Uganda Commercial Bank v KIGOZI (Civil Appeal 21 of 1999) [2002] UGCA 8 (28 February 2002)

Full Case Text

#### **THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA**

# IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

#### CORAM: HON. LADY JUSTICE L. E. M. MUKASA-KIKONYOGO, DCJ HON. MR. JUSTICE S. G. ENGWAU, J. A. HON. MR. JUSTICE A. TWINOMUJUNI, J. A.

### **CIVIL APPEAL NO.21 OF 1999**

**UGANDA COMMERCIAL BANK....................................**

## VERSUS

DEO KIGOZI...................................

(Appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Uganda (Musoke-Kibuuka, J) dated the 23rd October, 1998 in HCCS No.12 of 1996)

#### **JUDGMENT OF TWINOMUJUNI, J. A** 25

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This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court in which the appellant was ordered to pay special and general damages for false imprisonment and assault and wrongful detention of the respondent's motor vehicle Registration No.849 UAQ.

The facts behind this dispute are as follows: -

On 16th January 1995, John Bosco Ssemwogerere, an employee of Uganda Commercial Bank, Nkrumah Branch, was arrested on suspicion of having embezzled twelve million shillings from the bank. He was taken to the

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o Central Police Station Kampala. The next day he was taken to the CID Office attached to Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) Head Otfice where he was interrogated. He is reported to have admitted stealing the money with which he purchased a motor vehicle Registration No.439 UAe Toyota Hierce which was operating as a taxi on Kampala-Sernuto road. He took the police and oflcials of Uganda Commercial Bank to the taxi-park where instead of showing them M/v Registration 439 UAe, he showed thern M/v Registration 849 UAQ which they impounded and took it to Uganda Commercial Bank Headquarters. As it turned out, M/v Registration g49 UAQ did not belong to John Bosco Ssemwogerere at all but to Deo Kigozi, the respondent in this case. Deo Kigozi was not in Kampala when his vehicle was impounded. He had gone to Mbarara on a business trip but had left his friend and neighbour, John Bosco Ssemwogerere in charge of the vehicle. When he learnt of what had happened during his absence, he tried to recover his car fiom the Uganda commercial Bank. Despite the f-act that, he produced proof that he was the owner of the car, it rvas never retumed to him till 3'd May 1995. Instead, he was arrested and charged with being an accessory after the f'act of embezzlenrent of the ntoney John Bosco Ssemwogerere had allegedly embezzled. During interrogation he was assaulted and he sustained injuries. In 1996, he tlled this suit in the High Court which was decided in his favour as already indicated above, hence this appeal. : IO t5

l There are six grounds of appeal contained in an Arnended Mernorandurn of Appeal filed on 2 l- l-2002 which stares: -

- 1. The learned trial Judge erred in law and in fact in holding that the arrest and detention of the respondent was wrongful. - 2. If the arrest and detention of the respondent was wrongful, which is not admitted, the learned trial Judge erred in law and in fact in holding that the appellant was vicariously liable for the wrongful arrest detention and assault of the respondent. - 3. The learned trial Judge erred in law and in fact in failing to consider the question of whether the Motor Vehicle 849 UAQ was wrongfully $10$ detained. - 4. If the detention of Motor Vehicle 849 UAQ was wrongful, which is not admitted, the learned trial Judge erred in law and in fact in holding that the appellant was vicariously liable for the acts of the **Police Officers in so doing.** - 5. The learned trial Judge erred in law and in fact in awarding the respondent general damages in the sum of Ug.shs.3,000,000/ $=$ . - 20

$15$

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- 6. The learned trial Judge erred in law and in fact in using a figure as daily earnings of Ug.shs.85,000/ $=$ in the computation of special damages which had not been proved in evidence. - Mr. Masembe-Kanyerezi argued this appeal on behalf of the appellant. He 25 argued grounds one and three above together. The gist of the two grounds is that the trial judge erred when he held that the arrest and detention of the

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o respondent was unlawfu[, and also failed to consider whether motor vehicle Registration No.849 UAQ was wrongfully detained. He then conceded that the vehicle was actually detained at the premises ol the appellant between January and May 1996. He also conceded that the respondent was arrested and detained at Uganda Commercial Bank headquarte'rs rvhen he went to claim his car. He submitted that both acts were lawtul as police was only exercising their powers under the Police Act l3 ol 1994.

Mr. Caleb Alaka, leamed counsel, for the respondent pointed out that the leamed trial judge dealt at length with the issues whether the anest of the respondent and the detention of his vehicle were lawful or not. He subrnitted that on the evidence which was before him and which he carefully evaluated, he carne to the correct conclusion that both the, arrest of the respondent and the detention ol his vehicle were unlawf ul. He invited us to uphold this holding and ro dismiss grounds I and 3 of the appeal. l0 l5

I propose to deal first with the issue: whether the police and Uganda commercial Bank had any reasonable grounds to ir,pound the respondents vehicle and whether they were justified to retain it for so long. Here are the findings of the leamed trial judge based on evidence which was adduced before hirn (See page 5 of the Judgment) : -

"lt does appear to me from the evidence before mc that the investigation officers who impouncled vehiclc 8.19 UAQ had no justifiable cause for doing so. I do, of course, not believe thc evidence of l)Wl that Sscmwogerere told him that he had purchnsctl that

o vehicle. In DW I's own words, Ssemr+ ogerere told him that had pu rch:rsed motor vehicle, rcsistration No.{39 UAO rvhich was working on KarrrJrala-Sscrrruto :rrrrl n ot motor vehiclc 8,{9 tlAQ, u'hich uas ru nning alorrg l hc Kamnala/Hoim a route. There is no logical cxplanation why thc two could havc been mixed up. The likell explanation is that the defendant \$,irs so anrious to recover the missing money antl thc investigation officers were so overzealous to produce a motor vehicle allegedly purchased by the suspect, Ssemrvogerere, \*ith thc allegcd missing money, the plaintiffs vehicle was impoundetl instead. The other possible and even nrorc likely explanation is that the defendant merely suspectcd that Ssemwogerere, might ffinougtt a vrhicle uith the alleged nrissing money and the investigation officers accordingly forced Ssemwogerere to take them to thc taxi park and show them that vehicle(sic). [lnder that kintl of pressure, Ssenrrvogerere show.ed them the pltintifl's vehicle whose registration number obviouslv did not correspond with the Registration No. 439 tlAe, rvhich Ssemwogerre had given to the investigators. Therc is no surprise, therefore, that Ssemwogerere and el.en DWl, subsequently failed to tress(sic) the seller of that vehicle to Ssemwogerere. For none did exist. The plaintiff produccd concrete evitlence of orvnership of thc vehicle to DWI on lOth March, 1995, still, the vehicle uas retainetl until 3"r May, 1998 without the slightest justifiable cause.

I therefore, conclude upon the basis of thc evitlence adduced before me, that motor vehicle 8{9, UAQ clid legally belong to the plaintiff when it was impounded on lTth January, 1995, by the agents ofthe defendant. I :rm also quite satisfied that the motor vehicle in question remained in the custody of the defendant from lTth January, to 3"r May, 1995. As, a result of that fact, the plaintiff lost income in the form of daih, carnings frum the taxi business in which the motor vehiclc u.as involved,"

I would respectfully agree with this conclusion. I equally do not see a single reason why the respondent's vehicle was impounded. Apart fi.om verbal allegations, John Bosco Ssemwogerere never produced any proofthat he had used the allegedly embezzled money to purchase a motor vehicle. There is no evidence that he even clairned to have bought M/v Registration No.g49 UAQ. According to evidence adduced fbr the appellant, Sserrwogerere claimed to have bought M/v Registration No.439 UAe. Since no starement was recorded fiom him, there is no evidence on record to contradict this. It is amazing, and no reason was shown why, that the vehicle was kept at the appellant's premises and under its direct custody till 3"r May 1996. I would therefore, hotd that the respondent's vehicle was impounded without any reasonable grounds and the impounding was unlawful. l5 l0

Now, I come to the issue of whether the arrest of the respondent was lawful or not. There is no doubt that the Police Act, 1994, enrpowers police

officers to arrest on "reasonable" suspicion that a suspect is, about to commit, committing, or has committed an offence. The arrest must, however, be upon "reasonable" grounds. The learned trial judge made the following observations and finding on the matter (See page 6 of the judgment): -

"On the basis of the evidence laid before me, I do not find any reasonable ground or suspicion justifying the arrest or detention of the plaintiff. Makerere University vs. Daudi Kasiringi (1977) HCB, 25, M'bin vs. Dyer (1967) $E. A \quad 315.$ The plaintiff went to the defendant's investigation office, on 10th March, 1995, all by himself. He took with him the vendor of the vehicle, PW2, who talked to the investigators first and gave them all the relevant documents in relation to the ownership of the motor vehicle in question. I do not believe the evidence of $DW1$ that the plaintiff had hidden $\overline{or}$ assisted Ssemwogerere to escape or that the plaintiff had moved Ssemwogerere from Nakulabye to Nansana. I must add that, generally, DW1 did not appear to me to be a truthful witness. On the other hand, I was quite impressed by the plaintiff and his three witnesses all of whom gave me the impression of being very truthful. It, therefore, appears to me that that piece of evidence was an after thought just as the charge of being an accessory after the fact of a commission of a felony also appears to have been. But even if the plaintiff had assisted Ssemwogerere to move

$10$

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o from Nakulahye to Nansana, it rvould be unreasonable to conclude that he had done so in order to aitl Ssemwogerere to escape. DWI himself stated that he sau. Ssemwogerere in a vcry sick state at Nakulabye. lndeetl, DWI lvas forced to crtend Ssemlvogererc's policc bond at Ssemwogerere bedside at Nakulabye. It is also on record that Ssemrvogerere had a home at Nansana. At Nansana. Ssemwogerere was a neighbour of the plaintiff. I cannot see holv a pcrson who assists a sick neighbour to nrove to his home can reasonable be said to be assisting that person to escape."

> Again, I respectfully agree and find no fault with this analysis. All in all I would hold that there was overwhelming evidence to justify the learned trial judge to conclude on the above two issues, as he did. that: i5

> > "Considering the entire circumstances of this case, I fintl it quite irresistibly to come to only one conclusion. That is that the oflicers who wrongfully inrpoundect the plaintiffs vehicle, Toyota Hierce Registration No.g{9 UAQ, and arrested the plaintiff and also assaultetl hirn, on lOth March, 1995, are themselves liable for those torts against the plaintiff. Subsequently whocvcr cmployec| them or on u hoeve r's behalf the1, actcd must be r.icarious liable for their actions. Therc is no disputc as to rvhether those officers rrere acting within the scope of their employment, Both parties seem to bc agrcccl on that.',

In my judgment, grounds I & 3 of this appeal have no rrerit and shoLrrd fail

5 The second and forth grounds of appeal concern the issue of vicarious liability namely whether the appellant is vicariously liable fbr the wrongful acts which were committed against the respondent as we have seen above. Mr. Masembe-Kanyerezi fbr the appellant argued at length that the acts cornplained of were done by officers ol the CID Department of Uganda Police under the Supervision of the Dpp and that it was Uganda Government which was vicariously liable for their acts. He submitted that Uganda Comrnercial Bank was only a complainant and could not be held l0 responsible. He relied on the cases of John Mubiru vs. A1t()r'nev (ienclal ( r984 )IICB 46. Ebeema vs. West Nile District Adrrinistration ( t972) EA 60 and K. Jivan das vs. Joyce Namusisi ( I973 ) UI\_R.58 in supporr of his t5 subrnissions. He specifically that: referred to the Jivandas case where it was held

"Where a person delegates a task or tlutl, to :rnother, not a servant, to do something for his benefit or for the joint benefit of himself or the other, that person will be liable for the negligence of the other in the performancc of that task or duty."

He concluded that Uganda commercial Bank did not have the powers to arrest or irnpounding the vehicle as was done in this case and therefore could not have delegated a task it had no powers to pertbrrn to the police. That the police were not agents or servants of Uganda commercial Bank in any way l5

o but independent contractors whose wrongful acts should not be visited on Uganda Corrrmercial Bank.

on the other hand Mr. Alaka fbr the respondent suppo'ted the rnanner the leaned trial judge handled this issue. His main submission was that the CID and Uganda Commercial Bank had a corllron interest in recovering the money allegedly stolen by one John Bosco Ssemwogerere and were liable for the acts of the police under the authority of Jivandas ( supra ). He also pointed out that a number of documents on record, like police Form lg a release on bond issued to the respondent, (Exh.p2), the Exhibit Record of Motor Vehicle Registration No.849 UAe (Exh Dl) and the recorded statement of the respondent (Exh. D2) were all endorsed with the olficial stamp (logo) of the appellant which clearly shows that police was not acting independently but was under the control or in collaboration with Uganda commercial Bank which made it vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of the police. l0 t5

The learned trial judge comprehensively reviewed the law relating to vicarious liability. He concluded that fbr the respondent (who was then the plaintiff) to succeed, he

> "must show that officers llho manncd the tjgantla Commercial Bank investigation office were the ser!.ants or agents of the defendant or that there was a dclegation by' the defend:rnt to then do something on the del'endant's behalf or for their joint bcnefit or th:rt thc tlcft nttant

## interfered or controlled and directed the manner in u,hich these officers c:rrried out their work."

The Learned trial judge took time to deliberate on the issue whether the appellant was vicariously liable in the instant case. I lind myself unable to resist the temptation to quote fiom his judgment at length fbr my reader to see for himself/herself how he handled the evidence that led to his findinp that the appellant was liable.

t0 This is how he handled it: -

"The evidence on record by DWI CID olficers werc .. Secontled" is that hc and other to the tlefcndant's investigation oflice in order to carry out investigations of frauds in the bank and eventually to dcvclop thc investigation br:rnch into a fully fletlged CI D branch. Their operations were restricted to bank u.ork. They. obviously receivcd instructions from the bank as to rr.hat to investigate. All their implements were providetl by, the bank. That included office spacc, stationarr.(sic) antl transport during operations. Thcy also e:rrnctl some allou':rnces although their salaries ll ere paitl by the Uganda Police Force.

When thc plaintiffs vehicle was impoundcd accortling to PW3, there lverc fou r mcn involved in the opcration apa rt from Ssemwogerere. DWI says that of the four, there l5

o rvere only two CID officers. Those lyere hinrself and Dt. Cpl. Tukei. Who wcre the others? Certainlv, thcy werc officcrs of the defendant.

> When the vehicle rvas brought to thc bank, according to PW3, one of those who had impounded it reported to a fat short man who tvas standing on the bank.s stcps in the words, "Manager we have brought thc vehicle'.. That,, would appear to bc an indication that thc invcstigation officers were operating under the instructions, tlircction and control of the defendant. The vehicle, rvhen impounded fnr nearly four months, lvas kept in the bank's go-dorvn. The bank lvas not a police post lvhere such vehicle could be exhibited. The fact that it u.as kept there for that long shows thc apparent interest the bank had in it. lf the investigators lyere solelv ansucrable to the police then the vehiclc should hale been scnt to il police station such as CPS lvhich was not la r fronr the bank. The key of the vehicle was kcpt,, accortling to pW4,, by the Manager, Nkurumah(sic) Branch. u.herc Ssemwogerere had been working. That is whcre the plaintiff, PW4, DWI and others collected it from on 3,,t May, 1995, when thc vehicle was releascrl. When the letter from the DPP was obtained b1, l)Wl and the plaintiff and PW4 presentcd themselves to collcct thc motor vehicle, DW l , rr as not in position to release it. He told thenr that there tvas need for prior iruthorisation by

o the head of thc legal department of the bank betirrc hc could release the vchicle. That was on 2",r May,, 1995. The plaintiff and PW4 had to return the follorving day when the head of the legal department was prcsent. On that day, DWI obtained the required authorization ancl the vehicle was eventually released after collecting the Manager, Nkrumah Branch, to bring the vehicle's ker,. I cannot find any stronger evidence ofcontrol antl tlirection or, at the verv least, intcrference in the manner in u,hich the investigation officers, w,hom the tlefendant claims \$'ere not his emplot.ees' carried out their duties in relation to this particular case. It appears to nre that the investigation officers were working untler thc firm control of the defendant whose sole purpose was to recover the money allegedly lost by Ssemwogerere. The investigation office of Uganda Commercial Bank rvas a very specialised office, it was very differe nt fronr othcr CID offices. It entirelv belonged to the bank rvhich gave it u,ork and, to a largc t'xtent, dircctctl its opcrations. Although DWI says that he rcmainetl ansuerablc to the Director of CID, I think that that n.as only' as far as police hierarchy required but for practical purposes, hc was anslverable to, a Iarge extent, to the bank's nranagcnrcnt since, in his very words, he hatl been secontied to the 25 bank's investigation offi ce.

, Lastly, the fact that the head of thc legal departnrent of the bank when giving his authorit-v to relezrse the vehicle apologiscd, in the follnwing words, to the plaintitT and l,\\'-1, "\'ou uill c\cusc Lts Iirr n hat has hapDenctl. Wc have no rrroblem with relcasin the vch icle". irtlrls:r I'in u I touch to this case. ln reality, the Managcr \*,as admitting through that apologv that the bank felt responsihle for what had happened to the plaintiff.

I0 ln Iight ofthe principles I set out above, and in light ofthe evidence on record, I think that the justicc of this case requires, at thc verv minimum' a finding that the investigation officers were agents of the dcfendant. Orving to the major role played by thc defenrtant in the entire operation involved in this case, it would atso be proper to assume that even though the dcfendant did not appoint the CID officers or paitl their remuncrations, apart from allowances, a master servant rclations existed since the officers u,ere seconded to the defendant ancl hc exercised considerable contrnl in relation to how their operations were carried out, at least as far as the instant case wils concerned. Lastly, even if the CI D ofliccrs acted independently in executing the duties of thc dcfentlant's investigation office, still the defendant hacl a considcrable amount of interest and benefit as the police itself clid. I5 l0 Thus, on the basis of Fivandas(sic l5 ) antl ('o. Ltd. vs.

i.1 # o Nakaclama C. A. No.3 of 1973 (ULR.58 ) the de fentla n t cirnnot csca pe fronr liabilitv.

Irespectfully agree. clearly the evidence indicate that the appeltant and the police collaborated at every step in the attempt to recover rnoneys allegedly stolen from the appellant. It was not rerevant to the porice case, as the Dpp himself fbund, to impound the respondent's vehicle. It was impounded purely because of the pressure on the police to recover rnoneys alregedly stolen' That is why Uganda Commerciar Bank was so activery involved in the impounding, continued detention and eventual release of the vehicle. The arrest and detention and assault of the respondent by the police was in furtherance of the same objective. That conclusion is consistent with the existence of the Uganda commercial Bank official stamp or logo on the Police Release on bond Form l8 of the respondent, the Exhibit Record Police Forrn 19, and the statement of the respondent (police tbrrr 2A). I do not accept Mr. Kanyerezi,s explanation fiorn the bar that Uganda comrnercial Bank's stamp appears on the police Stationary because it is Uganda Commercial Bank which supplies it. I think it is evidence that whenever police had to take action on the case, Uganda cornrnerciar Bank was always consulted. The learned trial judge found a lot of evidence to the same effect. l0 t5 l0

Before I dispose of these two grounds of appeal, I wish to comlrent on Mr. Kanyerezi's submission that since Uganda Commerciar Bank had no power to an'est the respondent or irnpound his car, it could not have.,clelegated,. to the police such power within the meaning of the holding irr Jivandas case (supra). The statement of the law in Jivandas case (quoted above) was parlry

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taken from an earlier case of Selle vs. Associated Motor Boar Co. Ltd & Anor (1968) E. A 123 where at page 128 paragraph D, Sir Clement De Lestang V. P. of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa stated the law in slightly different manner: -

"Where, however, a person delegates a task or duty to another, or employs another, not a servant, to do something for his benefit or the benefit of himself and the other, whether the other person be called agent or independent contractor, the employer will be liable for the negligence of that other in the performance of the task, duty or act as the case may be." (Emphasis mine).

In the instant case, the facts show that the Uganda Commercial Bank employed the Police to perform a task for the joint benefit of both and 15 Uganda Commercial Bank will not escape liability whether he is called an agent or independent contractor. Here the word "employed" means "interfered or controlled and directed" the manner in which the police officers carried out their work. I would hold that the 2nd and 4th grounds of this appeal should fail. 20

I now turn to ground No.5 in which the appellant complains that the trial judge erred in law and in fact in awarding the respondent general damages in the sum of shs.3,000,000/ $=$ . It should be noted here that the trial judge awarded the respondent shs.3,000,000/= made up of: -

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- o (a) Shs.2,000,000/= general damages for inconveniences arising from the impounding of his vehicle for the period in question. - (b)Shs.500,000/: for wrongful arrest and detention, and

Mr. Masembe-Kanyerezi arracked the trial judge's award of shs.2,00,000/:. He submitted that since the respondent had arready been awarded damages fbr loss of earnings as a result of impounding his vehicre, the award of general damages for inconveniences as a result of the same act would amount to double payment and therefore erroneous. He also argued that the award of general damages for assault, wrongful arrest and detention could not be supported because these acts, if they took place, rvere not authorised by the appellant and were committed by policemen on a lioric of their own. He conceded, how'ever, that if Uganda Commerciar Bank was fbund vicariously liable for the acts of the policernen in the insrant case, then it would also be liable for any damages awarded fbr assaLrrt, wrongful arrest and detention of the respondent by the same policernen. Mr. Kanyerezi did not seek to challenge the awards on the grounds that they were excessive.

In reply, Mr. Alaka submitted rhat since the appellant i'ailed to show that the trial judge acted on a wrong principle ol law or that the award was so high as to make it erroneous, it should be upheld. He relied on the Supreme Court decision of Robert Coussens vs. Atrorney Genera I, Civil Appeal No.8 of l0 I999 ( unreported ).

Regarding the subrnission that the award of shs.2,000,000/: was tantamount to double payment, I do not agree. The award ofspecial darrages only cover

o Ioss of eaming as a result of the respondent's vehicle being unlawfully detained. It could not have covered the inconveniences he must have suffered, such as having at times to hire a vehicre when he has his own, having at times to walk or wait for or struggre to enter into public transport or indeed the hurniliation he must have felt to have ones vehicle detained for months on grounds that it was bought from stolen money. In rny judgment, the award was justified and I do not see any good reason for intert-ering with lt.

l0 I5 Regarding the award of general damages for assault, wrongful arrest and detention, I have already held that Uganda Commerciar Bank was variously liable for the acts of the policemen in the circurnstances of this case. It is equally liable for how they performed the task Uganda comrnercial Bank entrusted to them' The policemen were not on a fioric of their own. They assaulted, arrested and detained the respondent in an arte,pt to recover fbr the Uganda Comrnercial Bank the money allegedly storen by John Bosco Ssemwogerere. I find no merit in this ground of appear which should fhil.

The last ground of the appeal is that the trial judge was wrong to award special damages of shs.85,000/: per day which was not proved in evidence. Mr' Masembe-Kenyerezi argued half-heartedly that the figures which were pleaded in the plaint were not specifically proved because the trial judge did not believe them to be correct been dismissed. In his view, the whole clainr should have

Mr. Alaka for the respondent countered that the respondent had pleaded special damages of shs. l0l ,000/= per day and the trial judge was entitred to

find that a lesser figure was proved. In this case, credible evidence was received from the respondents driver (PW3) that he used to give to the respondent shs.85,000/= after deducting other expenses for fuel, maintenance of the vehicle and wages for himself and a conductor.

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Mr. Kanyerezi's understanding of the law seems to be that if you plead a certain sum of money in special damages, you must prove that figure or else you get nothing.

With respect, I do not think that is the law. In my judgment, I think Mr. $10$ Alaka is correct to say that a court is entitled to award a lesser figure than what was pleaded if it is satisfied that the lesser amount was proved. In the instant case, though shs101,000/= had been pleaded, the trial judge found that only shs.85,000/= was proved. He was entitled to award that sum. This ground of appeal has no merits and should also fail. $15$

In the result, I would dismiss this appeal with costs to the respondent here and in the lower court.

28TL day of February Dated at Kampala this.. 20 $\ldots\ldots 2002.$

25 Amos Twinowa JUSTICE OF APPEAL. 30

## THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA

#### CoRAM:

## l0 HON. LADY JUSTICE L. E. M. MUKASA-KIKONYOGO, D. C. J HON. MR. JUSTICE S. G. ENGWAU, J. A. HON. MR. JUSTICE A, TWINOMUJUNI. J. A.

# CIVIL API'EAL NO.2I OF I999

UGANDA COMMERCIAL BANK APPELLANT

#### t0 VERSUS

DEO KIGOZI . RESPONDENT

(Appealfrom the judgnent oJ the High Court oJ Uganda (Musoke-Kihuuka, J) doted the 23't October, t998 in HCCS No.l2 oI t996)

## JUDGMENT OF L. E. M. MUKASA-KIKONYOGO. DCJ

-.10 I have had the opportunity of reading in draft the judgment prepared by Twinomujuni J. A and I agree that the appeal must fail.

Since Engwau J. A. also agrees the appeal is dismissed with costs to the Respondent both in this Court and High Court.

Dated at Kampala ttris &.8/.foay orP.lrf\$dz

-l0

L. E. SA-KIKONYOGO DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICE

# THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF UGANDA **HOLDEN AT KAMPALA**

CORAM: HON. LADY JUSTICE L. E. M. MUKASA-KIKONYOGO, DCJ. HON. MR. JUSTICE S. G. ENGWAU, JA. HON. MR. JUSTICE A. TWINOMUJUNI, JA.

#### CIVIL APPEAL NO. 21 OF 1999 **BETWEEN**

*UGANDA COMMERCIAL BANK*=======*APPELLANT*

AND

$DEO KIGOZI = \texttt{=} = \texttt{=} = \texttt{=} = \texttt{=} = \texttt{=}$ $==RESPONDENT$

> (Appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Uganda at Kampala by (Musoke-Kibuuka J.) dated the 23rd October, 1998 in H. C. C. S No. 12 of 1996).

# JUDGMENT OF S. G. ENGWAU, JA.

*I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of Twinomujuni, J. A.* and I agree with him that this appeal must fail. I would also concur with his proposal that costs of this appeal be to the respondent here and in the High Court.

Dated at Kampala this $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{I}L}$ day of Feb vuory 2002.

nowan S. G. ENGWAU *JUSTICE OF APPEAL.*