The People v Antifellow Chigabba (APPEAL NO. 32/2016) [2017] ZMSC 305 (5 December 2017)

SELECTED JUDGMENT N . 54 OF 2017 P.1873 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ZAMBIA APPEA NO. 32/2016 HOLDEN AT KABWE\NDOLA (Criminal Jurisdiction) THE PEOPLE AND APPE LANT ANTIFELLOW CHIGABBA ! RESP NDENT CORAM: Muyovwe, Kabuka, Chinyama, JJS on the 4 th October , 2016; 1 s t November, 2016 and 5 th December, 2017. FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mrs. R. Khuzwayo, C ief State Advocate. Mr. K. Muzenga, Dep ty Director, Legal Aid Board. JUDGMENT Kabuka JS, delivered the Judgment of the Court Cases referred to: 1. Mwewa Murono v The People (2004) Z. R. 207 (S ). P.1874 2. Chizu v the People (1979) Z. R.225 (SC) . 3. Kambarange Mpundu Kaunda v The People (1992) S. J. J (SC) . 4 . The People v Njapau (1967) Z. R. 95 . 5 . The People v The Principal Resident Magistrate Ex Par , Faustin Kabwe and Aaron Chungu (2009) Z. R.170 (SC) . 6. Jackson Kayuni and Another v. the People, Appeals N . 251 and 252 of 2011. 7. Simon Malambo Choka v. The People (1978) Z. R. 243 ( ). 8. Shamwana and 7 Others v. The People ( 1985) ZR 41 9 . Patrick Brian Baker 119771 65 Cri App R 278. 10. Yokomiya Mwale v The People Appeal No. 205/2014. 11. Mukena v The People, SCZ Appeal No. 128/2009. 12 . Guardic Kamoya Klavwana v The People SCZ Appeal N . 84/2015. Legislation referred to: The Penal Code Cap. 87 S.200 Th e Crimina l Proced u re Code Cap.88 S.291 ( 1) The respondent was acquitted on a finding of no case to answer and the State h as a ppealed against that findi g. The background to the matter is that the r spondent was charged on two counts of murder, contrary to sect on 200 of the Penal Code Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia. Pa tic~lars of the J2 P.1875 offence alleged that, on the 22nd of September, 2014 at Choma, the respondent murdered two children, named Event S mbulyani and Ettrick Simbulyani. At the trial of the matter, the prosecution calle six witnesses and closed their case. The gist of the prosecution evidence was that, in the night of 22nd September, 2 014 the two deceased children re sleeping in their home in Chigaba village with three other sibli 20:00 hours the entrance door to the house which as not locked, was pushed open and the respondent in this appeal, ANTIFELLOW CHIGABA, entered unannounced. He was apparentl in a rage and ranting that, the children's father had made his ife difficult by persistently reporting him to the police, in connectio with offences related to cattle rustling. In the process, he also uttered death threats on the lives of the children. The responden kept entering and coming out of the house fetching grass from a atched house that was nearby. Upon bringing the grass insid he placed it randomly, everywhere. J3 P.1876 Finally, the respondent came to the windo with burning coals, which he threw onto the grass and ignited a fire. The three older children managed to escape and ran to diffi rent homes of their relatives to seek help. When people came to elp out, it was too late to save the two younger children who had mained in the 'r. house and only their charred remains were recove ed from there, the following morning. The two oldest children testified as PW 1 and PW2 and were both categorical in their evidence, that it was the r spondent they saw set fire to their house that night. They said he w s their relative who had also b een their neighbour for five year , prior to the incident. That he often came to their home to borro their father's bicycle and the ir re la tionship with him was cordial. When they were questioned in cross-examina ion as to why they did not mention the name of their assailant o the relatives from whom they had gone to seek help; the two itnesses were adamant in their answer, that it is the respondent w J4 P.1877 house on fire. They said they were able to see him ith the aid of light emanating from the two solar bulbs in the ho se which were lit at the material time and there was further light rovided by the fire, when the house started burning. The two also aid, they gave this information to the police in their statement recorded the following morning, the 23 rd of September, 2014. In his evidence given at the trial, the father t the deceased children (PW4) , confirmed that the respondent wa his uncle. He further confirmed that in his capacity as a ember of the Community Crime Prevention Unit (CCPU), he h reported the respondent to the police previously for cattle rust! ng. He further confirmed that, the said reports had soured their rel tionship. The arresting officer, Innocent Kambelembel (PW6) in his evidence said that, on the 23rd of September, 20 4, he met the survivors who had been in the house during the He later apprehended the respondent with the help of the c munity. After he interviewed him in connection with the arson tha resulted in the JS P.1878 death of the two children, the respondent denied kn wing anything about it. Dissatisfied with his response, PW6 char ed him with 2 counts of murder. PW6 admitted that he did not record the de cription of the (-& respondent that wa s given to him when taking <low the statement from PW2, but denied that this was a case of mist n identity. His explanation was that, the respondent was a well- own person m the sam e village whe re h e lived with the very rsons he had attacke d . This was t h e su bsta n ce of the prosecution evi nee which was b efore the tria l court and on which the learned tri 1 judge found a prima facie case not esta blis h ed against the respo dent. The view taken by the tria l judge in making tha t fin ing, was that prosecution eviden ce was unsatis fa ctory in the follo ing aspects : (a) The identification of the assailant; (b) The pros ecution relied on the evidence of PW 1 a d PW2, whom the judge found to be s uspect witnes s es; J6 P.1879 (c) The only corrobora tive evidence was also from susp t witnesses; (d) The inadequacy of scenes of crime evidence where o ly one side of the house where there w ere actually no windows wasp otographed and not the side where there was a window to which t e witnesses could have been referring in their evidence; (e) Failure by the police to finish or properly conduct th investigations. The State has advan ced two grounds of appe to this Court, against the finding of no case to answer, which a stated in the following terms: 1. the trial court e rred in law and fact when held that the prosecution evidence on record could not establ sh a prima facie case against the respondent. 2 . the trial court erred in law and fact when ·t made a final assessment as to the credibility of the wit esses and their (f.._ f truthfulness at no case to answer stage. The learned State Advocate Mrs. Khuzwayo rgue d the two grounds of appeal together. She p roceeded from t e premise that, the ingredients of the offence of murder contrary to ection 200 are that, the death of a person must have been caused y an unlawful J7 P. 1880 act or omission on the part of the accused, who lso acted with malice aforethought. Counsel contended that, in th present case, the home of the two deceased persons was set on fir at night whilst the two were in there, sleeping and the two died fro severe burns. She referred to the definition of malice aforethou ht as given in section 204, the relevant parts of which state that: 204. Malice aforethought shall be deemed to b established by evidence proving any one or more circumstances: f the following (a) ....... . . (b) knowled e that the act or omission ea death will erson whether such erson actuall killed or not, although such knowledg is accompanied by indifference whether death or grie ous bodily harm is caused or not, or by a wish tha it may not be caused; (Und erlining supplied) Counsel argued that, in terms of the sect on 204 (b) as quoted above, the person who set the house on fir in the present appeal, was indifferent as to whether death or caused to the occupants; as the person ought to hav known but J8 P.1881 did not care, that the house was occupied by the inh bitants. It was also her argument that, two members of this fami who escaped from the fire and testified as PWl and PW2, identified the respondent as the person who set their house on e. She further argued that evidence obtained through cross-exam· ation of these witnesses by Defence Counsel revealed that the spondent had differed with PW4, the father of the deceased child n who had on previous occasions, reported the respondent to the police over his involvement in cattle rustling activities. It was Counsel's submission that, the evidence adduced by the prosecution h a d established a prima facie ea e against the respondent. She noted that, in proving a primafade case against an accused person, the prosecution need only establis that there is a link between the accused and the offence commi ed; as the law does not require the case to be proved beyond reas nable doubt at this stage. Counsel referred us to our decision in M ewa Murono v The People 1 where we held that, a finding of no cas to answer is J9 P.1881 did not care, that the house was occupied by the inh bitants. It was also her argument that, two members of this fami who escaped from the fire and testified as PW 1 and PW2, identified the respondent as the person who set their house on e. She further argued that evidence obtained through cross-exam· ation of these witnesses by Defence Counsel revealed that the spondent had differed with PW4, the father of the deceased child n who had on previous occasions, reported the respondent to the police over his involvement in cattle rustling activities. It was Counsel's submission that, the evidence adduced by the prosecution had established a prima facie ea e against the respondent. She noted that, in proving a prima f acie case against an ,r:_r accused person, the prosecution need only establis that there is a link between the accused and the offence commi ed ; as the law does not require the case to be proved beyond reas nable doubt at this stage. Counsel referred us to our decision in M ewa Murano v The People 1 where we held that, a finding of no cas to answer is J9 P.1883 In addressing the position taken by the leamefi trial judge as i expressed in the ruling that, since PW 1 and PW2 wet e related to the deceased, they were suspect witnesses and their evii.dence required i, to be corroborated before it could be relied upon. Counsel argued \ ' that, the said relationship notwithstanding, there \:fas no evidence I placed on record which revealed that the two, i~ addition, had ; j interests of their own to serve, concerning th1s matter. The submission was that, they therefore had no mbtive to falsely implicate the respondent. I i l I Counsel went on to submit that, the facts ~f this case are distinguishable from those of Kambarange Mpundq Kaunda v The I ' People3 where the witnesses were related to the dec~ased, only; and l in addition, they had equally been picked up b~ the police in connection with the death of their said relative. She noted that in ' the present case, PWl and PW2, are related to bottj the respondent ' and the deceased; and that they both had no ~ersonal grudge I i ' \ i against the respondent for them to falsely implicate ;him. She I i I ! Jl 1 P.1884 I . pointed to evidence in cross- examination, where thr two witnesses had infact said they had a cordial relationship with re respondent. i That they further said the person with whom the respondent had a personal grudge was PW4, who as a CCPU membef, had reported him to the police despite being his relative. i I f I i J Counsel concluded by submitting that, wherd witnesses are related to both the victim and the accused, ! the need for corroboration does not arise, particularly in cases Jiere it has not been established that the witnesses had a m t ve to falsely implicate the accused. Reference was made to the evidence, as l earlier in this judgment set out and it was submitt d that, in the face of proof of the elements of the offence of rpurder by the I prosecution and the credible evidence of the witnedses, there was I ! no basis on which the lower court made a findingi of no case to ! I j ! I I I I I I answer. We were accordingly urged to find that, on the ~vidence led by the prosecution, a primafacie· case had been made o~ t against the I ! Jl2 P.1885 respondent and that he should have properly bee:p found with a : i i i case to answer in terms of the Criminal Procedure Code section 291 (1). The cases of Mwewa Murono 1 and The Pef>ple v Njapau4 were cited in support of the submission. In response to those submissions, learned tjounsel for the ! respondent identified the first issue to be resolved i:tj this appeal as whether or not an appeal can lie against a finding made by a trial court on determination of whether or not a case to answer has been established against the accused 1 pursuant to sections 206 and 291 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Couns~l relied on the following observations of this Court which were mad 1 in the case of I Mwewa Murono 1 that: "Section 206 should be read together with section 2 1(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 291 (1) provides tp.at: - ! 291 (1) "When evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution has been concluded, and the statement or evidence 1 (if any) of the accused person before the committing court ha~ been given in evidence, the court, if it considers that there is no evidence that I the accused or any one of several accused committed the offence I Jl3 ! I t ! I l I P.1886 shall, after hearing, if necessary, any arguments w!Jich the advocate for the prosecution or the defence may desire to isubmit, record a finding. The judge on considering that there is no evidence 'that the accused or any one of several accused committed the off~nce must acquit the accused. The finding must show that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence followed by an1 order acquitting the accused." Counsel for the respondent made further r<tference to the decision in the case of The People v The Principal Resident Magistrate Ex Parte, Faustin Kabwe and Aaron Chungu5 where • we held to the effect that, there are no interlocu1ory appeals in I criminal matters. And, that a trial court is obliged o give reasons for acquitting an accused person on a finding of no ase to answer. Accordingly, Counsel's submission was that , the prJ sent appeal by the State, is incom petent and must be dismissed. It was argued in the alternative that, the coutt was on firm I I ground when it acquitted the respondent at case to a~swer stage as l the decision to do so was based on the court's impression and i appearance of the evidence b efore it. The question be~ng: whether a \ Jl4 ! i l I I ! l I ( I i reasonable tribunal could convict on the evidence µdduced by the I P.1887 prosecution at that stage. That this is what prompted the trial court i I to consider the evidence that was adduced, analys~ the credibility I thereof, come to a conclusion that the prosecµtion had not sufficiently made out its case and accordingly, \ acquitted the I I I respondent. The submission was that, the trial )court's finding cannot be faulted. I i • Regarding the requirement for corroboration cpf the evidence f I which came from suspect witnesses, Counsel rtferred to the I ) I observations which we made in Jackson Kayuni ahd Another v. I The People6 when we said : "It is common cause that, PW3 the only eye witness ~o the said beating was a biological son of the deceased. A~ such, he can properly be classified as a witness with interest ~f his to serve. I Such a witness should be treated as if he were an acyomplice". Counsel further referred to the case of Sin!,.on Malambo Choka v The People7 as held that: I "(i) A witness with a possible interest of his own to sJrve should be I < J15 P.1888 treated as if he were an accomplice to the j extent that his evidence requires corroboration or something nr-ore than a belief in the truth thereof based simply on his detjleanour and the plausibility of his evidence. That "something mpre" must satisfy l the court that the danger that the accused : is being falsely implicated has been excluded and that it is safe to rely on the evidence of the suspect witness.'' The submissions by Counsel were that, hav.ing considered PWl and PW2 to be witnesses with their own possible interest to serve, their evidence could not stand in the absence bf corroborative f evidence or evidence of 'something more'. That t i learned trial judge could, therefore , not be faulted for not r dlying on their evidence. Counsel further argued that, assessing thel credibility of witnesses should not be done at case to answer st~ge if the trial I court will find an accused person with a case to ansr er, as in that scenario, the trial Court should reserve the issue fo~ consideration ! to the end of the trial. The case of Sham wana and 7 , Others v The People8 was cited as authority. His submission was rat, in the t I l I ! l Jl6 I ! l I I l l I I P.1889 present case, the trial court was entitled to jembark on the assessment of the credibility of witnesses since t~e nature of the I ruling or finding he made, brought the casej to its finality. I I Respondent's Counsel closed his submissions by ueferring to obiter I remarks from the case of The Principal Resident Magistrate5 , that ' there are no interlocutory appeals in criminal mattJ rs. ! l I We have given the arguments and submissit s in support of the two grounds of appeal our utmost consider~tion. The issue i raised for our de termination in ground one, is whkther in terms of section 291 (1) of the Criminal Procedure , ode, there was evidence adduced by the prosecution before the trial court to support a prima facie case? While in ground two, it is whether, a trial court is entitled to assess the credibility of t itnesses at this stage of the proceedings? I There were two other peripheral issues raised 1n the arguments. The first, relates to whether an appe8:l can lie against an acquittal made, following upon a finding of no c~se to answer. I J17 i I I I l i l i I I ! l ] I P.1890 The second, is on the requirement for corroboration of witnesses who are suspect for being relatives or friends of th~ accused; or the victim; or both. Since the issue of whether or not an appeal clan lie against an acquittal raised by learned Counsel for the respondent is preliminary to the determination of the whole appe~, we propose to first deal with it and return to the other, on thel requirement for corroboration, at an appropriate stage 1n thei course of the judgment. In his heads of argument, Counsel for the respondent appeared to be arguing that, a finding of a case to rnswer, and one of no case to answer are both interlocutory findin~s against· which l no appeal can lie . Our short answer to the ques4 on, whether an I I appeal can lie against an acquittal of the accused ai~ the stage of no case to answer, is that it can. This was our holdi1 g in the case of ! ! The Principal Resident Magistrate5 and c1unsel ! for the respondent clearly, misapprehended the facts of thalt case. We j I Jl8 P.1891 there, clarified that: " .......... . a finding of a case to answer is a final verdict. However, a finding of no case to answer is ~ final verdict and therefore a Magistrate would be required and obliged to give i I reasons. However, the most important issµe in the present appeal is one of procedure. We have said be~ore that there can be no interlocutory appeals in criminal maJters." (Underlining for emphasis supplied) .! i I The holding as quoted above, sealed the ~ rgument raised ! by Counsel for the respondent as states that, a fi ding of no case to answer is a final decision, for the reason t at, it effectively determines a criminal matter and brings it to fi ality before the trial court. The outcome is thus appealable to superior court. In the event, the ensuing appeal cannot be I said to be an interlocutory appeal, when the matter has f een effectively determined to finality by a finding of no case to a p swer. It is only in an on-going criminal trial that appeals are t ot permissible. This was the position taken by this court in t~e case of The Principal Resident Magistrate, 5 where the appli, ants were l J19 I l l I P.1892 I I I ! I appealing against a ruling of the High Court for ~eave to apply for I I I judicial review, in an on-going criminal matte :. In the matter subject of the present appeal however, the case is, not on going, as the proceedings were determined by the finding of no case to I I answer which was made by the trial court. ! In a nswer to the argument and for avoidance of doubt, we re- ! iterate that, an appeal can lie against a finding of nb case to answer as such a finding is a final decision, which brings J criminal trial to an end. We now proceed to consider the main groun4s of appeal and \ we will for convenience, start with ground two. Dt ending on our finding on this ground, we will then, further procl 1ed to deal with ground one of the appeal. Ground two of the ap peal attacks the trial ct urt for having I I ' assessed the credibility of witnesses at the stage of f ase to answer. The question is whether a trial court is entitled \ to assess the credibility of the evidence adduced by the prosecuti4n at this stage of the trial. J20 \ P.1893 I I This question was considered in the ~ nglish Court of Appeal case of Patrick Brian Baker9 which emp~ asised the point that, a trial court should not stop, or 'curtail' Pf oceedings at the l j case to answer stage, unless evidence led by th, prosecution has I failed to establish the elements of the offencJ . It was further noted that, it is not the duty of the court at thaf stage, to assess the weight of the evidence by considering the !credibility of the I witn esses. The said findings were expressed \in the following words: " ... ...... the judge's obligation to stop the cas~ is ....... concerned primarily with those cases where the nef essary minimum evidence to establish the facts of the crime hf s not been called. It is not the judge's job to weigh the evide~ ce, decide who is I use he thinks the telling the truth and stop the case merely bee witness is lying." Following that decision, E. J. Swarbrick Editor, of the Magistrates Handbook, 6 th Edition, (1991), National Institute I ! for Public Administration, Lusaka, which provi i es authoritative guidance to Subordinate Courts in Zambia as regar. s procedure in J21 I ; \ criminal cases, has given the approach which a tjrial court should P.1894 l adopt at the close of the prosecution case. He stater that: . l j "At this stage, provided the evidence is not obviously defective, the l l magistrate should assume that the evidence fJr the prosecution will be accepted and he should ignore evidence m llitating against the prosecution case as it could, conceivably, be rejectet The magistrate, therefore, should not concern himself with t i e quality of the evidence by considering the veracity of the variius witnesses and ! deciding which evidence to accept. \ Provide d tha t .... ... .if there has been sufficient evidence adduced which, if accepted, would justify a conviction thi n the magistrate should rule that there is a case to answer ... .... ' (Boldfacing for I ! emphasis only) That, we accept, is the position of the law which equally applies to trials in the High Court. Accordingly, wt agree with the prosecution for faulting the trial judge, when 1 assessed the credibility of witnesses at the stage of case to t swer. For the same reason, the second peripheral issue \ of want of corroboration of the evidence of PWl and PW2 whil h arose in the I I J22 I ·1 l ! \ i i \ I i I P.1895 process of considering the credibility of witnef ses by the trial court, is also unsustainable, for being an exerci}se the trial court should not have embarked on, at that stage of tl-f proceedings. I \ Nonetheless, we are still mindful that the issf e raised by the learned State advocate was that, where witness~s are related to I both the victim and the accused, the need for co~roboration does not arise. This is particularly so, if it has not tjeen established I that the witnesses had a motive to falsely implicl te the accused. The issue of corroboration was raised in referenc~ to the evidence of PW 1 and PW2 and we were requested to confit m that the two ! witnesses, in the particular circumstances of th case, did not require to be corroborated. ( As we have found, the trial court erred in law when it assessed the credibility of witnesses at no case to answer st~ge. The view that we take of this case is that embarking on r n exercise of \ assessing the evidence of the two witnesses which i~ on record, 1n order to ascertain whether they had any interests of t ieir own to J23 l I i i \ I \ I P.1896 serve or other motive for falsely implicating the re\ pondent may be I delving in the issues yet to be decided after hearing the whole of the l evidence in the case if the accused elects to give et dence and thus, inappropriate. . .1· We can only confirm the general propos1t1 of the law as l stated by the learned State advocate, that whe~e witnesses are related to both the victim and the accused j the need for I corroboration does not arise, unless there is evidence which discloses that the witne sses, in a ddition, have inter sts of their own to serve concerning the matter, or that they have y other motive, to falsely implicate the accused. The court is otherwise not precluded from relying on evidence of witnesses who are relatives or friends of the accused or victim or both, once it is s~tisfied that the danger that the accused is being falsely implict ted, has been I excluded. This was in effect, our holding in the cat of Yokomiya Mwale v The People 10 where upon acknowledging \ that, there are and will indeed continue to be, crimes committed in h omes or such l I ! I l J24 I \ I \ t I \ I P. 1897 other family environments where the only witnbsses are family I members or friends of the accused or the victim o~ both, but where I the law must nonetheless be allowed to take its co+ rse for justice to prevail, we opined as follows: i ·l "We are of the view that insistence on the osition that the evidence of every friend or relative of the deceased or the victim l must be corroborated, is to take the princ~ple in the case authorities on this point out of context ......... a coi;11viction .;u1 thus be safe, if it is based on uncorroborated evidence) of witnesses who are friends or relatives of the deceased or the vi~tim provided the court satisfies itself that on the evidence before ii, these witnesses could not be said to have had a bias or motive t<>j falsely implicate ' t ' ', the accused or any other interest of their ~ own to serve." (underlining for e mphasis supplied) In yet another decis ion of this Court, Mukena v The People 11 we highlighted, the real test as stated in the followin1 excerpt: " ... it has b een argued that the evidence of PW 1 and PW2 needed to be corroborated as witnesses with an inter est to serve o~ witnesses whose evidence was suspect as they were relatives of the dec~ased. We accept I • i that the two witnesses were related to the deceased . 11owever, adopting the rationale of Lord Hail sham in the English case of p PP v Kilbourne, the critical consideration is whether or not the two :witnesses had a possible motive to give false evidence against ! the Appellant. (Underlining for emphasis s upplied). I J25 P.1898 And, in Guardic Kamoya Kiavwana v The :People 12 , a case decided after Yokomiya Mwale 10 , we did stress that: l ' .. "there is no law which precludes a blood relative of the deceased from testifying for the prosecution. Evidence of a blood relation can be accepted if cogent enough to rule out any elem~nt of falsehood or bias." Having found that the trial court misdirect~d itself when it I assessed the credibility of witnesses at the case to ;answer stage, in the process of which it also strayed into de~iding issues of corroboration, ground two of the appeal faulting that approach, i i I I succeeds. The net result is that, for the justic~ of the case to I prevail, re-trial of the matter is rendered inevitable. j t Against that backdrop, the need to determine\ the issue raised ' I i i in ground one of the a ppeal, of whether or not the e;\ridence adduced at the trial of this matter established a prima facie :case, falls away. At the most, it may only pre-empt the determinaµon of that very issue, by the trial judge, at the hearing of the matter, de nova. f J26 P.1898 And, in Guardic Kamoya Kiavwana v The :People 12 , a case decided after Yokomiya Mwale 10 , we did stress thar "there is no law which precludes a blood relative of the deceased from testifying for the prosecution. Evidence of a blood relation can be accepted if cogent enough to rule out any elemfnt of falsehood or bias." : Having found that the trial court misdirectyd itself when it assessed the credibility of witnesses at the case to ;answer stage, in the process of which it also strayed into detiding issues of corroboration, ground two of the appeal faulting that approach, I succeeds. The net result is that, for the justictj of the case to ! ' i prevail, re-trial of the matter is rendered inevitable. i I Against that backdrop, the need to determine: the issue raised in ground one of the appeal, of whether or not the e;vidence adduced i I at the trial of this matter established a prima facie '.case, falls away. At the most, it may only pre-empt the determination of that very issue, by the trial judge, at the hearing of the mattef, de novo. ' ' J26 appeal succeeds and we order a re-trial of the matter, before P.1900 another judge of the High Court. Re-trial ordered. / I E . N. C. Muyovwe SUPREME COURT JUDGE J. K. Kabuka SUPREME COURT JUDGE ............... \¼J ... : ~ ......... .. J. Chinyaina SUPREME COURT JUDGE J28 .,