Vinod Yaddula and Muvi TV Limited v Panyam Vikram Deva Reddy (APPEAL No. 133 of 2023 (Consolidation of CAZ/08/557/2022 & CAZ/08/526/2022)) [2025] ZMCA 114 (20 August 2025)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF ZAMBIA APPEAL No. 133 of 2023 HOLDEN AT NDOLA (Civil Jurisdiction) BETWEEN: VINOD YADDULA MUVI TV LIMITED AND 0 .. G 2025 REGISTRY 2 (Consolidation of CAZ/08/557/2022 & CAZ/08/526/2022) 1 ST APPELLANT 2ND APPELLANT PANYAM VIKRAM DEVA REDDY RESPONDENT CORAM: Chashi, Ngulube and Banda-Bobo, JJA ON: 12th and 20th August 2025 For the 1st Appellants: C. M Zulu, Messrs Linus E. Eyaa & Partners For the 2nd Appellant: H. C Musa (Mrs), Messrs Milner and Paul Legal Practitioners For the Respondent: K . Kombe, Messsrs Andrew & Partners JUDGMENT CHASHI JA, delivered the Judgment on behalf of the Court. Cases referred to: 1. Zambia Revenue Authority v Dorothy Mwanza & Others - SCZ Appeal No. 194 of 2010 2. Levis Mumba v Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation & 2 Others - CAZ Appeal No. 142 of 2020 -J2- 3. Bevin Ndovi v Post Newspapers Limited and Another - SCZ Judgment No. 8 of 2011 Legislation referred to: 1. The Defamation Act, Chapter 68 of the Laws of Zambia Other works ref erred to: 1. Halsbury's Laws of England, 4 th Edition, Volume 28 B 2. Black's Law Dictionary, 9 th Edition, by Bryan A. Gardner, West Publsihers USA, 2009 3. Investopedia-https//www.investopedia.com 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 This appeal emanates from the Judgment of Honourable Mrs Justice M. Mapani - Kawimbe, delivered on 23rd November 2022. In the said Judgment, the learned Judge held that the 1st and 2 nd Appellants', (who were the 1st and 2 nd defendants in the court below), claim for damages for publication of defamatory statements against the Respondent, (plaintiff in the court below) had I been proved. 1.2 Dissatisfied with the Judgment, the 1st and 2 nd Appellants separately appealed to this Court. -J3- Subsequently by Consent Order under the hand of a single Judge of this Court dated 9 th March 2023, the two matters under cause numbers CAZ/08/557 /2023 and CAZ/08/ 526/2022 were consolidated. 1.3 Although the parties under the said Consent Order indicated that they had agreed the terms of settlement, the said terms were not revealed to the court. Apart from filing a consolidated record of appeal (the record), no attempt was made at consolidating or reconciling the grounds of appeal. They therefore remained as they were before consolidation. 2 .0 BACKGROUND 2.1 The Respondent by way of writ of summons on 10th December 2021, commenced proceedings against the Appellants in the court below. The said writ was amended 'on 3 rd March 2022. The reliefs sought were as follows: " (i) Damages for libel contained in a television news programme and online article published by the 1st defendant and -J4- broadcast and published by the 2nd defendant; (ii) Exemplary damages for libel; (iii) Unreserved apology, retraction and withdrawal of mentioned false, malicious · and defamatory statements published on various dates; (iv) Costs for and incidental to this action; (v) Any further or other re lief which may seemjust and equitable to the court." 2.2 According to the attendant statement of claim, the 1st Appellant is a former employee of the Respondent. It was averred that the 1st Appellant, caused to be published on an online blog known as Tumfweko, false and malicious defamatory statements concerning the Respondent in the following words: "(i) On 2nd January 2020 - "Bogus Investor Panyam Vikram Deva Reddy Posing as an influential property buyer. " (ii) On 2 nd February 2020 - "Vinod Yadula's former employer, Panyam Vikram Deva -JS- Reddy and his accomplices are threatening his life with identified vehicles trailing him everywhere he goes." (iii) On 1st April 2020 - "Vikram of Vikram Investment Limited, Chairperson, last week wanted his hired killers to either Kill Vinod or remove his eyes, so that he could not see again." (ix) On 23rd September 2020 - "An Unregistered White Toyota Prado with a set of mafias from South Africa, trailed Yaddula from Lusaka East Park Mall to his house in 10 miles, Chibombo District hired by Panyam Vikram Deva Reddy." (v) On 26 th September 2020 - An Indian Investor, Vinod Yaddula is seeking Justice following a murder attempt on his life allegedly engineered by his former business partner cum-j'oe Panyam Vikram . Deva Reddy." -J6- 2.3 It was also averred that on or about 4 th April 2021, the 1st Appellant falsely and maliciously spoke and caused to be published defamatory statements concerning the Respondent in the following words: "(i) That Panyam Vikram Deva Reddy, he wants me to eliminate uh, because he hires some 4 killers, some 2 Kenyan Nationals, 2 Zambian news report and online article, the 2 nd Appellant falsely and maliciously caused to be published of ' and concerning the Respondent defamatory statements in the following words: (i) A 40 year old Indian businessmen Vinod Yadulla has been living in fear following death threats from his farmer boss a businessman Pan yam Vikram Deva Reddy; (ii) It is alleged that Vikram hired 4 assassins, two from Zambia and two from Kenya to eliminate Yaddula -J7- following his resignation from Vikram Investment Limited to establish his own; (iii) Mr Yaddula has told Muvi TV News that he came to learn about the murder plot when one of the hired assassins identified as Simon Nganga from Kenya turned into his informer; (iv) Mr Nganga allegedly turned against Mr Vikram and gave Mr Yaddula evidence on how they were trailing him and how they were planning to eliminate him; (v) It is said that Mr Vikram, based in India hired assassins to kill nationals to eliminate me. (ii) Actually he is working with my wife, his intention is to grab my prospecting licence and also my property in 10 miles -JS- (iii) because after I resign from his company, he is busy following me and sending me WhatsApp threat messages to me saying I am going to eliminate you; (iv) Even my wife has confirmed that you are in danger in Zambia, your boss is going to eliminate you, so give the licence to Mr Vikram Deva Reddy, he told me like that; (v) What to say no, licence is given through government and I am not going to give him what, me I am doing my own business and I am going to develop some other things (vi) I' am doing my own business why after resignation he is trying to eliminate me, no I can't give you that." 2.4 It was further, averred that on or about 4 th April 202 1, during one of its news reports, the 2 nd Appellant falsely -J9- and maliciously caused to be published of and concerning the Respondent, defamatory statements in the following words: (i) A 40 year old Indian businessman Vinod Yaddulla has been living in fear following death threats from his former boss a businessman Panyam Vikram Reddy", (ii) "It is alleged that Vikram hired 4 assassins, two from Zambia and two from Kenya to eliminate Yaddula following his resignation from Vikram Investment Limited to establish his own", (iii) "Mr Yaddula has told Muvi TV News that he came to learn about the murder plot when one of the hired assassins identified as Simon Nganga from Kenya turned into his inf armers", (iv) "Mr Nganga allegedly turned against Mr Vikram and gave Mr Yaddula evidence on how they were trailing him and how they were planning to eliminate him", -JlO- (v) It is said that Mr. Vikram, based in India hired assassins to kill Mr. Yaddula but that one of the assassins turned into the targets informer." 2.5 According to the Responden t, th e aforestated quoted words in th eir natural and ordinary meaning meant and were u n der stood to m ean: (i) The Respondent is fraudulent and a criminal; (ii) The Respondent is unfit to be an investor generally in Zambia. 2.6 The Responden t averred that by r eason of the p u blications, h e has seriously been injured in his reputation, character, credit and has been brought into public scandal, odium and contempt. In claiming exemplary damages, it was averred that the publication was done 1n a sensational manner and that the Appellants knew or ought to have known that the allegations were untrue. 2. 7 In his amended defence settled on 17th May 2022, the 1s t Appellant averred th at he had r eported the matter to -Jl 1- the Zambia Police and the Human Rights Commission and the Indian Embassy, that the Respondent had threatened his life and had hired people to eliminate him. That he was justified in making the statements he made to the Police, Human Rights Commission and the Indian Embassy. 2 .8 The 2 nd Appellant settled its defence on 27th January 2022 and averred that the words in the broadcast set out in the statement of claim were as to the extent that the 1st Appellant told Muvi TV News, about the murder plot by the Respondents and that the 1st Appellant was living in fear following death threats from the Respondent. According to the 2 nd Appellant, the words were true in substance and in fact and were not defamatory and were meant to cover news which it had received from the 1s t Appellant. 2. 9 In pleading justification in its defence , the 2 nd Appellant averred that on or about 15th March 2019, the 1st Appellant wrote a letter to Lusaka Central Police Station stating that the Respondent was issuing death threats against him. That on unknown dates but between 15th -Jl2- March 2020, the police arrested four suspects 1n connection with the conspiracy to murder the 1st Appellant and confiscated vehicles which were deemed to be accessories to the illegal activities. 2. 10 That after concluding the investigations the police opened a docket and submitted the same to the National Prosecutions Authority. 2 .11 Further in its defence, the 2 nd Appellant pleaded section 6 of The . Defamation Act 1 . The 2 nd Appellant further pleaded fair comment, on a matter of public interest. It was averred that the words consisted of statements of fact, which were true in substance and fact and consisted of opinion and were fair comment upon facts which were of public interest. 2 . 12 The 2nd Appellant denied that the words in the broadcast bore or were understood to b ear any of the meanings alleged in the statements of claim. According to the 2 nd Appellant, the Respondent has not been injured in his credit and reputation nor has he been brought into public scandal, odium or contempt at all. -J13- 3.0 TRIAL IN THE COURT BELOW 3.1 In the court below, the Respondent and the 1s t Appellant gave evidence on their part and they were accordingly cross examined. When it came to the 2nd Appellant to adduce its evidence, Counsel for the 2 nd Appellant applied for an adjournment on the ground that its witness had a bereavement outside town. In refusing the application, this is what the learned Judge said (Refer page 509 of the record). "Order 33 rule 3 of the amended High Court rules provides 1. A Judge shall not grant an application for an adjournment except in compelling and exceptional circumstances; 2. A party intending to apply for an adjournment of a hearing shall not less than 10 days before the date set for hearing file notice of that intention What this rule entails is that the court as a matter of course shall not grant any adjournment except where special -J14- circumstances or compelling exceptional reasons have been .... (page 510 of the record is missing). 3.2 In reference to the issue of the refusal to adjourn, this is what the learned Judge stated at page J23 (page 34 · of the record): "When the 2 nd defendant's case came up for hearing, its Counsel purported that the witness was out of town attending a funeral. The court was not satisfied with the explanation because there was no one from the 2 nd defendant's institution who was called to inform the court of its position, it appeared as though Counsel was testifying from the bar, a practice that is not allowed in court. Thus is deemed that the 2 nd defendant had forfeited its rights to defend the suit and proceeded to close trial." 3 .3 The record shows that after the r efusal to adjourn, Counsel for the 2 nd Appellant made an application to r eview the ruling, which application was also refused. • -JlS- The parties were then directed to file written submissions, which they did. 4.0 DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW 4.1 After considering the pleadings, the evidence and the submissions, the learned Judge formulated the main issue for determination as; "whether the words attributed to the defendants were def amatory." Arising therefrom, she categorized the following sub-issues for determination: " (i) Whether the words or the statements complained of by the plaintiff have defamatory imputation? (ii) Whether the statements published by the 1st and 2 nd defendants refer or identify the plaintiff? (iii) Whether the publication was published or communicated to other persons, other than the plaintiff? (v) Whether the statements caused harm or injury to the reputation of the plaintiff?" • -J16- 4 .2 The learn ed Judge th en h ad recourse to th e learn ed au thors of Halsbury's Laws of England 1 , at p age 8 wh ere th ey state as follows: "A defamatory statement is a statement which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally or to cause him to be shunned or avoided or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule or to convey an imputation on him disparaging or injurious to him in his office, profession, calling, trade or business." 4. 3 On the definition of libel, th e learn ed Judge m ade refer en ce to Black's Law Dictionary2 wh ere it is d efin ed as: "The act of making such a statement: publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words, by its being embodied in physical form or by any other form of communication that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words." 4.4 The learn ed J u dge opined th at th e plaintiff bears the burden of proving defamation from th e p osition of a • -Jl 7- reasonable man, that is to say, if that reasonable man placed in the Respondent's position would have understood the words to be defamatory. 4.5 The learned Judge made a finding that the 1st Appellant did not deny uttering the statements attributed to him in the Tumfweko publication and those of the 2 nd Appellant. That the Appellants published libelous statements against the Respondent that he intended to kill the 1st Appellant. Further that the defamatory statements were conveyed by the 1st Appellant without proof of the Respondent's intentions. 4.6 The learned Judge noted that the 1st Appellant in his testimony recklessly averred that the Respondent was involved in a number of criminal cases and that the subordinate court had issued a bench warrant against him, without proof. 4.7 As regard,s the 2 nd Appellant, the court observed that, it had never interviewed the Respondent and merely relied on the 1st Appellant's version of the story. The learned Judge opined that a reasonable man from the facts could perceive that the Respondent is a criminal and of -J18- questionable character or standing. The learned Judge further found that the Appellants' conduct was malicious and reckless, because it was aimed at disparaging the character of the Respondent. 4.8 In respect to the second sub issue, the learned Judge was of the view that the news articles clearly showed that the ~erson who was subject of the defamation was the Respondent. The learned Judge found that the Appellants were explicit in naming the Respondent as the person behind the 1st Appellant's impending assassination and there was no need to say more. 4.9 On the issue of whether the statements were false and defamatory, the learned Judge opined that there was no proof that the Respondent attempted to assassinate the 1st Appellant. In the court's view, the 1st Appellant seemed to have been harbouring delusions that his life was in danger. 4 . 10 In view of the aforestated, the learned Judge also made a finding that the statements were malicious and non factual. That they lacked justification. That the 2 nd Appellant did not care to verify the statements. -J19- 4 .11 The learned Judge also made findings that the words in the statements were communicated to a large audience and that they were malicious and lowered the Respondent's reputation or estimation among the right thinking members of society. According to the learned Judge, the Respondent was likely to be shunned, ridiculed or avoided by other people. Consequently, the learned Judge awarded the Respondent damages subject to assessment by the Registrar. 5.0 THE APPEAL 5.1 Disenchanted with the Judgment, both Appellants appealed to this Court separately. In the memorandum of appeal filed on 2 nd December 2022, the 1st Appellant advanced· five grounds as follows: (i) The learned Judge in the court be low erred in law and fact when she found that the 1st defendant was liable for statements made on the online blog called tumfweko. J35 1st paragraphs lines 5-9 (ii) The learned Judge in the court be low erred in law and fact when she held that the 1st -J20- Appellant's statements were taken out of mere slander by the publication and qualify to be considered under the test of libel. J 35 1st paragraph lines 10-12 (iii) The learned Judge in the court be low erred in law and fact when she found and held that there was no proof that the plaintiff attempted to assassinate the 1st defendant and therefore dismissed the 1st defendant's defence of justification. J39 2 nd paragraph lines 3-5 (iv) The learned Judge in the court below erred in law, and fact, when she found that the 1st defendant seems to be harbouring delusions that his life is in danger and that the 1st Appellant's allegations against the plaintiff are baseless. J40 3 rd Paragraph lines 4-6 (v) The learned Judge in the court be low erred in law and fact, when she held that the 1st defendant's statements were malicious and non-/ actual and equally lacked justification -J21 - for their publication. J40 last paragraph and J41 1st paragraph lines 1-2 5.2 The 2 nd Appellant in the memorandum of appeal filed on 22nd Decem ber 2022, advanced the following nine grou n ds: (i) The lower court erred in law and fact when it held that there was no person from the 2 nd defendants institution who was called to inform the court of its position; (ii) The lower court erred in law and fact when it held that the 2 nd defendant had forfeited its rights to defend the suit and proceeded to close trial; (iii) The lower court erred in law and fact when it held that the defendants published libelous statements against the plaintiff; (iv) The lower court erred in law and fact when it held that the 2 nd defendant -J22- merely relied on the 1st defendant's version of the story; (v) The lower court erred in law and fact when it held that the defendants' conduct was malicious and reckless because it aimed at disparaging the character of the plaintiff; (vi) The lower court erred in law and fact ' when it held that the statements published were false and defamatory of the plain tiff; (vii) The lower court erred in law and fact when it held that the defendants' statements were malicious and non factual and that the statements equally lacked justification for the publication; (viii) The lower court erred in law and fact when it held that the 2 nd defendant did not care to verify the statements which were largely communicated to a large audience through its TV station; -J23- (ix) The lower court erred in law and fact when it held that the defendants' publication of defamatory statements against the plaintiff have been proved. 6.0 l 8T APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE APPEAL 6.1 At the hearing, Mr Zulu, Counsel for the 1st Appellant relied on the 1st Appellant's heads of argument which he augmented with brief oral submissions. The 1st Appellant argued grounds one and two jointly. It was submitted that the learned Judge erred in finding that the 1st Appellant was liable for statements on the online blog Tumfweko, as the finding was not supported by evidence. That as noted by the learned Judge herself, the 1st Appellant did not know Tumfweko; which shows that he never made any statements to them. That this was compounded by the fact that they were neither made a party to the action nor called as witnesses to confirm their source of information. 6.2 It was the 1st Appellant's contention that if there is any room for consideration of the statements under libel, the -J24- liability ought to have fallen solely on the shoulders of Tumfweko, based on the evidence on record. 6. 3 Grounds three, four and five were also argued together. Our attention was drawn to paragraph 12 of the 1st Appellant's witness statement (page 245 of the record) where it shows that he reported his suspicions to the police on 15th March 2019. According to the 1st Appellant, the Respondent never brought any evidence to show that such a report was never made to the police. 6.4 On the finding by the learned Judge that th e 1st Appellant harboured delusions of life endangerment and that his statements were malicious; it was submitted that the statements were not malicious as he had the right to assume that his life was in danger based on the information he had received from the Kenyan National. That in fact by reporting to the police, he showed that he believed that his life was in danger and that the threat originated from the Respondent. 6.5 Further, the 1st Appellant submitted that there was no malice as the 1st Appellant was merely seeking to protect -J25- his life. That he acted in a bona fide manner in trying to safeguard his life and cannot therefore be held liable. 7.0 2ND APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE APPEAL 7 .1 Mrs Musa, Counsel for the 2 nd Appellant also relied on the 2 nd Appellants heads of argument which she augmented with brief oral submissions. The 2nd Appellant argued the first and second grounds together. According to the 2 nd Appellant, the two grounds seek to assail the exercise of discretion of the trial Judge , in the manner that she handled the application for the adjournment. 7.2 It was submitted that in this matter, the 2 nd Appellant was represented by Counsel, who had authority to represent it; Counsel was therefore the appropriate person to inform the court and seek an adjournment and not any other person. According to the 2 nd Appellant, the discretion exercised by the learn ed trial Judge was arbitrary and unreasonable as the witness had a bereavement and could therefore not be before court. -J26- 7.3 We were called upon to interfere with the discretion of the trial court, as the same was not exercised judiciously and in the interest of justice. We were urged to allow the two grounds of appeal and accord the 2 nd Appellant an opportunity to present its evidence in the court below. 7 . 4 The third and fourth grounds were also argued together. It was submitted that the 2 nd Appellant is seeking to assail findings of fact by the trial court. We were in that respect referred to a number of authorities as to when the appellate court can interfere with findings of fact of the trial court. Notable amongst these cases is the case of Zambia Revenue Authority v Dorothy Mwanza & Others 1 wh ere the Supreme Court held as follows: "Although it is trite law that this Court will not interfere with findings of fact unless it is satisfied that the finding was either perverse or made in the absence of any relevant evidence or misapprehension of the facts or that the findings which on a proper view of the -J27- evidence no trial court acting correctly and reasonably can make ... " 7.5 According to the 2 nd Appellant, the issue for determination was whether the learned Judge rightly held that the 2 nd Appellant published libelous statements against the Respondent and wh ether the 2 nd Appellant merely relied on the 1st Appellant's version of the story. It was submitted that the finding was not based on a proper view of the evidence as it was a misapprehension of the facts, that the 2 nd Appellant published libelous statements against the Respondent; when there was overwhelming evidence that the 1st Appellant feared for his life and that prompted him to report the matter to the police. 7 .6 Our attention was drawn to the case of Levis Mumba v Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation & 2 Others2 , where in applying the defence of fair comment, we stated the following: "The 1st Respondent placed reliance on the report as being one which was authentic. The matter that was reported on regarding the -J28- irregularities at Chongwe Municipal Council was of public interest. There is no evidence that the comment was actuated by malice. The fact that the Appellant was not reached for comment does not in and of itself mean that there was malice on the 1st Respondents part or that defamation was established." 7 . 7 It was contended that the findings of fact by the learned Judge should be faulted and that this is a proper case for this Court to reverse the findings of fact by the lower court . 7.8 In arguing the fifth and sixth grounds together, it was submitted that here again, the grounds were assailing findings of fact; that the Appellant's conduct was malicious and reckless. According to the 2 nd Appellant, these findings were not supported by evidence. 7 . 9 It was further submitted that the finding of fact by the learned Judge that the statements were false were not made on a proper view of the evidence, in view of the evidence that this was a matter which was reported to the police, who were carrying out investigations. That -J29- the matter was also reported to other relevant institutions. According to the 2 nd Appellant, the published statements were not false but true in substance and fact. 7.10 Grounds seven, eight and nine were argued together. It was submitted that, the finding of fact by the learned Judge that the Appellant's statements were malicious and non -factual and that they lacked justification for their publication, was not made on a proper view of the evidence. It was submitted that the 1st Appellant confirmed that he reported the matter to the police and also wrote to Transparency International Zambia and Human Rights Commission, which letters were availed to the 2n d Appellant. 7.11 It was further submitted that at common law, the party relying on this defence had to justify everything in the defamatory publication. That however section 6 of The Defamation Act1, has since altered that position by providing as follows: "In an action for libel or slander in respect of words complained in two or more distinct -J30- charges against the plaintiff, a defence of justification shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved, if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiffs reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges." 7 .12 It was submitted that the Respondent's evidence at trial was that he was not aware that the police were investigating the 1st Appellant's allegations. That it was also his evidence that he was never summoned by the police, although he was aware that two people were arrested · over the allegations. In addition, it was submitted that the 2 nd Appellant verified the 1st Appellant's allegations with the police. 8.0 RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE TO THE APPEAL 8.1 At the hearing of the appeal, Mr Kombe, Counsel for the Respondent confirmed that the Respondent did not file Respondent's heads of argument. As such, the Respondent was not allowed to participate in the appeal. -J31- 9.0 OUR ANALYSIS AND DECISION OF THE APPEAL 9.1 We have considered the record and the arguments by the parties. As earlier alluded to, apart from filing a consolidated record of appeal, the parties made no attempt to reconcile the grounds of appeal. Therefore, the 1st and 2 nd Appellants' grounds shall be considered separately. 9.2 In respect to the 1st Appellant, we shall start by considering the second ground , then follow up with the first. The. third and fifth grounds shall be considered together and we shall then conclude with the forth ground. 9.3 The first ground seems to suggest that the 1st Appellant is not convinced that the d efamation in issue was libel as opposed to slander. We note that in respect to Tumfweko, it was an online blog and in respect to the 2 nd Appellant, it was a news broadcast. We have taken note of the definitions assigned to libel by the parties and the court below. It is evident that libel refers to defamatory statem ents published in a p ermanent form , such as writings, pictures or online. This therefore -J32- include newspaper articles, social media posts, blog entries, radio and television broadcasts 9 .4 Investopedia3 defines libel as follows : "Libel involves the act of publishing a statement about an indivi.dual, either in written form or by broadcast over media platforms such as radio, televi.sion or the internet, that is untrue and threatens to harm the reputation and/or livelihood of the targeted person." 9.5 In view of the aforestated definition, we are of the view that the learned Judge correctly considered the statements under libel and not slander, and as such, we find no basis on which to fault her. 9.6 As regards the first ground, the 1st Appellant attacks the finding by the learned Judge that the 1st Appellant was liable for ' statements made on the online blog called Tumfweko. A perusal of the Judgment at page J35 (refer page 46 of the record) shows that in arriving at that decision, the learned Judge noted that the 1st Appellant did not deny uttering the statements attributed to him -J 33- 1n the Tumfweko publication and those of the 2 nd Appellant. 9. 7 The learned Judge arrived at this finding after consideration of the pleadings and the evidence in the court below and therefore it was not perverse. We also note that there is no relief being sought which is directed at Tumfweko or based on the statements published by Tumfweko . We therefore find no basis on which to fault the learned Judge. 9.8 As earlier alluded to, we shall consider the third and fifth grounds together. At page J34 , the learned Judge stated as follows: "Therefore a plaintiff bears the burden of proving defamation from the position of a reasonable man, that is to say, if that reasonable man placed in a plaintiff position would have understood the words t o be def amatory." 9 . 9 We note that out of the available defences , the 1st App ellant pleaded the defence of justification at common law. If a defendant proves justification, it is a -J34- complete defence to the claim for libel. The defence of justification means the statement is true. If the defendant successfully proves that the statement is substantially true, the claim for libel fails as the law protects the publica tion of truthful information. 9.10 Under section 6 of The Defamation Act 1 , adverted to by the 1st Appellant, the defendant does not need to prove that every single detail of the statement is true, but rather that the gist or sting of the statement is true . Therefore the defendant must only prove that the statement is substantially true. 9. 11 When justification is pleaded as a defence, the evidential burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the statement is true. The defendant must provide sufficient evidence to support the truth of the statement. The learned authors of Halsbury's Laws of England1 at paragraph 189, states on the defence of justification as follows: "Before pleading justification, a defendant should believe that the words complained of were true, intend to support the defence at -J35- trial and have reasonable evidence to support the plea or reasonable grounds to support that sufficient evidence to prove the allegations would be available at trial. " 9 . 12 Having p leaded justification, the evidential burden shifted to the 1st Appellant to substantially prove that the statemen ts were true. The 1st Appellant in ou r view did not lead sufficient evidence in that respect. In the view that we have taken, we cannot fault the learned J u dge for finding that there was no proof that the Respondent attempted to assassinate the 1st Appellant; or when she held that the 1s t Appellant's statement were malicious and non factual and lacked justification for their pu blication. 9.13 In respect to the fourth ground, the 1st Appellant attacks the fin ding that the 1s t Appellant seemed to have been harbouring delusions that his life was in danger and that his claims were baseless. This finding was indeed predicated on the 1st Appellants failure to prove the defence of justification . Here again, we find no basis on which to fault the learned Judge. -J36- 9.14 All the five grounds of appeal have no merit and are accordingly dismissed. 9.15 We now turn to the 2 nd Appellant's grounds of appeal. We will first consider grounds three to nine concurrently as in our view they are related and the outcome will have a bearing on grounds one and two. 9.16 We note that the 2nd Appellant pleaded the defences of fair comment and justification. We also note that the learned Judge glossed over these defences and did therefore not apportion adequate consideration to the same. 9.17 The defence of fair comment protects statements of opinion on matters of public interest, provided they are based on true facts and are not malicious. It essentially allows for open criticism and discussions that affect society. The key to advancing this defence is that the statement must be presented as opinion, rather than fact. Therefore , the statement or comment must be an expression of opinion or belief rather than a statement of fact. It should be clear that it is the defendants perspective and not a claim about objective reality. This .. -J37- defence was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Bevin Ndovi v Post Newspapers Limited and Another3 , where it was held inter alia as follows: (i) It is a defence to an action for defamation that the statement is a fair comment on a matter of public interest. The rationale is that criticism ought to be and is recognized in any civilized system of law as indispensable to the efficient working of institutions or offices. And as salutary for private persons who make themselves or their work the object of public interest. (ii) There are three requisites of the defence of fair comment. First, the comment must be an observation, or inference from facts, not an assertion off acts. Second, is · that the matter commented on must be of public interest. Third, the comment must be fair or objective and it should not be actuated by malice. Malice vitiates fair comment." -J38- 9.18 It is evident from the facts and circumstances of this case that the defence of fair comment was not available to the 2 nd Appellant as the statements in issue were not a comment or opinion on matters of public interest. 9 . 19 What was available in our view was the defence of justification. The 2 nd Appellant led evidence that they interviewed the 1st Appellant and verified what the 1st Appellant told them with the letters which were written to the Zambia Police and various organizations. Apart from pleading the defence, the 2 nd Appellant particularized the defence. In our view, the 2 n d Appellant succeeded in its defence of justification and therefore the holding by the learned Judge that it was liable for libel should be and is accordingly set aside. 9.20 Having set aside the 2 nd Appellant's liability, we see no point in addressing the first and second grounds which are basically asking us to reopen the case and receive the 2 nd Appellants evidence. • 10.0 CONCLUSION -J39- 10. 1 The appeal for the 1st Appellant fails , whilst the appeal own costs. J . CHASHI COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE P. C. M. NGULUBE COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE A. M. BANDA-BOBO COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE