'en once la cour de Paris, il faut que le pere prouve « que, compte il a organise sa vie scola ire et de tenu de I 'age et du degre de maturite de l'enfant, impossible; loisirs avec soin " qu'il s 'est couvert contre les risques eventuels " qu'il a conseille et guide son enfant " qu'enfin il a etabli avec lui des relations de confiance qui donnent a celui-ci une stabilite morale, preuve d'une bonne education» (Paris, 11 oct. 1971, Gaz. Pal. 1972. 1. 130). [49] Hence, proof of a "fait negatif", only operates a "deplacement de I 'objet de la preuve" where the "fait negatif" amounts to a "proposition negative indefinie" (as defined at paragraph 82 above) i.e. where the "fait negatif" cannot be directly established by an opposite positive fact, as in the examples given above. Paragraph 83 goes on to explain how proving a "fait negatif" amounting to a "proposition negative indefinie" by way of ''preuve indirecte" could instead of operating a "deplacement de l'objet de la preuve" operate a "renversement de la charge de la preuve" so that the burden of proving such "fait negatif" falls on the other party, which is open to criticism as it amounts to dispensing the party making the claim from bringing such proof It reads: 83. Mais la tentation est grande d'aller encore plus loin et de passer du deplacement de I'objet de la preuve a un veritable renversement de la charge de la preuve. Si l'on conserve l'exemple de la responsabilite des pere et mere, it est facile de voir comment un glissement insensible peut s'operer : les faits positi{s d'ou resulte la preuve indirecte du comportement correct des parents sont assez vagues " il suffit parfois defort peu de chasespour etayer le raisonnement sur lequelle juge fonde la preuve de l'absence defaute " a la limite, i! n'y a plus aucune preuve positive et Ie juge presume ab initio la rectitude de la conduite des parents, rejetant ainsi sur la victime la charge de prouver l'attitude fautive. Lajurisprudence cedeparfois a cette tentation (Crim. 27 oct. 1964, Gaz. Pal. 1965. 1. 186, Rev. trim. dr. civ. 1965. 349, obs. Rodiere ; RODIERE, La disparition de l'alinea 4 de l'article 1384 du code civil, D. 1961, Chron. 207). Une telle attitude est critiquable, car si la difficulte de prouver un fait negatifjusti/ie Ie deplacement de l'objet de la preuve, quelle que soit la souplesse du procede il n'est pas possible d'aller jusqu'a la dispense de preuve. Seulle legislateur pourrait etablir une telle dispense. A defaut d'indication dans la loi, Ie fait negatif doit etre prouve (LARGUIER, loc. cit. ,. MARTY et RAYNAUD, t. 1, no 214). [50] The following paragraphs address the point that only disputed facts need to be proved. It reads as follows: 84. En matiere juridique, la preuve est une preuve judiciaire. Or, reglementee «prouver en matiere judicia ire, c 'est determiner, au moyen de precedes admis par la loi, la conviction du juge par rapport a un fait litigieux. Pour que se pose la il faut donc une contestation ,. un fait reconnu ou simplement question de preuve, non conteste n'a pas besoin d'etre prouve » d'une realisation methodique du droit prive, these, Lyon, 1947, no 115 ,. dans Ie meme t. 12, par ESMEIN, 749, p. 52 ,. NORMAND, Lejuge et Ie sens, AUBRY et RAU, litige, n' 290 ,. Cf Civ. 5 mai 1976, Bull. civ. III, no 189). (MOTULSKY, Principes 85. C'est a Henri MOTULSKY que revient Ie merite d'avoir clairement distingue les incombent aux plaideurs dans la construction de deux taches differentes qui « I 'edifice de {ait» soumis au juge : I'allegation et la preuve (these prec., n' 83 et ; Le role respectij du juge et des parties dans l'allegation des faits, Etudes de s. travaux et recherches de l'institut de droit compare de I' droit contemporain, Universite de Paris, 1959, t. 15, 2e vol., p. 355 et s. ,. Prolegomenes pour unfutur code de procedure civile: la consecration des principes directeurs du proces civil par le decret du 9 septembre 1971, D. 1972, Chron. 91). Celui qui rec/ame Ie benefice de I'application une regIe juridique doit indiquer les faits qui, selon lui, {ondent Ie droit pretendu. il n 'est pas question de preuve. Un examen des allegations doit deja eire fait par Iejuge, car la pretention ne peut eire accueillie que s'i! y a coincidence entre les allegations du plaideur et les « elements generateurs » d'un droit pouvant produire Ie resultat reclame (MOTULSKY, these prec., no 107). C'est la question de la pertinence ou du caractere conc/uant des faits allegues I'examen porte sur de simples affJrmations. La question de preuve n 'apparait qu 'avec la contestation et son etendue est limitee a celle de la contestation. infra, nos 91 et s.). Mais [. ..}. A ce stade, (V. la contestation 86. II n 'est pas rare qu 'un plaideur qui dispose de moyens de preuve en fasse etat a de son adversaire. sans attendre I 'appui de ses allegations logiquement un prealable a toute question de Cependant, est la contestation preuve. I 'objet de la cette contestation qui circonscrit [. ..} C'est precisement preuve. II en resulte souvent une decomposition plus ou moins poussee des faits generalement allegues sous Ie couvert d'une notion « complexe » (MOTULSKY, op. cit., n" 90). Par exemple, a un plaideur invoquant I 'existence d'une vente, son adversaire repond en niant qu'un prix ail ete fixe ,. la contestation penetre dans seule la I'analyse de la notion globale de vente, pour n'en retenir qu'un element: preuve d'un prix devra etre rapportee. 87. La contestation l'adversaire. n'est pas toujours possible II faut, en effet, tenir compte des presomptions sur tous les points allegues par legales qui affirment faits de certains lorsque d'autres etablis. La seule l'existence la contestation efficace est alors celle qui porte sur les faits qui declenchent presomption. ils doivent eire consideres comme etablis et le resultat prevu par la loi s'impose, sans qu'une contestation de ce resultat ait la moindre portee. Si ces faits ne sont pas denies, faits sont 88. II faut cependant bien preciser que lorsque nous parlons de contestation, il s 'agit d'une simple denegation et non d'une preuve contraire. La seule contestation d'un fait allegue sumt a interdire de considerer que ce fait est etabli par la declaration de celui qui se prevaut de son existence. Le fait conteste ne peut etre retenu que Ie juge a ete s'il est prouve, c'est-a-dire lorsque, par des moyens adequats, convaincu de la veracite de l'allegation. r..} sont 90. On remarquera, enfin, combien les regles de la preuve judiciaire peuvent donner les moyens des faits une image deformee par rapport a la realite. Non seulement imparfaits, en ce sens que, s 'ils sont propres a entrainer la de preuves il ne s 'agit cependant que d'une approximation qui ne permet conviction dujuge, pas d'atteindre a la certitude absolue, mats Ie juge devra considerer comme etablis les faits allegues par un des plaideurs, des lors qu 'ils ne sont pas contestes par son adversaire r ..}. [51] In the present case, it is averred at paragraph 11 of the plaint that "In breach of the agreement, the Defendant has failed, refused or neglected to pay the Plaintiff the sum of SCR 1,500,000.00 as agreed or at all JJ. The Defendant denied this averment but did not aver that it had paid the sum of SCRl,500,OOO. OO. At paragraph 4 of the statement of defence, the defendant avers that - 4. The Defendant denies paragraph 11 and puts the Plaintiff that the payments as stipulated in clauses 2 and 3 of the Deed of Sale are unpaid. The Defendant avers that the Defendant has never acknowledged any debt owing to the is there evidence of the Plaintiff making a demand or claim whatsoever Plaintiffnor the Defendant at any time within any period offive years from the date that against an instalment was due and payable by the Defendant to the Plaintiff for any debt owed in respect of the sale referred to in paragraph 8 of the Plaint. to strict proof [52] According to the rules relating to pleadings what is simply denied is taken to be admitted. Section 75 of the Seychelles Code of Civil Procedure provides that: 75. The statement of defence must contain a clear and distinct statement of the material facts on which the defendant relies to meet the claim. A mere general denial of the plainrff's claim is not sufficient. Material facts alleged in the plaint must be distinctly denied or they will be taken to be admitted. [53] It is arguable whether the averment in the Statement of Defence that the defendant did not acknowledge any debt to the defendant or the absence of a letter of demand by the plaintiff amount to a "statement of the material facts on which the defendant relies to meet the claim". However, there is no doubt that it fulfils the requirement of a "denegation" which according to paragraph 88 of Dalloz (supra) requires that the fact that was denied to be proved. In this case, the averment of the plaintiff that the sum of SCRI ,500,000 was not paid has to be proved. [54] Having dealt with the issue of the "objet de la preuve" (CHAP. 2, SECT. Ire),the issue of "charge de fa preuve" is then addressed (CHAP. 2, SECT. 2.) It is pointed out that it is the "repartition de fa charge de fa preuve" which seems to present a difficulty rather than the "charge de fa preuve", in other words, how the burden of proving a fact is shared between the parties (paragraph I05). The issue of "imputation du risque de la preuve" is also raised: it is pointed out that Article 1315 in designating who proves what, also answers the question as to who will win the case if a party does not prove what they are required to under that provision. The relevant parts of SECT. 2., are reproduced below: SECT 2. - Charge de fa preuve. I05. La signification meme de I 'expression « charge de la preuve» doit eire precisee. fait la repartition de ce fardeau entre les plaideurs qui Mais c 'est surtout difJiculte. ART t- - ORDRE DE LA PREUVE ET RISQUE DE LA PREUVE 106. L 'article 1315 du code civil, relatif a la preuve des obligations, est considere comme exprimant un principe general: « celui qui reclame I 'execution d'une celui qui se pretend libere doft obligation doit I 'extinction de son obligation ». Tel justifier qu'il est redige, ce texte envisage done la charge de la production des preuves, en de fa preuve. Mais, designant un ordre chronologique dans I 'administration Ie paiement ou Iefait qui a produit la prouver. Reciproquement, quoique moins apparente, une autre solution se trouve egalement dans la {ormule legale: Ie sort du proces lorsque la preuve n 'aura pu etre faite. En exposant « qui doil prouver? )), l'article 1315 donne aussi une reponse a la question « a qui Ie lorsque la lumiere ne sera pas faite? ». ;uge devra-t-il donner satisfaction, (LEGEAIS, Les regles de preuve en droit civil, these Poitiers, 1954, p. 101; MOTULSKY, Principes d'une realisation methodique du droit prive, these, Lyon, 1947, n" 117; F. Boulanger, Reflexions sur les problems de la charge de la preuve, Rev. trim. dr. civ. 1966. 736, n" 5). Cette « imputation du risque de la preuve )) (LEGEAIS, op. cit.) est delicate etfait toute la dificultee du probleme de la charge de la preuve. [55] The following is stated in regards to the impression given by Article 1315 as to the "ordre de la preuve 11 i.e. the order in which proof of disputed facts is brought, so as to support the case of the respective parties' and negate the proof advanced by the opposing party: 107. 11 est classique de tirer de l'article 1315 du code civil le schema suivant. Le demandeur allegue un fait a l'appui de sa pretention. Si Ie defendeur le conteste if appartient au demandeur de faire la preuve de son par une simple denegation, allegation: actori incumbit probatio. Lorsque Ie demandeur a rapporte la preuve qui etait exigee de lui, le defendeur peut opposer une exception s Si celle-ci est deniee par Ie demandeur, les faits sur lesquels if fonde l'exception qu'il allegue : reus in excipiendo fit actor. Ainsi, au cours du proces, la charge de la preuve peut peser alternativement sur chacune des parties, au fur et a mesure qu'elles alleguent de nouveaux faits: onus probandi t. 9, par PERROT, n" 1160). incumbit ei qui dicit (BEUDANT et LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE, if appartient au defendeur de prouver {...} 109. Mais de roles de Ie la presentation classique regles la preuve» theatre de « l'ordre qui donne « l'impression juridique » (F. sur !'avance BOULANGER, Reflexions sur Ie probleme de la charge de la preuve, Rev. trim. dr. civ. 1966. 736, n" 1) est ires theorique. Elle revient a dire qu'un plaideur, en presence de l'allegation de son adversaire, n'a pas d'autre initiative a prendre qu'une simple denegation ; if lui suffira d'attendre que la preuve de cette if avancera d'autres allegation soit rapportee " ensuite seulement, s 'il y a lieu, faits qu'il devra prouver. {. ..} Mais la realite est assez differente. 11 est rare qu 'un plaideur puisse se borner a adopter une portion d'attente purement passive jusqu'a ce que Son adversaire ait satisfait aux exigences de preuve mises a sa charge. {. ..} 110. tenir compte du deb at qui s'instaure naturellement sur l'administration de IIfaut elle-meme. Celui sur qui pese la charge de la preuve doit tenter la preuve la conviction du juge. Hormis les cas ou la loi attache une force d'entrainer probante absolue a certains modes de preuve, la certitude totale, objective, ne peut jamais etre atteinte. Tout ce que peut esperer un plaideur est de proposer au juge des movens de preuve propres a Ie persuader de la veracite de ses il est probable allegations. Si l'adversaire se borne a une simple contradiction, que la conviction du juge sera assez facifement obtenue. Par consequent, Ie defendeur aura tout interet a combattre les movens de preuve du demandeur en proposant ses propres preuves, de faeon a empecher la conviction du juge de se former en faveur de son adversaire. A mesure que cette conviction prend corps, if devient urgent pour Ie defendeur de produire ses denegations. De sorte que « dans la pratique, chacun prend position sur Ie point de fait et aligne ses preuves. Celui-la meme qui soutient n'avoir rien a prouver ne manque pas de pousser son offensive pour ruiner adverse» (MIMIN, note sous Soc. 10 avr. 1941, D. C. 1942.35). les preuves qui havent 111. [ ...] l'ordre theorique de la production des preuves n'est generalement pas suivi leur contribution a la par les parties elles-memes qui, volontairement, apportent recherche de la verite meme lorsqu 'elles n y sont pas obligees ... [. ..] on s'apercoit combien est devenue inexacte l'image d'une seule partie aux prises avec le tandis que son adversaire [. ..] assiste[ntJ passif[sJ a ses fardeau de la preuve, efforts. [. ..] Le schema classique de l'alternance des initiatives des parties dans la production des preuves est tres loin de la realite. 112. Ainsi, en depit de ce que semble laisser croire laformule de l'article 1315 du code civil, la question de la charge de la preuve n'est pas, ou n'est plus, celie d'un ordre les elements de production des preuves. Peu importe, au fond, d'ou proviennent de conviction sur lesquels le juge peut fonder sa decision. Envisage sous l'angle de la production des preuves, le probleme de la charge de la preuve s'evanouit, Le plus souvent (LEGEAIS, op. cit., p. 177). La veritable question est celle de I 'imputation du risque de la preuve. [56] As stated at paragraph 112, it is concluded that despite the impression given by Article 1315as to the importance of the order in which proof of disputed facts is brought i.e. "ordre de la preuve" in the context of discharging the "charge de la preuve '', it is "I 'imputation du risque de la preuve" which is of import. This is discussed below: J J 3. « Lorsque fa conviction du juge est etablie, dans un sens ou dans I 'autre, if est, indifforent de savoir a laquelle des deux parties incombaient en somme, la tache de la provoquer. Mais quand la balance reste en suspens, quand la verite meme cette verite restreinte que permet la procedure ne peut pas eIre decouverte, c 'est alors qu 'i! importe de determiner sur qui pese Ie fardeau de la preuve. Comme Ie juge n 'a pas (ou n 'a plus en droit moderne la ressource de renoncer a prendre partie et qu 'if doit , des lors, toujours se prononcer pour f 'une et contre I 'autre fa carence de celle qui se trouve sous Ie coup de cetle charge sumt a des parties, entrafner une decision favorable a son adversaire» (MOTULSKY, Principes d 'une realisation methodique du droit prive, these, Lyon, J 947, n "IJ 7). Ainsi que I 'enonce la Cour de cassation: « L 'incertitude et le doute subsistant a la suite de la production d'une preuve doivent necessairement etre retenus au detriment de J 962, Bull. civ. IV, celui qui avait n °105 ; 15 oct. 1964, ibid. IV, n° 678). Tel est le veritable interet de la question de la charge de fa preuve (PLANIOL et RIP ERT, t. 7, par GABOLDE, N°1417,' LEGEAIS, Les regles de preuve en droit civil, these, Poitiers, J 954, p. J 00 et s.) la charge de cette preuve» (Soc. 3J janv. J J 4. Cette facon d 'envisager la charge de fa preuve permet de restreindre la question a ses exactes dimensions en eliminant de la discussion de nombreuses hypotheses la repartition du fardeau de la preuve entre les ou les principes gouvernant sont invoques hors de propos. II est frequent que la Cour de cassation plaideurs doive rejeter Ie moyen d 'un pourvoi la violation de I 'article 1315 du code civil, alors qu 'en I 'espece la preuve a he faite. Des lors que les juges ont pu se {arger une conviction it I 'egard des allegations des parties, il est sans interet de rechercher sur qui pesait la charge de la preuve. [ ... J invoquant laquelle des pretentions 117. Si des preuves sont produites, quelle qu'en soil I'origine, et si elles permettent au juge de se forger une conviction, une solution peut etre donnee au proces. Mais if faut encore trancher lorsque Ie doute subsiste, car Ie juge ne peut, sous peine est incapable de de commettre un deni de justice, refuser de statuer au motifqu'il discerner est {andee. L 'anaLyse classique determinant un « ordre de Lapreuve» (JI: Supra, nO107) (ournirait une reponse : dans L'aLternance des allegations, dont chacune doit etre prouvee par ceLui qui l'avance, on s'arrete lorsqu'une des parties n 'est pas en mesure d'etabUr Ie fait qu'elle enonce " com me, par hypothese, au point oil en etait arrive Ie Utige, la demonstration de ce fait etait necessaire au succes de la pretention de celui qui l'avait allegue, l'echec de la preuve entratne la perte du proces pour Ie plaideur qui etait, a ce moment, en position de demandeur. Cette vision trop abstraite du debat judiciaire ne correspond pas it fa realite. contradictoires des parties incumbit probatio » conserve sa valeur: le principe Mais, meme debarrasse de ce cadre inutile d 'un ordre de la preuve, « actori independamment du point de savoir si I 'on est en presence d'une demande initiale ou non, une allegation necessaire au soutien de sa pretention n 'a pu etre prouvee (ce qui peut etre Ie cas pour les deux parties, si chacune avance une pretention distincte et echoue dans sa demonstration: Com. 10 mat 1977, Bull. civ. IV, n" 134). 118. Malheureusement, on s 'apercoit vite que cette regie est trop sommaire pour fournir une solution satisjaisante dans tous les cas. Elle implique que Ie risque de la preuve pese sur celui qui aUegue un fait et non sur celui qui Ie conteste. Mais ou s 'arrete la contestation et oi: commence l 'allegation d'un fait nouveau? Lorsqu 'un plaideur reclame l 'execution d'un contrat et que son adversaire invoque la nullite de cette convention, s 'agit-il de fa part de ce dernier d 'une contestation de la validite du contrat, imposant a I 'autre partie la preuve de cette validite, ou de I 'allegation de la nullite qu 'il lui appartiendrait de prouver ? De plus, mettre a la charge du demandeur, en louIe hypothese, Ie risque de la preuve est une regIe trop brutale. « Si Ie proces, dans une societe civilisee, ne doit pas judicia ire, mais une occasion de de{inir ce qui est juste, il n'v a etre un combat aucune bonne raison de faire peser svslematiquement toutes les obligations de preuve sur Ie demandeur qui, meme s 'i! est digne d'interet, n 'aura pas les movens su(fisants pour les remplir (LEGEAIS, op. Cit., p. 170). On concoit que certaines nuances puissent s 'imposer. » 119. Loin du bel ordonnancement classique, la repartition du risque de la preuve entre les plaideurs est une question tres delicate, qui suscite bien des controverses et introduit souvent un regrettable element d'incertitude dans le droit de la preuve. [57] It would seem from what is stated in Dalloz (supra) at paragraph 113, that where the case of both parties is evenly balanced and the Judge is not swayed or convinced by the case of one party or the other or the probative value of their evidence, is when the "charge de la preuve JJ i.e. "sur qui pese Ie jardeau de la preuve JJ as set out in Article 1315 becomes important. [58] In the present case the plaintiff alleges that the defendant has not paid the outstanding sum of SCRl,500,OOO. The oral testimony of the plaintiffs sole witness, Mr Hoareau, is not convincing on that score. According to his testimony the plaintiff s claim of non-payment appears to be based on what was stated in the deed of sale in that regard, and not from any personal knowledge or other reliable information of the same. He also relied on an undischarged charge which he claimed was registered against the property to secure payment of the outstanding sum of which no evidence was produced to this Court. He testified that according to the deed of sale (Exhibit P3) there was an outstanding amount of SCRl,500,000.00 on the purchase price of SCR4,000,000.00 but that he could not truthfully say whether or not it had been paid. He stated that however according to what was stated in the deed of sale the outstanding sum had never been paid, and that he only realised this when he saw the transcription of the deed of sale about two years ago. He admitted that he had never discussed the issue of such payment with Mr. and Mrs. Delhomme and acknowledged that he did not know how the sum of SCR2,500,000.00 had been paid to them. He further admitted that he did not have any documents including bank documents belonging to them. The Notary who dealt with their affairs no longer had any of their documents either. I agree with counsel for the defendant that the claim that the sum of SCRI ,500,000.00 remained unpaid by the Government seems to be founded purely on speculation on the part of Mr Hoareau, and not on any reliable information or evidence. In addition to his oral testimony he has produced the title deed which shows that the defendant had an obligation to pay an outstanding sum of SCRI ,500,000.00. This is obviously not sufficient to show non-payment of the debt by the defendant. [59] Counsel for the plaintiff also submitted that the fact that a charge is still registered against the property in favour of the plaintiff as well as a privilege adds credence to the plaintiffs case that the defendant has, in breach of the agreement, failed to make full payment of the purchase price, as agreed under the sale agreement. As stated, no evidence has been adduced as to the existence of a charge against the property. Furthermore, I fail to see how a privilege could add credence to the plaintiffs case that the defendant failed to pay the outstanding sum of SCRI ,500,000.00. Clause 4 of the deed of sale stipulates that: "The Government also grants to the Vendorsa Seller's Privilege under Article 2103 of the Civil Code to secure the payment of the outstanding sum of R.1,500,000". Article 2095 defines a privilege as "a right which the nature of the claim confers upon a creditor to enjoy a priority over other creditors, even those whose debts are secured by a mortgage". According to Article 2096 "[Ajmongst creditors entitled to aprivilegethe priority is settled in accordance with the class of privilege applicable ", and Article 2097 further provides that "[TJhe creditors entitled to a privilegeoj the same class shall bepaid inproportion to the amount oj their claims". The "Seller's Privilege" mentioned in the deed of sale is provided for in Article 2103 alinea 1 which provides that the seller of immovable property is entitled to a privilege on the immovable property sold, for the payment of the price. What this means is that if the Government were to sell Coetivy Island without having paid the plaintiff the outstanding sum of SCR.l ,500,000, the plaintiff would have priority over other creditors of the Government for the price paid to the Government for the sale of the island, in settlement of the outstanding sum owed to plaintiff by the Government. In the event of several successive sales, the plaintiff as the first seller would have priority over the second seller who in turn would have priority over the third seller and so on. This does not in any way show failure to pay the balance of the purchase price by the Government. [60] The defendant, on its part has not brought any evidence to show that it has discharged its obligation by paying its debt to the plaintiff. Mr Lablache the defendant's sole witness was unable to state with any certainty that the balance of SCR1,500,000.00 had been paid by the defendant or produce documentary evidence to show the same. He testified that payments were effected by the Treasury Department and not by the Ministry of Lands where he worked at the time. Although he had never come across a case where the Government had defaulted on its repayments for land purchases, he could not confirm that this had never happened. However, he was unaware of any default in regards to the repayments for Coetivy, nor had he seen any demand for payment for the same. Although he stated that he had found a letter giving instructions to the Chief Accountant and the Treasury to effect the payments, he stated that he was unable to obtain any records of such payments as the Treasury only kept such records for up to ten years. The letter was not produced. [61] This is obviously a situation envisaged by paragraph 113 Dalloz (supra) where "quand la balance reste en suspens, quand la verite meme cette verite restreinte que permet la procedure nepeut pas eire decouverte, c 'est alors qu 'il importe de determiner sur qui pese le fardeau de la preuve. [ ...] la carence de celle qui se trouve sous Ie coup de cette charge suffit a entrainer une decision favorable a son adversaire ". [62] Following the "presentation classique de I 'ordre de la preuve" as set out in Article 1315, the plaintiff having alleged non-payment, the defendant denied such allegation. The plaintiff is then required to bring evidence of such non-payment: he adduced evidence of the defendant's obligation to pay the sum of SCR1,500,OOO. OObut no evidence that the defendant had not paid that sum. The defendant in its tum did not bring any evidence to show that it had paid the said sum thereby discharging its obligation under the contract of sale. In light of the plaintiffs submission, this raises the question of whether it was sufficient for the plaintiff to bring proof of the obligation and not of its non-execution. [63] In Dalloz (supra) an examination of relevant "solutions jurisprudentielles" is carried out. I find that the following provide useful guidance: 141. 3°Inexecution d'une obligation. la prouver, ne presume-t-it pas - La responsabilite contractuelle suppose, pour sa mise en oeuvre, que soit etablie I 'inexecution totale ou partielle des obligations du debiteur. La preuve de cette inexecution incombe au creancier demandeur en interets. Un element de doute pourrait a cet egard, provenir de dommages- L'article 1315 lui-meme. En enoncant que celui qui reclame l'execution d'une de sorte qu'il obligation doit suffirait au creancier d 'etablir 1'existence de 1'obligation et, que ce sera it au distingue I 'action en I 'execution? Mais la jurisprudence debiteur execution de I 'obligation regie directement par I 'article 1315, et I 'action en - interets pour inexecution be I 'obligation. Dans ce dernier cas, Ie dommages c 'est-a-dire demandeur doit etablir toutes les conditions de la responsabilite, outre I 'existence de 1 'obligation, Ie fait de I'inexecution (par ex. .' Com. 22 mars 1977, Bull. Civ. IV, n092). l'inexecution, de prouver [64] The plaintiff in the present case has not filed an "action en dommages - interets pour inexecution be I 'obligation" presumably under Article 1146, for which, it would seem from what is stated at paragraph 141 above, that he would have to prove both the existence of the obligation and "le fait de I 'inexecution". It appears therefore that the plaintiff only has to prove the existence of the defendant's obligation to discharge its burden. The plaintiff having done so, the defendant bearing the "risques de la charge" of proving that it has discharged its obligation, has to prove the execution of its obligation i.e. the payment of the outstanding sum of SCRI ,500,000. Failing that "la carence de celle qui se trouve sous le coup de cette charge [i.e. sur qui pese le fardeau de la preuve} sufjit a entrafner une decision favorable a son adversaire ", and for judgment given against the defendant. [65] The following "solutions jurisprudentielles" relating to "[Ejxceptions opposees a la demande" are also relevant to the present case: en decidant que le gerant 144. 4° Exceptions opposees a la demande. - La question de la liberation du debiteur est directement reglee par I 'article 1315 du code civil, selon lequel celui qui se pretend libere doit justifier le paiement ou Iefait qui a produit I 'extinction de son obligation. Ainsi, doit-etre censure un arret qui, pour debouter une salariee de sa demande en paiement d'indemnites de transport, que son employeur soutenait avoir toujours versees, se contente d'observer que cette employee n 'apporte pas de justifications a I 'appui de sa demande .' la charge de la preuve du paiement incombait a I 'employeur qui se pretendait libere (Soc. 4 mai 1966, Bull. civ. IV, n0406). Des lors qu 'un gerant non salarie de succursale a reconnu, en signant des bordereaux de livraison correspondants, avoir recu les marchandises dont Ie lui est reclame par la societe succursaliste et qu 'il ne justifie ni de leur reglement les juges du fond ne renversent pas la charge de restitution ni de leur paiement, la preuve reste debiteur de la valeur de ces (Com. 13 nov. 1972, Bull. civ. IV, n" 287, J. C. P. 1973, II 1,7468, marchandises note J. H). C 'est au bailleur, tenu de delivrer au preneur la chose louee, qu'il appartient de prouver qu 'il s 'est libere de cette obligation, et lorsque Ie preneur le bailleur doit etablir qu'il a satisfait allegue une delivrance partie lie, entierement ason obligation (Civ. 30 oct. 1972, Bull. Civ. Ill, n" 563). Des associes doivent prouver la realite de leurs apports bien qu 'its soient defendeurs a L'instance, car etant debiteurs envers la societe de tout ce qu 'its avaient promis d'y apporter, leur liberation (Civ. l=juill. 1971,Bull. civ. III, n" 438). La preuve de la novation de la dette par changement de debiteur principale incombe a un donneur d'aval qui se pretend ainsi libere du paiement d'une letter de change (Com. 26 juin. 1972, Bull. civ. IV, n" 202). II appartient a une partie qui a ete condamnee a faire cesser des troubles de voisinage et a payer aux demandeurs une somme fixee par jour de retard, de justifier avoir mis fin aux trouble, fait qui aura it produit I 'extinction de son obligation ainsi judiciairement determine (Civ. 15 dec. 1971, Bull. Civ. III, n" 632). Meme lorsqu 'une convention autorise le creancier a prelever d'ofjice a chaque echeance les sommes dues sur le compte bancaire du debiteur, ce n 'est pas au creancier qu 'il incombe d'etablr ils alleguent que sa creance ne peut etre honoree faute de provision, mais c 'est au debiteur qui se pretend libered'en justifier (Com. 26 oct. 1976, Bull. civ. IV, n° 272 D. 1977. 490, noteCabrillac, J C. P. 1978. II 18832, note Lucas de Leyssac). [...} 147. D 'une facon generate, la preuve. Ainsi en est-it il resulte de I 'article 1315, alinea 2, du code civil, que si Ie defendeur oppose une exception a la demande de son adversaire, il doit en lorsqu 'un acheteur pretend echapper a rapporter I 'obligation de payer le prix en alleguant le defaut de conformite de marchandises a la commande (Com. 27 avr. 1966, Bull. civ. III, n? 206 " 14 oct. 1969, ibid. IV, n" 294) " lorsque le maftre de I 'ouvrage, assigne en paiement du solde du prix des travaux, allegue des malfacons (Com. 21 juin. 1965, Bull. civ. III, n° 385) " lorsqu 'un acquereur, assigne en restitution de la somme a valoir sur le prix d'une en vente non realisee, pretendant que le versement a ete fait atitre de dedit (Civ. 21 juin. 1968, Bull. Civ. III, n° 296) [ ...}. tente de se soustraire a I 'obligation de remboursement [66] In view of all the above, it appears as contended by the plaintiff that, in terms of Article 1315, the plaintiff only has to prove the obligation of the defendant i.e. the obligation to pay the outstanding sum of SCR 1,500,000.00, and having done that it is for the defendant to prove that he has paid the sum. This view is confirmed in Precis Dalloz, Droit Civil, Les obligations, 8 e edition, p. 1255, on the subject of proof of payment ("Preuve du paiement'') (See also Dalloz Encyclopedie Juridique, Repertoire de Droit Civil, 2 e Edition, Tome VI, Paiement), as follows: 1354. 10 Charge de fa preuve 0 II resulte des termes de I 'article 1315 du Code Civil la preuve de I 'existence de que, s'il appartient au creancier de rapporter I 'obligation dont it entend obtenir I 'execution, Ie debiteur peut y echapper en prouvant que I 'obligation est eteinte par une cause quelconque, en particular par Ie paiement qu 'il pretend avoir fait. [67] As to how such proof is to be brought, it is stated at pp. 1256 and 1257 that: 1355. 2°Modes de preuve 0 II est generalement admis que s 'applique au paiement Ie droit commun de la preuve des actes juridiques et qu 'un ecrit doit done etre produit des lors que fa somme a payer ou la valeur de I 'objet de I 'obligation depasse le seuil prevu a I 'article 1341 du code civil. Cette solution se justifie si, conformement a la doctrine dominante, Ie paiement doit etre pleinement considere comme un actejuridique. [...] Conformement au droit commun, l'exigence d'une preuve ecrite, cesse si Ie debiteur se trouve dans l'impossibilite materielle ou morale de rapporter une preuve de cette nature (art.1348}. II en est ainsi nottament s'il existe entre Le creancier et le debiteur des liens de subordination ou de parente empechant le debiteur de requerir une quittance de son paiement. Lajurisprudence reconnait aussi que les usages interdisent de demander quittance du paiement d'honoraires dans certaines professions liberals. La preuve du paiement peut alors eirefaite par tous moyens. [68] It is noted that Article 1341 of our Civil Code also requires proofby documentary evidence for "any matter the value of which exceeds 5000 Rupees" and prohibits oral evidence against such writing, subject to the exceptions provided under Articles 1347 (where there is writing providing initial proof) and 1348(where it is impossible for the creditor to obtain written proof of an obligation undertaken towards him in certain prescribed circumstances). It is doubtful that the fact that the defendant was unable to bring any evidence of payment of the sum claimed because of the time that has elapsed, would be considered as an "impossibilite materielle ou morale" justifying proof by means other than a writing as required by Article 1341. In any event, no proof of any kind was brought to show such payment. Mr Lablache's testimony in that regard was at best, equivocal. [69] In view of the above, I find that the plaintiff having proved the debt of the defendant, and the latter having failed to prove that it has paid that debt in accordance with Article 1315, the plaintiff has made out its case on a balance of probabilities. Remedies [70] The remedies sought by the plaintiff in terms of the plaint are rescission of the contract of sale and, in the alternative, the payment of the sum of SCRI ,500,000.00 which is alleged to remain unpaid by the defendant, with interest. [71] The plaintiff, in its submissions dated 8th January 2021, relied on the following excerpt from the majority judgment (per Twomey JA, Msoffe JA concurring) in the COUliof Appeal case of Charlemagne Grandcourt and others vs Christopher Gill (SCA 7 of2011) [2012] SCCA 31 (07 December 2012): 12. It is true that the deceased was right to avail of the provisions of the Civil Code in until 19th May 1994. This right of non is contained in Article 1612 of the Civil (non adimpleti contractus) relation to I' exception d'inexecution performance code of Seychelles: "The vendor shall not be bound to deliver the thing if the purchaser has not paid the price, provided that the vendor has not granted him time J). [72] On that basis it submitted that in the present case, given the thing had already been delivered even though the purchaser had not paid the price, the vendor/ seller is conversely entitled to demand the thing delivered from the buyer, subject to the refund of the part payment of the purchase price. The plaintiff does not state in its submissions, the legal provision on the basis of which he makes this demand. It would seem that he is relying on some sort of reverse application of the "exception d'inexecution J). In any event, such remedy is not sought for in the plaint and can therefore not be granted, both the parties and the court being bound by the pleadings. Furthermore, it does not seem that this solution is possible from the following in Droit civil, Les Obligations, 8 eedition, Editions Dalloz- 2002 in regards to "I 'exception d'inexecution J).: 630. Definition 0 En principe, les prestations promises par les contractants doivent etre executees simultanement, trait par trait. Par exemple I 'acheteur doit payer le prix en mime temps qu 'il prend livraison de la chose, ou encore chaque coechangiste doit livrer la chose au mime moment. II en resulte que, si I 'un des contractants reclame I 'execution de ce qui lui est du sans pour autant payer ce sa proper prestation en qu'il doit, I 'autre contractant peut refuser d'executer non lui opposant termes, adimpleti contractus it un contrat 1'exception d'inexecution la prestation it laquelle elle est tenue synallagmatique de refuser d'executer tant qu 'elle n 'a pas recu la prestation qui lui est due ... r ..} L 'exception d'inexecution entrafne non la disparition des obligations, mais un simple ajournement de leur execution. Elle ne detruit pas Ie contrat, mais en nommee inexecute). En d'autres le droit qu 'a chaque partie (exception du contrat d'inexecution, l'exception exception encore est suspend I 'execution. Le contractant entend ainsi se garantir contre la situation ires defavorable dans laquelle le placerait une execution unilaterale de ses obligations etfa ire pression sur son partenaire pour I 'amener a s 'executer. La situation qui resulte du jeu de I'exception d'inexecution est provisoire: soit Ie moyen de pression se revele e(ficace, et chaque partenaire execute finalement ses obligations, soil I'inexecution apparaft definitive et on aura recours a la resolution pour inexecution afin de denouer la situation. [73] It would seem that the return of the property to the plaintiff with the corresponding refund to the defendant of the sums already paid, by application of the remedy of "exception d'inexecution" does not find its application simply because the vendor has already executed its obligation of delivery. Furthermore, it is only a temporary relief. This is confirmed by Twomey JA in Charlemagne Grandcourt and others vs Christopher Gill (supra) when she states: 12. [ ..} When thepurchaser does not makepayment for the goods or property sold, the vendor can resort to non performance, in this case refuse to transfer the land However, that right of non-performance is only temporary it only suspends the obligation of the vendor not to transfer untilpayment of the contract price [...} [74] The plaintiff, in its submissions further relied on Article 1658 alinea 1 to submit that it has the right to rescind the contract "by reason of insufficiency of the price". Article 1658 provides: Article 1658 1. Apartfrom the grounds of nullily or rescission already explained in this Title, and those which are common to all contracts, the contract of sale may be rescinded by the exercise of the option to redeem and by reason of the insu(ficiency o{the price. [75] Suffice it to say the issue of "insufficiency of the price" does not arise in the present case. The reference'thereto in Article 1658 alinea 1 is clearly made in the context of rescission for lesion, which is dealt with in the subsequent Articles 1674 to 1684. The pleadings in this case do not disclose an action for rescission for lesion. [76] The defendant has also raised the point in its submissions dated 11th June 2024 that the plaintiffs claim should not be treated as an action en revendication. I agree. The pleadings do not disclose such an action. In Nolin v Nolin (SCA 4 of 2014) [2016] SCCA 13 (22 April 2016), Twomey JA explained that: 13. In practical is called upon to determine which title overrides terms, a classical case of "action en revendication JJ would start off with each proprietor coming to court with a competing document of title where the court the other. There are variations of this standard scenario admittedly. As the Doctrine lays down: "la JJ Note 47, question posee est uniquement celle de la preuve du droit de propriete. Encyclopedic Dalloz, ibid. In an action en revendication, the sole issue is the right of ownership between competing title-holders. [77] Finally, counsel for the plaintiff, invokes Articles 1183 and 1184 to ground his prayer for rescission; These Articles provide, in relevant part: Article 1183 A condition subsequent is the condition which, whenfulfilled, rescinds the obligation and restores the things in the same state as they would have been if the obligation had never existed It does not suspend the performance of the obligation; it only binds the creditor to restore what he has received, if the event envisaged by the condition occurs. Article 1184 1. A condition subsequent shall always be implied in bilateral contracts in case either of the parties does not perform his undertaking. [...} In that case, the contract shall not be rescinded by operation of law. The party towards is not fulfilled may elect either to demand execution of the whom the undertaking contract, If a contract is only the Court may decide whether the contract shall be rescinded or partially performed, to the payment of damages to the extent of the whether it may be confirmed subject The Court shall be entitled to take into account any failure of performance. partial if that is possible, or to apply for rescission and damages. fraud or negligence of a contracting party. Rescission must be obtained through proceedings but the defendant may be granted time according to the circumstances. [...} [78] In his submissions on behalf of the plaintiff, counsel again relied on Charlemagne Grandcourt and others vs Christopher Gill (supra), in particular the following per Twomey l. A, after she had carried out a review of relevant legal provisions namely Articles 1583, 1134,1183, and 1184: 13. The comment on Article 1183 in Dalloz Codes Annotes, Nouveau Code Civil III states: "La condition resolutoire est celle qui, lorsqu 'elle s 'accomplit, opere la revocation de I 'obligation, ce qui remet les choses au meme etat que si I 'obligation n 'avait pas existe. Elle ne suspend point I 'execution de I 'obligation: elle oblige seulement Ie creancier a restituer ce qu 'il a recu, dans le cas ou I 'evenementprevu par la condition arrive. " 14. From the above we can summarise: 1. Contracts are of an obligatory nature. 2. Contracts cannot be unilaterally revoked. 3. Where a party to a bi-lateral contractfails to perform his obligation, the other party can suspend the performance of his own obligation but only until the other party performs his corresponding obligation. 4. Wherea party to a contractfails toperform his obligation, the otherparty cannot of his own rescind the contract, he must seek the remedy in court. The exceptions to this rule are commercial contracts and contracts where theparties have inserted a term in the contract providing for rescission. [. .. J 15. lfwe are to apply theseprinciples to thepresent case it is clear that the Respondent breached the contract by not paying the last instalment on time. The letters of 4th and 5th May indicate that he was given time to meet his obligation. The deceased would have been entitled to bring an action under article 1183 of the Civil Code to bring an actionfor rescission and damages. This he did not do. [79] On the basis of the above pronouncements by Twomey lA, counsel for the plaintiff submits that contrary to the case of Charlemagne Grandcourt and others vs Christopher Gill (supra) where the remedy sought by the plaintiff was for specific performance under article 1142 of the Civil Code, in the present case the plaintiff has brought an action for rescission of the contract on the basis of the breach of the contract of sale by the defendant pursuant to Articles 1183 and 1184, as he is entitled to do. It is to be noted that the primary remedy sought is for rescission but that the plaintiff has also prayed for specific performance in the alternative i.e. the payment of the balance of the purchase price. [80] Counsel further submitted that the condition subsequent implied in the contract of sale, as per Article 1184, was for the defendant to make monthly instalment payments of SCR300,000.00 until all payments due were made, and that the defendant, in breach of the contract failed to do so. In Estate of the late Andre Delhomme & Ors vAG (CS 79/2020) [2021] SCSC 227 (18 May 2021) at paras [82] to [83] this Court explained the following in regards to the condition subsequent: "fa] condition subsequent that in case either of 81. So much for the condition precedent. 1now turn to Article 1184 alinea 1 which shall always be implied in bilateral the parties does not perform his undertaking". A is defined in Article 1168 as a of which cancels provides contracts condition subsequent future and uncertain event the obligation which is subject the occurrence or non-occurrence to such condition. resolutoire") ("condition 82. The plaintiff claims that the defendant has failed to pay the outstanding sum of Rupees One Million Five Hundred Thousand (Rl,500, 000. 00) due under the deed of sale. In terms of Article 1184 alinea 1, the non-performance by the defendant of its obligation to pay the price amounts to a condition subsequent. The non-payment ofthe price by the defendant is the event which gives rise to the cancellation of the defendant's obligation in terms of Article 1168. of the non-payment 83. According to Article 1183 the effect of the fulfilment ofthe condition subsequent 0.e. the the price by the defendant) obligation and restoration of things in the same state as they would have been if the obligation had never existed. of the if the event obligation but only binds the creditor to restore what he has received, envisaged by the condition occurs. It does not suspend the performance is the rescission of [81] Dalloz, Encyclopedie Juridigue, Repertoire de Droit Civil, 2 c Edition, Tome VlI, Vente (l'obligations de I'achetcur), CHP. 2 - Resolution pour inexecution des obligations de I'acheteur explains that: 106. Le code civil a specialement prevu la resolution de la vente pour defaut de paiement du prix (art. 1654), car Ie prix est I 'obligation de I 'acheteur la plus importante [oo. J 107. Lorsqu 'un acheteur ne paye pas le prix a I 'echeance, le vendeur peut, soit agir en paiement par les modes de contrainte du droit commun, soit agir en resolution, soit opposer une des guaranties que lui confere la loi: I 'exception d'inexecution, Ie droit de retention lorsqu 'il s 'agit d'un meuble, Ie privilege du vendeur. [82] It goes on to explain that: 109. En principe, lorsque I 'une des parties ne satisfera pas a son engagement, la resolution de la vente pour defaut de paiement du prix doit etre .' « si prononcee par jugement. Aux termes de I 'article 1654 du code civil I 'acheteur ne paye pas Ie prix, le vendeur peut demander la resolution de la vente ». Regle qui applique le principe general pose par l 'article 1184 du code civil, selon lequel, le contrat n 'est pas resolu de plein droit " « la resolution doit eire demandee en justice, et il peut etre accorde au defendeur un delai selon les circonstances ». L 'article 1655 du code civil reproduit cette regie pour la vente d'immeubles. « La resolution de la vente d'immeubles est prononcee de suite, si le vendeur est en danger de perdre la chose et Ie prix. Si ce danger n 'existe pas, Ie juge peut accorder a I 'acquereur un delai plus ou moins long suivant les circonstances. Ce delai passe la resolution de la vente sera prononcee ». sans que I 'acquereur ait paye, [83] Articles 1654 and 1655 are referred to in Dalloz (supra) (see paragraph [80] of this judgment) in regards to rescission for non-payment of the price. It is stated that Article 1654 applies the general principle enunciated in Article 1184. These provisions provide as follows: Article 1654 1. lfthe buyer does not pay the price, the seller may demand rescission of the sale. 2. However, after the extinction of any privilege that the seller may have upon the property, his right to claim rescission cannot be exercised to the detriment of third parties having over the property to which the privilege applied rights derived from the purchaser, and having conformed to the lawfor preserving their said rights. Article 1655 The rescission of the sale of immovablesshall be ordered forthwith if the seller is in danger of losing both the thing and theprice. If that danger does not exist, the Judge may grant to the buyer a time-limit, long or short, according to the circumstances. If this time-limit expires without the buyer having paid, the rescission of the contract shall be ordered [84] This Court found at para [69] that the plaintiff had made out its case on a balance of probabilities. [85] The plaintiff has prayed for rescission of the contract of sale in terms of Article 1184. In the alternative it prays for the payment of the sum of SCR1,500,000.00 which is alleged to remain unpaid by the defendant, with interest. [86] Under Article 1184 the plaintiff is entitled to "elect either to demand execution of the contract, if that ispossible, or to applyfor rescission and damages ". The plaintiff has opted for rescission. Article 1184 further provides that "[iJfa contract is only partiallyper(ormed the Court may decide whether the contract shall be rescinded or whether it may be confzrmed, subject to the payment of damages to the extent of the partial failure of performance ", and further that "[tJhe Court shall be entitled to take into account anyfraud or negligenceof a contractingparty ". It appears that in the case of partial performance of the defaulting parties' obligation, as is the case here, the Court is given the power to decide whether to order rescission of the contract or to confirm the contract subject to payment of damages, notwithstanding that the plaintiff s claim is for rescission (although I do take note that there is a claim for payment of the outstanding sum with interest in the alternative). [87] In Ceccaldi c. Albertini Civ. 14 avril 1891 the Cour de Cassation held that: if appartient aux Lorsque Ie contrat ne contient aucune clause expresse de resolution, tribunaux de rechercher, dans les termes du contrat et dans l'intention des parties, quelles sont I 'etendue et la portee de I 'engagement souscrit par celle d 'entre elles, qui y aurait manque completement, et, en cas d 'inexecutionpartielle, d 'apprecier, d 'apres les circonstances de fait, si ceUe inexecution a assez d'importance pour entrafner la resolution ou si eUe ne sera pas sufJisament reparee par une condamnation a des dommages-interets; et, a cet egard, Ie pouvoir d'appreciation des juges du fait est souverain(C civ., art. 1184}. [88] In the circumstances of the present case, the entire purchase price amounted to SCR4,000,000.00, out of which the larger sum ofSCR2,500,000.00 was paid and a sum of SCR1,500,000 remained to be paid. The court based its finding that the plaintiff had proved its case on the basis of Article 1315 which imposed on the defendant proof that it had paid the outstanding balance of the purchase price. This suit was filed some forty years after the sale of Coetivy Island, and the defendant claims that it was unable to bring any evidence that it had settled the outstanding balance because such evidence is not kept for such a long period, which is a plausible explanation. Mr Hoareau's testimony regarding the non payment of the balance of the purchase price was less than convincing. I also note that no fraud or negligence on the part of the defendant has been alleged or proven by the plaintiff. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the partial failure of the defendant to perform its obligation does not warrant the rescission of the contract, especially given the long period that has elapsed since the purchase of the property by the defendant. The payment of damages to the plaintiff to the extent of the partial failure of performance of the defendant, is in my view sufficient. Accordingly, I decline to order rescission of the contract of sale. [89] The plaintiff is entitled, in terms of Article 1184,to the sum of SCR1,500,000.00 being the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the property. The plaintiff has claimed interest at the commercial rate of 12% from the date of the contract of sale 13th December 1979until date of judgment. Under the Interest Act, Cap 100, unless the interest rate is fixed by contract, the legal rate of interest in civil or commercial matters is 4% per annum. No interest rate having been stipulated in the sale agreement, the legal rate of 4% is the applicable rate. The defendant not having been served with a mise en demeure prior to the filing of this suit, interest shall run as from the date of filing of this suit i.e. 24th August 2020 until payment is effected. In that regard Dalloz, Encyclopedie Juridigue, Repertoire de Droit Civil, 2 eEdition, Tome VB, Vente (I'obligations de I'acheteur), CRP. 2 - Resolution pour inexecution des obligations de l'acheteur states that: 185. II n 'est pas necessaire que la demande en resolution soit precedee d'une mise en somme d 'avoir a payer Ie prix, demeure, ou que I 'acheteur ait he prealablement car l 'assignation vaut mise en demeure (Com. 28fevr. 1972, D.1972. Somm.140, Bull. civ. IV, n" 75 " Civ. 6fevr. 1973, ibid III, n °95). [90] Accordingly, I make the following orders: B. The defendant shall, not later than two month from the date of this judgment, pay to the plaintiff the sum of SCRl,500,000.00 with interest at the rate of 4% per annum as from the date of filing of this suit i.e. 24th August 2020 up to the date of payment. C. Each party shall bear its own costs. Signed, dated and delivered at Ile du Port on 28 March 2025. Carolus J 41