Turyatunga & 2 Others v Attorney General (Civil Appeal 5 of 2017) [2019] UGSC 81 (5 September 2019)

Full Case Text

### THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

# IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

# (Coram: Arach-Amoko; Opio-Aweri; Tibatemwa; Buteera; JJ. S. C.; Tumwesigye. AG. JJ. S. C.)

#### CIVIL APPEAL NO. 05 OF 2017.

#### BETWEEN

# 1. DUNCAN TURYATUNGA RUJOJO

#### 2. AHIMBISIBWE FRED BAZIMBWA

3. BATAKA JOVIA (Suing on behalf of themselves & on behalf of 50 OTHER **WOOD FARMERS IN NAMANVE** CENTRAL FOREST RESERVE)

APPELLANTS

#### AND

#### ATTORNEY GENERAL ....................................

(An appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal presided over by S. B. K. Kavuma DCJ, Elizabeth Musoke JA, and Paul Mugamba JA, dated 12th January 2014 sitting at Kampala)

#### JUDGMENT OF BUTEERA. JSC

#### **Background**

The background to the suit is that in 1932 the Government gazzeted Namanye as a Forest Reserve. The purpose was to boost tree farming and forest conservation. In 1991, private tree farmers including the appellants were licensed by the Government through the National Forest Authority to plant and manage private tree plantations in Namanve Central Forest Reserve. The appellants paid the required fees to the Authority and went ahead to plant the trees.

$\mathsf{S}$

On 18th and on 19th October 2015, the Minister for Water and Environment (MWE) communicated to the Minister for Lands, Housing, and Urban Development (MLHND) and proposed that the land occupied by the respondents be set aside for construction of Low-cost Housing for the occupants of Kisenyi,

Mulago, Katanga, Kivulu slums, Naguru and Nakawa Housing Estates. $\mathsf{S}$

The Minister of State for Lands, Housing and Urban Development requested the appropriation of the stated land in Namanye Central Forest Reserve from the Secretary, Uganda Land Commission for construction of Low-cost Housing for the slum dwellers.

The Secretary, Uganda Land Commission then issued instructions to M/s Wemo Consultant Planners and Survey, to demarcate and survey the road network at Kirinya and Bukasa within Kira Town Council. He further requested Police to ensure that the exercise was peaceful.

The appellants claim that M/s Wemo Consultant Planners and Surveyors Ltd in carrying out the exercise of surveying the land and demarcating the road network cut and destroyed their eucalyptus trees.

$\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{A}}$

The appellants further alleged that their forest plantations were destroyed by veterans and other groups of people as a result of the communication between the two Ministers who proposed that the unutilized land in Namanye Central Forest Reserve be set aside for construction of low cost housing.

Consequently, the appellants sued the Attorney General in the High Court and obtained Judgment in their favour. The Attorney General appealed and the Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the High Court. The appellants were dissatisfied with the Court of Appeal decision hence the appeal to this Court.

According to the Memorandum of Appeal, the appeal is on the following grounds:-

- 1. That the learned Justices erred both in law and in fact when they came to a finding that the people who cut the appellants' trees were never linked to the Government as agents or servants and that nor can it be said that the "unknown persons" or "veterans" or landless people were servants or agents of Government, or that Government could not be vicariously liable for the acts of the persons who cut down their tress. - 2. That the learned Justices erred both in law and in fact when they came to a finding that the evidence on record does not support the appellants claim that the persons who cut down their trees were not servants or agents of, or under the control of the Government and therefore Government cannot be held vicariously liable for actions of unknown people. - 3. That the learned Justices erred both in law and in fact in coming to a finding that there was no cogent evidence placing Messrs. Wemo Consultants' Planners and Surveyors Ltd contracted to demarcate and survey the road networking the forest reserve, as the actual perpetrators. - 4. That the learned Justices erred both in law and in fact in making a 25 finding that the respondent cannot be held vicariously liable for the appellants loss thereby reversing the award of Ugshs. $40,176,000,000/=$

$\mathsf{S}$

(Uganda shillings forty billion one hundred and seventy six million only).

- 5. That the learned Justices erred both in law and in fact in coming to a finding that the appellants had not proved the respondent was responsible for the destruction of the appellants trees thereby reversing the award of Ugshs.300,000,000/ $=$ (Uganda shillings three hundred million only) in damages. - 6. That the learned Justices erred both in law and in fact in overturning 10 the award of exemplary damages of Ugshs.150,000,000/ $=$ (Uganda shillings one hundred and fifty million only) based on the finding that the award was made in error as the perpetrators that destroyed the appellants' property were never shown to be agents/servants of the respondent. - 7. That the learned Justices erred both in law and in fact on overturning the award that the "Government should avail the appellants 620" hectares in another reserve within 6 months and further assist them in a pro rata manner to re-establish their plantations" as having been made unsolicited, superfluous and without basis. - 8. That the learned Justices erred both in law and in fact in rejecting the award for interest of 25% as having been made in error.

9. That the learned Justices erred both in law and in fact in failing to reappraise the evidence on record as the court of first instance thereby

$5$

arriving at a wrong decision that the Attorney General cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of the unknown people and making the finding the basis of overturning all the claims of the appellants.

- The appellants prayed to this Court for the following orders:- $\mathsf{S}$ - (a) The decision and/or Decree of the Court of Appeal be reversed. - (b) The Judgment orders and/or Decree of the High Court in the original suit be reinstated.

Representation.

At the hearing of this appeal the appellants were represented by learned counsel, 15 Mr. Businja Fred Kiiza. The respondent was represented by Ms. Maureen Ijang, a State Attorney. Counsel for both parties filed written submissions. They orally highlighted their written submissions at the hearing of the appeal. I shall consider both the written submissions and the highlights in resolution of the appeal.

#### Submissions by counsel for the appellants.

Counsel argued grounds $1, 2, 3, 4, 5$ , and 6 together.

He submitted that both the High Court and the Court of Appeal found that the appellants were licensed by the National Forest Authority as commercial farmers and both courts also found that the appellant's trees were massively destroyed leading to economic loss for the appellants.

$\mathsf{S}$

He submitted further that on 18th October 2010 the Minister of Water and Environment wrote to the Minister of Lands, Housing and urban Development proposing that the "unutilized" land in compartments 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 14 in Namamve Central Forest Reserve should be set aside for construction of low cost housing for occupants of Kisenyi, Kivulu, Katwe slums and Naguru and Nakawa Housing Estates.

Counsel contended that the correspondence between the two Ministers was not copied to the National Forest Authority which is in charge of forest reserves. The Forest Reserve was not "unutilized" as alleged by the Minister of Water and Environment since it was occupied by the appellants who were growing commercial trees.

According to counsel the correspondence between the two Ministers played a big role in the destruction of the appellant's investments.

Counsel contended further that as a consequence of the minister's letters, within 20 2 months, the Ministers engaged M/s Wemo Consult Planners and Surveyors Limited through Uganda Land Commission to survey the land and demarcate road networks within Namanve Forest Reserve. In the process of marking the boundaries and grading the roads using tractors the surveyors destroyed the appellants' trees. 25

According to counsel, following the opening of roads in the Forest Reserve by the surveyors deployed by the Uganda Land Commission, multitudes of people claiming to be landless people of Kampala and the surrounding areas entered the

Forest Reserve and cut trees and uprooted stumps starting from the areas where the surveyors were opening roads.

Counsel submitted that officials of the land office illegally allocated land titles in the same Forest Reserve to different people including Government servants. According to counsel, the illegal land title holders also participated in destroying the appellant's trees.

Counsel submitted that the appellants reported all the destruction to Police but Police failed to protect the appellant's trees.

Counsel contended that the learned Justices of Appeal had failed in their duty as a first appellate court to re-appraise and properly evaluate the evidence on Court record and if the Justices had done so, they would have maintained the lower court finding that the Attorney General was vicariously liable for the acts of the Ministers, surveyors, Uganda Lands Commission officials and Police which led to the total destruction of the appellants commercial tree plantations on 620 Hectares in Namanye Forest Reserve.

# Ground No. 7

Counsel submitted that the learned Justices of Appeal erred in law and fact in overturning the award of the High Court "that Government should avail the appellants 620 hectares in another reserve within six (6) months and further assist them in a pro rata manner to re-establish their plantations."

Counsel contended that the award had been pleaded for by the appellants both in the pleadings and evidence on record and it was not unsolicited, superfluous and without basis as found by the Justices of the Court of Appeal.

# Grounds Nos. 6 and 8.

Counsel submitted that the appellants had proved that the people who directly destroyed the appellants' property were partly the servants of the respondent including Ministers, the officials of the lands office in giving illegal land titles, $\mathsf{S}$ Officers of CMI, Police, the army, veterans and unknown people indirectly with the help of servants of the respondent. It is therefore erroneous for the Justices of the Court of Appeal to overturn the award of exemplary damages of $150,000,000/$ = (Uganda shillings one hundred and fifty million only) which had been pleaded for by the appellants both in the pleadings and evidence on record. 10 Counsel submitted that it was also in error for the learned Justices of Appeal to have rejected the award of interest of 25 $\%$ .

# Submissions by counsel for the respondent. Grounds $1, 2, 3, 4$ and $5$ .

Counsel for the respondent also argued grounds 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 together.

Counsel supported the judgment of the Court of Appeal and submitted that all 20 these grounds hold no merit as the Justices of Appeal had diligently addressed all the issues and rightly concluded that the respondent would not be held vicariously liable for the actions of encroachers who were not identified to be agents or servants of Government.

Counsel contended that the letters between the Ministers of Water and Environment and that of Lands, Housing and Urban Development were merely a communication/discussion between the Ministers as to whether to use the unutilized land and degrade forest areas for construction of low cost housing for

the resettlement of slum dwellers but the Ministers were alive to the fact that such a decision would necessitate formal and legal degazetting of the forest as advised by the National Forest Authority.

Counsel submitted that the evidence available on Court record was that M/s $\mathsf{S}$ Wemo Consultants did not build any roads but only carried out a survey for the road networks. She added that the allegation that the surveyors cut the whole forest after two days of their activities was a blatant exaggeration by the appellants.

According to counsel, the appellants witnesses (PW1, up to PW7) gave evidence to the effect that their trees were cut by people they did not know and could not identify. They referred to people who destroyed the trees variously as "unknown" people", "unidentified culprits", "veterans", "people I do not know". The people who destroyed the trees were never identified to be employees, servants or agents of the respondent.

Counsel contended that there was evidence on Court record that the Police. National Forest Authority and other Government agencies tried to intervene and stop the eviction and destruction of trees in the forest reserve. Some of the encroachers who destroyed the trees were arrested and they had been prosecuted and convicted in the Chief Magistrates Court of Nakawa. None of the convicted encroachers were agents of Government. According to counsel, no evidence had been laid to prove that the encroachers who destroyed the forest were Governments servants, employees or agents for whom Government should be held vicariously liable. Counsel asserted that therefore, the Court of Appeal Justices rightly held that Government could not be held vicariously liable for actions of people who are not its employees, servants or agents.

Counsel further submitted that no evidence was adduced to establish how many $\mathsf{S}$ trees were actually planted by the tree farmers. What acreage was utilized by the farmers. There was no proof of how many trees were destroyed or even how much money could have been earned by the appellants from the trees they had planted or from those that were destroyed

Ground 7.

Counsel submitted that there was no merit in this ground of appeal and the Court of Appeal decision should be upheld since the respondent could not be held liable 15 for actions of trespassers that were not the respondent's agents.

## Ground 8.

Counsel submitted that the grant of interest of 25% per annum to the appellants by the High Court Judge was excessive and the Court of Appeal was correct when they rejected the award because the learned trial Judge had not granted the award after due exercise of judicial discretion.

# **Consideration by Court**

This is a second appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal. I find it appropriate to restate the powers of a second appellate Court.

- This Court has had occasion to state what its duty is as a second appellate Court $\mathsf{S}$ in numerous cases including Kifamunte vs. Uganda (S. C. C. A No.10 of 1997), Bogere Charles vs. Uganda (S. C. C. A No.10 of 1998) and Ongom John Bosco vs. Uganda (S. C. C. A No.21 of 2007). - In the latter case, the Court re-stated what it had held in the previous cases as 10 follows:

"A second appellate court is precluded from questioning the concurrent findings of facts by the trial and first appellate courts, provided that there was evidence to support those findings though it may think it possible or even probable that it would not have come to the same conclusion.

A second appellate court can only interfere with such finding where there was no evidence to support the finding because this is a question of law.

The above principles were echoed by the former Court of Appeal for East Africa in Okeno vs. Republic (1972) EA 32, where it said:-

'It is appropriate on a second appeal only to decide whether a judgment can be supported on the facts as found by the trial and first appellate court as this is purely a question of law.'

This court has had occasion to re-state the principles in *Kifamunte* Henry vs. Uganda, an Appeal No.10 of 1997, when it said:

'On second appeal, the Court of Appeal is precluded from questioning the findings of facts of the trial court provided that there was evidence to support those findings though it may think it possible or even probable that it would not have itself come to the same conclusion; it can only interfere where it considers that there was no evidence to support the finding of fact this being a question of law."

I perused the records of proceedings of the High Court and the Court of Appeal and the Judgments of both Courts. I have also studied the submissions of counsel for all the parties and the relevant available authorities. I shall now proceed to apply the legal principles stated in the authorities above quoted in resolution of the appeal.

I shall resolve the grounds in the order in which they were argued by the parties 15 at the hearing of the appeal.

### Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and $6$

I find the critical issue for consideration in resolution of these grounds of appeal 20 to be whether or not the Court of Appeal erred when they held that the Attorney General was not vicariously liable for the people who destroyed the respondent's trees.

The principles of law governing the liability of the Attorney General or Government which the Attorney General represents were stated in **Muwonge vs.** 25 Attorney General of Uganda, [1967] EA 17. The defunct Court of Appeal for East Africa held:

> "It is not in dispute that the principles of law governing the liability of the Attorney-General in respect of the acts of a member of the Police

$\mathsf{S}$

force are precisely the same as those relating to the position of a master's liability for the act of his servant. This being so the legal position is quite clear and has been quite clear for some considerable time. A master is liable for the acts of his servant committed within the course of his employment or, to be more precise in relation to a Policeman, within the exercise of his duty. The master remains so liable whether the acts of the servant are negligent or deliberate or wanton or criminal. The test is: were the acts done in the course of his employment or, in this case within the exercise of the Policeman's duty. The acts may be so done even though they are done contrary to the orders of the master."

This Court's duty as a second appellate Court, is to find out whether the Court of Appeal considered the legal principles and correctly applied them in the analysis of the available evidence to reach the conclusion they came to. I shall seek to establish whether on the basis of the available evidence on Court record the decision of the Court of Appeal was justified.

In all this, I have to keep in mind the role of the second appellate Court as stated by this Court in Civil Appeal No.08 of 1998, Banco Arabe Espanol:

"It does not seem to us that except in the clearest of cases, we are required to re-evaluate the evidence like a first appellate court. On second appeal it is sufficient to decide whether the first appellate court on approaching its task, applied or failed to apply such principles: See D. R. Pandya v. R (1957) E. A (supra) Kairu v. Uganda [1978] HCB 123."

The Court of Appeal considered the evidence in respect of the persons who destroyed the respondent's trees in their Judgment. I reproduce the relevant portion of the Judgment to illustrate the point:

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"All the plaintiff witnesses who gave evidence in respect to the cutting of their trees never witnessed the actual cutting. They merely heard from different sources about what transpired and who the trees had been cut by. They refer to the perpetrators as either 'unknown persons', 'veterans' or 'landless people'. Other witnesses mention they heard some persons like Twaha or Bukenya were part of the people that cut their trees. These persons were however never linked to the Government as agents or servants nor can it be said that the 'unknown persons' or 'veterans' or landless people' were servants or agents of the appellant. The evidence on record does not support the respondents' claim that servants or agents of Government cut or destroyed the trees in issue. In that regard the appellant cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of unknown.

Similarly, the fact that the surveyors from M/s Wemo Consultant Planners and Surveyors Ltd went to the Forest Reserve to demarcate and survey the roads network does not make them automatically liable for the alleged destruction. No one saw the surveyors cut the trees, nor was there cogent evidence placing them as the actual perpetrators. However, there is evidence that these perpetrators were in hundreds 20 of numbers (see evidence of DW1). There was evidence somewhere affiliated to private consultants like Mr. Sebulime Ronnie of Ronnie Consult (see Exh. D14). Such evidence in no way indicates that the appellant was liable."

From the quoted portion of the Judgment the Court of Appeal re-evaluated the evidence in respect of the two critical elements in the resolution of the appeal before them.

$\mathsf{S}$

One element was the identity of the people who cut the trees. The other was whether or not there was a link of the people who cut the trees to Government for the Attorney General to be held vicariously liable. The question would be whether the people who destroyed the trees were Agents or servants of Government.

There were different categories of people who destroyed the trees. One category was the people described as unknown people, veterans and landless people. The second category was the surveyors. The third category was of people who were issued with certificates of title.

I will proceed to consider the issues of loss or damage caused by each of these categories separately.

### (a) Unknown people, veterans, landless people. 15

The appellants averred that some of their trees were destroyed by unknown people, veterans or landless people as a result of the communication between the two Ministers who proposed that the unutilized land in Namanve Central Forest Reserve be set aside for construction of low cost housing. Pw1 Jovia Bataka, Pw2 Patrick Rukangira Ngabire, Pw3 Reverend Grace Erisa Ssentongo and Pw5 Ambrose Kyaroki made witness statements in that regard and they testified in Court.

$\mathsf{S}$

Mrs. Jovia Bataka stated in Court that the encroachers cut the trees and she does not know the specific people who cut the trees. Ambrose Kyaroki stated that the trees were destroyed at night and he does not know the people who destroyed them. Rev. Grace Erisa Ssentongo in his statement stated that the trees were cut down by enchroachers who were unknown and refused to identify themselves.

The other witnesses were, David Hafashimana and Rubayiza Wilson. They all testified to the same effect about the unidentified encroachers being the people who destroyed their trees.

In A. K. P. M Lutava vs. Attorney General, (S. C. C. A No.10 of 2002), the $\mathsf{S}$ respondent was held vicariously liable on the following facts: Six hundred Government soldiers who had been deployed at Mpoma satellite station, trespassed upon the appellant's farm next to the satellite and caused substantial damage to the farm and his exclusive demarcated forest. The soldiers together with their families cut down trees and removed valuable timber for construction 10 of houses to live in, for firewood and charcoal burning. The Army Chief of staff testified as a witness and confirmed that the soldiers had been deployed next to the appellants land by the Army. The Court held:-

> "the Ministry of defence deployed soldiers at Mpoma Satelite station to perform state security matters, the Ministry of defence was bound to provide accommodation and food to the soldiers. Failure to make the provisions for the soldiers tempted the soldiers or their commanders to use initiative for the soldiers to survive in order to be able to perform state duties. The acts of the soldiers were official acts and they bound the respondent in terms of the vicarious liability principles enunciated in the Muwonge case."

The army acknowledged they had deployed the soldiers who were therefore known to be Government's servants. The army also acknowledged the destruction by their soldiers who had been on official duty in the area.

Similarly in the South African case of K vs. Minister of Safety and Security 25 [2005] ZACC8 (6) SA 419, the Government was held vicariously liable for the conduct of the Policemen who raped the applicant. In this case, the identity of the three Policemen that raped the applicant had been clearly established. They raped

her when they had offered to take her to her home in a Police car at night. They failed in their duty to protect her. The Court held:-

"In this case, viewed objectively, it was reasonable for the applicant to place her trust in the Policemen who were in uniform and offered to assist her. Thirdly, the conduct of the Policemen which caused harm constituted a simultaneous commission and omission. The commission lay in their brutal rape of the applicant. Their simultaneous omission lay in their failing while on duty to protect her from harm, something which they bore a general duty to do, and a special duty on the facts of this case.

In my view, these three inter-related factors make it plain that viewed against the background of our Constitution, and in particular, the constitutional rights of the applicant and the constitutional obligations of the Policemen and their employment was sufficiently close to render the respondent liable."

The Court went further and stated:-15

$\mathsf{S}$

"When the Policemen - on duty in uniform - raped the applicant, they were simultaneously failing to perform their duties to protect the applicant. In committing the crime, the Policemen not only did not protect the applicant, they infringed her rights to dignity and security of the person. In so doing, their employer's obligation (and theirs) to prevent crime was not met. There is an intimate connection between the delict committed by the Policemen and the purposes of their employer. This close connection renders the respondent liable vicariously to the applicant for the wrongful conduct of the Policemen."

Both respondents in the above quoted two cases were held vicariously liable for 25 the acts of their agents. The agent's actions and identity had been clearly established and they were found to have been acting in the course of their

employment. The instant case differs from the two quoted cases, as the identity of the "unknown people", "veterans" and "landless people" who are said to have destroyed some of the appellant's trees in Namanve Central Forest Reserve has not been established and neither have they been linked to the Government as its agents.

The Court of Appeal found that the unknown people were never linked to the Government as its agents or servants and therefore the appellant could not be held vicariously liable.

$\mathsf{S}$

I find no fault in the Court of Appeal holding that the respondent cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of unknown people on the legal principle of vicarious liability.

#### (b)Surveyors 15

In addition to the destruction caused by the unidentified encroachers, there was evidence of destruction of some of the appellant's trees by surveyors.

The appellants emphasized that M/s Wemo Consultant Planners and Surveyors Ltd in carrying out the exercise of surveying the land and demarcating the road network cut and destroyed the appellant's eucalyptus trees.

On the contrary, counsel for the respondent submitted that the surveyors were strictly instructed to map and survey possible roads. She asserted that no roads were opened in the process. M/s Wemo Consult Planners and Surveyors Limited were instructed by Uganda Land Commission to survey the land. It is not disputed. What is contested is the allegation that the surveyors made roads and in the process destroyed the trees.

It was the appellant's duty to prove the destruction caused by the surveyors, the $5$ extent of the damage, and the value of the damage caused by the surveyors while demarcating and surveying the roads.

The Court of Appeal re-evaluated the evidence on Court record and found that "No one saw the surveyors cut the trees, nor was there cogent evidence placing 10 them as the actual perpetrators." On perusal of the Court record, I find that there was evidence from some of the appellants/plaintiffs witnesses who saw the surveyors cutting down trees planted by the appellants in the plots they were licensed to plant the trees.

There was failure on the part of the Court of Appeal as a second appellate Court in their duty to re-evaluate the available evidence on record. So this Court will proceed to evaluate the evidence.

The evidence on record is that the surveyors were instructed by the Commissioner 20 of surveys and mapping on the 3rd of December 2010 to carry out a demarcation and survey of roads in Kirinya and Bukasa. There were no instructions to make roads. The destruction they caused could therefore be in relation to the exercise they were instructed to carry out and that is demarcation and survey of roads and not the making of roads. 25

This is supported by witnesses on record who describe the destruction of trees that the surveyors caused.

In August 2010 PW6, Mr. Rubayiza Wilson, witnessed M/s Wemo Consult Planners and Surveyors demarcating roads and putting landmarks whilst cutting down trees in the forest reserve. According to Rubayiza, the surveyors cut down 500 of his trees in his plantations in compartments 7 and 8. Pw7, Mr. Duncan Turyatunga also witnessed M/s Wemo surveyors cut down 20 of his trees while opening the boundaries in his plantation in compartment 7.

Pw2 Mrs. Patricia Rukangira Ngabire witnessed the surveyors surveying her land with protection from Police Officers. Pw4 Mr. David Hafashimana also stated that he was informed by his employee that surveyors were putting mark stones on his plantation in compartment No.4. That when he confronted the surveyors, he was told that they were working for the Uganda Land Commission.

The M/s Wemo surveyors became agents of the respondent when they were instructed by the Uganda Land Commission to carry out a survey in Namanve 15 Central Forest Reserve. While carrying out their work, the surveyors destroyed some of the appellant's trees.

The appellants were licensed commercial tree farmers by the National Forestry Authority. The Forest Reserve they operated in has not been degazetted up to 20 now. Their licenses had not been revoked nor had they expired by the time their trees were destroyed.

The Uganda Land Commission acted unlawfully when it sent surveyors to Namanve Central Forest Reserve to survey and demarcate roads in the appellant's 25 forests without the knowledge and consent of the National Forest Authority and the appellants.

$\mathsf{S}$

According to the evidence on record, in the process of conducting the survey, the surveyors destroyed some of the appellant's trees. I would find Government to be liable for the damage caused by M/s Wemo Consult Planners and Surveyors Limited who were acting on the instructions of Uganda Land Commission, a Government Agency.

In my view therefore, the respondent is vicariously liable for the acts of the surveyors following the principles in Muwonge supra. The appellants should be compensated for the trees destroyed by the surveyors.

$\mathsf{S}$

## (c) Issuing of Certificates of Title

Counsel for the appellants contended that the issuance of Certificates of Title by the Ministry of Lands in Namanve Central Forest Reserve also led to the massive destruction of trees in the forest reserve.

There is evidence on record that different companies and individuals acquired plots of land in Namanve Central Forest Reserve and were given land titles by the Ministry of Lands.

Various Certificates of Title issued by the Uganda land Commission in Namanve 20 Central Forest Reserve were exhibited.

The Companies and individuals who were granted plots of land with land titles moved to the Namanve Forest Reserve and destroyed some of the appellants trees

25 on the plots of land over which they had been given land titles.

$21$

Section 8 of the National Forestry and Tree Planting Act empowers a Minister responsible for forestry with approval from Parliament to degazette a Forest Reserve once an environmental impact assessment is done and complies with the law.

$5$

The provisions in section 8 above were not adhered to before the issuance of land titles. Parliament did not pass a resolution to degazzette Namanve Central Forest Reserve. It still remains a gazetted Forest Reserve up to date.

- The Ministry of Lands was wrong to have issued land titles to the Companies and 10 individuals when it was well aware that Namanve Central Forest Reserve was still gazetted for tree planting. The Certificates of Title were illegally issued by the Ministry of Lands. - The Ministry of Lands is an agent of the Government of Uganda. I find that the 15 respondent is vicariously liable for the Ministry of Lands act of illegally issuing Certificates of Title in Namanve Central Forest Reserve when the Forest Reserve was not degazetted. The appellants trees were destroyed by the people to whom the ministry issued land titles.

The appellants were adversely affected and suffered loss as a result. In this regard, they should be compensated for the resulting loss suffered.

## **Police**

Counsel for the appellants raised and emphasized the issue of what they referred 25 to as Police inaction, indecision and total lack of interest in helping the appellants and stopping the destruction of trees which was contrary to the Police role to protect persons and properties as well as preserve law and order.

Counsel also contended that both the Police and the National Forest Authority have a duty to protect the trees and the environment and both institutions failed $\mathsf{S}$ in their duties. He prayed this Court to hold the respondent vicariously liable for the loss suffered by the appellants because of the Police inaction and failure to protect their trees.

I have read the plaint upon which the appellants based their claim. The issue was 10 not raised in the plaint. No remedy is sought in the plaint based on that claim.

There was no amendment of the plaint at the trial Court. The issue was not raised at the Court of Appeal.

A party would not be allowed to raise a claim at the level of this Court that was not raised in their pleadings at the trial Court and was never raised at the first appellate court.

In Interfreight Forwarders (U) Ltd vs. East Africa Development Bank, 20 (S. C. C. A No.33 of 1993) this Court observed:-

> "A party is expected and is bound to prove the case as alleged by the pleadings and as covered in the issues framed. He will not be allowed to succeed on a case set up by him and be allowed at the trial to change his case as set up a case with what he alleged in his pleadings except by way of amendment of the pleadings."

To be exhaustive, I would like to assess the Police's actions in reference to the principles of law on vicarious liability.

$\overline{2}$

The appellants in their evidence explained that their trees were destroyed by various people described as "landless", "veterans" and "unidentified people". They reported the destruction to the Police. The evidence on record shows that the Policemen did everything they could to protect the appellant's tree plantations. A number of times the Police evicted the encroachers. DW1 Twinomugisha John, the Police Laison Officier of National Forest Authority stated that on several occasions, in an effort to evict the encroachers, the Policemen from the land protection Police were faced with aggressive encroachers with pangas and stones. There is evidence that in the fight with encroachers one person was shot dead. The Police arrested and prosecuted some of the encroachers they found cutting down trees in the forest reserve.

$\mathsf{S}$

A copy of a charge sheet and court proceedings in the Chief Magistrates Court of Nakawa was exhibited. Over 20 people were tried in Court. They were convicted 15 and sentenced. None of the people arrested or convicted was a Government agent.

In view of my above observations, I do not find this to be a case where there was Police inaction, indecision and total lack of interest in helping the appellants and stopping the destruction of trees as alleged by the appellants.

I therefore find that the principles of vicariously liability do not apply as there was no wrongful act or omission on the part of the Police that led to the destruction of the trees in the forest reserve. The activities that led to the destruction of the appellant's trees were not by Police nor was the destruction caused by Police recklessness or inaction.

## **REMEDIES**

Counsel for the appellants contended that the Justices of Appeal erred when they overturned the awards granted to the appellants by the trial Judge.

In their plaint, the plaintiffs/appellants prayed for:-

- 1. A declaration that as licensees, the plaintiffs' land could not be parcelled and/or given out to third parties without their consent. - 2. A declaration that the plaintiffs' be paid adequate compensention as shall be determined by a qualified independent valuer for their developments which includes the growing of trees on a total of $(620)$ hectares. - 3. General damages for breach of the license agreement. - 4. Exemplary damages - 5. Interest at the rate of 25% from the date of filing the suit until payment in full. - 6. Costs of the suit. - 7. A declaration in the alternative but without prejudice to the foregoing that 15 in case of proper appropriation, each plaintiff be given (1) hectare on the suit land and be allocated land equivalent in value in another central forest reserve. - 8. Any other remedy that Court deems fit.

## 20

The trial Judge found that the Government was vicariously liable for the destruction of all the appellant's trees and ordered the Government to avail 620 hectares to the appellants to plant new plantations. She awarded the appellants $40,176,000,000/$ = for compensation, 300,000,000/= for general damages, 150,000,000/= for exemplary damages and interest at the rate of 25% per annum on the general and exemplary damages.

$\mathsf{S}$

The Court of Appeal Justices found that the Government was not vicariously liable for the destruction of the appellant's tree plantations and thus overturned all the awards made by the trial Judge.

The appellant now prays Court to reinstate the awards made by the trial Judge. $\mathsf{S}$ They also prayed for costs of this appeal in this Court and the Courts below.

It is well settled law that an appellate Court should not interfere with an award of damages made by the trial Court unless this Court is satisfied that the trial Court acted on a wrong principle of law or that the amount awarded was too high or too low.

In Margret Kato and Joel kato vs. Nuulu Nalwoga, (S. C. C. A No.03 of 2013), Okelo JSC, stated:-

"It is important to reiterate that it is a well-established principle of law 15 that an appellate Court shall not interfere with an award of damages by the trial Court unless the appellant Court is satisfied that the trial Court has either acted on a wrong principle or that the amount awarded was so high or so low as to amount to entirely erroneous estimate of the damages to which the successful party is entitled." 20

There were different categories of people who destroyed the trees in Namanye forest reserve. In awarding damages, the trial Judge awarded damages to the appellants on the basis that the Government was vicariously liable for the destruction of ALL the trees in Namanve Forest Reserve regardless of whether 25 they were destroyed by unknown people who have not been found to be Governments agents.

I found that the Government is vicariously liable for only the trees destroyed by the M/s Wemo Surveyors and then for trees destroyed by people who were illegally issued with land titles in the forest reserve.

$\mathsf{S}$

In the circumstances, I find that the awards made by the trial Judge in respect to the acts of the unknown people and the alledged Police inaction were based on a wrong principle of law. They are not maintainable.

- I will therefore proceed to assess the appropriate quantum of damages to be 10 awarded to the appellants who were affected and suffered loss by the destruction caused by the surveyors and the illegal issuance of Certificates of Title. - First, I wish to point out that the plaintiff's/appellants witnesses on record stated that there were over 70 tree farmers in Namanve forest reserve. In a letter annexed 15 to the plaint, the appellants resolved that four members represent them in a representative suit. Annexed to the plaint was a list of 50 tree farmers with their signatures consenting to be part of the representative suit. Leave of Court was sought to bring the representative action following Order 1 Rule 8(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules. The trial Court then gave an order granting Duncan Turvatunga 20 Rujojo, Fred Ahimbisibwe and Jovia Bataka permission to sue on behalf of 47 other tree farmers in Namanye forest reserve.

Court could only give an award to the 50 tree farmers that signed the resolution giving consent to be part of the representative suit. The award would not be to 25 non-parties to the suit.

$77$ # **Special damages**

It is trite law that special damages must be strictly pleaded and proved. See: Uganda Breweries Limited vs. Uganda Railways Corporation (S. C. C. A No. 06 of 2001) and Philip Ongom, Capt vs. Catherine Nyero Owota (S. C. C. A No. 14 of 2001).

In their plaint the appellants prayed Court to be paid adequate compensation for the trees destroyed as determined by an idependent valuer.

$\mathsf{S}$

To prove the quantum of special damages, the appellants relied on witness evidence from some of the tree farmers in Namanve Central Forest Reserve and the Financial Valuation Report provided by Bukenya Mohamed.

On the destruction caused by the surveyors, Wilson Rubayiza stated that the 15 surveyors cut down 500 of his trees and they were 4 years old. That at that stage, he could use them for thinning, poles or firewood. That at the thinning stage, each pole is sold at 3,000 Ugx. That among the 500 trees cut were transmission poles which could have been left behind to be harvested when they are 7-8 years old. Duncan Turyatunga stated that the surveyors cut down 20 big poles of his trees. 20 According to Duncan, the rest of his trees were also later destroyed by the surveyors. He did not state how many and how old the remaining trees were. Both Patricia Rukangira and David Hafashimana stated that their trees were cut down by the surveyors but they did not state how many of their trees were specifically cut down by the surveyors. 25

As regards the destruction caused by the illegal issuance of Certificates of Title, there is evidence on record that various land titles were issued to various individuals and companies in Namanve forest reserve. However, the evidence on

record does not specify which compartments in the Forest Reserve were particularly affected when the land titles were issued and how many and how old the trees destroyed were. It does not also specify which of the appellants plots were affected in that regard. There is no evidence as to what each of the tree farmers lost and its value in monetary terms.

No other evidence was adduced apart from the expert evidence in respect of actual loss caused to each of the appellants.

Bukenya Mohamed (Pw8), the expert witness who was instructed by the 10 plaintiffs/appellants to make an expert assessment and/or carry out a financial evaluation of the appellants tree plantations in Namanve Forest Reserve testified that he was only able to visit the kirinya area of the reserve but not the entire forest reserve. He found that trees had been cut down, stumps uprooted and houses built. He stated that his assessment and financial evaluation was based on 15 the said three management objectives i.e. Firewood, construction poles, transmission poles and sawlog for timber grown for a certain period of time.

$\mathsf{S}$

The Financial valuation report provided by Bukenya Mohamed to guide Court on compensation did not set out the extent or the number of the trees particularly destroyed per individual tree farmer but rather, it was a general report on the estimated value of all the trees destroyed in the reserve. It is not clear which farmers are covered by this report. It is not clear either how he assessed this when clearly he did not inspect the whole area where the trees were destroyed.

The above evidence created a difficulty in determining the value of the award and ascertaining to whom the award should be made among the appellants in respect to the destruction caused by the surveyors and the people issued with land titles.

The appellants being licensees to different compartments individually suffered a specific loss, some higher or lower than the others depending on the number of plantations owned and the value of the trees. The quantum of specific damages to which each appellant was entitled to ought to have been proved by the appellants.

Based on the above findings, I find that the claim for special damges was not proved by the appellants.

This Court can interfere with an award of damages made by the trial Judge if that 10 award was based on wrong principles or so high or so low. See: the case of Margret Kato and Joel kato vs. Nuulu Nalwoga, Supra.

In the circumstances, I find that the award of $40,176,000,000/$ = for compensation awarded to the appellants by the trial Judge cannot stand as it was not proved by 15 the appellants and was made on wrong principles. It is therefore set aside.

## **General damages**

General damages are compensatory in nature and they should offer indemnification to the party who has suffered loss. 20

In Robert Cuosssens vs. Attorney General (S. C. C. A No.8 of 1999), Oder JSC stated:

"The object of an award of damages is to give the plaintiff compensation for the damage, loss or injury he or she has suffered. The heads or elements of damages recognised as such by law are divisible into two main groups: pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss. The

$\mathsf{S}$

former comprises all financial and material loss incurred, such as loss of business profit, loss of income, or expenses such as medical expenses. The latter comprises all losses which do not represent inroad upon a person's financial or material assets such as physical pain or injury to feelings. The former, being a money loss is capable of being arithmetically calculated in money, even though the calculation must sometimes be a rough one where there are difficulties of proof. The latter, however, is not so calculable. Money is not awarded as a replacement for other money, but as a substitute for that which is generally more important than money: it is the best that a Court can do, damages have to be measured in order to arrive at what compensation should be awarded.

The general rule regarding measure of damages applicable both to contract and tort has its origin in what Lord Bluckbum said in: Livingstone vs Ronoyard's Coal Co. (1880) 5. App. cas 259. He there defined measure of damages as: "that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation."

The appellants suffered loss when their trees were destroyed by the surveyors and people issued with land titles in Namanve forest reserve. Their licenses had not been revoked nor had they expired by the time their trees were destroyed. The illegal certificates of title issued by the Ministry of lands breached the appellants license agreements.

$\mathsf{S}$

In the circumstances of this case, I therefore reinstate the trial Judge's award of a sum of Three hundred million shillings only (UGX. 300,000,000/=) as general **damages** to the appellants.

## **Exemplary damages** $\mathsf{S}$

The rationale behind the award of exemplary damages is to punish the defendant/respondent and deter him/her from repeating his/her misconduct but not to enrich the plaintiff/appellant. See: Esso Standard(U) Ltd vs. Semu Amanu Opio (S. C. C. A No.3 Of 1993).

In Rookes v Barnard and others [1964] AC 1129 Lord Devlin stated that there are only three categories of cases in which exemplary damages are awarded, namely:

(a) where there has been oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional action by

the servants of the government;

- (b) where the defendant's conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff; or - (c) where some law for the time being in force authorises the award of exemplary damages.

In the instant case, the illegal issuance of Certificates of Title in a gazetted Forest Reserve by the Ministry of Lands falls under category (a) above. The Ministry of Lands as a Government's agent ought not to have issued the land titles in a gazetted Forest Reserve to which the appellants had valid licenses to plant their trees.

I would therefore reinstate the trial Judges award of a sum of **One hundred and** fifty million shillings only (UGX. 150,000,000/=) as exemplary damages to the appellants.

## Grant of 620 hectares in another Forest Reserve to the appellants. $\mathsf{S}$

Counsel for the appellants submitted that the Justices of the Court of Appeal erred when they overturned the award that Government should avail the appellants 620 hecatres in another Forest Reserve within 6 months and further assist them in a pro rata manner to re-stablish their plantations as having been made unsolicited, superfluous and without basis.

In response, counsel for the respondents contended that the award should have been overturned as held by the Court of Appeal Justices since the respondent could not be held liable for actions of trespassers that were not the respondent's agents.

In my view, court would not be in a position to know if there is Forest Reserve land available for the purpose of allocating to the appellants. Court should give orders that they can enforce. Suppose the land was available in Kapchorwa, Bundibugyo, Moyo or Mubende, would the appellants still be interested in 20 planting their trees in those distant areas? It is not the business of Court to allocate land in Forest Reserves. There are responsible officials who are familiar with the policy and criteria for such allocations and that duty should be left with the responsible officials. The appellants like other Ugandan citizens and/or investors may approach the responsible officials for such Forest Reserve land allocation to 25 them.

I find that the grant of 620 hectares in another Forest Reserve to the appellants by the trial Judge was based on wrong principles, unrealistic and thus not maintainable.

### **Interest** $\overline{5}$

Counsel for the appellants submitted that the Justices of the Court of Appeal erred when they rejected the award of interest of 25% made by the trial Judge.

On the other hand, counsel for the respondents submitted that although the award of interest is discretionary, this discretion must be exercised judicially. He 10 asserted that interest of 25% for compensation for destroyed property/trees is excessive. According to counsel, the rate of 25% is applied on matters of commercial loss which loss was not occasioned by Government officials or proved by the plaintiffs at trial.

In their plaint, the appellants prayed for Interest at the rate of 25% from the date of filing the suit until payment in full. No justification was given for interest on general and exemplary damages.

### 20 Section 26 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act on Interest provides:

"Where and in so far as a decree is for payment of money, the Court may, in the decree order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged from the date of the suit to the date of the decree in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any to the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable on the aggregate sum so adjudged from the date decree to the date of payment or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit."

In the Supreme Court Civil Appeal No.03 of 2010, Cairo International Bank vs. Sadique, Tsekooko JSC, noted that in commercial cases or some civil cases where there is evidence, a plaintiff can successfully claim for interest at higher rates from either the date of filing the suit or the date when cause of action arose. He then considered the interest rate of 18% p.a too high because there was no evidence to justify it and substituted it with the interest rate of 10% p.a.

$\mathsf{S}$

Similarly, in the case of Bank of Baroda (U) Ltd vs. Wilson Buyonjo Kamugunda, (S. C. C. A No.4 of 2004), this Court found that an award of 26% as 10 interest was on the high side in this case. It held that the circumstances given in this case did show that the plaintiff lost use of money due to him but they did not show why he should get the high interest rate of 26%. The Court then set aside the award of interest at the rate of 26% p.a and substituted it with the rate of interest at 10% per annum. 15

In the instant case, the appellants planted their trees as a business venture and suffered financial loss when their trees were destroyed by the surveyors and people issued with land titles in Namanve forest reserve. The appellants were deprived of their money invested in tree farming when their trees were destroyed. However, the appellants gave no justification for the plea for interest at the high rate of 25% per annum.

Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, especially the fact that there was no justification for the interest pleaded. I find that the award of interest at the 25 rate of 25% per annum on general and exemplary damages as made by the trial Judge is too high. I would reduce it to the interest rate of 10% per annum from

the date of the High Court Judgment until payment in full following the authorities of this Court above quoted.

In the result, the appeal partially succeeds. I would award the costs of this appeal to the appellants in this Court and the Courts below.

$\mathsf{S}$

In summary, the Judgment is partially entered for the appellants on the following terms:-

- 1) It is declared that the appellants had valid licences to plant trees in 10 Namanve Central Forest Reserve when the Uganda Land Commission unlawfully gave out Land Titles on the same land in a Forest Reserve that had not been degazetted. - 2) The respondent is vicariously liable for the trees destroyed by the $M/s$ 15 Wemo Surveyors and by the people who were illegally issued with land titles in Namanve Central Forest Reserve where the appellants had lawfully been licensed and had planted trees that were destroyed as a result. - 3) The award of Forty Billion One Hundred Seventy Six Million Shillings Only (UGX 40,176,000,000) as compensation to the appellants is quashed. - 4) General damages for breach of the license agreements of an amount of 25 Three Hundred Million Shillings Only (UGX 300,000,000) awarded by the trial Judge to the appellants is hereby reinstated. - 5) An award of exemplary damages of **One Hundred Fifty Million Shillings** 30 Only (UGX 150,000,000) awarded to the appellants by the trial Judge for the illegal issuance of Certificates of Title in a gazetted Forest Reserve by the Ministry of Lands is hereby upheld.

- 6) The award that Government should avail the appellants 620 hecatres in another Forest Reserve within 6 months and further assist them in a pro rata manner to re-stablish their plantations made by the trial Judge is not maintainable and the decision of the Court of Appeal declining to grant this award is upheld. - 7) I award interest on the awards in 4 and 5 above at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of the High Court Judgment until payment in full. - 8) Costs are awarded to the appellants in this Court and the Courts below.

5th September $\frac{1}{2019}$ Dated at this day.

$20$

Hon. Justice Richard Buteera JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

$5$

## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA

### AT KAMPALA

## (CORAM: ARACH-AMOKO, OPIO-AWERI, TIBATEMWA, BUTEERA; JJ. SC **TUMWESIGYE, AG. JJ. S. C.)**

### CIVIL APPEAL NO: 05 OF 2017

#### **BETWEEN**

1. DUNCAN TURYATUNGA RUJOJO

2. AHIMNISIBWE FRED BAZIMBWA

3. BATAKA JOVIA (Suing on behalf of

themselves & on behalf of 50 Other

**Wood Farmers in Namanye**

Central Forest Reserve):::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

AND

ATTORNEY GENERAL ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

[An appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal presided over by S. B. K Kavuma DCJ, Elizabeth Musoke JA, and Paul Mugamba JA, dated 12th January 2014 sitting at Kampala]

## **JUDGMENT OF ARACH-AMOKO, JSC**

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment prepared by my learned brother, Hon. Justice Buteera, JSC and I agree with his reasoning and his conclusions that this appeal should be partly allowed

I also agree with the orders what he has proposed.

Dated at Kampala this Stranday of September 2019

**IUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT**

## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

(Coram: ARACH-AMOKO; OPIO-AWERI; TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA; BUTEERA; JJSC, TUMWESIGYE; Ag. JSC).

### CIVIL APPEAL NO. 05 OF 2017

### BETWEEN

1. DUNCAN TURYATUNGA RUJOJO

**2. AHIMNISIBWE FRED BAZIMBWA:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: APPELLANTS**

## 3. BATAKA JOVIA (Suing on behalf of themselves & on behalf of 50 other Wood Framers in Namanve Central Forest Reserve.

### AND

## ATTORNEY GENERAL::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

(An appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal at Kampala before (Hon. Justices: S. B. K. Kavuma DCJ, Elizabeth Musoke and Paul Mugamba, JJA) in Civil Appeal No. 0046 of 2014, dated 12th January 2014 at Kampala).

### **JUDGMENT OF OPIO-AWERI**

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment prepared by my learned brother Hon. Justice Richard Buteera, JSC and I agree with

his conclusion and orders. Dated at Kampala this...... ...day of

Hon. Justice Opio-Aweri JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

# IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

(CORAM: ARACH-AMOKO; OPIO-AWERI; TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA; BUTEERA; JJSC TUMWESIGYE; Ag. JSC.)

$5$

# CIVIL APPEAL NO.05 OF 2017

### BETWEEN

## 1. DUNCAN TURYATUNGA RUJOJO

## 2. AHIMNISIBWE FRED BAZIMBWA

- 3. BATAKA JOVIA(Suing on behalf of themselves & ::::: APPELLANTS on behalf of 50 other Wood Farmers in Namanye - Central Forest Reservel.

### AND

## ATTORNEY GENERAL ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

[An appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal at Kampala before (Hon. 25 Justices: S. B. K Kavuma DCJ, Elizabeth Musoke and Paul Mugamba, JJA) in Civil Appeal No. 0046 of 2014, dated 12th January 2014 at Kampala.]

### **JUDGMENT OF PROF. TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA, JSC.**

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment prepared by my learned brother Hon. Justice Buteera, JSC and I agree with his 30 analysis and conclusion as well as the Orders he has proposed.

Dated at Kampala this ... 5th day of September 2019.

In Isalenwe.

PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

# IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA

## AT KAMPALA

## (CORAM: ARACH-AMOKO, OPIO-AWERI, TIBATEMWA, BUTEERA; JJ. SC **TUMWESIGYE, AG. JJ. S. C.)**

CIVIL APPEAL NO: 05 OF 2017

### **BETWEEN**

1. DUNCAN TURYATUNGA RUJOJO 2. AHIMNISIBWE FRED BAZIMBWA 3. BATAKA JOVIA (Suing on behalf of themselves & on behalf of 50 Other **Wood Farmers in Namanve**

Central Forest Reserve):::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

AND

ATTORNEY GENERAL ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

[An appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal presided over by S. B. K Kavuma DCJ, Elizabeth Musoke JA, and Paul Mugamba JA, dated 12th January 2014 sitting at KampalaJ

### **JUDGMENT OF TUMWESIGYE, AG. ISC**

I also agree with the orders he has proposed. Dated at Kampala this 5th day of September 2019

> Hon. Justice Jotham Tumwesigve AG. JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT