Timwood Products Limited v Karachiwalla (Nairobi) Limited [2016] KEHC 4606 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL APPL. NO.  600 OF 2015

TIMWOOD PRODUCTS LIMITED ……........................APPLICANT

VERSUS

KARACHIWALLA (NAIROBI) LIMITED....................RESPONDENT

RULING

1. By an  Notice of Motion dated  24th December  2015, the applicant  Timwood  Products  Limited filed an application  seeking from this  court orders :

Spent

Spent

That the  court be  pleased to grant  the applicant  leave to lodge its appeal  against the  judgment  and decree of 5th October  2015  delivered by Honourable  Mr Chesang( Senior Resident Magistrate) in Milimani CMCC 3522 of 2014, Karachiwalla ( Nairobi) Limited  V Timwood  Products  Limited, out of time.

That there be  a stay of execution  of the  decree and judgment of 5th October 2015  and further  proceedings in Milimani  CM CC 3522 of  2014, Karachiwalla (Nairobi Limited Vs Timwood  Products  Limited, pending  the determination of the applicant’s  intended   appeal.

That costs be provided for.

2. The application is premised on the grounds that:

On 18th December  2015, the  respondent  proclaimed the applicant’s  core business  goods pursuant  to a decree in Milimani CM CC 3522 OF 2014, where  judgment  was  delivered  in the absence  and without  notice  to the applicant’s  advocates.

That the applicant was not heard on its defence that it did not receive goods whose value formed the basis of the respondent’s claim.

That the 30 days period within which to file an appeal has expired.

That the  applicant  wishes  to appeal  against the  trial court’s  judgment  and unless  execution is stayed  pending  the hearing  of the intended  appeal, the respondent  will proceed  with execution  which will cause  substantial  harm to the applicant  and render the applicant’s intended  appeal nugatory.

That in the circumstances, it is just and fair that this application be certified as urgent and the orders sought in the interim be granted.

3. The application is brought  under the  provisions of  Sections           1A, 3, 3A, 79G and 95 of the Civil Procedure Act, Section  59  of the Interpretation and General Provisions   Act, Cap  2 Laws of Kenya,  Order  51 Rule  1 and  Order 42 Rule  6  of the Civil Procedure  Rules and  all other enabling  provisions of the  law.

4. The said  application is further  supported  by the affidavit of  V.H.D. Bakrania, Director  of the applicant sworn on 24th  December  2015  deposing  that the respondent’s claim in the  lower court for  shs  504,600 was  on account of goods  allegedly  collected by the  applicant’s  agents  using its vehicles but that  there  was  no evidence that  the applicant  owned  those motor  vehicles. That the applicant denied the claim in its defence.  That the applicant was never heard on its defence and that had the trial court heard the evidence  in defence it would  not have arrived at  the conclusion that  the applicant  received the claimed  goods.  Further, that the  applicant’s  counsel  was not notified of the date  of judgment  hence it   was  delivered  in its absence; and  they only  learnt of the judgment  on 17th December  2015  after  expiry of the time for filing  of an appeal. That the applicant’s goods were proclaimed on 18th December 2015 and it was given only 7 days to settle the claim. That  the  applicant is  dissatisfied  with the judgment  and decree and that the  intended  appeal is meritorious; that the applicant  will suffer substantial  loss unless  stay is  granted; and  that the  applicant  is willing to abide  by any conditions for  stay of execution  that the  court may  give.

5. To the affidavit are annextures of the plaint, order of stay on a temporary basis and Notice of change advocates.

6. The application was opposed by the respondent who filed a replying affidavit sworn  on 5th January 2016 by Sanjay Chiman Bhai Patel the director of the respondent Company.  Mr Patel deposes that he actively participated in the hearing of the suit and gave evidence.  That the applicants did not  have witnesses on the hearing  date and  so a date  for submissions  was given for 4th September  2015  but  that no submissions  were filed by  the applicants  hence a date  for  judgment   was set  for 29th  September  2015  at 9. 00am.  That on 29th September 2015  judgment   was not ready and  the trial magistrate  deferred  it to 5th October  2015  when  the same  was delivered and  that had  the applicant’s  advocates  exercised  due diligence  and follow up, they  would have   known of the date  of the judgment. That the letter of  17th December  2015  acknowledges  that judgment   was delivered  on 5th October  2015  and their indebtedness  to the  respondent   following  the regular  judgment. That the applicant is  seeking to  introduce  new evidence   regarding  ownership of the motor vehicle yet it  had deliberately  failed to do so  hence that  new evidence  cannot  form the basis of  this  appeal.  That these proceedings  are subjudice  and an afterthought, meant  to deny  the respondent  its entitlement  and dues  upon successful litigation and finally that  the intended  appeal stands no reasonable  chance of success; is made in bad faith and is an abuse  of court  process.

7. The applicant  filed supplementary affidavit  on 12th January 2016  sworn on 11th January 2015  by V.H.D. Bakirania  deposing  that the  replying affidavit is  incompetent  for non compliance  with  the requirements  for swearing  of  affidavits  on behalf of corporations hence  it should be  struck out.

8. Further that the  deponent   was  the sole   witness  who was locked  out of  the proceedings  by the refusal  of the trial court to   grant an adjournment  on account of  an emergency that had held him in Mombasa  when the  matter came up for  hearing  on 6th August  2015.  That  the submissions   were not filed on  4th September  2015  as that  was the day the trial  court  had  set  for hearing of the application for leave  to be heard  on its defence.  That their advocates  tried to  locate the  court file  without  success  as  it  could have  been in custody  of the trial magistrate  for judgment  and or  decree thereby complicating  their efforts  in tracing  the location  and movement  of the file  at  the registry  and it  was  only located  on 17th December  2015  at the execution of decree section.  That had the process for drawing and extraction of decree been followed then the applicant’s counsel could have been made aware of the judgment.  That  the failure  to adduce  evidence  in the lower  court  was not  deliberate but refusal by the  trial court  to grant an adjournment  yet bona  fide  grounds had been  advanced thereby denying the  applicant  its right to fair hearing  and to exercise  its right of appeal.

9. The parties’ advocates canvassed the application by way of oral submissions   on 19th January 2016. Mr Mituga submitted on behalf of the applicant   whereas the respondent   was represented by Mr Olonde who opposed the application vigorously.

10. The parties  advocates s submissions  echoed  the grounds, supporting  affidavit, supplementary affidavit  and  the replying affidavit  which I have  reproduced  above.

11. Mr Mituga in addition  submitted  that the application  was made without undue delay  since the  same   was filed  on  24th December  2015  after  learning of the judgment on  17th December  2015. Further, that the appeal   as  intended   is not  frivolous.  On the prayer for  stay  of execution of decree  pending  appeal It  was submitted  that the  applicant   was  willing to deposit  security for due performance  of decree and that if stay  is refused  and  execution proceeds  the applicant   stands to suffer  as the attached  goods  form the core  of the applicant’s business  hence the applicant’s business would be grounded.

12. Mr Mituga  relied on High Court Miscellaneous  Application 78/2015  [2015] e KLR  Edward  Kamau  & Another  V Hannah Mukui Gichuki  and Another wherein this court granted  leave to the applicant  to appeal  out of time  and also gave   orders of stay of execution   of decree  pending  appeal  by balancing  out two rights, that  of appeal  by the applicants   and  of enjoyment of a lawful judgment  and not  being  discriminated for being of unknown  financial means.  He also  relied on the Court of Appeal decision of Abdirahman Abdi  V Safi Petroleum Products  Ltd &  6 Others  CA Nairobi 173/2010 [2011] e KLR  where the Court of Appeal exercised  its discretion  to grant  extension of time for  filing of  Notice  of Appeal taking into  account the overriding  objective of  civil litigation and  found that   delay of one day   was excusable, to afford  a constitutional  right to a hearing by the applicant.

13. As stated  earlier  Mr Olonde  counsel  for the respondent   vigorously  opposed  the applicant’s  application  and relied  entirely  on the  replying  affidavit  of his client’s  director   filed on  6th January 2016.  He  submitted that if this court  had the   lower court  record  it would  properly exercise  its discretion  to either  grant  or reject  this application  since the  applicant  was not  being candid.  That  the trial  court declined  an adjournment   after the applicant’s  counsel  stated that  he had no  witness in court  and that the  trial court  correctly  exercised its discretion to reject  an adjournment, which orders  were never  appealed  against for such  refusal to grant  an adjournment.  That the applicant  never served  upon the respondent’s  counsel  an application  to arrest  the  judgment  in the trial court  which  Mr Olonde  had just  learnt  of.  That  the applicant’s  counsel  was  aware of  the date for  judgment  given as  29th September  2015  when the  court deferred it  to  5th October  2015 on which  date the  applicant’s  counsels  did not  attend court.  Mr Olonde  maintained  the stance  that had the applicant’s counsel’s  been vigilant  they would have  followed  up the  issue  of date  for judgment  from  29th September  2015  and known  the judgment  date  and further  that the  fact of  applying to arrest  a judgment  is a clear  indication that they  knew of the judgment  date.

14. Further, Mr Olonde submitted that the applicant did not even file submissions   and therefore   the court relied on unrebutted evidence.  Further, that there is no ownership of the blunders by the applicant’s former advocates. Mr Olonde  further  maintained  that the  intended  appeal  has no  chances of success and that albeit  the court has  the discretion to enlarge   time for  filing of  an appeal, the material  placed  before  the court  in support  of the application   was not  sufficient  to warrant   enlargement  of time as  the  applicant   seeks to introduce  new evidence  which it failed  to adduce at the hearing.  Mr Olonde urged the court to dismiss the application by the applicant   with costs.

15. In a brief  rejoinder, Mr  Mituga submitted that  his client  did not  wish to adduce new evidence  but  was  denied  a fair hearing  and an opportunity  for a fair  hearing  so they seek that opportunity which  they lost  on 4th September  2015.

16. I have  carefully considered  the application   herein in line with  the annextures, affidavits  and the able rival submissions  by both  parties’  advocates in support  thereof and in opposition  thereto.  The issues for determination are two namely:

Whether  the applicant has made out a case  for grant  of leave  to file an  appeal  challenging  judgment  and decree  of the lower court  out of time; and

Whether the applicant has fulfilled conditions   for the granting of stay of execution of decree pending hearing and determination of the intended appeal.

17. On the first  issue of  whether  the  applicant  has made  out a case  for leave  of this  court to be  granted  to file an  appeal out of  time, the applicable  law is  Section 79 G  of the Civil Procedure  Ac  which enact  that:

“ Every appeal from a subordinate  court to the  High Court shall  be filed within  a period of 30  days from  the date of the  decree  or order  appealed  against,  excluding  from such period any  time which  the lower court may certify as having been  requisite  for the preparation and delivery to the appellant  a copy of the decree or order provided  that an appeal may  be admitted out of time  if  the appellant  satisfied the court that he had  good  and  sufficient  cause for  not  filing the appeal  in time.”

18. In Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Salat V IEBC & 7 Others SC Application 16/2014, the Supreme Court of Kenya laid down some underlying principles that a court ought to consider in the exercise of discretion to extend time for filing an appeal out of time. The Court stated:

“……………the grant or refusal  of an  extension of time  is a matter of  judicial discretion to be exercised, not subjectively, or  at whim or by rigid rule  of thumb, but  in a principled manner  in accordance  with reason and justice.  The  exercise  of the discretion is a matter  of weighing  and balancing  all the  relevant  factors  which appear from  the material before the appeal tribunal.  The result  of the exercise  of a discretion  is not dictated by any set factor.  Discretions  are not packaged, programmed  responses.”

2.  As Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. pointed  out in Costellow V Somerset CC (supra) at page 956 C, times problems  arise at the intersection of two principles, both salutary, neither absolute. ………..The first principle is that the Rules of court and   the associated rules of practice, deserved  in the  public interest to promote  the expeditious  dispatch of litigation, must be observed.  The prescribed  time limits are not  targets to be  aimed at  or expressions of pious hope but requirements to be met…..”  ( Emphasis added).

The second  principle is that:

“…….a plaintiff should not in the ordinary way be denied an adjudication  of his claim on its merits because of a  procedural default, unless the default  causes  prejudice  to his opponent  for  which an award  of cost cannot  compensate………”

3.  The approach indicated in these two principles  is modified  to the stage  which the relevant proceedings have reached.  If for example, the procedural default  is  in relation to an interlocutory  step in proceedings, such as a failure  to serve a  pleading  or give  discovery  within the  prescribed  time limits, the court  will, in the ordinary way and in the  absence  of special circumstances, grant  an extension of time.  Unless the delay  has caused irreparable  prejudice, to the  other party, justice will usually favour  the action proceeding  to a full trial  on  the merits.

The approach is  different, however, if the procedural default as to  time relates to an appeal against  a decision on the merits  by the court or tribunal of first instance.  The party  aggrieved  by that decision  has had  a trial to hear  and determine  the case.  If he is  dissatisfied  with the result  he should  act promptly.  The grounds for extending  his time are not as strong as where  he has not yet  had a trial.  The  interests  of the parties and the  public in certainty  and finality  of legal  proceedings  make the court  more strict  about time  limits on appeals.  An extension may be  refused even though the  default in observing  the time limit  has  not caused  prejudice  to the party successful  in the original  proceedings.

4.  An extension of time is an indulgence  requested  from the court by a party in default.  He is not  entitled  to an extension.  He has no reasonable  or legitimate  expectation of receiving  one.  His only  reasonable  or legitimate expectation is that  the discretion relevant  to his application  to extend time  will be exercised  judicially in accordance  with established  principles  of what is fair  and reasonable.  In those  circumstances, it is   incumbent   on the  applicant  for an extension  of time to  provide  the court with it full, honest   and  acceptable  explanation of the reasons for  the  delay.  He cannot  reasonably expect  the  discretion to be exercised  in  his favour, as a defaulter, unless he provides an explanation  for the default.”

19. The above holding can be summarized as folows:

Extension of time is not a right of a party.  It is   an equitable   remedy that is  only available  to a deserving  party  at the discretion of the court;

The party  who seeks  for extension of time has the  burden of laying a basis  to the satisfaction of  the court;

As to whether the court should exercise the discretion to extend time is a consideration to be made on a case to case basis.

Whether   there  is a reasonable   reason  for the delay; the delay should be  explained  to the satisfaction of the court,

Whether there will be any prejudice to be suffered by the respondents if the extension is granted.

The application should have been brought without undue delay; and in certain cases, like election petition, public interest should be a consideration for extending time.

20. Applying the above principles to this case, the question is whether the applicant has shown good and sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time.  The applicant  claims  that it  was  not aware  of the  judgment  and  neither   was its advocate   notified  of the dare  of judgment and that it   was awoken by the  proclamation to attach its  property.

21. Proceedings  and record of  the trial  court has  not been availed by any  of the contending  parties  for this court’s examination  and or verification of the above   allegations.  However, the  respondent submitted  that when the  judgment  date  was  given for  29th September  2015  the applicant’s  counsel  was in court.  He then concedes that the  applicant did not  attend  court on 29th September 2015  when the  judgment  was deferred  to 5th October 2015  when the  applicant’s counsel also  failed to attend court   and that  had they been diligent  they would  have followed  up the issue  from 29th September  2015  and  known the judgment date of  5th October  2015.  Further, that the fact that the applicant filed an application to arrest judgment is an indication that they knew of the judgment date.  This court has not been shown the application to arrest that judgment and as to whether it was placed on the court file before or after 29th September 2015.  That  being  the case, this court  is inclined  to give to the applicant  the benefit  of doubt  that indeed, they  were not  aware  of the judgment    date, although  it was their  duty to enquire  and know such date from the  presiding   magistrate.

22. This court, nonetheless  agrees  with the applicant that  it is not  clear  how the  decree  and certificate  of costs  were drawn and sealed  by the court  without seeking   for an approval of the  adverse  party as required  by the  Rules  under Order  21 Rule  8 of the Civil procedure Rules which provide, material to this case:

………

Any party  in  a suit in the High  Court may prepare  a draft decree  and submit  it for the  approval of the other  parties to the suit, who  shall oppose it with or without  amendment, or reject  it,  without undue  delay; and if the  draft  is approved  by the parties, it  shall be  submitted to the registrar  who, if satisfied  that  it is drawn  in accordance  with the judgment, shall sign  and seal the  decree accordingly.

If no  approval of or disagreement  with the  draft  decree is received  with seven days  after delivery  thereof  to the other  parties, the Registrar  on receipt  of notice in writing  to that effect, if satisfied  that the  draft decree is drawn  up in  accordance  with the  judgment, shall  sign  and seal the decree accordingly.

On any disagreement with the  draft  decree any party may file the draft  decree marked  as “ for  settlement” and the  registrar  shall  thereupon list  the same  in chambers  before the judge who  heard the case or if he  is not  available, before  any other judge  and shall  give notice  thereof  to the parties.

The provision of Subrules 2, 3, and 4 shall apply to a subordinate court and reference to the registrar and judge in Subrules shall refer to magistrates.

Any  order, whether in the High Court   or in the subordinate  court,  which is required  to be drawn up, shall be  prepared and signed in like manner  as a decree.

……..

23. The above provisions obliged the plaintiff/decree holder in the lower court to prepare a draft decree, send it over to the defendants/ judgment debtor’s advocates for approval.  In the absence of such approval  or an order  by the court  under Subrule  7 thereof approving  a draft  decree at the time of  pronouncing  the judgment  in the suit, the “decree” thereof  was irregular  which irregularity can nonetheless  be cured by following the procedure  as stipulated   in Subrules  1,2,3, and 4 of Order  21 Rule  8 of the Civil Procedure  Rules.

24. As was  espoused in the Nicholas  Kiptoo Arap Korir  Salat  V IEBC & 7 Others (supra) case,  the power to grant leave  extending the period  for filing of  an appeal  out of the statutory period is a discretionary one  and granted  on a case  by case  basis since it is  not a matter of right.  It therefore follows that a party applying for leave must satisfy the court such material upon which the discretion of the court may be exercised in their favour.

25. Indeed, it   was the duty of the applicant or its advocate to follow up on the date of pronouncement of judgment even if no notice of such judgment   date was given to the parties.  It is upon them to be vigilant.  In this case, I am  satisfied  that the applicant was  not vigilant  in knowing the judgment  date otherwise  nothing  prevented  them from knowing  the  date which  was given  on 29th September  2015  when judgment was deferred  to 5th October  2015.

26. Nonetheless, the applicants having failed to attend court on                   29th September 2015, It was upon the court or even the respondent’s counsel, to notify them of the next date   when judgment would be delivered.  Neither the court nor the respondent’s counsel notified the applicant of such subsequent date.

27. A judgment  or order  of the  court gives  rise to a new cause  of action that can  only  be ventilated  at  the appellate  stage.  The right of appeal is a constitutional right which is the cornerstone of the rule of law.  It would be a denial of  access to justice  if this court were, in the circumstances of this case  to deny the applicant  an opportunity to ventilate  their  grievances  on appeal, which appeal  as intended  need not  necessarily  be meritorious  but that  it is  arguable from the draft  Memorandum of appeal annexed.  It is not for this court  at this stage  to determine the merits  of the intended  appeal which  the parties’  respective  advocates  have endeavoured  to demonstrate.  There  was indeed  delay  in filing   the appeal but  which delay   was not  inordinate  from date of discovery of  judgment  and decree and which delay  has been explained to the partial satisfaction of this  court in that had  the  respondent’s  counsel submitted a  draft decree  for approval  by the applicant’s  counsel,  the applicant would  not be  claiming that it   was ambushed  by the  proclamation.  The fact of failure to notify the applicant  of date of  judgment  after the  judgment delivery aborted  in the date  that  was  given interpartes is sufficient  explanation to justify an exercise  of  judicial discretion to extend  the time within which the appeal should have been  filed challenging  the judgment and  decree of the  trial court.

28. In any event, the delay  occasioned which as  I have stated  is not inordinate  can still be  sufficiently compensated  by an  award  of costs.  Further, It has not been shown by the respondent what amount of prejudice it will suffer if the application herein is allowed.

29. I reiterate  my findings  and holding  in Edward  Kamau & Another  V Hannah Mukui Gichuki & Another [2015] e KLR  wherein  I cited  with approval Banco Arabe  Espanol Vs  Bank of Uganda  [1999] 2 EA 22 where  it  was held  that:

“ The administration of justice should normally  require that the substance  of all disputes   should be   investigated and decided  on their merits  and that errors, lapses  should not  necessarily debar  a litigant   from the pursuit of  his rights and unless a lack of  adherence  to rules renders  the appeal  process  difficult  and inoperative, it would  seem that the main purpose of  litigation, namely, the hearing and  determination of disputes  should be  fostered  rather than  hindered.”

30. Applying   the above  principles to this case, I would, in the spirit  of according the applicant an  opportunity  to ventilate  its grievances   on appeal and in order not to  oust  it from the judgment  seat, allow the  application for  leave to  file  an appeal out of  the statutory  period  of  30 days  and order that such appeal  shall be filed within  21 days  from the date  of this ruling.

31. Turning  now to the  prayer for Stay of execution of  the judgment  and decree  of the subordinate  court pending  the hearing  and  determination of the intended  appeal, the law  applicable to  the  grant of stay pending appeal is  Order  42  Rule  6  of the Civil Procedure  Rules which espouse  that:”

“1. No appeal or second  appeal shall operate  as a stay of execution or proceedings under a decree or order appealed  from except  in so far as  the court appealed  from may order but, the court  appealed  from may for  sufficient  cause order stay of execution of such decree or order.

No order of stay of  execution shall  be made under Subrule (1) unless:-

The court is satisfied d that substantial loss may result may result to the applicant unless the order is made and that

The application has been made without unreasonable   delay; and

Such security as the court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding   on him has been given by the applicant.”

32. This court must therefore be satisfied that the applicant has satisfied the three conditions set out in the above Order 42  Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

33. As to what substantial loss  the applicant will suffer  if the stay  sought is  not granted  pending appeal, the applicant contends  that the attached  goods  form the core  of  its business  venture and so it  will be  grounded  if execution  takes  place  and that it  has a good  and meritorious  appeal   which is likely  to be rendered nugatory  if stay  is not  granted.

34. I note that the claim by the respondent against the appellant   was liquidated and therefore monetary in nature.  The applicant denied  the  claim albeit  it did not adduce  any evidence  in defence  to counter  the assertion by the respondent  and now complains that  it  was  denied  the right to a hearing. That argument in my view,  will  be  subject of  the appeal and therefore  this court  restrains itself from  venturing into the  merits of  the intended  appeal.

35. Nonetheless, I have  seen the  proclamation  dated  15th December  2015  which lists  9 items  proclaimed   which are basically goods found  in the applicant’s business  premises  and for sale; with  estimated values  given. Although  in money decrees  it may not be true  that an appeal shall  be rendered  nugatory  if successful unless it is proved  that the  respondent  is not  possessed  of sufficient  means to recompense  should  the appeal be successful, this  court  takes cognizance  of the fact  that once goods  in  trade  are sold  to recover  a debt,  that business  can never  be the same.  It is  not  the intention of this court  to ground the  business  operations  of any business entity or person  for it is businesses that contribute  to the growth  of our economy.  This is not to say that a decree cannot  be executed  to recover the decretal sum but that  before the  merits  of the appeal are  considered  by the court on appeal, the appellant  should be  given the  opportunity to continue trading  as opposed  to grounding it by selling off the goods forming its core  business.

36. The justice  of the case  such  as this one is that this  court is  enjoined to apply the overriding  objectives  of the  Civil Procedure  Act and  balance out on the rights of  both parties.  The respondent  indeed  has a lawfully obtained judgment  which it is  entitled to  execute to recover  the claimed  sum of money  but the applicant  too should  be allowed  to continue  with its   business as well and if found liable, payment of the decree shall not be an option to the applicant.

37. Therefore, taking into account the rights of each party to this application and intended appeal, this court can still grant a stay on terms that will guarantee the security of the decretal sum.

38. As earlier stated in the decision extending time for filing of the appeal out of time, the application herein was filed timeously upon discovery of the judgment.  The second condition for stay is therefore fulfilled.  The applicant is also ready, able and willing to deposit security for the due performance of decree. That  being the case, I would  grant stay of execution of decree of the subordinate  court in Milimani CMCC 3522 of  2014  pending  hearing   and determination of the intended appeal  on condition  that the  applicant  deposits  the whole of  the decretal sum in a joint interest  earning  account  to be opened  and operated  by both counsels  for the parties  hereto  within  21 days  from the date hereof. In default thereof, the stay granted herein shall lapse unless such period is extended by the court.

39. The  Respondent shall have the costs of this application which shall be in the appeal.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 22nd day of March 2016.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of Mr Olonde for the Respondent

Mr Kosgei h/b for Mulani for the applicant

Gitonga: Court Assistant