Twagira v Attorney General (Constitutional Appeal 1 of 2007) [2016] UGSC 36 (7 March 2016)

# <sup>5</sup> THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT I(AMPALA

(CORAM: If,ATUREEBE, C. J. ; TUIvIV. ESIGyE, KISAAKYE, ti[SHIItlIttE, MVTANGUSYA, MWONDHA, TIBATEMItrIA. EKIRIKUBI NZA, . TI. S. C) 10

tl.l

# CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL NO. OI OF 2OO7

# CHARLES HARRY TWAGIRA : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : APPELLANT VERSUS

## ATTORNEY GENERAL : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : RESPONDENT

(Appeal from the decision of the Constitutional Court at Kampala before Hon Justices L. E. M Kikonyongo, DCJ, G. M Okello, A TWinomujuni, JA, C. N. B Kitumba, JA and C. K Byamugisha, JA dated the 3l"t day of October 2006 in Constitutional Petition N0. 7 of 200s1

#### JUDGMENT OT TUMWESIGYE JSC

Mr. Charles Harry TWagira, the appellant, appeals to this court against the decision of the Constitutional Court which dismissed the Constitutiona-l petition he brought against the Attorney General. It was the appellant's claim in that petition that his constitutional rights to a fair hearing were violated when the chief magistrate before whom he was being prosecuted in a criminal matter, ruled

1,

/

5 10 The Chief Magistrate, after considering the prosecution evidence ruled that a prima facie case had been made out against the appellant on both counts and called upon the appellant to make his defence. The appellant then made an application to the Chief Magistrate for the review of the finding of the prima facie case but the Chief Magistrate rejected the application on ground that the court did not have the jurisdiction to review its own orders.

The appellant then petitioned the High Court seeking to obtarn an order revising the ruling of the Chief Magistrate. The High Court dismissed the petition and upheld the decision of the Chief Magistrate. He appealed to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the High Court which dismissed the appeal. He then appealed to this court which also dismissed the appeal.

zo

Finally, the appellant lodged a petition to the Constitutional Court, the subject of this appeal. In his petition, the appellant stated that he was aggrieved by;

(i) the charging and his continued prosecution in the Magistrates Court for the offence of ernbezzlement under section 257lbl (now section 268(b) of the Penal Code Act which he stated was vexatious, malicious and insonsistent with the provisions of the Article 2811, 7 and 12) of the Constitution which guarantees his right to a fair hearing and non trial for an offence not defined by law.

- (ii) His continued prosecution which is inconsistent with Article 120(51 of the Constitution which imposes <sup>a</sup> mandatory duty on the Director of Public Prosecutions to have regard in exercising his or her duties to public interest and interest of the administration of justice. - (iii) The finding of a prima facie case on both counts which he stated was inconsistent with his right to a fair trial. - (iv) The refusal of the learned Magistrate to revisit his finding of a prima facie case after the prosecution had re-opened and adduced further evidence contrary to Article 28(1). - (v) The order freezing his personal accounts that contained his personal money which was inconsistent with his right to respect for human dignity and protection from inhuman treatment contrary to Article 24 of the Constitution.

25 Prior to the hearing of the petition in the Constitutional Court, a settlement agreement dated the 16th February, 2006 was reached between the appellant and the complainants in which the parties agreed, among other things, that the appellant immediately pays to the complainants Ug. Shs. 150,000,000/= in full and final settlement of the claim and that the complainant's complaint

(

- against the appellant in the Buganda Road Court Criminal Case No.l423 12000 Uganda vs. Charles Harry TWagira be withdrawn. - On the 17th February, 2006, the DPP discontinued the proceedings against the appellant in the Buganda Road Magistrates Court which led to the vacation of the orders freezing the appellant's accounts.

At the hearing of the petition before the Constitutional Court, four issues were framed for the Court's determination. These were:

- (i) Whether the charging and continued prosecution ot the petitioner for the offences of Embezzlement under Section 268 (b) and Thefi bg Agent under the Penal Code Act in Crimlnal Cq.se No. 7423 oJ 2OOO-Ugand.a a Chorles Harry Twagira ts inconsistent with Artictes 2a( 1), 28 (7 ) 28 (12) and 72o (5) of the Constltrttion. - (ii) Whether the findings by the trial Chtef Magistrate in Crilminal Case .lVo. 1423 of 2OOO that the petltloner has a co,se to o,nswer jor the offences of Embezzlement and Theft bg Agent under the Penal Code Act is tnconsistent with artlcle 28 (1) of the Constitrttion. - Ffq Whether the freezing of the petltloner's cssets pendlng the completion of the petitioner's triq.l in

Criminal Case No. 1423 of 2000 is inconsistent with Article 24 of the Constitution.

#### Whether the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs $(iv)$ sought.

The Constitutional Court resolved all the issues framed in the negative and dismissed the petition. 10

Being dissatisfied with the decision of the Constitutional Court, the appellant lodged this appeal.

#### Ground of appeal

$\tilde{\omega} \wedge \lambda \geq \cdots \geq \tilde{\omega}$

$\mathsf{S}$

The appellant's sole ground of appeal was framed thus: 15

The learned Justices of Appeal erred in Law and fact when they did not determine the meaning of the specified provisions of the Constitution allegedly violated and determine whether the conduct complained of actually violated the provisions.

20 He prayed Court that the appeal be allowed and:-

i) A declaration that the conduct of the proceedings in the criminal court violated the appellant's constitutional rights

ii) A declaration that the prosecution of the appellant in the criminal court constituted malicious prosecution.

iii) General damages and costs. 25

### Submissions of counsel

At the hearing, the appellant was represented by Mr. Kaganzi Lester, Mr. Timothy Arinaitwe and Mr. Patrick Nasinyama. The respondent was represented by Ms. Nabakooza Margatet, Principal State Attorney in the Ministry of Justice. Counsel adopted written submissions that they had filed earlier.

sl 2000 and Col. lRtdl Dr. Kiiza Besigye & 22 others vs. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the petition was properly brought before the Constitutional Court under the provisions of Articles 137(3) (b) and 137(41 of the Constitution rs which give the court the mandate to interpret the Constitution and cited the Constitutional Court's decisions in Alenyo Georqe William vs. Attornev General & Others ,Const. Petition No. Attornev General ,Const. Petition No. 12/2006, on the duty of the Constitutional Court to interpret the Constitution.

In counsel's view, the Constitutional Court failed to discharge its mandate of constitutional interpretation when it did not determine the meaning of the constitutional provisions, Articles 24, 28(ll, (7) (l2l and l2O (5), but instead considered the procedure of commencing a criminal trial which in their view was not the issue, thereby reaching a wrong conclusion.

Learned counsel further stated that the court misunderstood the appellant's complaints by stating that his allegations pointed to the

- <sup>5</sup> propriety of the procedure adopted to institute proceedings against the appellant in the Chief Magistrates Court whereas his petition set out to show that the appellant's prosecution in the Chief Magistrates Court u,as vexatious and malicious. - Counsel contended that the learned Justices of the Constitutional Court failed to properly interpret Article 28 (1) and Article 28(3)(a) on the presumption of innocence and further argued that had that court given Article 28 the meaning they gave it in the case of Col (Rtdl Kiiza Besigve & Others vs. AG (supra), they would have upheld the appellant's complaint with regard to the freezing of his accounts. Counsel further argued that to deny one access to one's funds for a period of up to 6 years as was the case here, because of the possibility that compensation could be ordered had an underlying assumption that one was already Cuilty and if he was to be found not guilty it would amount to torture and inhuman treatment. 10 15

Counsel complained about the Constitutional Court's decision in regard to the exercise of the powers of the DPP under Article 120(3) (b) of the Constitution, and the Chief Magistrate's constitutional mandate under Article 129(ll (d), stating that the court's decision seemed to suggest that the Chief Magistrate and the DPP can exercise their Constitutional mandate in total disregard to the limitations imposed under the Constitution. Counsel argued that section 41(6) (a) of the Magistrate's Court Act empowers <sup>a</sup> magistrate before whom a charge is laid to issue either a summons

5 case. or warrant of arrest to compel the attendance of the accused person before a court, and that a warrant of arrest should not be issued in the first instance unless the charge is supported by evidence on oath, either oral or by aflidavit which in their view, was not the

ro Counsel further argued that Article 120(5) prevents the DPP from infringing upon other person's rights by bringing vexatious and malicious charges against them. It was counsel's submission that the learned Justices of the Constitutional Court failed to appreciate the issues and the wealth of evidence adduced leading to their 1s reaching a wrong conclusion.

On the issue of the constitutionality of the order freezing the appellant's accounts, counsel faulted the learned Justices of the Constitutional Court's failure to determine whether the appellants' rights guaranteed under Article 24 of the Constitution were breached in the exercise of the power conferred on the magistrate under Section 275 of the Penal Code Act. Counsel contended that the Constitutional Court should have inquired into whether the magistrate in issuing the freezing order, took into consideration the maximum limitations imposed by Section 275 of the Penal Code Act.

Counsel also faulted the Constitutional Court's finding that the appellant could apply for the review of the freezing order stating that the order could only be vacated after the completion of the trial in the Chief Magistrates Court and attempts by the appellant to

have the order reviewed had been futile thereby infringing the appellant's rights under Article 24 of the Constitution.

10 Counsel, therefore, prayed this court to allow the appeal, grant the declarations that the conduct of the proceedings in the criminal court violated the appellant's constitutional rights, and that the prosecution of the appellant in the criminal court constituted malicious prosecution. Counsel also prayed for general damages and costs of the appeal.

15 20 In response, learned counsel for the respondent opposed the appeal and supported the way the Constitutional Court considered the four issues framed by the parties before dismissing the petition. She submitted that since the appellant was dissatisfied with the way the Constitutional Court considered the issues as framed for the consideration of that court, she would argue the sole ground framed by the appellant on the basis of how the Constitutional Court considered and resolved the four issues. Counsel opposed the respondent's argument that the Justices of Constitutional Court misunderstood the issues as had been raised in the constitutional petition.

She contended that the petitioner's complaint was in relation to the irregularities in the procedure adopted in the institution of criminal proceedings in criminal case No. 1423 of 2000. She argued that the Constitutional Court was right when it investigated the procedure that was used to commence proceedings against the appellant. That the procedure was through a police officer first laying a charge 25 <sup>5</sup> before a magistrate for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The question as to whether the appellant being a managing director fell within the scope of persons that could be held liable under section 268(b) of the Penal Code Act was answered in the affirmative by the Constitutional Court, she contended.

On the issue of whether the finding of a prima facie case by the trial magistrate breached the appellant's right to a fair trial, the respondent agreed with the decision of the Constitutional Court which held that the principle of a fair trial cannot be said to be contravened by a finding of a prima facie case as alleged by the appellant and that the challenge of the linding did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. 10 15

Counsel also opposed the appellant's argument that the freezing of his accounts under section 275(ll of the Penal Code Act pending the determination of the trial amounted to torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment as gua-ranteed under Article 24, argaing that the purpose of this section is to ensure payment of the compensation to the victim in case it is ordered. Counsel further argued that the Constitutional Court rightly stated that the section provides room for periodic review of the order and that the record indicates that the appellant had applied for the review of the same order in the trial court although the court had rejected it. Counsel contended that the appellant cannot raise the issue of the constitutionality of the rejection of the application for the review of

<sup>5</sup> the freezing order because it was not part of his pleadings in the Constitutional Court.

On the issue of the remedies sought, counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant having failed to prove the alleged violations was not entitled to any of the reliefs sought and that the Constitutional Court correctly denied the reliefs. She thus prayed this honourable court to dismiss the appeal with costs.

In his written rejoinder, the appellant reiterated his earlier submissions.

## 1s Consideration ofthe ground ofappeal

The appellant's sole ground of appeal is that the Constitutional Court erred when it failed to determine the meaning of the specified constitutional provisions and determine whether those provisions were violated by the way the appellant was arrested, charged and prosecuted.

In his submissions before this court, counsel for the appellant cited Article 28(1l,,28(7),28(l2l and Article 120(5) of the Constitution as having been violated when he was arrested, charged and prosecuted for crimina-l offence earlier mentioned.

25 Article 28 of the Constitution generally is about the right to a fair hearing. Article 28(1) which the appellant alleges to have been violated provides:

L2

<sup>5</sup> "In the determination of civil rights and obligations or any criminal charge, a person shall be entitled to a fair, speedy and public hearing before an independent and impartial court or tribunal established by law."

Article 28(7) provides:

"No person shall be charged with or convicted of <sup>a</sup> criminal offence which is founded otr an act or omission that did not at the time it took place constitute a criminal offence." 10

Article 28(l2l provides:

"Except for contempt of court, no person shall be convicted of a criminal offence unless the offence is defined and the penalty for it prescribed by law." 15

And Article i20(5) provides:

"fn exercising his or her powers under this article, the Director of Public Prosecutions shall have regard to the public interest, the interest of the administration of justice and the need to prevent the abuse of legal process.t'

The appellant's complaint is that certain actions and omissions of the prosecution and the Chief Magistrate had contravened the appellant's rights under the above quoted constitutional provisions because the charges brought by DPP before the Chief Magistrates court were vexations and malicious. 25

<sup>5</sup> According to the submissions of counsel for the appellant, what was in issue was not the procedure as the learned Justices of the Constitutional Court allegedly found but whether the charge being vexatious and malicious was established by evidence. In counsel's view there was plent5r of evidence which the Constitutional Court allegedly failed to consider. 10

What then were the unconstitutional actions and omissions which the appellant complained about in his petition to the Constitutional Court? In his constitutional petition he stated that his being charged and prosecuted with Embezzlement under section 257(bl (now section 268(b) of the Penal Code Act in Buganda Road Criminal case No. 1423 of 2000 was vexatious and malicious; that the finding of a prima facie case on Ernbezzlement and Theft by Agent in Buganda Road Criminal Case No. 1423 of 2000 (Uganda vs. Charles Harry Twagira) was inconsistent with Article 28(1) of the Constitution which guarantees fair trial, and that the order of the Chief Magistrate freezing his personal bank accounts was inconsistent with Article 24 of t!l.e Constitution which guarantees respect for human dignity and protection from inhuman treatment.

In the same petition, the appellant stated that at the time the charge was filed, there was no allegation that the appellant had committed or was guilty of Ernbezzlement; that as "Managing Director" he was not a person named in Section 257(b) of the Penal Code; that his charging and continued prosecution was not for the purpose of promoting criminal law but rather for achieving the

1,4

5 10 individual personal claims of the complainants in private transactions under the Companies Act; that no prima facie case had been established and the evidence adduced negated any possibility of a prima facie case; that the appellant's procedural protections were deliberately infringed, and that on the evidence on record the continued freezing of the appellant's bank accounts amounted to a form of torture, cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment and punishment.

15 2Q In his lead judgment, Justice Okello, J. A. (as he then was) gave careful consideration to all the issues the petitioner had raised in his petition. On the issue raised by the appellant that he was improperly charged as "Managing Director' instead of being charged as "a director" in accordance with s. 257(bl (as it then was) of the Penal Code Act, Justice Okello, JA, rightly stated in his judgment that a mistake in a charge sheet cannot be interpreted to mean that the right to a fair hearing guaranteed under Article 28(1), 28(7) and 28(12) of the Constitution has been contravened.

The learned Justice of the Constitutional Court went on to state:

"For us in this country, Article 28(3f of our constitution elaborates on what is expected to be accorded to an accused person who appears before court for trial to ensure a fair hearing. This includes presumption of innocence, informing him/her in the language he/she understands of the nature of the offence, affording him/her adequate time and facilities to prepare his/her

,<

defence; permitting him/her to appear before court in person or by advocate of his/her choice; in case of charge of capital offence or offence carrylng life imprisonment, to avail him/her legal representation at the state's expense; afford him/her without payment, assistance of an interpreter if he/she does not understand the language used at the trial, afford him/her faclllties to examine witnesses and obtain attendance of witnesses on his/her behalf before court..."

I entirely agree with the learned Justice's statement regarding the principle of fair hearing as enshrined in Article 28 of the Constitution. The right to a fair hearing is essentially about the rights that must be accorded to arr accused person when he or she is brought for trial before a court of law. 15

I do not agree with the appellant's argument that a right to a fair hearing is violated when a charge that an accused person considers to be vexatious and malicious is brought to court against him or her. What is important is that when such a charge is brought against a person, the person charged is accorded all the rights that were ably expounded on by Justice Okello, JA, in his judgment. 20

The appellant's counsel submitted that the appellant was denied the procedural protection guaranteed by law under section a2(5)(a) of the Magistrates Court Act, and that the Chief Magistrate should have first satisfied himself that prima facie, a commission of an

5 offence had been disclosed before allowing the charge to be laid against the appellant.

With respect, this argument is misconceived. The duty for <sup>a</sup> magistrate to satisfy himself or herself that prima facie an offence has been disclosed is only relevant when criminal proceedings are instituted by "any person", other than a public prosecutor or <sup>a</sup> police officer. (See Section a2(1)(c) and (5) of the Magistrates Court Act). In the instant case, the charge against the appellant was laid before a magistrate by a police officer and not by "any person" and, therefore, the question of the magistrate first satisfying himself that an offence was committed did not arise.

I also agree with the learned Justices of the Constitutional Court that the Chief Magistrate did not infringe on the appellant's right to a fair hearing when he ruled at the closure of the prosecution's case that there was a prima facie case against the appellant and called upon him to make his defence. It is within the powers of <sup>a</sup> magistrate to do so.

Moreover, a ruling of a court that an accused person has a case to answer does not mean that the accused will necessarily be convicted of the offence he or she is charged with at the end of the trial. It is possible that if the appellant had made his defence and gave all the information that was within his knowledge, the court would have acquitted him. In the event that the court went ahead and convicted him, he had a right of appeal against the conviction and sentence guaranteed by law. In my view, it was wrong for the

I

L7

<sup>5</sup> appellant to try to scupper the criminal proceedings in the Chief Magistrates' Court after the Chief Magistrate found that he had a case to answer.

On the question of whether the DPP can bring a charge against the appellant which he believes to be vexatious and malicious, court has no powers to prevent the DPP from preferring a charge against any person. The decision to prosecute lies within the discretion of the DPP. See the case of Uganda vs. Thomas Kwoyelo, SCCA No. <sup>1</sup> of 2012. Article 120(3) of the Constitution provides that the functions of the DPP are the following:

(a) 15

- (b)To institute criminal proceedings against any person or authority in any court with competent jurisdiction other than a court martial - (c)

(d)

The same Article of the Constitution in clause (5) provides:

\*In the exercise of the functions conferred on him or her by this Article, the Director of Public Prosecutlons shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority."

The court's control of the DPP lies not in stopping the DPP from preferring charges against any person but in acquitting the person when the DPP adduces insufficient evidence in court against him or

<sup>5</sup> her, or in dismissing the charge when the DPP does not lead any evidence against the person.

However, under the Constitution all public offices are accountable to the people and, therefore, in exercising his or her powers, the DPP must always bear in mind Article 120(5) of the Constitution that provides that in exercising his or her powers the DPP must have regard to the public interest, the interest of the administration ofjustice and the need to prevent abuse oflegal process.

On the issue of freezing the appellant's bank account allegedly amounting to a form of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in violation of Article 24, and Article 28(3)(a) which provide that a person shall be presumed to be innocent until proved or pleads guilty, the Constitutional Court, in my view, considered the issue adequately and resolved it well. <sup>I</sup> respectfully agree with the view expressed by the learned Justices of the Constitutional Court that freezing bank accounts of persons suspected of having committed an offence does not amount to torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. A person suspected of committing a criminal offence may be presumed to be innocent until he or she is proved Cuilty or pleads guilty, but the Constitution also recognizes that a person may be deprived of his or her liberty and suffer other forms of inconveniences in the interest of victims of crime or public safety. Freezing of an accused's bank account is one of them. 15 2Q 25 5 10 The harshness of section 275 of the Penal Code Act is, however, mitigated by other subsections of the same section which provide that the freezing order must be reviewed every six months and the amount frozen should not exceed an amount that will be required to compensate the victim of the offence. If the amount was exceeded, it was wrong, but it is not a matter that calls for constitutional interpretation.

a

In conclusion, I find that the appellant took a wrong course when he went to the Constitutional Court to have his grievances redressed. I do not see any question for constitutional interpretation which the petitioner presented to the Constitutional Court. All he presented were allegations of violation of his constitutional rights as guaranteed under Articles 28, 24 and 120(5) of the Constitution. I respectfully agree with Justice Kitumba, JA. (as she then was ) when she stated in her judgment:

20 25 "The petitioner's contention that he was denied his right of fair trial as provided by Article 28 of the Constitution is not tenable. The petitioner was charged and prosecuted in Buganda Road Court Criminal Case No. L423 of 2OOO of Embezzlement contrary to Section 268(b) and Theft by Agent contrary to Section 27llbl of the Penal Code Act. These are offences provided for by the written law and the penalties thereof prescribed. The question whether the petitioner did not commit these offences or did not qualify to be charged was to be determined on evidence

adduced during the criminal trial. This was not an issue for constitutional interpretation."

It is important to understand that seeking redress for the violation of constitutional rights is provided for under Article 50(1) of the Constitution. This Article provides that a person whose constitutional right or freedom has been infringed is entitled to apply to a competent court for redress. It is only matters that call for the interpretation of the Constitution that go to the Constitutional Court.

15 In the result, I find that this appeal lacks merit. Accordingly, <sup>I</sup> would dismiss it with costs.

L Delivered at Kampala this of M 20t6

Hon. Jus eJ ham T\r

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

$\mathcal{H}$ 3 hors Prop.<br>Carol Batado Curald - (Fr Prop.) col Kogni Lesu - fr an oppt $-$ Pors alos $P$


$\mathscr{V}$ $713h$ si.

## INTERNAL MEMO

$\mathcal{L}$

The Registrar, Supreme Court To:

Hon. Justice Jotham Tumwesigye, JSC From:

Date: 4<sup>th</sup> March, 2016

#### **Constitutional Appeal No. 01 of 2007** Re:

## **BETWEEN**

CHARLES HARRY TWAGIRA ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::APPELLANT

## **VERSUS**

## ATTORNEY GENERAL ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

Delivery of this judgment was fixed for 7<sup>th</sup> March, 2017. Please deliver it on behalf of the Justices on this date.

Hon. Justice Jotham Tumwesigye

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

# TTIE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

# IN THE SUPREME OF UGANDA

# AT KAMPALA

## (CORAM: KATUREEBE, GJ; TUMWESIGYE, KISAAKYE, NSHIMYE, MWANGUSYA, MWONDHA, TIBATEMWA EKIRIKUBINZA, JJ. S. CI

## CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL NO. 1 OT' 2OO7

## CHARLES HARRY TWAGIRA APPELLANT

### VERSUS

## ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONDENT

(Appeal from the decision of the Constitutional Court at Kampala before Hon Justices L. E. M Kikonyongo, DCJ,G. M Oketlo, A. Twinomujuni, JA, C. N. B Kitumba, JA and C. K Byamugisha, JA dated the 31"' day of October, 2006 in Constitutional Petition No. 7 of 20051.

## JUDGEMENT OF KATUREEBE. CJ

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of my brother T\rmwesirye, JSC, and I agree with him that the appeal has no merit and should be dismissed.

As all the other members of the Court agree, the appeal is hereby dismissed with costs.

tL-Dated at Kampala this day of March, 2016.

fuZ--\*--'e"-

B. M Katureebc CHIEF JUSTICE

# THE REruBLIC OF UGANDA

# IN THE SUPREME COI.'RT OF UGANDA AT KAMPAIA.

ICORAM: KATURTf,Bf,,CJ; ruMWESIG,Z; KTSAAKYE; NSHIMIT; M WANG US YA; M WONDHA ; nBA TWI WA - EKIRIKIIBINZA ;ISCI

## CONSTITUTIONAT APPEAL NO 01 OF 2OO7

## BETWEEN

#### ]APPELLANT CHARLES HARRYTWAGIRA

## AND

10 THE ATTORNEY GENERAT ]RESPONDENT

lAppal fton theJudgment of the Coastitutional Coutt (Kikonyogo, DCJ Okeilo, Tluinomujuni, Kitumba, Byanugisha,l/A) dated 31d Octobr 2OO6 in bnstitutional Petition No. O7 of 2OO5. J

# ruDGEMENT OF DR KISAAKYE. ISC

<sup>15</sup> I have had the benefit of reading in draft the Judgment of my learned brotherJustice Tumwesigye, Justice of the Supreme Court. <sup>I</sup> agree with him that this Appeal should fail. I also agree with the orders he has proposed'

.--1L Dated at Kampata \*i, ,l.-lauv ot -1!ftP{4,.. 2016.

\*\* ,.. (

HON. JUSTICE DR ESTHER KISAAIffE JUSTICE OF TIIE SLTPREME COURT

# THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

# IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA **AT KAMPALA**

#### KATUREEBE, CJ, TUMWESIGYE, KISAAKYE, NSHIMYE, CORAM: MWANGUSYA, MWONDHA, TIBATEMWA EKIRIKUBINZA JJ. S. C.

## **CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL NO.01 OF 2007**

## CHARLES HARRY TWAGIRA:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

### **VERSUS**

ATTORNEY GENERAL ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

[Appeal from the decision of the Constitutional Court at Kampala before Hon. Justices L. E. M. Kikonyogo, DCJ, G. M. Okello, A. Twinomujuni, C. N. B. Kitumba, and C. K. Byamugisha JJ. A) dated 1<sup>st</sup> day of November, 2006 in Constitutional Petition. No.07 of 20057

## JUDGMENT OF A. S. NSHIMYE JSC

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of Hon Justice J. Tumwesigye JSC, and I associate myself with his reasoning and conclusion $\mathbf{I}$ that the appeal be dismissed with costs.


## THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

,r.t' ! '

I

,

## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

CORAM: (KATUREEBE, CJ, TUMWESICYE, KISAKYE, NSHIMYE, MWANGUSYA, MWONDHA, TIBATEMWA EKIRIKUBINZA, JSC)

# CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL No. I OF 2007

## CHARLES HARRY TWAG I RA: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :A PPELLANT

### VERSUS

ATTORNEY GENERAL: : : : : : : : : : : : ] : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :: : ] : : : : : : : : : RESPONDENT

(Appeal fron the decision of the Constitutional Court at Kampala before Hon. Justices L. E. N. Kikonyogo,DcJ, G. N. Okello, A. Twinomujuni JA, C. N. BKitumba JA, and C. K. Byamugisha, JA dated the 3l't day of October 2006 in Constitutional Petition No.7 of 2005)

## JUDCMENT OF MWONDHA, JSC

I had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment by Tumwesigye, JSC. <sup>I</sup> agree with the reasoning and decision reached therein. The Appeal has no merit and is dismissed with costs.

I

Dated at Kampala this ,rL day of March 2016.

Faith E. K. Mwondha JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COUR'T.

# THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

## IN THE SUPREME OF UGANDA

## AT KAMPALA

## (CORAM: KATUREEBE, CJ; TUMWESIGYE, KISAAKYE, NSHIMYE, MWANGUSYA, MWONDHA, TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA, JJ. S. C)

### **CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL NO.1 OF 2007**

## CHARLES HARRY TWAGIRA ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

### **VERSUS**

### ATTORNEY GENERAL

**::::::::::::::::::::::::RESPONDENT**

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(Appeal from the decision of the Constitutional Court at Kampala before Hon Justices L. E. M Kikonyongo, DCJ,G. M Okello, A. Twinomujuni, JA, C. N. B Kitumba, JA and C. K Byamugisha, JA dated the 31<sup>st</sup> day of October, 2006 in Constitutional Petition No. 7 of 2005).

### JUDGEMENT OF JUSTICE PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA

I had the benefit of reading in draft the Judgement of my learned brother Justice Tumwesigye, Justice of the Supreme Court. I agree with the analysis and conclusions therein.

I am also in agreement that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

Dated at $\frac{1}{2016}$ Dated at $\frac{1}{2016}$

HON. JUSTICE PROF. LILLIAN TIBATEMWA-EKIRIKUBINZA JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

In Underwe.