Uganda Revenue Authority v Ojok (Civil Appeal 33 of 95) [1997] UGSC 27 (7 November 1997)

Full Case Text

# THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA

### AT MENGO

# (CORAM: WAMBUZI, C. J., ODER, JSC., & TSEKOOKO, JSC.)

### CIVIL APPEAL NO. 33/95

#### **BETWEEN**

**UGANDA REVENUE AUTHORITY**

#### APPELLANT

AND

**BONIFACE OUINTO OJOK**

## $\cdots\cdots\cdots$

:::::::::

**RESPONDENT**

(*Appeal from the judgment of the* High Court of Uganda at Kampala (Ntabgoba, P. J) dated 23.3.1995 in H.. C. C. S. No. 490 of 1995).

#### JUDGMENT OF ODER, JSC.

This is an appeal by Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) against a decision of the High Court in a suit in which URA was the defendant and Boniface Q. Ojok (the present respondent) the plaintiff. The suit substantially failed. Except for an item of the respondent's claim for special damages, namely overtime allowances, the suit was dismissed. This appeal is not against the award by the learned Principal Judge who partly tried the suit and delivered the judgment. The Judge who commenced the trial of the suit had died. The appeal is against the learned Principal Judge's interpretation of the relevant statutes and the respondent's terms of employment regarding what probationary period the respondent should have served as an employee of the appellant's.

By a letter dated 1.4.1992(exhibit P.1) URA appointed the respondent in its employment as a Junior Revenue Assistant. The letter set out the terms and conditions on which the respondent was employed. These included a salary of shs.2,137,992/- per annum, a taxable housing allowance, transport allowance, leave per annum, leave allowance, etc. For purposes of the appeal the relevant parts of the letter of appointment stated:

> $"5$ Your appointment is subjected to the Authority's Regulations, a copy of which will be made available for your perusal and retention when you report for duty

> > 274

You will be required to give one month's notice or cash equivalent to one month's salary in lieu of notice in the event of your wish to leave the Authority and vice versa. Your appointment is effective from $I^d$ April, 1992, and you will serve a probation period of two $y\bar{c} \epsilon \bar{t} t S.$

Thereafter, the respondent worked for the appellant for sometime. But by a letter dated 22.2.1993 (Exhibit P.3) the URA Commissioner General dismissed the respondent from its employment with immediate effect. Reasons for the dismissal were that the respondent had been negligent and careless regarding entries made by him of vehicles carrying imported goods coming into Uganda. The respondent made the entries in the URA's records at Mukono Customs check point on 14.12.1992. It was said that by reasons of such negligence and recklessness the respondent failed to perform his duties as expected of him.

The second, and last, paragraph of the letter of dismissal said:

"In exercise, therefore, of powers confirmed upon be by the *Board of Directors of the URA pursuant to clause* $15(4)$ *of the* terms and conditions of service, and Rule 83 (c) and (d) of the rules and conditions of service for staff of the U. R. A., I hereby dismiss you from the service of U. R. A. The dismissal takes *immediate effect."*

Following his dismissal the respondent instituted a suit against U. R. A. for wrongful dismissal. It was pleaded in the plaint, inter alia, that there were no reasonable grounds or any ground at all for the respondent's summary dismissal; that the summary dismissal was not in accordance with the provisions of the terms and conditions of services of U. R. A's staff; and the respondent was not paid his entitlements under the terms, rales and conditions of his employment. The plaint also pleaded and prayed for special damages totaling shs.5,053,230/-. This sum included shs.1,323,384/- as unpaid overtime allowance.

In its written statement of defence, the appellant denied the respondent's claims and, in essence, pleaded that the respondent's dismissal was lawful under the terms ad conditions of his contract as stated in his letter of appointment, and the terms and conditions of pervice and rules and conditions or service applicable to the U. F. A's employees.

In the alternative U. R. A's defence was stated in paragraph 8 as follows

"8 .................................... appointment was subject to probation for two years effective from 1st April, 1992, and that it was settled law that a person appointed on probationary basis can have his service. terminated without giving any reason and that the plaintiff herein was dismissed while on probationary service and, therefore, has no claim from the defendant what-so ever."

Four issues were framed with the agreement of the parties. They were:-

Whether the dismissal of the respondent was lawful.

$\mathbf{I}$

2. Whether the respondent was entitled to terminal benefits, special and general damages as claimed.

3. Whether the respondent was still undergoing lawful probationary period at the time of his dismissal and whether, therefore, he could be dismissed without reason or notice.

4. Whether the respondent was entitled to interest on his claim and could.

The Learned Principal Judge answered the first issue in the positive, finding that the dismissal of the respondent was lawful.

On the second issue, the learned Principal Judge's answers were, first, that having been summarily dismissed under rule 85 (d) of U. R. A's Rules, the respondent was not entitled to terminal benefits, and general damages; and secondly that the respondent was not entitled to the various items of special damages claimed except overtime allowance of shs.1,323,384/which was due and payable to him at the time of his dismissal.

The answer to the third issue was that the respondent was serving a twelve month's probation and had not completed it yet; and that he was validly dismissed without notice.

The answer to the fourth issue was if the respondent were to be awarded damages as prayed in the plaint or part thereof, he would be entitled to interest thereby. If he succeeded in his claims, or part thereof, he would also be entitled to recover costs, since costs follow the event. In the event, the respondent was awarded shs.1,323,384/-, being part of his claims. plus interests and costs.

The respondent was dissatisfied with the finding on the third issue. Hence this appeal.

The complaints in the two grounds set out in the memorandum of appeal are that:

- 1. The learned trial Judge misdirected himself in holding that all probationary employment must be served for six months and with agreement of the employee be extended for a further period of six months but not longer as provided in the Employment Decree of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as "Decree 4/75"). - 2. The learned trial Judge erred in holding that under the URA's statute No.6 of 1991, (hereafter referred to as "statute 6/91") no employee can serve a maximum period on probation of more that 12 months.

I will consider the two ground of appeal together since, in my view, they are only different aspects of the same issue, which is whether the period of service on probation for URA is limited to six months extended by a further six months only as provided under Decree 4/75. In a nut-shell is the URA bound by the provisions of the Decree concerning probationary period?

The passage of the judgment of the learned Principal Judge which gave rise to the complaints in the grounds of appeal reads as follows:

> "According to Mr. Byamugisha, Counsel for the defendant, section 12(3) of Statute No. 6 of 1991" gives sufficient authority to determine, amongst other things, the period of probation" and the statute in this respect, Counsel argues, supercedes section 23(2) of the Employment Decree (No.4 of 1975) which would only apply to cases which are not governed by any specific legislation. With respect to Counsel, he got the law the other way round. Whereas according to the rules of statute interpretation a later statute supercedes an earlier statute, that would not be so where an earlier statute, which is of general application with regard to a certain aspect is being compared with a later statute which does not expressly exclude that certain aspect from the application of the earlier statute. In this case the Employment Decree provides a probationary period per every employee. For that probationary period to be excluded by statute No. 6.91 from its application, the statute must say so expresis verbis. This is to say that even under the Revenue Authority Statute (No. 6 of 1991) no employee can serve a maximum period on probation All probationary periods of for more that 12 months. employment thus must be served for 6 months and, with the agreement of the employee be extended for further period of $6$ months but not longer. And I dare say that since the plaintiff accepted the terms of service offered to him in the letter of

appointment, he is deemed to have consented to a 6 months extension, so that his probationary period was 12 months. He was employed on 1.4.1992 and his services were terminated on 22.2.1993. He had not yet served for 12 months and, therefore he was still on probation when he was summarily dismissed."

Under these grounds of appeal, Dr. Bakibinga, learned Counsel for the appellant, presented to us arguments similar to those made in the lower Court. He submitted that section 23(2) of Decree 4/75 does not apply to URA because URA is a "government undertaking" As such it is exempted from application of Decree 4/75by S.5(3) of the same Decree; and the probationary period of its employees is not restricted to a maximum of 12 months. It was contended that URA is a government undertaking although it has its own Board which controls policies. This is, first, because under section 5 (1) of statute 6/91 the Board has nine members - the Chairman and three other members of whom are appointed by the Minister responsible for finance; five members of the Board are ex-officio members, by virtue of their being government officials. Although it is a body corporate, URA is effectively controlled by the Minister of Finance (MOF) through the Board. It is thus, essentially, a "government undertaking" which is controlled through the composition of the Board by the Ministry of Finance.

Secondly, because under section 5(3) of statute 6/91 the MOF has powers to give directives to the Board regarding the performance of its function, and it is the duty of the Board to comply with such directives.

Thirdly, it was contended, another aspect which shows that URA is a government undertaking arises from the appointment, and function's of the Commissioner General as the Chief Executive of URA under Section 10 of statute 6/96. He is appointed by the Minister, who may also terminate his appointment.

The fourth aspect of URA being a "government undertaking", it was said, is that it is funded by the Government as Section 15(2) of statute 6/91 appears to show. Under that section, the expenditure of URA is a charge on the Consolidated Fund. In addition, the annual accounts of URA is audited by the Auditor General under section 17(2) who, under s.17 (3), must submit his opinion to the Minister. Under Section 17(4) the Minister must cause copies of the annual report with a copy of the Auditor General's opinion to be laid before Parliament.

It was also contended that the definition of "public officer" in article 175 of the Constitution is relevant to the definition of URA as a government undertaking.

Section 23 of Decree 4/75 provides:

"23 $(1)$

A probationary period of service shall not $(2)$ exceed a period of six months in the first instance but may, with agreement of the employee, be extended for a further period of not more than six months."

In my view, section 23(2) makes mandatory provisions to the effect that a probationary employment shall not exceed a period of six months. However, the period of six months may be extended with agreement of the employee for a further period of six months only, and no more. This means that the maximum probationary period of employment is twelve months.

Section 5 of the Decree, however, makes some exceptions to the application of section 23(2). Section $5(3)$ provides:

> "5 (3) sections ... ................................ of this Decree shall not apply to any government service or undertaking or to any public officer, or any other person employed by the government in a civil capacity."

It is the appellant's contention that URA is a "Government undertaking". Consequently it is exempted from the application of s. 23(2) of Decree $4/75$ by s. 5(3) of the same Decree.

The expression "Government undertaking" is not defined in Decroe 4/75. Nor does statute 6/91 establishing URA, say that URA is a government undertaking. Infact, the expression does not appear defined in any legislation relevant to the point under consideration. We therefore, have to resort to its plain ordinary meaning. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines the word " undertaking" as enterprise, something undertaken or attempted. The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines it as a job, piece of work or anything needing effort. So, a government undertaking is an enterprise, something undertaken, a piece of work or anything needing effort, by government.

Inrleetl, it is correct tllat under section 5(l) of statute 6/91 the Chairman altd three members ol- UIIA's Board ol Directors arc appointed by the MOF, and the others are ex ofTicic rDcrnbers, nanrely, rhe Conrnrissiorrcr Gdnlral ol URA, the Secretary to'the Treasury, the [)crnlanent Sccretary ol the lvlinistry ol Commerce, the Commissioner lor Industry and the Governor ot'the Bank of Uganda. Thesc are ex officio men.rbeirs of the URA Board by virtue of thc ofllces\_ they hold It is also correct that the Board is responsible for thc lbrrnulation and inrplementation of the policy of URA; that the MOF may give directives to thc Board regarding the performalce ot'its functior.rs; and that the Board is obliged to comply with such directives. I

It is also correct that under s. l0 statute 6/9 I the Commissioner General of URA is appointed trv the MOtr The Cornrnissioner General as its Chief Executive is responsible lor the day to dny operations ol URA.

It is also correct that under Section l7 of statute 6/91 the expenditure of U. R. A is a charge on the Consolidated Fund; and that the annual accounts of U. R. A are audited hy iire Auditor Ceneral, and the Auditor General's opinion is of the U. R. A's audited accounts arc subntitted lo the NIOF for laying belore Parliament

l-lorvever, notwithstanding the provisions of statute 6/91 referred to above, I am with respect, not persuaded by the submission ofthe appellant's learned Counsel that URA is a government undenaking lor purposes ol exemption under s.5(3) from the application of s 23(2) of Decree 4t75 I am inclined to go along with the submission of Dr. Banya, the learned Counsel lor the respondent This is because, firslly, URA is an independent body corporate with 'a legal personality. It ls capaBle'of suing and being sued in its corporate namc: As such it rs not unique fiom other statutory bodies with sonle other leatures and characteristics ,irnilo, to those of URA. Such other statutory bodies are ntany, and only sorne exanrples can be given here. They are, the Bank of Uganda, estabiished by the Bank ol'Ugarrda statute 1993; the Civil Avialion Authority, established by the Civil Aviation ,\Lrrhority st.tute, 1994, the Cotton Development Organisation, establislred by the{otton l)cvelol.rrucnt Srattrte 1994, the Uganda National F-xarnination lloarrl, cstablished by the Ilqarrrla National lixanrination Board Act, 1983; the Uganda National Br.trcau of Standards, csrablishccl [ry thc Uganda National. Bureau of Standards Act, 198i. thc Uganda Posts and 'l cleconr rrrrrn icat iorrs. cstablishc<l t>y rhe Ugandi Posr and -lelecotrt mtr n ical. ions Act. 1983,

280 (

. I

and the Uganda Railways Corporation, established by the Uganda Railways Corporation statute, 1992.

Secondly, if it was the intention of the legislature to exempt public statutory bodies or corporation from the application of s.23(2) of Decree 4/75, then it would have said so in s.5(2) of the same Decree. In my view s.5(3) would have said that S.23(2) shall not apply to public statutory bodies or corporations. As it is, the learned Counsel wishes us to widen the exemption provided for in s.5(3) to cover URA by implication. I think that its too important a matter for the legislature to have left the definition of "government undertaking" to be extended to statutory public bodies or corporation by implication. If it was the intention of the legislature to define "government undertakings" such as to include public statutory bodies or corporations, it would have in my view, said so expressly

## Article 175 of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda provides:

"175. In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires "Public Officer" means any person holding or acting in an office in the public serve; "Public Service" means service in any civil capacity of the Government the emoluments of which are payable directly from the consolidated fund or directly out of money provided by Parliament".

In my view, this is a contextual definition of "Public Officer." The definition applies to Chapter Ten of the Constitution, and it appears to be limited to the provisions of that chapter only. Chapter Ten establishes and concerns the Public Service Commission, the Education Service Commission, and the Health Service Commission. In the circumstance, I am unable to agree that the employees of URA are public officers under Chapter Ten of the Constitution and, therefore, URA is a government undertaking for purposes of exemption under section 5 (3) of the Decree $4/75$ . In the circumstances I do not think that the definition of "Public Officer" applies to public bodies or corporations such as the URA.

In this connection, it must be noted that section 5(3)states specifically that section 23 shall not apply to "any public officer or to any other person employed by Government in a civil capacity." These are almost identical to the definitions given to "public service" in Article 175 of the Constitution. By section 5 (3) public officers or other persons employed by Government in a civil capacity are specifically exempted from the application of section 23 $(3)$ of Decree 4/75

Finally, in this connection, it must be pointed out that s.5(1) of Decree 4/75 provides that: "The Minister may by statutory order, limit or extend the application of all or any of the provisions of this Decree to any class or classes of employees".

The Minister, apparently, has not yet by a statutory order, limited the application of S.23(2) or any other provisions of the Decree from affecting statutory corporations or bodies such as URA. $\mathbf{1} \mathbf{1} \mathbf{1} \mathbf{1} \mathbf{1} \mathbf{1} \mathbf{1} \mathbf{1} \mathbf{1} \mathbf{1} \mathbf{1} \mathbf{1} \mathbf{1}$

The learned Counsel for the appellant put forward an alternative argument in support of the grounds of appeal under consideration. This is that under section 12 (3) of statute 6/91 the URA, the Board is authorised to appoint officers and staff as may be required for the performance of the functions of URA, and on such terms and conditions as it may determine. It was under the authority contained in section 12 (3) that the Human Resources Management Manual of URA was made.

Under conditions 4 of appointment, the manual provides:

"4.1 PROBATIONS. **Duration**

Every staff other than temporary or contract staff, shall $(a)$ on initial engagement, undergo a probationary period of twenty four months after which his appointment shall be considered for confirmation by the Authority."

In this connection, the appellant's learned Counsel contended that as there is a conflict regarding probationary period, Statute 6/9 L being a subsequent statute should prevail over Decree 4/75. Consequently, it was contended, s.5(3) of Decree 4/75 and Section 12(3) of statute 6/91 should be read together with regulation 4.1 (a) above referred to. The result would be that an employee of URA can serve a probationary period of 24 months. This is based, it was contended, on the fact that s.23(2) of Decree 4/75 does not apply to URA, because it is a "Government undertaking" that employs public officers. Finally was contended that the probationary period of 24 months prescribed by URA for its employees in regulation 4.1(a) of the Human Resource Management Manual is lawful.

In my view, the essence of the point raised here by the appellant is whether any provisions of statute 6/91, a subsequent statute, overrides the provisions of s.23(2) of Decree 4/75, an earlier statute, in so far as probationary period for URA employees is concerned.

My answer to the question would be in the negative for the following reasons. Firstly, because there are no specific provisions in statute 6/91 which sought to repeal, amend or alter the mandatory provisions concerning probationary period of employment stipulated in s.23 (2) of Decree 4/75, the maximum length of which is 12 months. Statute 6/91 does not say anywhere that the probationary period for URA employees is extended to 24 months. s.12 (3) on which the appellant's learned Counsel relies for his submission in this regard provides:

> "12 (3) The Board shall appoint other officers and staff as may be required for the performance of functions of the Authority and on such terms and conditions as it may determine."

This section, in my view, with respect, does not authorise the URA Board to appoint any employee on a probationary period in convention of the clear mandatory provisions of s.23 (2) of Decree 4/75. By purporting to appoint the respondent, or any of its employees on probation for 24 months allegedly under 2.12(3) of statute 6/91, the Board, in my view acted contrary to Section 23(2) of Decree 4/75. It had no powers to do it, and it should not have done so in view of the provisions of $s.23(2)$ of Decree 4/75.

Secondly, regulation 4.1(a) of the Human Resources Management Manual, which the appellant's learned Counsel referred to, is not a statutory enactment. It is not a Statutory Instrument, for instance. Consequently, even it was validly made (which I think it was not) it ought to have been produced in evidence. It was not. As a result, it cannot form the basis of the appellant's case in this connection.

Thirdly, in the interest of certainty, it is clearly undesirable that the effect of a statute on existing legislation should be left to implication. Generally in modern statutes which seek to supercede earlier statute express provisions are made to that effect. The general rule, that prior statutes are held to be repealed by implication by subsequent statutes if the two are repugnant is said not to apply if the prior enactment is special and the subsequent enactment is general, the rule of law being, as stated by Lord Selborne\_in Sewand -v - Vera Cruz (1884). 10 App. Cas. 59 at 68- "that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by any earlier legislation, you are not to hold that the earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of general words without any indication of any particular intention to do so."

## In Lancas Dire Asslum Board - v- Manchester Corporation (1900) I, QB, 358 at 471, A. L. Smith, L. J. put it this way:

"There is a well known rule which has application to this case, which is that a subsequent general Act does not affect a prior special Act by implication. That this is the law cannot be doubted and the cases on the subject will be found collected in the third edition of Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes."

## In Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn, on page 196, it is stated:

"In a later case, Viscount Haldane said "We are bound .......... to apply a rule of construction which has been repeatedly laid down and is firmly established. It is that whenever parliament in an earlier statute has directed its attention to an individual case and has made provisions for it unambiguously, there arises a presumption that if in a subsequent statute the legislative lays down a general principle, that general principle is not to be taken as meant to rip up what the legislature had before provided for individually, unless an intention do so is specially declared. A mere general rule is not enough, even though by its terms it is stated widely that it would, taken by itself, cover special cases of the kind I have referred to".

In the instant case the legislature made special provisions in s. $23(2)$ of Decree 4/75 regarding probationary period in employment. On the basis of the rules of construction of statutes I have referred to, the provisions of $s.1\overline{2}(3)$ of statute 6/91, a subsequent statute, cannot be said to have repealed amended, or altered the provisions of s. $23(2)$ of Decree 4/75 S.12(3) of statute 6/91 is a general provision concerning terms and conditions of service of URA officers and staff as may be determined by the Board. Such terms and conditions cannot, in my view extend probationary period in URA beyond 12 months. As I understand him that is the effect of what the learned Principal Judge said in the passage of his judgments to which I have already referred. I think that what he said there cannot be faulted.

In the circumstance, my judgment is that the two grounds of appeal should fail.

In the result, I would dismiss this appeal with costs. $x = \infty$ $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}$ $\langle \gamma \rangle_{\rm{c}} = \gamma$

Dated at Mengo this 7th day of November 1997.

## A. H. O. ODER JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT.

I CERTIFY THAT THIS A TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL

$W.$ MA\$ SENE REGISTRAR, SUPREME COURT

# TIIIi REPII8LIC OF IlCr\NDA IN TIIE SIIPREME COUR,'f OIT UGANDA

## Af MENGO

## (CORAM: WAMBUZI C. J., ODER'. ISC., & TSEKOOI(O' JSC)

## CIVIL APPEAI. No.33/95

#### BETWEEn-

UGANDA REVENUE AUTIIORITY APPELLANT

AND

BONIFACE QUINTO OJOK RESPONDENT

(Appeal Jrom the Judgment of the High Court of Uganda at KamPola (Nrabgoba, P. J) dared 23.3.1995 in H. C. C. S. No. t90 of 1995).

## . IUDGIVIENT OF WA MBIJZI. C. J.

I have had the advantage ofreading in draft the judgment. prepared by Oder, JSC and I agree that this appeal should fail. I wish only to make a few observations

The issue before us is whether the respondent was liable to sewe a probationary period of 'I 2 months in aicordance with the provisions of the Employment Decree, 1975 or a probationary period of 24 months in accordanoe with the provisions of the Uganda Revenue Authority Statute, 1991.

It was argued lor the appellant in effect that the provisions of the Employment Decree did not apply to the appellant which is a government enterprise and therelore exempted from the provisions of the Employment DecreE whicttlir.nits the probationary period to a maximum of l2 nl6tlths

First of all, ir appears to me that the questiorr whether the probation period is I2 months or 24 months is academic as far as the respondent is respondent. The Court below decided tha the respondent was dismissed within I2 months of his probationary period and apparently he accel>ted this decision as there was no appeal against it. So rvhether the period is l2 or 24 nronths does not nrake any difference to him. This would explain the respondent's apparent tlisrnterest in the appeal until publication of the hearing noticc in the newspapers, nrade at the request olthe appellant.

(

Secondly, rhe point whether the appeilant was a Government enterprise and therefore exempted from the provisions of the Emfloyment Decree was not taken in the lower coun The case for the appellant in the lower court was that the provisions ofthe Uganda Revenue Arrthority Statute regarding probationary period superseded the provisions of the Employment Decree in respect ofthat matter. This was the argument the learned Princlpal Judge did not acceft. Accordingly we did not have the benefit of the views ol the lower Court on the submission before us as to rwhether the Uganda revenue Authority is a govemment enterPrise. t t r

Be that as it may, the respondent was represented by counsel at the hearing of the appeal and raised no objection to the issue raised belore us. Although Dr. Bakibinga for the appellant conceded that the Uganda revenue Authoriry is a body corporate, he submitted that the corporate veil should be lifted to show that URA was a government undertaking or enterprise. In my view the learned Counsel did not lay any grounds for lifting the corporate veil.

As Tsekooko, JSC also agrees with the judgment ol Oder, JSC, there will be orders in the rerms proposed by the learned Oder, JSC.

Daled at Mengo this 7 ' Da1 of Novcnlbcr 1997

## S. W. W. WAI\{BUZI CIIIE,IT. IUST ICE.

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF TIIE'ORIGINAL. ( (t w. l\{ IiN II RIiGI ItA S PITI}MIi COT]R]..

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## THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

#### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA

#### AT MENGO

#### (CORAM: WAMBUZI, C. J., ODER, JSC., TSEKOOKO, JSC.)

#### CIVIL APPEAL NO. 33 OF 1995

#### **BETWEEN**

## **UGANDA REVENUE AUTHORITY**

### APPELLANT

RESPONDENT

#### AND

$\cdots\cdots\cdots$

**BONIFACE QUINTO OJOK**

(Appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Uganda at Kampala (Ntabgoba, P. J.) dated 23.3.1995 in H. C. C. S. No. 490 of 1995)

#### JUDGMENT OF TSEKOOKO.

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment prepared by Oder, JSC. and agree with and the with the orders he has proposed. I have nothing useful to add.

Delivered at Mengo this 7th day of November 1997.

J. W. N. TSEKOOKO JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT.

### I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL.

W. MA **REGIST** AR, SUPREME COURT.