Mercy Sietso Vrs Thomas Doe Amuzu [2022] GHACC 81 (16 December 2022)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT “A”, TEMA, HELD ON FRIDAY THE 16TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2022, BEFORE HER HONOUR AGNES OPOKU- BARNIEH, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE SUIT NO. C5/07/21 MERCY SIETSO ----- PETITIONER VRS. THOMAS DOE AMUZU ----- RESPONDENT PARTIES PRESENT NO LEGAL REPRESENTATION FACTS: JUDGMENT The petitioner and the respondent got married under Part III of the Marriages Act, (1884-1985) Cap 127, at the St. Thomas Moore Catholic Church, Achimota on the 17th of June, 2006. After the marriage, they cohabited at Ashaiman Lebanon and later relocated to their current matrimonial home at Plot No. 32 D Kubekro. There is no issue to the marriage. On 8th October, 2020, the petitioner filed the instant petition for divorce alleging that the marriage between herself and the respondent has broken down beyond reconciliation and prayed the court for the following reliefs; a. Dissolution of the Ordinance marriage celebrated between the petitioner and the respondent on 17th June, 2006, at the St. Thomas More Catholic Church, Achimota. b. Alimony of Fifty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GH₵50,000). c. Fifty percent (50%) share of all properties acquired during the pendency of the marriage. d. Cost. The respondent entered appearance on 16th October, 2020, filed an answer to the petition and cross-petitioned as follows; a. Consent for the marriage to be dissolved. b. 50% interest in the properties acquired by the petitioner. c. That the Honourable Court makes no order regarding the award of alimony. The parties agree that their marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation since for more than five (5) years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition for divorce, they have not lived as man and wife. According to the petitioner, the problems in the marriage started on the second day after their wedding when the respondent’s sister and her two children started sleeping with them in their matrimonial room. She complained about it but respondent did nothing about it so she complained to respondent’s friend and his wife who were staying close to them. The petitioner further avers that the respondent started complaining about their inability to conceive which caused her to visit hospitals for treatment including contacting a herbalist for solution without success. The petitioner says that out of desperation to get pregnant, a herbalist gave her a concoction and after taking it, she started experiencing pain during sexual intercourse. Consequently, she suggested to the respondent that they stay away from sex to enable her to recover fully but the respondent did not take it kindly and started womanizing. Petitioner says that on 18th November, 2015, the respondent moved out of their matrimonial home and his current place of abode is unknown to her. She narrated the various attempts she made for the respondent to return to the matrimonial home. The petitioner says that after persuasion for him to return home failed, she involved both families and friends but the respondent refused to return to the matrimonial home. Again, she summoned the respondent before three of his brothers for settlement of their differences but the respondent did not show interest in the marriage. Again, she involved the assistant Parish Priest of St. Luke Catholic Church who met both parties in an attempt to resolve the issues between them and reconcile them but respondent did not allow the priest to even talk. Additionally, she later invited both families for settlement but the respondent again stated categorically that they could not continue as a married couple so petitioner’s family told the respondent to send the petitioner to her family which is proper and he agreed but failed to do over two and a half years. The petitioner says they have not had sexual intercourse for the past five years. The respondent also blamed the breakdown of the marriage on the constant refusal of the petitioner to have sexual intercourse with him. According to him, based on the inconsiderate behaviour of the petitioner, he moved into another room in the same house where he has been occupying since 8th November, ,2015. The respondent further states that it was his sister who initially rented the room to keep her belongings she had brought from school. The respondent further states that child bearing was an issue for them and he told the petitioner to exercise patience and they later started both orthodox and herbal treatment. The respondent admits all the various attempts made by the petitioner to reconcile their differences but maintains that, the attempts did not work since the petitioner still denied him any form of intimacy. Regarding properties acquired during the subsistence of the marriage, the petitioner alleges that after the marriage, they lived in a rented apartment and she advised the respondent to use his salary to buy a plot of land to enable them build their own whilst she uses her salary to maintain the home. After purchasing the land, she took a loan to support the respondent to put up three chambers and hall with a porch. The petitioner says that she again went for a loan to build another four-bedroom self-contained house with a store. When she discussed her intention to file a divorce petition in court, they advised the respondent to refund the sum of GH₵9,000, she took to put up the three bedrooms and self-contained house. The respondent denies the contribution of the petitioner towards the acquisition of the properties. According to him, the petitioner proposed to help him to build the house but he refused as he had already molded blocks for the project. This caused the petitioner to report him to his brother that she wanted to assist him to build the house but he had refused to accept the money but after an arbitration, he accepted the money, but he refunded same upon completion of the building. Additionally, he states that he obtained a staff loan to build his four 4-bedroom house. According to him, at the time, the petitioner was constructing her brother’s building near their house and when she ordered 200 bags of cement, she gave him 100 bags but when the petitioner was building her own house in her hometown, he replaced the bags of cement he took and gave her 3 bundles of roofing sheets and upon completion, he did the electrical works in the house for her. Subsequent to that, he also completed his house at Kubekrom which now serves as their matrimonial home. The respondent maintains therefore that during the subsistence of the marriage, he acquired three (3) chamber and halls with a porch and a four- bedroom self-contained house at Kubekrom whilst the petitioner also built a four-bedroom houses in her hometown, bought two plots of land at Bawaleshie and two acres of farm land with Palm plantation in her hometown. Again, he states that he supported the education of the petitioner from Diploma to 1st Degree at the University of Cape Coast. He also maintains the petitioner and is responsible for her medical bills as a benefit of his employment. He states that due to his responsibilities and servicing the loan obtained to put up the building, he does not have the financial muscle to pay GH₵50,000 alimony. Based on the pleadings and the evidence led, the court set down the following issues for determination after the trial. LEGAL ISSUES 1. Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent has broken down beyond reconciliation. 2. Whether or not the parties acquired properties jointly during the subsistence of the marriage which must be shared equally upon the dissolution of the marriage. 3. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to an award of GH₵50,000 as alimony from the respondent. BURDEN OF PROOF The principle of law is that he who asserts must prove. In the case of Adwubeng v. Domfeh [1996-97] SCGLR 660, the Supreme Court held in its holding 3 that: “sections 11(4) and 12 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323) have clearly provided that the standard of proof in all civil actions was proof by preponderance of probabilities. No exceptions were made. The court further stated: “in assessing the balance of probabilities, all the evidence be it that of the Plaintiff or the defendant must be considered and the party in whose favour the balance tilts is the person whose case is more probable than the rival version and is deserving of a favourable verdict”. The standard of proof as stated applies to petition for divorce. Thus, the petitioner bears the burden to prove her petition on a balance of probabilities. Also, where, as in the instant case, a respondent cross-petitions, he bears the burden to prove his cross-petition on a balance of probabilities. ANALYSIS ISSUE 1: Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent has broken down beyond reconciliation. Under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), the sole ground for granting a petition for divorce is that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. See Section 1 of the MCA. To succeed, a petitioner is required to plead and prove one of the facts set out in section 2(1) of Act 367 namely, adultery, unreasonable behaviour, desertion, failure to live as man and wife for two years, failure to live as man and wife for five years, irreconcilable differences. The parties are also mandated to inform the court about all attempts made at reconciliation and the court shall refuse to grant a petition for divorce if there is a reasonable possibility for reconciliation. Also, the court has a statutory duty to enquire into all the facts alleged in support of the fact that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation and the court shall decline to grant a dissolution of the marriage if there is a reasonable possibility for reconciliation. See the case of Donkor v. Donkor [1982-1983] GLR 1158, the High Court, Accra. This legal proposition is amplified in the case of Danquah v. Danquah [1979] GLR 371, where the court held in its holding 2 that: “The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), imposed on the court a species of restriction which was unique. For having established by section 1 (2) that the sole ground for granting a petition should be that the marriage had broken down beyond reconciliation and having by section 2 (1) laid down those facts the proof of which should, prima facie, show that the marriage has so broken down, section 2 (3) authorised the court to grant a petition for divorce only when the court was satisfied, on all the evidence, that there has been an irreconcilable breakdown of the marriage.” The petitioner in the instant petition has set out to prove that for at least five years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition for divorce, they had not lived as man and wife. To succeed under section 2 (1)(e) the petitioner is required to prove that for a continuous period of five years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition for divorce, she and the respondent had not lived together as man and wife. The law does not require proof of any matrimonial offence committed by the other spouse and there is no need to establish blame. Proof of not having lived together as man and wife for a continuous period of at least five (5) years coupled with inability of the parties to reconcile to resume cohabitation as husband and wife shall suffice. I am fortified in this view by the case Kotei v. Kotei [1974] 2 GLR 172, where the High Court presided over by Sarkodie J, (as he then was) in espousing on section 2(1) (e) of Act 367 held @ 175-176 that: “Proof of five years’ continuous separation enables the marriage to be dissolved against the will of a spouse who has committed no matrimonial offence and who cannot be blamed for the breakdown of the marriage”. The court continue to say at page 176 that: “There must be a total breakdown of the consortium vitae. Mere physical separation is not sufficient; a petitioner has to prove not only the factum of separation but also that he or she has ceased to recognise the marriage as subsisting and intended never to return to the other spouse… Therefore, it seems the state of mind of the parties needs to be considered, that is, whether they treated the marriage as at an end. It may not matter whether the state of mind of one of the parties was not communicated to the other.” Here, there is no dispute that for five years prior to the presentation of the petition for divorce, they had not lived as man and wife for a continuous period of at least five years. It is also not controverted that by reason of their inability to live as man and wife for that period, the marriage has broken. The parties in their testimonies before the court laid charges and counter charges against each other to show who is to be blamed for the breakdown of the marriage which is not required by law. The petitioner considers their inability to have children and their unsuccessful attempts to have a solution through orthodox and herbal means as the beginning of their marital woes. She recounts with sadness the problems she faced with her reproductive health after a herbalist gave her a concoction purporting to treat her of infertility. According to her, since that time, she experienced excruciating pain anytime she had sexual intercourse with the respondent. According to her, the respondent taunted her with their inability to have children but she testified that during the marriage, she discovered to her chagrin, a laboratory results dated 25th July, 2005, of the respondent which was admitted and marked as Exhibit “A”, showing that prior to the marriage the respondent knew that he had fertility issues but hid this information from her. The respondent testified in his defence and denied that he had fertility issue which he concealed from the petitioner. He states under cross-examination that he was diagnosed with low sperm count but he was receiving treatment and there was improvement in his condition and as such, he was not the cause of their inability to have children. He denied that he took advantage to womanise but maintains that the respondent consistently denied him sexual intercourse. The respondent did not mince words to say that his major challenge in the marriage is the decision of the petitioner to deny him sexual intercourse. According to him, anytime he tried to have sexual intercourse with the petitioner, she assaulted him which caused him to leave and occupy one of the rooms in the house from 8th November, 2015. The petitioner recounted the various attempts by pastors and family members to reconcile their differences which all proved futile. To support her case that all attempts made at reconciliation have proved futile, the first witness for the petitioner, Paul Komla Klu , the brother of the petitioner testified that he was one of the people who attempted to reconcile the parties when they were having issues in their marriage. He testified that they met the parties on three occasions and the respondent complained that the petitioner was denying him sex and the petitioner told them that she experiences pains anytime they had sexual intercourse as a result of the concoction. He stated that the respondent confirmed that he has a fertility issue and cannot father a child. He also confirmed that their attempts at reconciliation were not successful and that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. PW2, Michael Amuzu , the brother of the respondent also confirmed the challenges the parties faced in the marriage and the various attempts at reconciliation. From the evidence led by the parties, it can be gleaned that the issue of their inability to have children impacted negatively on their marital relationship which marred their otherwise harmonious marriage. It is trite that inability to conceive is not a ground for the dissolution of a marriage. However, where the issue of their inability to have children has triggered other issues leading to their separation for more than five years prior to the presentation of the petition for divorce, a court cannot deny the parties that which they seek. The two witnesses for the petitioner confirmed that all attempts they have made with other family members to resolve the issues between the parties have proved futile, Consequently, I hold that the petitioner proved her case on a balance of probabilities that the Ordinance marriage celebrated between the petitioner and the respondent has broken down beyond reconciliation. I enter judgment for the petitioner and grant the prayer for the dissolution of the marriage celebrated between the parties. The said marriage is accordingly dissolved. ISSUE 2: Whether or not the parties acquired properties jointly during the subsistence of the marriage which must be shared equally upon the dissolution of the marriage. It is provided for under Article 22 (3) (b) of the 1992 Constitution that: "Assets which are jointly acquired during marriage shall be distributed equitably between the spouses upon dissolution of marriage". In the case of Arthur (No 1) v. Arthur (No.1) [2013-2014] 1 SCGLR 543 held in holding 3 as follows; “…Property acquired by the spouses during the marriage was presumed to be marital property. Thus, marital property was to be understood as property acquired by the spouses during the marriage, irrespective of whether the other spouse had made a contribution to its acquisition.” In the recent Supreme Court’s decision in Peter Adjei v. Margaret Adjei (unreported) [Suit No. J4 06/ 2021] delivered on 21st day of April, 2021, the Court per Appau, JSC(as he then was) reiterated the position of the law on the presumption of when His Lordship stated at page 10 as follows: “…any property that is acquired during the subsistence of the marriage, be it customary or under English or Mohammedan Ordinance, is presumed to have been jointly acquired by the couple and upon divorce, should be shared between them on equality is equity principle. This presumption of joint ownership is, however, rebuttable upon evidence to the contrary… What this means in effect is that, it is not every property acquired single-handedly by any of the spouses during the subsistence of a marriage that can be termed as a “jointly-acquired” property to be distributed at all cost on this equality is equity principle. Rather, it is property that has been shown from the evidence adduced during the trial to have been jointly acquired, irrespective of whether there was direct, pecuniary or substantial contribution from both spouses in the acquisition.” Thus, notwithstanding the current position of the law on presumption of joint acquisition, the law recognises the constitutional right of an individual to acquire a separate property within the marital union and properties acquired by gift, through inheritance or through individual loan not fully liquidated are not regarded as marital property. Therefore, each case is determined on its particular facts and the evidence led to rebut the presumption of joint acquisition. In the instant case, what is the evidence led in support of the joint acquisition and the evidence adduced to rebut the presumption of joint ownership of all properties acquired during the subsistence of the marriage? The petitioner testified that whilst living in a rented apartment, she advised the respondent to use his salary to buy a plot of land to enable them build their own house whilst she uses her salary for the upkeep of the home. According to her, after purchasing the land, she took a loan to support the respondent to put up three chambers and hall with porch. The petitioner says that she again went for a loan to build another four-bedroom self-contained house with a store. She also stated that she gave the respondent an amount of CFA 200,000 as funeral donation when his mother died and he was going for the funeral in Togo but the respondent insisted on investing the funeral donation she gave him on the building project. Under cross-examination by the respondent, the following ensued; Q: You stated that at the last sitting that you gave me 200,000 CFA for my mother’s funeral. Was it for the funeral or the building cost. A: It was for the funeral. Q: If it was for the funeral why are you relating it to the building cost. A: I said you said because of the building I should give it to you in Ghana for the building before we go to Togo. Q: You said during the four-bedroom project you gave money. Was the money a loan to me or to support the building project. A: It was a loan but the respondent did not pay all. When I asked of the rest you said I was also going to stay in the house. Q: Did you give me physical money or you gave me material as a loan.? A: I gave the money to the cement seller at Tema Main Commercial Bank. Q: How much was the money that you gave to the cement seller? A: My Lord, I cannot remember the actual amount. Q: If I remember and tell you, will you agree. A: If the amount is correct, I will agree. A: I want to put it to you that it was GH₵1,800 because during that time cement was GH₵18 per bag in May/June 2013. Q: What was the agreement between you and I in connection with the cement given to me. A: You said you will give the money to me when you receive your provident fund. Q: Have I done that. A: You gave me the principal without the interest. Q: Did you make it known to me that I was going to pay interest on the money? A: It was a loan I took from a bank so I had to pay interest on it. The petitioner who claims that she took loans for the respondent to acquire the properties in issue testified that she does not remember the amount she took as loan to support the respondent and under intense cross-examination by the respondent , she could not remember the amount she took as loan and also admits that the respondent refunded the financial assistance she gave him as a loan and even complains that the respondent did not pay interest on the amount, she advanced to him as a loan. Despite that, she contends that she took loans for the respondent to put up the two houses. The evidence that the amount was paid without interest is inconsistent with her pleading that when she informed the petitioner that she would petition for divorce, they advised him to refund the loan of GH₵9,000 that she took to support him put up the initial three rooms and the self-contained house. The respondent testified that indeed when he acquired the two properties, they were married but he denied that it was based on the advise of the petitioner that he acquired the land. According to him, when he bought his land, the petitioner proposed to help him build the house but he refused as he had already molded blocks for the project. She then reported him to his brother that he, the respondent, had refused to accept her financial assistance towards the building project. They had an arbitration over the issue and he accepted the money. However, after completing the building, he refunded the money to her. Additionally, the respondent testified that he obtained a staff loan to put up the second four-bedroom house which currently serves as their matrimonial home. According to him, at the same time, the petitioner was constructing her brother’s building near their house and when she ordered 200 bags of cement, she gave him 100 bags for his building. When the petitioner commenced her building project in her hometown, he replaced the 100 bags of cement and in addition gave her 3 bundles of roofing sheet to use and he supported her with electrical works for her house and thereafter he completed his house at Kubekrom where they are currently living. He maintains that in the course of the marriage, he built three (3) chamber and hall with a porch and a four- bedroom self-contained house at Kubekrom whilst the petitioner also built a four-bedroom house in her hometown and bought two plots of land at Bawaleshie and two acres of palm plantation in her hometown, Fodome Axor. Under cross-examination by the petitioner, the following ensued; Q: I am putting it to you that I contributed in building the two houses that we have. A: No my Lord. There was no contribution. I borrowed money from her and I paid her back. Q: I am putting it to you that you are not being truthful because you said in this room that I went for a GH₵3,000 loan and then gave you GH₵1,200 as contribution, so tell the court what I used the GH₵1,800 for? A. You claim you went for Barclays loan. You did not go there purposely for me because you told my senior brother that you wanted to collect loan for me and I refused. Later before the scheme loan came to your work site and you took it for your reason and because you summoned me to your senior brother, I took the GH₵1,200. Later, I paid you the money back. It was that money that you alleged I gave it to you without interest. So your money is no more with me. The petitioner maintains that the four-bedroom house in her hometown is for herself and her siblings; a brother and a sister who helped her to acquire same. PW1 under cross-examination testified that the building is for the petitioner and her elder brother and states that, it is constructed on her father’s plot. When seriously challenged by the respondent, he stated that the building consists of two bedrooms with a porch and the last time he visited the project, it was not completed but at the foundation level. The second petitioner witness (PW2) admitted that the respondent told him that the petitioner had acquired a four-bedroom house in her hometown. From the evidence on record, it is not in dispute that the respondent knows the property in the petitioner’s hometown very well since it is not in dispute that when she started the building, the respondent refunded the 100 bags of cement that he had taken from the project site of her brother. The petitioner also admits that the respondent supported her with roofing sheets and also being an electrician did the electrical works on the house albeit she maintains the respondent charged her for his services. The assertion of the petitioner that the property belongs to her, her brother and sister is unfounded since the respondent having challenged her that she purchased the land in her hometown and put up the building, the onus was on the petitioner to lead admissible evidence to establish this joint acquisition. In the case of Nyamaah v. Amponsah [2009] SCGLR 361, where the petitioner wife, in her amended petition at the High Court, claimed, inter alia, that a house located at Odeneho Kwadaso, the matrimonial home be partitioned and the petitioner given her portion. The respondent husband contended that the property belonged to his father. The High Court held that the property did not belong to any of the parties and could not be settled on any of them. The wife appealed and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and unanimously held, inter alia, that the matrimonial home was the self- acquired property of the husband, and being the matrimonial home, should be partitioned into two and shared between the husband and wife. The husband appealed to the Supreme Court and on this issue of whether or not ownership of the Odeneho Kwadaso House vested in the husband or in the father of the husband, the Supreme Court held in its holding 4 that: “The husband (the appellant) cannot assert that the disputed house the (Odeneho House) belonged to his father given the conduct of the father, the alleged owner of the house. He failed to join as a party to the action and preferred to be the witness in this case. The applicable principle is that where a grantor stands by in a case between his grantee and a third party involving the validity of the title he has conveyed, and is content to see the battle fought by the grantee, he, the grantor, will be bound by the result of the case and will be estopped from re-opening the issue determined in that case.” In the instant case, none of the said siblings gave evidence in the matter on this joint acquisition. PW1 who described himself as the brother of the petitioner in his evidence in-chief, did not lead evidence on the acquisition of the property by the petitioner but only focused on attempts made at reconciliation between the parties. The petitioner in her reply stated that on the issue of the farmland the respondent claims she acquired during the subsistence of the marriage, it was a gift from her aunties for herself and her siblings and they have already fell the palm trees on the land to solve family problems. However, having admitted the existence of the property, she did not lead a scintilla of evidence to establish the gift. The two plots of land at Bawaleshie she is alleged to have purchased from her workers’ union, is also not challenged by the petitioner either in her pleadings or her evidence in-chief. From the matrimonial history of the parties, the intentions of the parties regarding the acquisition of properties, it can be deduced from the evidence on record that within the marital union, they intended to acquire their separate and individual properties. If indeed the parties intended to acquire the three chamber and hall with a porch and the current matrimonial home jointly, it is strange that from the onset of the project, the petitioner would have to call a family meeting before her contribution will be accepted only for monies advanced towards the project to be refunded albeit she claims it was paid without interest. The fact that the respondent took loans to put up the project is also not in issue and his statement that he has not fully liquidated his indebtedness to the bank was not challenged. He maintains that the loan responsibilities did not diminish his responsibilities as a husband since the still maintains he petitioner even in their separation since the repayment conditions of the loans are flexible. On the totality of the evidence led, I find that the respondent successfully rebutted the presumption of joint ownership and at all material times, the course of dealings between the parties shows that they intended to acquire their properties separately. ISSUE 3: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to an award of GH₵50,000 as alimony from the respondent. Section 20(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1971 (Act 367) states that: "The court may order either party to the marriage to pay to the other party a sum of money or convey to the other party movable or immovable property as settlement of property rights or in lieu thereof or as part of financial provision that the court thinks just and equitable." The award of lump sum financial payment under Act 367 is therefore need based and it is not intended to enrich one spouse at the expense of another. It is also not intended to punish a party who caused the breakdown of the marriage since it is not based on fault. In the case of Barake v. Barake [1993- 1994] I GLR 635 at page 666, Brobbey J (as he then was) held that: “On such an application, the court examines the needs of the parties and makes reasonable provision for their satisfaction out of the money, goods or immovable property of his or her spouse.” In determining what is “just and equitable”, a court is enjoined to consider the income, earning capacity, property, and other financial resources which each of the parties has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future, the standard of living enjoyed by the parties before the breakdown of the marriage; the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage. See the case of Obeng v. Obeng [2013] 63 GMJ 158, CA. The respondent testified that the petitioner is not entitled to her claims for an amount of GH₵50,000 as alimony or the financial provision because she is responsible for the breakdown of the marriage and he did no commit any matrimonial offence. According to him, he is burdened bank loans and the cost of building materials he purchased on credit during the time he was building his four-bedroom house and other family commitments. He further maintains that he met the petitioner as an O’Level leaver and has upgraded her and she is now a graduate and as such she is not entitled to her claim for financial provision. The petitioner denied that the respondent paid her school fees although she acknowledges he continued to maintain her as his wife. In the case of Aikins v. Aikins (1979) GLR 233, Sarkodee J (as he then was) held in holding 3 as follows: "The Court was entitled under Section 20 of Act 367 to order lump sum payment ……The husband's ability to pay was not merely to have physical cash but it could also be determined by his ability to provide money by way of overdraft or loan and in the absence of full and frank information by the husband as to his financial position, the Court was entitled to draw inference adverse to the husband as to his capacity.” Here, the parties did not lead evidence on their respective ages and on their earning capacities but looking at them, they still have considerable working years ahead of them. The parties have been married for sixteen (16) years. The petitioner works as a technician with Ghana Meteorological Agency and the respondent is an electrical technician with the Electricity Company of Ghana. The respondent states that he maintained the petitioner and with the breakdown of the marriage, the petitioner will lose the benefit of the maintenance by the respondent. The respondent also stated that his employers are responsible for the medical needs of the petitioner and with the dissolution of the marriage, the petitioner will lose this health benefit. I therefore find that the petitioner has a financial need which this court must meet. Accordingly, I award an amount GH₵15,000 as lump sum financial provision to the petitioner. In accordance with section 20(2) of Act 367, which empowers the court to order the money to be paid in gross or installment, the respondent shall pay the amount within three months in three equal monthly instalments from the date of judgment failing which any outstanding balance shall attract interest at the prevailing bank rate till date of final payment. CONCLUSION In conclusion, I hold that the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent has broken down beyond reconciliation. I therefore grant the petition for divorce and enter judgment in the following terms; 1. I hereby grant a decree for the dissolution of the marriage celebrated between the petitioner and the respondent on the 17th of June, 2006 at the St. Thomas Moore Catholic Church, Achimota. 2. The petitioner shall present the original copy of the marriage certificate for cancellation by the Registrar of the court. 3. I hereby declare Plot No. 32D Kubekro which serves as the matrimonial home of the parties and the three chamber and halls with porch acquired during the subsistence of the marriage to be the individual and separate properties of the respondent. 4. I hereby declare that petitioner solely acquired the four-bedroom house located in her hometown, the two plots of land at Bawaleshie and the two acres of farm land with palm plantation located at Fodome Axor. 5. I hereby award an amount of GH₵15,000 to the petitioner against the respondent. In accordance with section 20(2) of Act 367, which empowers the court to order the money to be paid in gross or installment, the respondent shall pay the amount within three months from the date of judgment either in gross or in three equal monthly instalments failing which any outstanding balance shall attract interest at the prevailing bank rate till date of final payment. 6. No order as to costs. H/H AGNES OPOKU-BARNIEH (CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE) (SGD) 20